THE

GREAT IMPEACHMENT

AND

TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON,

President of the United States.

The impeachment of Andrew Johnson forms an important epoch in the history of the United States; he was the first President brought to the bar of the Senate to answer the charge of high crimes and misdemeanors. Before Mr. Johnson's accession to the Presidency, and for a few months after his assumption of that high office, his politics were of the extreme Republican or Radical school. During the summer and autumn of 1865, Mr. Johnson undertook to restore the State Governments of the Commonwealths which had receded from and waged war against the national authority. This important task Mr. Johnson sought to accomplish on principles directly opposed to his previous political professions. The Thirty-Ninth Congress at its first session dissented from the reconstruction views of the President; the President, however, paid little heed to the wishes of Congress, and insisted on carrying out what he termed his policy. Congressmen of extreme views, former political associates of Mr. Johnson, boldly denounced his reconstruction measures on the floor of the House of Representatives, and even in the more dignified Senate, the Executive's Southern policy was severely criticised.

whether any acts had been done by any officer of the Government of the United States, which, in contemplation of the Constitution, are high crimes and misdemeanors. This resolution, requiring a two-thirds majority for its adoption, was not agreed to. On the 7th day of January, 1867, Representatives Benjamin F. Loan, of Missouri, and John R. Kelso, of the same State, offered resolutions aiming at the impeachment of the Executive, and on the same day Mr. Ashley formally charged President Johnson with the commission of high crimes and misdemeanors. The resolutions of Messrs. Loan and Kelso, and the charges of Mr. Ashley, were referred to the Judiciary Committee.

On the 28th of February following, a majority of the Judiciary Committee reported that they had taken testimony of a character sufficient to justify a further investigation, and regretted their inability to dispose definitely of the important subject committed to their charge, and bequeathed their unfinished labors to the succeeding Congress.

The Fortieth Congress.

Mr. Johnson saw fit to notice these strictures On the 4th day of March, 1867, the Fortieth of Senators and Representatives, and in nume- Congress convened; it was composed largely of rous public speeches he spoke of Congress in the members who had served in the previous body. bitterest terms. Nor did he confine himself to On the fourth day of the session, Mr. Ashley prowords alone. In all his official acts he evinced a posed that the Judiciary Committee continue the determination to weaken the influence of the investigations with reference to the impeachment majority of Congress. The Representatives were of the President. This proposition was agreed to, quite as determined as the Executive, and his un- and was immediately followed by a resolution friendly acts were repaid by legislation specially from Sidney Clarke, of Kansas, requesting the framed to defeat his plans of Southern restora- committee to report on the first day of the meettion. The breach between Congress and the ing of the House after the recess. This latter Executive grew wider and wider, and when the provision was not complied with by the commitsecond session of the Thirty-ninth Congress tee; there was a mid-summer session, short and opened, the Radical Representatives were deter- busy; but the impeachment investigation was not mined to examine the official conduct of the heard of until the 25th day of November, 1867, President, with a view to impeachment. At the when three reports were presented to Congress→→→ head of the first impeachment movement was was one majority and two minority; the majority reJames M. Ashley, of. Ohio. On the 17th of De- port recommended the impeachment of the Precember, 1866, he introduced a resolution for the sideft for high crimes and misdemeanors. The appointment of a select committee to inquire two minority reports, each signed by two mem

Second, Resolved, that a committee of seven be appointed to prepare and report articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, with power to send for persons, papers and records, and to take testimony under oath.

The Democratic members attempted to resort to fillibustering, but were cut off, after an ineffectual effort, by a motion to suspend the rules, so as to bring the House immediately to a vote on the resolutions. The rules were suspended, and the resolutions were adopted. Yeas, 124; nays,

4.2.

The Speaker then announced the two commitees as follows:

Committee of two to announce to the Senate The action of the House-Messrs. Stevens (Pa.), and Bingham (Ohio.)

The committee of seven to prepare articles of Impeachment, consists of Messrs. Boutwell (Mass.), Stevens (Pa.), Bingham, (Ohio), Wilson, (ía.), Logan, (Ill.), Julian, (Ind.), and Ward (N. Y.)

The House at twenty minutes past six adjourned.

Impeachment Under the Constitution.

the mode of choosing the Executive. He approved of that which had been adopted at first, namely, of referring the appointment to the National Legislature. One objection against electors was the danger of their being corrupted by their candidates, and this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments while in office. Shall thre man who has practiced corruption, and by that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape punishment by repeating his guilt?

Dr. Franklin was for retaining the clause as fa Vorable to the Executive. History furnishes one › example of a first magistrate being brought for mally to justice. Everybody cried out against this as unconstitutional. What was the practice before this in cases where the Chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why, recourse was had to assassination, in which he was not only deprived of his life, but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It would be the best way, therefore, to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal where he should be un

The views and opinions of the fathers of the Republic on the subject of impeaching and re-justly accused. moving from office the Executive of the government, may be readily gathered from the following debate in the Federal Convention:

In the Convention which formed the Constitution of the United States, on June 2, 1787, Mr. Williamson, seconded by Mr. Davie, moved that the President be removed on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty, which was agreed to.

On July 20, Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out this provision. Mr. Pinckney observed that the President ought not to be impeachable while in office.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris would admit corrup tion and some other few offenses to be such as ought to be impeachable; but he thought the cases ought to be enumerated and defined.

Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The Mr. Davie said:-If he be not impeachable while case of the executive magistracy was very disin office, he will spare no efforts or means what- tinguishable from that of the Legislature or any ever to get himself re-elected. He considered other public body holding offices of limited durathis as an essential security for the good behavior tion. It could not be presumed that all or even of the Executive. Mr. Williamson concurred in the majority of the members of an assembly making the Executive impeachable while in office. would either lose their capacity for discharging Mr. Gouverneur Morris said:-He can do no or be bribed to betray their trust. Besides the criminal act without coadjutors, who may be pun-restraints of their personal integrity and honor, ished. In case he should be re-elected that will the difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of be a sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides, corruption was a security to the public. And if who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend one or a few members only should be seduced, his functions? If it is not, the mischief will go on. the soundness of the remaining members would If it is, the impeachment will be nearly equiva- maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. lent to a displacement, and will render the Exe- In the case of the executive magistracy, which cutive dependent on those who are to impeach. was to be administered by a single man, loss of Colonel Mason remarked:-No point is of more capacity or corruption was more within the comimportance than that the right of impeachment pass of probable events, and either of them might should be continued. Shall any man be above be fatal to the republic. justice? Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit the most extensive injustice? When great crimes were committed, he was for punishing the principal as well as the coadjutors. There had been much debate and difficulty as to

Mr. Pinckney did not see the necessity of impeachments. He was sure they ought not to issue from the Legislature, who would, in that case, hold them as a rod over the Executive, and by that means effectually destroy his independ

ence. His revisionary power, in particular, would ring to the Senate the trial of impeachment be rendered altogether insignificant.

Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachment. A bad one A good magistrate will not fear them. ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped the maxim would not be adopted here that the Chief Magistrate could do no wrong.

Mr. Rufus King thought that unless the Executive was to hold his place during good behavior, he ought not to be liable to impeachment.

Mr. Randolph said the propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle with him. Guilt wherever found, ought to be punished. The Executive will have great opportunities for abusing his power, particularly in time of war, when the military force, and in some respects, the public money, will be in his hands. Should no punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults and insurrections.

Dr. Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange during the late war. An arrangement was made between France and Holland, by which their two fleets were to unite at a certain time and place. The Dutch fleet did not appear. Everybody began to wonder at it. At length it was suspected that the Stadtholder was at the bottom of the matter. This suspicion prevailed more and more. Yet as he could not be impeached, and no regular examination took place, he remained in his office; and strengthening his own party, as the party opposed him became formidable, he gave birth to the most violent animosities and contentions. Had he been impeachable, a regular and peaceable inquiry would have taken place, and he would, if guilty, have been duly punished; if innocent, restored to the confidence of the public.

against the President, for treason and bribery, was taken up.

Colonel Mason said: Why is the provision re strained to treason and bribery only? Treason, as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason, as above de fined. As bills of attainder, which have saved the British Constitution, are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend the power of impeachments. He moved to add, after "bribery," or maladministration." Mr. Gerry seconded him. Mr. Madison objected. be equivalent to a tenure the Senate.

66

So vague a term will during the pleasure of

Mr. Gouverneur Morris remarked:-It will not be put in force, and can do no harm. An election every four years will prevent maladministration.

Colonel Mason withdrew "maladministration" and substituted "other high crimes and misdemeanors against the State." And the proposition as amended was adopted.

Mr. Madison objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially as he was to be im peached by the other branch of the Legislature, and for any act which might be called a misdemeanor. He would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial of impeachments; or, rather, a tribunal of which that should form a part.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted. The Supreme Court were too few in number, and might be warped or corrupted. He was against a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, considering legislative tyranny the great danger to be apprehended; but there could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly, on their oaths that the President was guilty of crimes or faults, especially as in four years he can be turned out.

After some further debate, the clause was amended by adding the words "and every member shall be on oath," and as adopted reads as follows:

"The Senate of the United States shall have power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of the members present, and every member shall be on oath."

After further remarks by Mr. King, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Pinckney, Mr. Gouverneur Morris said his opinion had been changed by the arguments used in the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachment, if the Executive was to continue for any length of time in office. Our Executive was like a magistrate having a hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing our first magistrate in foreign pay, without being able to guard against it by displacing him. One would think the King of England well secured against bribery. He has, as it were, a fee simple in the whole kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought, therefore, to be impeached for treachery. Corrupting his electors and incapacity were other causes of impeach-peachment Resolution (Tuesday, February 25), ment. For the latter he should be punished, not as a man, but as an officer, and punished only by degradation from his office. This magistrate is not the king, but the prime minister. The people are the king. When we make him amenable to Justice, however, we should take care to provide some mode that will not make him dependent on the Legislature.

The Senate Notified.

On the day following the passage of the Im

the House of Representatives officially notified the Senate of its action.

While Senator Garrett Davis (Ky.) was address→ ing the Chair, the Doorkeeper announced a committee of the House of Representatives, and Messrs. Stevens and Bingham entered and stood facing the President pro tem., while a large number of members of the House ranged themselves

On the 6th day of September the clause refer- in a semi-circle behind.