on the grounds which I have imperfectly indicated an opinion which, when applied to this particular case, raises the doubts which I have indicated here arising out of the fact that this law does not pursue either of the opinions which were originally held on this subject, and have occasionally been stated and maintained by those who were restless under its operation; an opinion justified by the practice of the government from its origin down to the present time.

If he might properly and honestly form such an opinion under the lights which he had, and with the aid of this advice which we shall show you he received, then is he to be impeached for acting upon it to the extent of obtaining a judicial decision whether this department of the Execu tive Department of the government was right in its opinion, or whether the Legislative Department was right in its opinion? Well, strangely enough, the honorable managers themselves say, "No, he is not to be impeached for that."

I beg leave to read from the argument of the honorable manager, by whom the case for the prosecution was opened, "If the President had really desired solely to test the constitutionality of the law or his legal right to remove Mr. Stanton, instead of his defiant message to the Senate, of February 21, informing them of his removal, but not suggesting the purpose, which is thus shown to be an afterthought, he would have said in substance, 'Gentlemen of the Senate, in order to test the constitu tionality of the law entitled an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, which I verily believe to be unconstitutional and void, I have issued an order for the removal of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War. I felt myself coustrained to make this removal, lest Mr. Stanton should answer the information in the nature of a quo warranto. which I intend the Attorney-General shall file at an early day, by saying that he holds the office of Secretary of War by the appointment and authority of Mr. Lincoln, which has never been revoked. Anxious that there shall be no collision or disagreement between the several departments of the government and the Executive, I lay before the Senate the message, as the reason of my action, as well as the action itself, for the purpose indicated, may meet your consideration."

Thus far the quotation shows the communication which the President should have obtained from the managers and Bent to the Senate in order to make the mattter exactly right. Then follows this:-"Had the Senate received such a message the representatives of the people might never have deemed it necessary to impeach the President for such an act, to insure the safety of the country, even if they had denied the accuracy of the legal position." so that it seems that it is, after all, not the removal of Mr. Stanton, but the manner in which the Presieent communicated the fact of that removal, after it was made public, the President is to be impeached for.

That message is called here "the defendant's message of the 21st of February." I have read that message as you all have read it. If you can find anything in it but what is decorous and respectful to the Senate and to all concerned, your tastes are different from mine. But whether it be a point of the managers, well or ill conceived, one thing seems to be quite clear, that the President is not impeached here because he entertained an opinion that the law was unconstitutional; he is not impeached here because he acted on that opinion, and removed Mr. Stanton; bit he is impeached here because the House of Representatives con iders that this honorable body was addressed by a defiant message, when it should have been addressed in the terms which the honorable manager has dictated.

I now come, Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, to another topic connected with this matter of the removal of Mr. Stanton, and the action of the President under it. The honorable managers take the ground, among others, that whether, upon a construction of this Tenure of Office act, Mr. Stanton is not legally Secretary of War, or even if you should believe the President thought it unconstitutional and had a right in some way to construe it, by his own conduct and declaration the President is estopped; he is not to be permitted to assert the true interpretation of this law; he is not to be permitted to allege that his purpose was to test the question concerning its constitutionality; and the reason is that he has done and said such and such things.

Well we all know that there is at common law a doc trine called rules of estoppel, founded undoubtedly on good reason, although they were called in the time of Lord Coke, and have been down to the present day, odious, because they shut out the truth, nevertheless there are circumstances when it is proper the truth should be shut out. What are these circumstances? They are, where a question of private right is involved, where, in a matter of fact the private right accrues, and wherein the party to the controversy does himself what he ought not in good conscience to be allowed either to assert or deny. But did any one ever hear of estoppel in a matter of law? Did any one ever hear that a party had put himself into such a condition, that when he came into a court of justice upon a claim of private right, he could not a k a judge to construe an estoppel and insist on sucu a construction? Did anybody ever hear, least of all, that a man was affected by reason of an estoppel, under any system of jurisprudence that ever prevailed in the civilized worldthat the President of the United States should be impeached and removed from office, not by reason of the truth of his case, but because he is estopped from appealing. It would be a spectacle for God and man.

There is no matter of fact here. They have themselves put in Mr. Stanton's commission, which shows the date of

the commission, and the terms of the commission, and that is the whole matter of tact involved. The rest is the construction of this Tenure of Office act, and the application of it to the case, which they have thus made for themselves, and also the construction of the Constitution of the United States in the abstract question, whether that was lodged the power of removal with the President, with the Senate, or with both.

I respectfully submit, therefore, in reply to this ground, which is taken here, that no conduct of the President, who endeavors to assert, not a private right, but a great public right, confided to his office by the people, in which, if any body is estopped, the people may be estopped, that nothing that the President could do or say, could put this great public right into that extraordinary position. What has he done? what are the facts which they rely upon, out of which to work this estoppel as they call it? Why, in the first place he sent a message to the Senate, on December 12, 1867, informing the Senate that he had suspended Mr. Stanton by a certain order, a copy of which he gave; that he had appointed General Grant to exercise the duties of that office, ad interim, by a certain order, a copy of which he gave, and then entered into a discussion, in which he showed the existence of this question, whether Mr. Stanton was in the Tenure of Office bill, and the existence of the other question, whether this was or was not a constitutional law. Then he revoked the action of the Senate.

There was nothing misrepresented; there was nothing concealed, which he was bound to state. It is complained by the honorable managers that he did not tell the Senate that if their action should be such as to restore Mr. Stanton practically to the position of the office he should go to law. It may have been, possibly, an omission; but I rather think that that good taste which is so prevalent among the managers, and which they so insist upon here, would hardly insist that the President should have held out to the Senate something which might possibly have been rejected. They said he made a case for their action, in which he was the defendant to the Senate, both by reason of their conduct and his, and also other couduct too deferential.

Senators, there is no inconsistency in the President's position or conduct in this instance. Suppose a party who has a private right in question, submit to the sole tribunal in the same proceeding, these questions:-First, I deny the constitutionality under which the right is claimed against me; secondly, I assert that the interpretation of that law will not affect the case; thirdly, I insist that even if it is within the laws, I have made a case within the laws.

Is there any inconsistency in that? Is it not seen every day, or something analagous to it. in courts of justice? Suppose the President had summed up his message in this way: "I insist, in the first place, that the law is unconstitutional; I insist, in the second place, that Mr. Stanton is not within the law; and I respectfully submit, in the third place, whether, if it be a constitutional law and Mr. Stanton be within it, the facts that I present to you be not made such a case that you will not ask me to receive him back?" He has questioned whether the law was constitu tional and whether Mr. Stanton was within it, and then he submits that he had reason to believe and did think that the law was unconstitutional; that he had no reason to believe that they thought Mr. Stanton was within it; he submitted to their consideration the facts that he acted upon and within it. Well, the President, it seems, has not only been thus anxious to avoid, but has taken measures to avoid a collision with the Senate, but he has actually, in some things else, obeyed it.

Mr. Curtis went on to refer to the commission of acts on which ch urges have been made by the President, and with his sanction, and to the removal and suspension of col· lectors, etc., said it had doubtless been done under the law, and when an emergency arose, as in case of Mr. Stanton, when he must either act or abandon the power that he holds, it was insisted upon that he must run against the law, and take every possible opportunity to give it a blow. On questions of administrative duty merely, the Presi dent felt bound to obey it. When this emergency. how. ever, arose, so that this department of the government could not be carried on, he must meet it. He did not fear embarrassment or difficulty in the public service because of the suspension or removal of a fraudulent collector.

These changes in the commissions issued had nothing to do with the subject. They were made subject to conditions prescribed by law, one of which was the Senate must consent to a removal. Not only the law of Congress, but the Constitution was the law of the land. The changes in the Treasury Department, also, had nothing to do with the subject of his removal. Wherever it was vested, all officers are held subject to the power of removal which is vested somewhere.

He saw nothing in this subject of estoppel growing out of the action of the President, either in the message to the Senate of December 12, or in the changes in the commissions, or in the sending to the Senate notices of sus. pension of different officers, that has any bearing on the construction of the Tenure of Office act, as affecting the case of Mr. Stanton. The law might be constitutional, the President might have acted. and might have been bound to act under it; still, if Mr. Stanton was not within it the case remains as it was originally, and the case not being within that law the first article was entirely without foundation.

At this point Mr. Curtis plead fatigue, and, on motion of Mr. JOHNSON, the court adjourned until noon to-morrow; and at 3.50 P. M., the Senate went into Executive Session, and soon after, adjourned.

PROCEEDINGS OF FRIDAY, APRIL 10.

The President pro tem called the Senate to order. Prayer was offered by the Chaplain.

The chair was then vacated for the Chief Justice, and the Court was opened by proclamation in due form.

The managers and members of the House of Representatives were successively announced, and took their places.

The journal of yesterday was read, and in the meantime the galleries had become about half filled.

General Sherman again occupied a seat on the floor. Mr. CURTIS, of the President's counsel, resumed his argument at 12.15.

What with the buzzing conversation of uninterested newspaper correspondents and other sources, and the reporters' remote positions, occasional imperfections may be found in the report.

Mr. Curtis Resumes his Argument.

Mr. CURTIS said:--Mr. Chief Justice-Among the points which I omitted to notice yesterday is one which seems to me of specific importance, and which induces me to return to it for a few moments. If you will indulge me, I will read a short passage from Saturday's proceedings. In the course of those proceedings, Mr. Manager Butler said:

"It will be seen, therefore, Mr. President and Senators, that the President of the United States says in this answer that he suspended Mr. Stanton under the Constitution indefinitely, and at his pleasure, and I propose now, unless it be objected to, to show that that is false under his own hand, and I have his letter to that effect, which if there is no objection, I will read, the signature of which was identified by C. E. Creecy:

Then followed the reading of the letter, which is as fol. Lowe:-

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., Aug. 14, 1867. Sir:-In compliance with the eighth section of the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, entitled 'an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,' you are hereby notified that on the 12th inst. Hon. Edwin M. Stanton was suspended from office as Secretary of War, and General Ulysses S. Grant authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, yours,

"ANDREW JOHNSON. "To Hon. Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury." This letter was read to show, under the hand of the President, that when he says in his answer that he has removed Mr. Stanton by virtue of the Tenure of Office act, that statement was a falsehocd. Allow me now to read the 8th section of that act:

"That whenever the President shall, without the advice and consent of the Senate, designate, authorize or employ any person to perform the duties of any office, he shall forthwith notify the Secretary of the Treasury thereof, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury thereupon to communicate such notice to all the proper accounting and disbursing officers in his department."

The Senate will perceive that this section has nothing to do with the suspension of an officer, but the purport of the section is that in case the President, without the advice and consent of the Senate, shall, under any circumstances, designate a third person to perform, temporarily, the duties of the office, he is to make a report of that designation to the Secretary of the Treasury, who is to give the necessary information to the accounting officers. The section applies in terms to, and includes all cases it applies to, and includes the designation on account of sickness, or absence, or resiguation, or any cause of vacancy, whether temporary or permanent, whether occurring by reason of a suspension or a removal; and, therefore, when the President says to the Secretary of the Treasury, "I give you notice that I have designated General Thomas to perform the duties ad interim of Secretary of War," he makes no allusion, by force of that letter, to the manner in which that vacancy occurred; and, therefore, instead of showing, under the President's own hand, that he has repeated a fal ehood, it has no reference whatever to the matter.

Mr. BUTLER-Will you read the second section, if you please. The first clause of the second section?

Mr. CURTIS (reading):-"That when any officer appointed as aforesaid, excepting judges of the United States courts, shall, during the recess of the Senate, be shown by evidence satisfactory to the President," &c.

The President is allowed to suspend such officers. Now, the President states in his answer that he did not act under it.

Mr. BUTLER That is not reading the section. Mr. CURTIS--I am aware that it is not reading the section. It is a very long section, Mr. BUTLER-The first clause of the section is all I nant.

Mr. CURTIS-It allows the President, because of crime or other occasion designated in it, to suspend the officer. The section applies to all occasions. Whether suspensions

under this second section-whether temporary disqualification, sickness, death, resignation-no matter what that cause may be, if for any reason there is a vacancy. he is uthorized to designate a person to supply the office ad nterim, of which notice is to be given to the Secretary of the Treasury. Therefore, I repeat, sir, that the subject matter of this eighth section, and the letter which the President wrote in consequence of it, has no reference to the subject of the authority upon which he removed or suspended Mr. Stanton.

I now ask the attention of the Senate to the second ar

ticle, and I will begin as I began before by stating what is the substance of this article. I hope the Senate will be able to see now every one of these allegations is controverted by what is already in the case, and that I shall be enabled to state what we propose to offer by way of proof in respect to each of them. The first substantial allegation in this article is the delivery of the letter of authority to General Thomas without authority of law; that it was an intentional violation of the Tenure of Office act; that it was an intentional violation of the Constitution of the United States, and the delivery of the order to General Thomas was made with intent to violate that act and the Constitution of the United States. That is the substance of the second article.

Now, the Senate will at once perceive that if the suspension of Mr. Stanton was not a violation of the act in point of fact-or, to state it in other terms, if the case of Mr. Stanton is not within the act, then his suspension or his removal, if he has been actually removed, or a removal which did actually take place, would not be a violation of the act; because if his case is not within the act at all, which does not apply to the case of Mr. Stanton, of course his removal is not in violation of this act.

If Mr. Stanton continued to hold under the commission which he received from President Lincoln, and has continued to hold under the act of 1789, it was no violation of the Tenure of Office act that Mr. Johnson removed or intended to remove Mr. Stanton; and, therefore, the Senate will perceive that it is necessary to come back again, to recur under this article, because it will be found necessary to recur under the whole of the first eight articles, to the inquiry whether Mr. Stanton's case was within the Tenure of Office act; secondly, whether it was so clearly and plainly within that act that it can be attributed to the Prezident as a high misdemeanor, that he considered it as not including that case. But, suppose the case of Mr. Stanton is within the Tenure of Office act, still the inquiry arises whether the delivering of this letter of authority to General Thomas was a violation of the act. I shall neces sarily ask your careful attention to the general subject matter of this act and the particular provisions contained in it. Senators will remember undoubtedly that this act, as it was finally passed. differed in many particulars from the bill as it was originally introduced.

The law related to two distinct subjects- the one to the subject of removal, the other to the subject of appointments to office. It seems that a practice had grown up under the government, that where a person was nominated to the Senate for an office, and when the Senate either did not act upon his nomination or rejected it, it was considered competent for the President, after the adjournment of the Senate, by a temporary commission to appoint that same person to the same office. That was deemed by a large majority of Senators to be an abuse of power-not an intentional abuse of power. It was a practice that had prevailed under the government to a very considerable extent. It was not limited to recent years. It had been supported by the opinions of the Attorney-Generals; but still it was esteemed t Senators to be a departure from the spirit of the Constitution, and in derogation of the just powers of the Senate in reference to nominations to office. That being so, it will be found on examination of this law that the first and second sections of the act related exclusively to removals from office and to temporery suspensions during a recess of the Senate; whereas, the other sections, to which I shall particularly ask your attention, related exclusively to that other subject of temporary appointments-appointments made to office after the Senate had refused to concur in the nomination of the person appointed.

This law provides that the President shall have power to fill all vacancies which may happen during a recess of the Senate, by reason of death or resignation. It will be remarked that this does not include all cases. It does not include the case of the expiration of a commission, but it includes simply death and resignation during the recess of the Senate. Why this was so I do not know. It is ma nifest that the law does not affect them. In point of fact it does not cover all cases that may arise, even belonging to this general class, to which the section was designed to refer. It provides that the President shall have power to fill all vacancies which may happen during the recess of the Senate. by reason of death or resignation, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the next session thereafter; and if no appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall be made to such oflice, during such next session, then such office shall remain in abeyance without any salary, fees or emoluments attached thereto, until the same shall be filled by appointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and during such time all powers and d ties belonging to such office shall be exercised by such other officer as may by law exersise such powers and duties, In case of vacancy in such office, all the offices brought within the provision of a vacancy occurring during the recess of the Senate, and all thelling of that vacancy by the President, are treated as going into abeyance unless the Senate shall have assented

to some nomination before its (adjournment, and that aplies, as I have said, to the two classes of cases, namely, vacancies happening by reason of death or resignation, but it does not apply to any other vacancy. The next section does not relate to that subject, but to the subject of removal: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to extend the term of any officer," &c.

The fifth section is "that if any person shall, contrary to the provisions of this act, accept any appointment to or employment in any office, or shall otherwise attempt to hold or exercise any such office or employment, they shall be deemed and declared to be guilty of a high misdemeanor, and upon trial and conviction therefore, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000 and by imprisonment." What are the provisions of this act in relation to accepting any appointment? They are found in the third section of the act putting some offices into abeyance under similar circumstances, which are described in that section.

If any person does accept an office which is thus put into abeyance, or any emolument or authority in reference to Buch office, he comes within the penal provisions of the fifth section; but outside of that there is no such thing as accepting an office contrary to the provisions of the act, because the provisions of the act extend no further than to those cases. And so of the next section. Every removal, appointment or employment made, had or exercised contrary to the provisions of this act, &c., shall be deemed and is hereby declared to be a high misdemeanor. The stress of this article does not seem to me to depend at all upon this question of the construction of the law, but upon a totally different matter, which I agree should be fairly and carefully considered.

The allegation in the article is that this letter of authority was given to General Thomas, enabling him to perform the duties of Secretary of War aa interim, without authority of law. That I conceive to be the main inquiry which arises under this article, provided the case of Mr. Stanton and his removal comes under the Tenure of Office act at all. I wish first to bring to the attention of the Senate the act of 1795, which is found in 1 Statutes at Large, p. 450. It is a short act, and I will read the whole of it:

"Be it enacted, &c., That in case of a vacancy in the office of Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, or Secretary of the Department of War, of anv officer in either of said departments who is not appointed by the head of a department, whereby they cannot perform their duties in the said office, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person or persons, at his discretion, to perform the duties of the said respective offices, until a successor be appointed or each vacancy be filled. Provided, No one vacancy shall be supplied in the manner aforesaid for a longer term than six months."

This act, it has been suggested, may have been repealed by the act of February 20, 1863, which is found in 12 Statutes at Large, page 656. This, also, is a short act, and I will read it:

Be it enacted, &c., That in case of the death, resignation, absence from the seat of government or sickness of the head of any executive department of the government, or of any oflicer in either of said departments, whose appointinent is not in the head of the office, whereby they cannot perform the duties of their respective offices, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, in ease he shall think it necessary, to authorize any other officer of the department, whose appointment is vested in the President, at his discretion, to perform the duties of said respective offices until a successor is appointed, or until such absence or inability by sickness shall cease; Provided, that no one vacancy shall be supplied in the manner aforesaid for a longer term than six months."

Now these acts, as the Senate will perceive, although they may be said in some sense to relate to the same general subject matter, are very different in their provisions, and the latter law contains no express repeal of the earlier law. If, therefore, the latter law operates as a repeal of the older law, it is only by implication. It says, in terms that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with it are repealed; but the addition of these words adds nothing to its meaning at all. The same inquiry would arise if they were not contained in it, namely: how far is that latter law inconsistent with the provisions of the earlier law?

There are certain rules on the subject which I shall not fatigue the Senate by citing cases to prove, because every lawyer will recognize them. In the first place, there is a rule as to the repeal by implication. As I understand it, the courts go upon the assumption of the principle that if the legislature really intended to repeal the law it would have said so-not that it should necessarily say so, because there are repeals by implication, but the presumption is that if the legislature entertains a clear and fixed intention to repeal a law, it will be likely at least to say so; therefore, the rule is a settled one that repeals by implica tion are not favored by the court. Another rule is, that the repugnancy between the two subjects must be clear. It is not enough that under some circumstances one law may possibly be repugnant to the other; the repugnance must be clear, and if the two laws can stand together, the latter does not operate as a repeal of the former.

If Senators have any desire to refer to the authorities on this subject, they will find a sufficient number of them collected in Sedgwick on statute laws, page 156. Now, there is no repugnance whatsoever, that I can perceive, between these two laws. The act of 1795 applies to all Vacancies, however created. The act of 1863 applies only to vacancies temporarily, or otherwise, occasioned by

death or resignation, removals from office, &c. ; expirations of commission are not included in it.

The act of 1795 applies only to vacancies; the act of 1863 applies to temporary absence or sickness. The subject matter, therefore, of the two laws is diferent. There is no inconsistency beween them; they may stand together, each operating on the case to which it applies, and, therefore, I submit that, in the strictest view that can be taken of this subject, and which may be ultimately taken of it, it is not practicable to maintain that the law of 1863 repeals altogether the act of 1795; but whether it did or not, I state here what I have so frequently had occasion to state before, that it is a fair question:-Is it a crime to be on one side of this question, and not on the other? Is it a high misdemeanor to believe that a certain view, taken as to repeal of the cartier view by the latter one, is a sound view? I submit that that would be altogether too stringent a rule even for the honorable managers themselves, and they do not, and the House of Representatives does not contend, for any such rule. The House puts it on the ground that there was a wilfull intention to give this letter with authority of law. Not that it was a mistaken one; not that it was one which, after due consideration, law. yers might differ about, but that it was a willful intention to act without authority. That I submit from the nature of the case, cannot be made to appear.

The next allegation to which I desire to call attention as contained in this article, is that the giving of this letter to General Thomas during the session of the Senate was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, and to that I will desire your attentive consideration. The Constitution, as you are well aware, has provided for two modes of till ing offices. The one is a temporary commission during the recess of the Senate, when a vacancy happens during the recess, and the other is by appointment, with aud by the advice and consent of the Senate, followed by a commission by the President; but it very early became apparent to those who administrated the government that cases might and would occur to which neither of the modes provided by the Constitution could be promptly and conve niently applied.

Cases, for instance, of the temporary absence of the heads of a department, which department, especially during the recess of Congress, must, for the public interest, continue to be administered; cases of sickness, or cases of resignation or removal, where the President was not in the condition immediately to make a nomination to fill the, office, or even to issue a commission, and, therefore, it became necessary, by legislation, to supply those defects which existed, notwithstanding those two provi sions of the Constitution.

Accordingly, beginning in 1792, there will be found to be a series of acts on that subject, the filling of vacancies by temporary appointment, or by ad interim appointment. The counsel in this connection referred to several acts, from the act of 1792 to the act of February 20, 1863, and continued:-The Senate will perceive what difficulties these laws were designed to meet. The difficulty was the occur ence of some sudden vacancies in office, or of some sudden inability, on the part of the officer to perform his duties, and the intention of each of these laws was to make provision so that, notwithstanding this vacancy, or this temporary disability, the duties of the office would still be discharged. That was the purpose of these laws. It is apparent that these temporary vacancies are not as liable to occur during the session of the Senate as they are during the vacations, and that it is just as necessary to have a set of legislative provisions to enable the President to carry on the public service during the session of the Sen ate as it is to have the same set of provisions during the vacation.

Accordingly, it will be found, by looking into these laws, that they make no distinction whatsoever between the sessions of the Senate and the vacations of the Senate in reference to these temporary appointments whenever the vacancy shall occur. Is the language of the statute "whenever there shall be a death or a resignation or an absence or a sickness?" The law applies when the occur rence takes place which gives rise to the event which the law contemplates; and the particular time when it occurs is of no particular consequence in itself, and is admitted by the law as of no consequence.

In accordance with that, it has been the uniform, certain and frequent practice of the government from its very earliest days, as I am instructed we shall be able to prove, not in one or two instances, but in a great number of instances; the honorable managers themselves produced, the other day, a schedule of temporary appointments, during the sessions of the Senate, of inferior officers of depart ments, to perform temporarily the duties of heads of departments, and those instances run on all fours with the cases of removals or suspensions of officers.

Take the case, for instance, of Mr. Floyd, whom I alluded to yesterday. Mr. Floyd went out of office; his chief clerk was a person in sympathy with him, and under his control. If the third section of the act of 1789 was allowed to operate, the control of the War Department went went into the hands of that chief clerk. The Senate was in session; it would not answer to have the War Depart ment in that condition one hour, and Mr. Buchanan sent to the post office and took the Postmaster-General into the War Department, and put it into his charge.

There were then in this body a sufficient uumber of persons to look after a matter of that sort if they felt an interest in it; and accordingly they passed a resolve inquiring of President Buchanan by what authority he had made an appointment of a person to take charge of the War Departinent without the consent of the Senate.