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where you say he surrendered himself to the terms of the Civil Office bill. He did all that, and it is to his credit that he has not gone about everywhere violating the law, instructing its violation or forbidding it to be exercised until it was ascertained as to its constitutionality in some way or another. Well, now, I have been sitting here listening to the evidence presented in this case for a long time, and reading more or less about it, and I have never been able to come to the conclusion that, when all these matters were placed before the Senate, and understood, they could convict the President of criminality for doing what was done.

There is no force-where is it? Where is the threat? Where is the intimidation? Nowhere. He did to get into the courts; that we know, He did his best to get it there; ran after a case by which he could have got it there. Where is his criminality? Is he criminal because he did not surrender the convictions of his mind on the constitutionality, according to your interpretation of the act of 1867? Why, so was General Washington criminal; so was Adams criminal. But the precedent in the whole history of the government is at his back in the position which he has taken. How are we going to try criminality upon this single question of the constitutionality of the act of 1867, having the opinion of every Congress at his back, the opinion of the administrations, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, as far as it goes?

Let us go back a moment to that brief examination which I made of the right construction of the civil office act. Iteld you then that if Stanton were not included, the first eight articles of this case substantially fell, and even if he were included, and we were advised as we were, there could be no criminality in acting upon a question of law under the advice of the Attorney-General, who was officially designated for the very purpose of giving 118 that advice. So that from that point of view, suppose Stanton were under the law, and we had no excuse for what he did, then the question is, where in the condition of this question was the power of removal lodged?

You may have your own opinion about the constitutionality, but there is another question which I present. It is this: It is a question of construction. Will you con demn as criminal a President who stood on the side where every decision of the government had been up to that time? I come now, gentlemen, to the next question about the ad interim appointment, and I beg you to observe that, if you shall come to the conclusion that the President had the right to make an ad interim appointment, then there is great shipwreck in his case. It nearly all tumbles into ruin. I beg you again, when you come to examine these articles, to see how many of them are built upon the two facts the removal of Stanton and the ad interim appointment of Thomas. He made the appointment, Senators, under the act of February 13, 1795.

Mr. Groesbeck read the law which authorizes the President, in case of a vacancy in the oflices of the Secretary of State and of War, to authorize a person to perform the duties of such office until a successor shall be appointed, and continued:-You will observe that all possible conditions of the department are expressed under the single word, vacancy." It covers the removal, the expiration of the term of office, resignation, absence, sickness-every possible condition of the department in which it would be necessary ad interim to supply the place. That law was passed on February 13, 1795. There has been another act passed partially covering the same ground, under the date of February 20, 1863. Now, docs that act repeal the act of February 13, 1795? Allow me to draw your attention to a few rules of interpretation of statutes before I compare them:

First, The law does not favor repeals by implication. Again, if statutes are to be construed together they are to stand. Still another, a better statute in order to repeal a former one must fully embrace the whole subject matter. Still again, to effect an entire repeal of all of the provisions of the previous statute the whole subject matter must be covered. Let me illustrate. Suppose, for illustration, there was a statute extending from myself to yonder door; then if another statute were passed which would reach half way, it would repeal so much of the former statute as it overlay, and leave the balance in force. What lies beyond is the legislative will, and just as binding as the original statue.

Now we come to a comparison of these statutes. The statute of February 20, 1862, provides for the occasion of death, resignation, absent from the seat of government, or sickness. There are two cases that are not provided for by this statute, and they are covered by the statute of 1795 -removal and expiration of term; so that we are advised by that simple statement that the reach of the statute of 1795 was beyond that of the statute of February, 1863, and so much of it as lies beyond the latter statute is still in force.

With these few remarks upon the repeal of statutes I come to the consideration of the ad interim letter. From the foundation of the government, as you have been advised by my colleague (Mr. Curtis) and others, it has been the policy of the government to provide for filling offices ad interim. They are not appointments. There is no commission under seal. It is a mere letter of appointment, and they are not considered as filling the office.

When Mr. Upshur was killed, in 1844, an ad interim appointment was made to supply the vacancy occasioned by that accident, and soon afterwards the President nominated to the Senate Mr. Calhoun to fill the office permanently. That illustrates the condition of an ad interim in the office. It has been the policy of the government from the beginning to thus supply vacancies in the department from sickness, absence, resignation, or any of those causes,

and this occurs both when the Senate is in session and when it is in recess. The law of 1863 makes no difference. It may be at any time.

Now, Senators, 1 will dismiss this part of the subject by calling your attention to ad interim appointments that were made during the session, of heads of departments. In the first place I give you Mr. Nelson, who was ap pointed, during the session of the Senate, Secretary of the State. I give you General Scott, who was appointed ad interim Secretary of War during the session of the Senate. I give you Mr. Moses Kelley, who was appointed ad in terim during the session of the Senate to the Department of the Interior. I give you Mr. Holt, who was appointed an interim, during the session of the Senate, Secretary of War. But I intend to linger a little at the case of Mr. Holt, which deserves especial consideration and attention.

Mr. Groesbeck read from the message of President Buchanan of January 1, 1868, in reply to a resolution of inquiry by the Senate in regard to the appointment of Mr. Holt to succeed John B. Floyd, and continued:-There was a case where the Senate took the matter under consideration and inquired of the President what he had done, and by what authority he had done it. Why did you not do that? Why did you not report upon it? A full inquiry was made by the Senate into that case of this ad interim question, and Mr. Buchanan replied that he had supplied the vacancy by an ad interim appointment under the law of 1795. He communicated that fact to the Senate. The Senate received that communication, and were satisfied that it was res adjudicata on his part.

The Senate, on that occasion, investigated thoroughly this identical question of ad interim appointments during the session, and received Mr. Buchanan's reply that he did it under the very law under which we acted, and the Senate did not censure that act, while they bring us for ward as a criminal and brand us with crime for ours. You cannot discriminate between them. Both were done under the same law, both done during the session.

I shall glance now at the next article. I do not intend to linger upon such charges as are contained in it. It makes a great noise in the articles, but it is very hard to see through it. What is the proof to sustain this article? The Presi dent had an interview with General Emory, and in the course of that interview General Emory informed him of the passage of a certain law. They had a conversation about it, and the President said, in the course of that conversation, that the law was unconstitutional. He did not say anything more; and that is the enormous crime committed under article nine. He said it was unconstitutional, What about that? Is it not in evidence before you and uncontradicted that the President had been informed that there were unusual military movements going on in the city the night before; and Secretary Welles called upon him to inform him of that fact, and the President said he would inquire about it?

He sent a note to General Emory, and General Emory waited upon him with the information. That is all. Is that not an explanation? Does anybody contradict it? No! The time the occasion, everything in the transaction adjusts itself to that explanation, and no other. Here was a President whom you has subordinated to an inferior-I mean to the extent of requiring him to send orders through an inferior-groping in the dark, as it were, called upon by one of his Cabinet to inquire about it.

I now come to article ten. I shall leave the elaborate discussion of this article to my colleague, but I wish to say just a few words about it. I refer you to the provision of the Constitution bearing upon this subject, which denies to Congress the power to deny freedom of speech. Are there any limitations of this provision? Does this privilege belong only to the private citizen? Is it denied to officers of the government? Cannot the Executive discuss the measures of any department? May Congress set itself up scribe the rules of Presidential decorum? Will it not be as the standard of good taste? Is it for Congress to prequite enough for Congress to preserve its own dignity? Can it prescribe the forms of expression which may be used, and punish by impeachment what Congress cannot forbid in the form of a law? But I do not propose to discuss it. In 1798 some of the good people of the country. who had been operated upon very much as the House of Representatives were in this instance, took it into their heads to make a sedition law. It was very like article ten. I propose to read it.

Mr. Groesbeck read the law punishing libellous publications or utterances against the President or Congress by fine and imprisonment, and proceeded:-This was the most offensive that has ever been passed since the government was started. So obnoxious was it that the people would not rest under it, and they started, as it were, a hue and cry against everybody who was concerned in it, and they devoted a great many, for their connection with this law, to a political death. But it was a great law compared with article ten. So unpopular was it that since then no law punishing libel, from that day to this, has been passed. It has been reserved for the House of Representatiues, through its managers, to renew this questionable proposition; but I take it upon myself to suggest that before we are condemned in a court of impeachment, we shall have some law upon the subject.

Mr. Groesbeck then read a burlesque law, with a number of preambles, which created considerable laughter, reciting the duty of the President to observe official decorum and to avoid the use of unintelligible phrases, such as calling Congress "a body hanging on the verge of the government," and recognizing the right of Congress, and especially the House of Representatives, to lay down rules of decorum to be observed, punishing the President by fine

and imprisonment for any breach of such decorum. "That," he said, "is article ten." (Laughter.)

He then took up article two, saying there was no testimony to support it, except the telegram between Governor Parsons, of Alabama, and the President, dated on the 15th day of January preceding the March in which the law was passed. They had heard the magnificent oration of one of the managers about it, sounding, and sonorous, and sensational, but would they uphold that article upon such proof as that? He had now gone as far as he need go, since he was to be followed by a gentleman who would take it up, step by step, article by article.

Looking back over the case, he was glad to be able to say there were no political questions involved in it. The ques tions were, where is the power of removal lodged by the Constitution? Is that covered by the Civil Tenure act? Could the President make an ad interim appointment? Did he do anything mischievous in his interview with General Emory? and then the matter of freedom of speech which he apprehended nobody would carry on his back as a heavy load for the remainder of his life,stripped of all verbiage. That was the case upon which their judgment was asked. It shocked him to think it possible that the President could be dragged from his office on such questions as whether he could make an ad interimappointinent for a single day. Was this a matter justifying the disturbing the quiet of the people, shaking their confidence in the President, and driving him from office? How meagre, he said, how miserable is this case-an ad interim appointment for a single day, an attempt to remove Edwin M. Stanton, who stood defiantly and poisoned all the channels of intercourse with the President. I do not speak this in censure of Mr. Stanton, but such is the fact.

We have been referred to many precedents in the past history of England; but those precedents should be to you, Senators, not inatters for imitation, but the beacon lights to warn you from the dangerous rocks on which they stand. What is to be the judgment, Senators? Removal from office and perpetual disqualification? If the President has done anything for which he should be removed from office, he should also be disqualified from holding office hereafter. What is his crime? He tried to pluck a thorn out of his heart, for it had become a thorn there, and the Senate had fastened it there. What more had he done? He had made an ad interim appointment, to last for a single day, which you could have terminated whenever you saw fit. You had only to take the nomination which he sent to the Senate, and which was a good nomination, and the ad interim would have vanished like smoke. The thing was in your hands. You had only to act on the nomination, and the matter was settled. That was no crime.

I can point you to cases that have occurred, and I point especially to that case of Floyd's, where the Senate, in its legislative capacity, weighed the question, decided upon it, heard the report of the President, and received it as satisfactory. For the purpose of this trial, that is res adjudicata. What else did the President do? He talked with an officer about the law. That is the Emory article. What else did he do? He made intemperate speeches. When reviled, he should not have reviled again. When smitten on the one cheek, he should have turned the other, then he would have escaped impeachment. "But," said the gentleman who addressed you the day before vesterday Mr. Boutwell-"He was eager for pacification, and to restore the South." I deny it in the sense in which the gentleman presented it as being criminal. Here, too, the President followed reason, and trod the path on which were the foot-prints of Lincoln, and which was lightened by the radiance of that divine utterance of Lincoln's, "Charity towards all, malice towards none."

He was eager for pacification. He knew that the war was ended; the drums were all silent; the arsenals were all shut the noise of the cannon had died, and the army had disbanded. Not a single enemy confronted us in the field, and he was eager for pacification. The hand of reconciliation was stretched out to him, and he took it. Was this kindness-this forgiveness-a crime? Kindness a crime! Kindness is omnipotent for good; more powerful than gunpowder or cannon. Kindness is statesmanship, Kindness is the high statesmanship of heaven it elf. The thunder of Sinai did but terrify and distract. It is the kindness of Calvary that subdues and pacifies. What shall I say of that man? He has only walked in the path and by the light of the Constitution. The mariner, tempest-tossed on the seas, is not more sure to turn to the stars for guidance than this man in the trials of public life to look to the star of the Constitution. He does look to the Constitution; it has been the study of his life. He is not learned or scholarly like many of you. He is not a man of many ideas, or of much speculation. He is a mar of intelligence. He is a patriot second to no one of you in the measure of his patriotism. He may be full of errors. I will not canvass how he views his love to his country, but I believe he would die for it if need be. His courage and his patriotism are not without illustration.

My colleague referred, the other day, to the scene which occurred in this chamber when he alone, of all the Senators from his section, remained, and even when his own State had seceded. That was a trial of which many of you, by reason of your locality and of your lifelong associations, know nothing. How his voice rang out in this hall on that occasion, in the hour of alarm, and in denunciation of the Rebellion! But he did not remain here. This was a pleasant and easy position. He chose a more difficult, and arduous and perilous service. That was a trial of his courage and patriotism of which some of you who now sit in judgment upon him know nothing.

1 have thought that those who dwell at the North at a

safe distance from the collision of war, know but little of its actual trying dangers. We who lived upon the border know it. Our homes were always surround d with red flame, and it sometimes came so near that we felt the heat on the outstretched hands. Mr. Johnson went into the very borders of the war, and there he served his country long and well. Which of you has done more? Not one. There is one among you whose services, as I well know, cannot be over estimated, and I withdraw all comparison; but it is enough to say that his services were greatly needed, and it seems hard, it seems cruel that he should be struck here upon there miserable technicalities, or that anybody who had served his country and borne himself well and bravely, should be treated as a criminal, and condemned upon these miserable charges. Even if he had committed a crime against the laws, his services to the country entitle him to some consideration.

But he has precedent for every thing he has done. Excellent precedents! The voices of the great dead come to us from their graves sanctioning his course. All our past history approves it. Can you single out this man now in this condition of things and brand him before the country? Will you put your brand upon him because he made an ad interim appointment and attempted to remove Edwin M. Stanton? I can at a single glance, Senators, fix my eye on many of you who would not endure the position the President occupied, You do not think it right yourselves. You framed this very Civil Tenure act to give every President his own Cabinet, and then the President's whole crime is that he wants an officer in the War Department with whom he can communicate on public business and entertain friendly relations.

Senators, I am too tired, and no doubt you are. There is a great deal crowding on ine for utterance, but it is not from my head, it is rather from my heart, and would be but a repetition of what I have been saying this last half hour. Andrew Johnson, administrator of the Presidential office, is to me as nothing in comparison with the possible consequences of your action in the government of the country. No good can come of conviction on the articles of impeachment. But how much will the heart of the country rejoice if it learns that the United States Senate was not unmindful amid the storm, and passion, and strife, of this power of the Constitution, and of its country, and of its own dignity.

Mr. Groesbeck was, throughout the whole argument. but particularly at the close, listened to with marked attention by the Senate, and with straining eagerness by the spectators. It was to be regretted that, on accountfor indisposition, he could not make himself heard distinctly. The reporters for the Associated Press, anxious as they were to give a verbatim report of the speech, were unable to do so from the difficulty of hearing it in the gallery, and had, therefore, to put much of it in the third person, and in other parts to construct the sentences out of the portions which they did happen to hear distinctly.

The court, at half-past four, adjourned till Monday, at

noon.

PROCEEDINGS OF MONDAY, APRIL 27.

The floor of the Senate Chamber was filled early today, a large number of members of the House being present.

Senator Nye appeared in his seat for the first time since his illness.

The first business was Senator Edmunds' motion to admit the official reporters after the arguments are concluded and while the doors are closed for final deliberation.

Senator WILLIAMS proposed an amendment that no Senator shall speak more than once, and not to exceed fifteen minutes, during such deliberation. Agreed to.

Senator HOWARD then moved a further amendment, that each Senator should speak but fifteen minutes upon one question, when the decision was demauded, and it was lost by 19 to 30.

The Republicans voting in the affirmative were Messra Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Howard, Trumbull and Willey.

Senator ANTHONY moved to allow each Senator to speak thirty, instead of fifteen minutes. This also was lost by a vote of 16 to 34.

Republicans voting in the affirmative-Messrs. Corbert, Fessenden, Fowler and Grimes.

On motion of Senator MORTON, the further consi

deration of the subject was postponed till after the arguments are concluded.

Senator Sumner's motion and his amendments to the rules were also postponed until after the arguments, at his own request.

Manager STEVENS then took the floor at 12:30 P. M., and commenced reading his speech, standing at the clerk's desk.

Mr. Stevens had not spoken more than half an hour when he was compelled to sit down, and soon after had to give up reading entirely.

General BUTLER then stepped up and volunteered to read for him.

Mr. STEVENS thanked him.

Mr. BUTLER proceeded in a clear, loud voice to read the remainder of the speech.

Argument of Manager Stevens.

May it please the court:-I trust to be able to be brief in my remarks, unless I should find myself less master of the subject which I propose to discuss than I hope, experience having taught that nothing is so prolix as ignorance. I fear I may prove thus ignorant, as I had not expected to take part in this debate until very lately.

I shall di cuss but a single article, the one that was finally adopted upon my earnest solicitation, and which, if proved, I considered then and still consider, as quite sufficient for the ample conviction of the distinguished respondent, and for his removal from office, which is the only legitimate object for which this impeachment could be instituted.

During the very brief period which I shall occupy, I desire to discuss the charges against the respondent in no mean spirit of malignity or vituperation, but to argue them in a manner worthy of the high tribunal before which I appear, and of the exalted position of the accused. Whatever may be thought of his character or condition he has been made respectable and his condition has been dignified by the action of his fellow-citizens. Railing accusation, therefore, would ill-become this occasion, this tribunal, or a proper sense of the position of those who discuss this question on the one side or the other.

To see the chief servant of a trusting community arraigned before the bar of public justice, charged with high delinquencies, is interesting. To behold the Chief Executive Magistrate of a powerful people charged with the betrayal of his trust, and arraigned for high crimes and mis demeanors, is always a most interesting spectacle. When the charges against such public servant accuse him of an attempt to betray the high trust confided in him and usurp the power of a whole people, that he may become their ruler, it is intensely interesting to millions of men, and should be discussed with a calm determination, which nothing can divert and nothing can reduce to mockery. Such is the condition of this great republic as looked upon by an astonished and wondering world.

The offices of impeachment in England and America are very different from each other, in the uses made of them for the punishment of offenses; and he will greatly err who undertakes to make out an analogy between them, either in the mode of trial or the final result.

In England the highest crimes may be tried before the High Court of Impeachment, and the severest punishments, even to imprisonment, fine and death, may be inflicted.

When our Constitution was framed, all those personal punisments were excluded from the judgment, and the defendant was to be dealt with just so far as the public safety required, and no further. Hence, it was made to apply simply to political offenses-to persons holding political positions, either by appointment or election by the people.

Thus it is apparent that no crime containing malignant or indictable offenses, higher than misdemeanors, was necessary either to be alleged or proved. If the respondent was shown to be abusing his official trust to the injury of the people for whom he was discharging public duties, and peservered in such abuse to the injury of his constituents, the true mode of dealing with him was to impeach him for crimes and misdemeanors (and only the latter is neccesary), and thus remove him from the office which he was abusing. Nor does it make a particle of difference whether such abuse arose from malignity, from unwarranted negligence or from depravity, so repeated as to make his continuance in office injurious to the people and dangerous to the public welfare.

The punishment which the law under our Constitution authorizes to be inflicted fully demonstrates this argument: That punishment upon conviction extends only to removal from office, and if the crime or misdemeanor charged be one of a deep and wicked dye, the culprit is allowed to run at large, unless he should be pursued by a new prosecution in the ordinary courts. What does it matter, then, what the motive of the respondent might be in his repeated acts of malfeasance in office? Mere mistake in intention, if so persevered in after proper warning as to bring mischief upon the community, is quite sufficient to warrant the removal of the officer from the place where he is working mischief by his coutinuance in power.

The only question to be considered is:-Is the respondent violating the law? His perseverance in such a violation, although it shows a perseverance, is not absolutely neces sary to his conviction. The great object is the removal from office and the arrest of the public injuries which he is inflicting upon those with whose interests he is intrusted. The single charge which I had the honor to suggest, I am

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expected to maintain. That duty is a light one, easily performed, and which, I apprehend, it will be found impossible for the respondent to answer or evade.

When Andrew Johnson took upon himself the duties of his high office, he swore to obey the Constitution and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. That, indeed, is and has always been the chief duty of the President of the United States. The duties of legislation and adjudicating the laws of his country fall in no way to his lot. To obey the commands of the sovereign power of the nation, and to see that others should obey thein, was his whole duty-a duty which he could not escape, and any attempt to do so would be in direct violation of his official oath; in other words, a misprision of perjury.

I accuse him, in the name of the House of Representatives, of having perpetrated that foul offense against the laws and interests of his country.

On the 2d day of March, 1867, Congress passed a law, over the veto of the President, entitled "An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices," the first section of wbich is as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress as sembled. That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who may hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the AttorneyGeneral, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

The second section provides that when the Senate is not in session, if the President shall deem the officer guilty of acts which require his removal or suspension, he may be suspended until the next meeting of the Senate; and that within twenty days after the meeting of the Senate the reasons for such suspension shall be reported to that body; and, if the Senate shall deem such reasons sufficient for such suspension or removal, the officer shall be considered removed from his office; but if the Senate shall not deem the reasons sufficient for such suspension or removal, the officer shall forthwith resume the functions of his office, and the person appointed in his place shall cease to discharge such duties.

On the 12th day of August, 1867, the Senate then not being in session, the President suspended Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of the Department of War, and appointed U. S. Grant, General, Secretary of War ad interim. On the 12th day of December, 1867, the Senate being then in session, he reported, according to the requirements of the act, the causes of such suspension to the Senate, which duly took the game into consideration. Before the Senate had concluded its examination of the question of the sufficiency of such reasons, he attempted to enter into arrangements by which he might obstruct the due execution of the law, and thus prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of his office as Secretary of War, according to the provisions of the act, even if the Senate should decide in his favor.

And in furtherance of said attempt, on the 21st day of February, 1868, he appointed one Lorenzo Thomas, by letter of authority or commission, Secretary of War ad interim, without the advice or consent of the Senate, although the same was then in session, and ordered him (the said Thomas) to take possession of the Department of War and the public property appertaining thereto, and to diacharge the duties thereof.

We charge that, in defiance of frequent warnings, he has since repeatedly attempted to carry those orders into execution, and to prevent Edwin M. Stanton from executing the laws appertaining to the Department of War, and from discharging the duties of the office.

The very able gentleman who argued this case for the respondent has contended that Mr. Stanton's case is not within the provisions of the act "regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," and that therefore the President cannot be convicted of violating that act. His argument in demonstrating that position was not, I think, quite equal to his sagacity in discovering where the great strength of the prosecution was lodged. He contended that the proviso which embraced the Secretary of War did not include Mr. Stanton, because he was not appointed by the President in whose term the acts charged as misdemeanors were perpetrated; and in order to show that, he contended that the term of office mentioned during which he was entitled to hold meant the time during which the President who appointed him actually did hold, whether dead or alive; that Mr. Lincoln, who appointed Mr. Stanton, and under whose commission he was holding indefinitely, being dead, his term of office referred to had expired, and that Mr. Johnson was not holding during a part of that term. That depends upon the Constitution, and the laws made under it. By the Constitution, the whole time from the adoption of the government was intended to be divided into equal Presidential periods, and the word "term" was technically used to designate the time of each. The first section of the second article of the Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together, with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows," &c. Then it provides that "in case of

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removal from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the duties of said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and Congress may by lay provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice President, designating what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall then act accordingly until the disability is removed or a President shall be elected."

The learned counsel contends that the Vice President, who accidentally accedes to the duties of President, is serving out a new Presidential term of his own, and that, unless Mr. Stanton was appointed by him, he is not within the provisions of the act. It happened that Mr. Stanton was appointed by Mr. Lincoln in 1862 for an indefinite period of time, and was still serving as his appointee, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Mr. Johnson never appointed him, and, unless he held a valid commission by virtue of Mr. Lincoln's appointment, he was acting for three years, during which time he expended billions of money and raised hundreds of thousands of men, without any commission at all. To permit this to be done without any valid commission world have been a misdemeanor in itself. But if he held a valid commission, whose commission was it? Not Andrew Johnson's. Then in whose term was he serving, for he must have been in somebody's term? Even if it was in Johnson's term, he would hold for four years unless sooner removed, for there is no term spoken of in the Constitution of a shorter period for a Presidential term than four years, But it makes no difference in the operation of the law whether he was holding in Lincoln's or Johnson's term. Was it not in Mr. Lincoln's term? Lincoln had been elected and re-elected, the second term to commence in 1865, and the Constitution expressly declared that that term should be four years.

By virtue of his previous commission and the uniform custom of the country, Mr. Stanton continued to hold during the term of Mr. Lincoln, unless sooner removed. Now, does any one pretend that from the 4th of March, 1865, a new Presidential term did not commence? For it will be seen upon close examination that the word "term" alone marks the time of the Presidential existence, so that it may divide the different periods of office by a well-recog nized rule. Instead of saying that the Vice President shall become President upon his death, the Constitution says:In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President." What is to devolve on the Vice President? Not the Presidential commission held by his predecessor, but the "duties" which were incumbent on him. If he were to take Mr. Lincoln's term he would serve four years, for term is the only limitation to that office defined in the Constitution, as I have said before. But th learned counsel has contended that the word "term" of the Presidential office means the death of the President. Then it would have been better expressed by saying that the President shall hold his office during the term between two assassinations, and then the assassination of the President would mark the period of the operation of this law.

If, then,Mr. Johnson was serving out one of Mr. Lincoln's terms, there seems to be no argument against including Mr. Stanton within the meaning of the law. He was so included by the President in his notice of removal, in his reasons therefore given to the Senate, and in his notification to the Secretary of the Treasury; and it is too late when he is caught violating the very law under which he professes to act, to turn round and deny that that law affects the case. The gentleman treats lightly the question of estoppel; and yet really nothing is more powerful, for it is an argument by the party himself against himself, and although not pleadable in the same way, is just as potential in a case in pais as when pleaded in record.

But there is a still more conclusive answer. The first section provides that every person holding civil office who has been appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person that hereafter shall be appointed to any such office, shall be entitled to hold such ofi ce until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided. Then comes the proviso which the defendant's counsel say does. not embrace Mr. Stanton, because he was not appointed by the President in whose term he was removed. If he was not embraced in the proviso, then he was now here specially provided for, and was consequently embraced in the first clause of the first section, which declares that every person holding any civil office not otherwise provided for comes within the provision of this act.

The respondent, in violation of this law, appointed General Thomas to office, whereby, according to the express terms of the act, he was guilty of a high misdemeanor. But whatever may have been his views with regard to the Tenure of Office act, he knew it was a law, and so recorded upon the statutes. I disclaim all neces sity, in a trial of impeachment, to prove the wicked or unlawful intention of the respondent, and it is unwise ever to aver it.

In impeachments more than in indictments, the averring of the fact charged carries with it all that it is necessary to Bay about intent. In indictments you charge that the defendant, instigated by the devil," and so on; and you might as well call on the prosecution to prove the presence, shape and color of his majesty, as to call upon the managers in inpeachment to prove intention. I go further than some, and contend that no corrupt or wicked motive need instigate the acts for which impeachment is brought. It is enough that they were official violations of law. The counsel has placed great stress upon the necessity of prov

ing that they were wilfully done. If by that he means that they were voluntarily done, I agree with him. A mere accidental trespass would not be sufficient to convict. But that which is voluntarily done is wilfullly done, according to every honest definition; and whatever malfeasance is willingly perpetrated by an office-holder is a misdemeanor in office, whatever he may allege was his intention. The President justifies himself by asserting that all previous Presidents had exercised the same right of removing oti cers, for cause to be judged of by the President alone. Had there been no law to prohibit it when Mr. Stanton was removed, the cases would have been parallel, and the one might be adduced as an argument in favor of the other. But, since the action of any of the Presidents to which he reters, a law had been passed by Congress, after a stubborn controversy with the Executive, denying that right and prohibiting" it in future, and imposing a severe penalty upon any executive of cer who should exercise it. And that, too, after the President had himself made issue on its constitutionality and been defeated. No pretext, therefore, any longer existed that such right was vested in the President by virtue of his office. Hence the attempt to shield himself under such practice is a most lame evasion of the question at issue. Did he "take care that this law should be faithfully" executed? He answers that acts, that would have violated the law had it existed, were practiced by his predecessors. How does that justify his own malteasance?

The President says that he removed Mr. Stanton simply to test the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office law by a judicial decision. He has already seen it tested and decided by the votes, twice given, of two-thirds of the Senators and of the House of Representatives, It stood as a law upon the statute books. No case had arisen under that law, or is referred to by the President, which required any judicial interposition. If there had been, or should be, the courts were open to any one who felt aggrieved by the action of Mr. Stanton. But instead of inforcing that law, he takes advantage of the name and the funds of the United States to resist it, and to induce others to resist it. Instead of attempting, as the Executive of the United States, to see that that law was faithfully executed, he took great pains and perpetrated the acts alleged in this article, not only to resist it himself, but to seduce others to do the same. He sought to induce the General-in-Chief of the Army to aid him in an open avowed obstruction of the law, a sit stood unrepealed upon the statute book. He could find no one to unite with him in perpetrating such an act, until he sunk down upon the unfortunate individual bearing the title of Adjutant-General of the army. Is this taking care that the laws shall be faithfully executed? Is this attempting to carry them into effect, by upholding their validity, according to his oath? On the other hand, was it not a high and bold attempt to obstruct the laws and take care that they should not be executed? He must not excuse himself by saying that he had doubts of its constitutionality and wished to test it. What right had he to be hunting up excuses for others, as well as himself, to violate this law? Is not this confession a misdemeanor in itself? The President asserts that he did not remove Mr. Stanton under the Tenure of Office law. This is a direct contradiction of his own letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, in which, as he was bound by law, he communicated to that officer the fact of the removal. This portion of the answer may, therefore, be considdred as disposed of by the non-existence of the fact, as well as by his subsequent report to the Senate.

The following is the letter just alluded to, dated August 14, 1867:

"Sir:-In compliance with the requirements of the act entitled "An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices," you are hereby notified that, on the 10th instant, the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton was suspended from his office as Secretary of War, and General U. S. Grant authorized and empowered to act as Secretary ad interim. "Hon. Secretary of the Treasury."

Wretched man! a direct contradiction of his solemn answer! How necessary that a man should have a good conscience or a good memory! Both would not be out of place. How lovely to contemplate what was so assiduously inculcated by a celebrated Pagan into the mind of his son: "Virtue is truth, and truth is virtue." And still more, virtue of every kind charms us, yet that virtue is strongest which is effected by justice and generosity. Good deeds will never be done, wise acts will never be executed, except by the virtuous and the conscientious.

May the people of this Republic remember this good old doctrine when they next meet to select their rulers, and may they select only the brave and the virtuous!

Has it been proved, as charged in this article, that Andrew Johnson in vacation suspended from office Edwin M. Stanton, who had been duly appointed and was then executing the duties of Secretary of the Department of War, without the advice and consent of the Senate; did he report the reasons for such supension to the Senate within twenty days from the meeting of the Senate; and did the Senate proceed to consider the sufficiency of such reasons? Did the Senate declare such reasons insufficient, where by the said Edwin M. Stanton became authorized to forthwith resume and exercise the functions of Secretary of War, and displace the Secretary ad interim, whose duties were then to cease and terminate: did the said Andrew Johnson, in his official character of President of the United States, attempt to obstruct the return of the said Edwin M. Stanton and his resumption forthwith of the functions of his office as Secretary of the Department of War; and has he continued to attempt to prevent the discharge of the duties of said office by said Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, notwithstanding the Senate decided in his

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You had found in our first conference that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office whether sustained in the suspension or not. You knew what reasons had induced the President to ask from you a promise; you also knew that in case your views of duty did not accord with his own convictions it was his purpose to fill your place by another appointment. Even ignoring the existence of a positive understanding between us, these conclusions were plainly deducible from various conversations. It is certain, however, that even under these circumstances you did not offer to return the place to my possession, but, according to your own statement, placed yourself in a position where, could I have anticipated your action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was compelled to ask of your predecessor in the War Department, a letter of resignation, or else to resort to tie more disagreeable expedient of suspending you by a successor."

He thus distinctly alleges that the General had a full knowledge that such was his deliberate intention. Hard words and injurious epithets can do nothing to corroborate or to injure the character of a witness; but if Andrew Johnson be not wholly destitute of truth and a shameless falsifier, then this article and all its charges are clearly made out by his own evidence.

Whatever the respondent may say of the reply of U. S. Grant, General, only goes to confirm the fact of the President's lawless attempt to obstruct the execution of the act specified in the artice.

If General Grant's recollection of his conversation with the President is correct, then it goes affirmatively to prove the same fact stated by the President, although it shows that the President persevered in his course of determined obstruction of the law, while the General refused to aid in its consummation. No differences as to the main fact of the attempt to violate and prevent the execution of the law exists in either statement; both compel the conviction of the respondent, unless he should escape through other means than the facts proving the article. He cannot hope to escape by asking this High Court to declare the "law for regulating the tenure of certain civil oflices" unconstitutional and void; for it so happens, to the hopeless n.isfortune of the respondent, that almost every member of this high tribunal has more than once-twice, perhaps three times-declared, upon his official oath, that law constitutional and valid. The unhappy man is in this condition: He has declared himself determined to obstruct that act; he has, by two several letters of authority, ordered Lorenzo Thomas to violate that law; and he has issued commissions during the session of the Senate, without the advice and consent of the Senate, in violation of law, to said Thomas. He must, therefore, either deny his own solemn declarations and falsify the testimony of General Grant and Lorenzo Thomas, or expect that verdict, whose least punishment is removal from office.

But the President denies in his answer to the first and the eleventh articles (which he intends as a joint answer to the two charges) that he had attempted to contrive means to prevent the due execution of the law regulating tenure of certain civil offices, or had violated his oath "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Yet, while he denies such attempt to defeat the execution of the laws, in his letter of the 31st of January, 1868, he asserts and reproaches General Grant by the assertion, that the General knew that his object was to prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of his office, notwithstanding that the Senate might decide in his favor; and the President and U. S. Grant, General, in their angry correspondence of the date heretofore referred to, made an issue of veracity-the President asserting that the General had promised to aid him in defeating the execution of the iaws by preventing the immediate resumption of the functions of Secretary of War by Edwin M. Stantion, and that the General violated his promise; and U. S. Grant, General, denying ever having finally made such promise, although he agrees with the President that the President did attempt to induce him to make such promise and to enter into such an arrangement.

Now, which of these gentlemen may have lost his memory, and found in lieu of the truth a vision which issues from the Ivory Gate-though who can hesitate to choose between the words of a gallant soldier and the pettifogging of a political trickster-is wholly immaterial. so far as the charge against the President is concerned. That charge is, that the President did attempt to prevent the due execution of the Tenure of Office law by entangling the General in the arrangement; and unless both the President and the General have lost their memory and mistaken the truth with regard to the promises with each other, then this charge is made out. In short. if either of these gentlemen has correctly stated these facts of attempting the obstruction of the law, the President has been guilty of violating the law and of misprision of official perjury.

But, again, the President alleges his right to violate the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, because, he says, the same was inoperative and void, as being in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Does it lie in his mouth to interpose this plea? He had acted under that law, and issued letters of authority, both for the long and the short term, to several persons under it, and it

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