that the remaining names be called, omitting the name of the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. HOWARD said there was no rule requiring the names to be called in alphabetical order. The remaining names could be called now. He saw no necessity for further discussion of this motion, and thought it was merely a question of order. It seemed to him that it must be held that the trial had commenced, and that as the Senate had 'the sole power to try impeachments, and as the Constitution also prescribed the administration of an oath, it was out of order to interfere with the taking of that oath.

Mr. BUCKALEW asked if the rules did not provide that, the presiding officer shall submit all questions to the Senate; but assuming it to be a question of order, he contended that the clause was intended to apply to the old form of taking votes by States. The Senate had already adopted a rule for excluding votes in a particular case-a rule founded in justice. The argument was that the Senator had a right under the Constitution to represent Ohio.

On several occasions recently, Senators had presented themselves and had been denied admission. Here they were organized into a court to decide the gravest possible questions. The objection was made at the proper time, and if not now made, a number of members not qualified to act might take part in the proceedings and be judges in the case. It was not only their right but their duty to raise the question now. They are acting under the Constitution, most of them having been sworn already, and the Chief Justice being there to add dignity and disinterestedness to the deliberations; and if they properly raised the question to be decided at the earliest possible moment, it was a question arising under the Senate, and they must meet it before they could organize. He was content to take the decision of the Chief Justice of the United States and the opinion of a distinguished commentator, in preference to that of the Senator from Massachusetts. Objections were always made to jurors before they were sworn; if not, it would be too late.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN (N. J.) asked whether the Senator supposed the accused waived his right of challenge by the Senators being all sworn? He would challenge, if at all, after they were organized, and, therefore, this was not the time to make objection.

Mr. BUCKALEW said he was not talking of chal-lenges. It had not been put upon that ground -by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Hendricks). Challenge was a right given by statute.

Mr. MORTON replied to Mr. Buckalew, and said the Constitution had made the tribunal itself, and they had no right to constitute one. It was not important what they called the Senate now, but it was material that they should sit as the Constitution authorized them, in the trial of an impeachment-as a Senate."

The Senator from Ohio being a member of the Senate, and the Senate performing duties imposed upon it by the Constitution, it was idle for them to talk about organizing a court, when the Constitution placed certain duties upon them.

At 4.30 P. M., Mr. GRIMES (Ia.), after premising that the Chief Justice having sat since 11 A. M., must be fatigued, moved to adjourn.

Mr. HOWARD suggested that as a court they could not adjourn the Senate, and Mr. GRIMES moved to adjourn the court until to-morrow morning.

PROCEEDINGS OF THURSDAY, MARCH 5.

The Chief Justice was again escorted to the chair by Mr. Pomeroy, the chairman of the committee appointed for that purpose.

The Secretary of the Senate read the minutes of the court yesterday, including the adjournment of the Senate.

The Chief Justice then stated the question to be an objection having been made to the swearing-in of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Wade)—a motion to postpone the swearing-in of that Senator until the remaining members have been

sworn.

He also announced that Mr. Dixon (Conn.) had the floor.

Mr. DIXON-Mr. President

A Point of Order.

Mr. HOWARD (Mich.)-Mr. President, I rise to a point of order

The Chief Justice-The Senator will state his point of order.

Mr. HOWARD-By the Constitution, the Senate, sitting on the trial of impeachment, is to be on oath or affirmation. Each member of the Senate, by the Constitution, is a component member of the body for that purpose. There can, therefore, be no trial unless that oath or affirmation be taken by the respective Senators who are present. The Constitution of the United States is imperative, and when a member presents himself to take the oath, I hold that, as a rule of order, it is the duty of the presiding officer to administer the oath, and that the proposition to take the oath cannot be postponed. Other members have no control volved upon the presiding officer of the body who over the question. That is the simple duty deadministers the oath.

Further, sir:-The Senate, on the second day of the present month, adopted rules for their government in proceedings of this kind. Rule third declares that, before proceeding to the consideration of the articles of impeachment, the presiding officer shall administer the oath hereinafter provided to the members of the Senate then present. Mr. Wade is present and ready, and the other members if they appear, whose duty it is to take the oath. The form of the oath is also prescribed by our present rules as follows:-

"I solemnly swear (or affirm as the case may be), that in all the things appertaining to the trial of the will do impartial justice according to the Constitution impeachment of Andrew Johnson, now pending, I and laws. So help me God,"

That is the form of oath prescribed by our rules. It is the form in which the presiding officer of this body himself is sworn. It is the form in which we all (thus far) have been sworn; and so far as the rules are concerned, I insist that they have already been adopted and recognized by us, so far as it is possible, during the condition in which we now are, of organizing ourselves for the discharge of our present duties. I, therefore, make the point of order, that the objection made to the swearing in of Mr. Wade, is out of order, under the rules and under the Constitution of the United States, and I ask the court respectfully, but earnestly, that the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, now presiding in the body, do decide the question without debate. I

object to any further debate.

Mr. DIXON-The question before the Senate is whether under this rule the Senator from OhioMr DRAKE (Mo.)-I call the Senator from Con

The Chief Justice The Senator from Conecti

cut is called to order. The Senator from Michigan (Mr. Howard) has made a point of order to be submitted to the consideration of the body. During the proceedings for the organization of the Senate for the trial of an impeachment of the President, the Chair regards the general rules of the Senate obligatory, and the Senate must determine itself every question which arises, unless the Chair is permitted to determine. In a case of this sort, affecting so nearly the organization of this body, the Chair feels himself constrained to submit the question of order to the Senate.. Will the Senator from Michigan state his point of order in writing?

Mr. DIXON-Mr. President, I rise to a point of order.

The Chief Justice-A point of order is already pending, and this point cannot be made until the other is decided.

Mr. DIXON-I desire to know whether a point of order cannot be made with regard to that question.

The Chief Justice The Chair is of opinion that no point of order can be made pending another point of order.

Mr. HOWARD prepared his point of order and sent it to the Chair.

The Chief Justice Senators, the point of order submitted by the Senator from Michigan is as follows: "That the objection raised to administering the oath to Mr. Wade is out of order, and the motion of the Senator from Maryland to postpone the administering of the oath to Mr. Wade until other Senators are sworn, is also out of order under the rules adopted by the Senate of 2d of March inst., and under the Constitution of the United States." The question is open to debate.

Mr. DIXON-Mr. President. The Chief Justice-The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. DRAKE-I call the Senator to order. Under the rules of the Senate questions of order are not debatable.

Mr. DIXON was understood to say that questions of order referred to the Senate were debatable.

Mr. DRAKE-I do not so understand the rules of the Senate. There can be debate upon an appeal from the decision of the Chair, but there can be no debate in the first instance upon a question of order, as I understand the rules of the Senate.

The Chief Justice-The Chair rules that a question of order is debatable when submitted to the Senate.

Mr. DRAKE-If I am mistaken in the rules of the Senate on that subject I would like to be corrected, but I take it I am not,

The Chief Justice-The Senator from Missouri is out of order, unless he appeals from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. DRAKE asked leave to read the sixth rule, providing that when a member shall be called to order by the President or a Senator, he shall sit down, and not proceed without leave of the Senate, and that every question of order shall be decided by the President, without debate, and subject to an appeal to the Senate.

Mr. POMEROY said the rule applied to submission to the Senate, without a question was not debatable.

Mr. DIXON said the question was now presented in a different shape from that presented yesterday by the Senator from Michigan, when he reminded them that after all this was a question of order, and ought to be so decided. The question now was, whether it was a question of the orderly proceedings of this body. The Senator from Ohio could take the oath. On that question he proposed to address the Senate. At the adjournment

yesterday, he was about remarking that the President of the United States was about to be tried before this body, in its judicial capacity, whether called a court or not, upon articles of impeachment presented by the House of Representatives. If upon that trial (continued Mr. Dixon), he should be convicted, the judgment of the body may extend to his removal from office and to his disqualification after to hold any office of profit or trust under the United States. How far the judgment will extend, in case of conviction, of course it is impossible for any one now to say. In all human probability it would extend at least as far as to his removal from office. In that event, the very moment the judgment was rendered, the office of President of the United States, with all its power and all its attributes, would be vested in the Senator from Ohio, now holding the office of President of this body. The office would vest in the President of the Senate for the time being. The question before this body now is for this tribunal to decide whether, upon the trial of a person holding the office of President of the Senate, and in whom the office of President of the United States, upon conviction, rests, can be a judge upon that trial, sir, is the question before this tribunal.

Mr. SHERMAN called the Senator to order. He claimed that the Senator was not in order in speaking upon the general question of the impeachment when a point of order was submitted to the Senate by the Chair. He thought they should adhere to the rules of the Senate.

The Chief Justice intimated that the Senator from Connecticut should speak within the rules. Mr. DIXON said that if permitted to go on without interruption, he had proposed to go into the general merits of the question, but as it appeared to be the opinion of the Senate that he could not do so, he would not trespass on its attention in that regard. He proposed to discuss the question under the Constitution of the United States and rules of order.

Mr. HOWARD-I call the Senator from Connec ticut to order, and ask whether it is now in order to take an appeal from the decision of the Chair?

Mr. DIXON submitted that there was not such a question of order as the Senator had a right to raise. The only question he had a right to raise was, whether he (Mr. Dixon) was out of order.

Mr. HOWARD Very well; I raise that question distinctly, and call the Senator to order. I make the point that the twenty-third rule, adopted by the Senate, declares that all orders and decisions shall be taken by yeas and nays, without debate.

The Chief Justice, in deciding the point of order, said the twenty-third rule is a rule for the proceedings of the Senate when organized for the trial of an impeachment. It is not yet organized, and in the opinion of the chair the twenty-third rule does not apply at present.

Mr. DRAKE appealed from the decision.

The Chief Justice Sustained. The Chief Justice re-stated the decision, and the chair stand as the judgment of the Senate? stated that the question was, shall the opinion of

The question was taken by yeas and nays, and resulted-Yeas, 24; nays, 20, as follows:

YEAS.-Messrs. Anthony, Buckalew, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, (Me.), Norton, Patterson (Tenn.), Pomeroy, Ross, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Van Winkle, Willey

and Williams-24.

NAYS.-Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Nye, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Wilson and Yates—20.

So the decision of the Chair was sustained.

The announcement of the result was followed by manifestations of applause, which were promptly checked.

Speech of Mr. Dixon.

Mr. DIXON then proceeded with his argument, and said he was not unmindful of the high character of the Senator from Ohio, and did not forget what he had learned from his observations in the Senate for nearly twelve years of his just and generous nature. He acknowledged most cheerfully that that Senator was as much raised above the imperfections and frailties of this weak, depraved, corrupt human nature, as it was possible for any member to be.

Mr. CONNESS raised the question of order, that the Senator was not confining himself within the limits of the debate.

The Chief Justice said he was greatly embarrassed in attempting to ascertain the precise scope of debate to be indulged in, and therefore he was not prepared to say that the Senator from Connecticut was out of order.

Mr. DIXON continued his remarks, and said he did not suppose that, in disavowing any personal objection to the Senator from Ohio, he was infringing the rules of debate. If any advantage or profit was to accrue to that honorable Senator from the trial, what was it? What was the nature of his interest? The Senator from Massachusetts

(Mr. Sumner) had spoken of it as a matter of trifling consequence, but it was nothing less than the high office of President of the United States. It was the highest object of human ambition in this country, and perhaps in the world.

Mr. STEWART (Nev.) called the Senator from Connecticut to order. He was discussing the main question, not the question of order

The Chief Justice remarked that he had already said it was very difficult to determine the precise limits of debate on the point of order taken by the Senator from Michigan. The nature of the objection taken by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Hendricks), and the validity of that objection must necessarily become the subject of debate, and he was unable to pronounce the Senator from Connecticut out of order.

Mr. DIXON resumed his speech. He ventured to say that with the great temptation of the Presidency operating on the human mind, it would be nothing short of miraculous if the Senator from Ohio could be impartial. Nothing short of the power of Omnipotence operating directly on the human heart, could, under such circumstance, make any human being impartial. It might be said that the objection made was not within the letter of the Constitution. The Constitution did not, he admitted, expressly prohibit a member of the Senate acting as presiding officer pro tempore, from acting as a judge in a case of impeachment. He was not prepared to say that the Senator from Ohio came within the letter of the express prohibition of the Constitution, but he certainly came within its spirit; and he assumed that the Senate was here to act, not on the letter, but on the spirit of the Constitution.

There was no prohibition in the Constitution that the presiding officer pro tempore on a trial of this kind shall vote. The provision only was, that the Vice President of the United States shall not preside or give the casting vote in a trial of this kind. The reason of that provision has already been explained. That reason was so manifest that it was not necessary to give it. It was that there was such a direct interest in the Vice President in the result of the trial, that it was deemed improper that he should preside in a proceeding through which a vacancy might be created. The framers of the Constitution knew that the provisions of the common law prevented

If

a man being a judge in his own case. They knew that, as had been said by a learned commentator, the omnipotence of Parliament was limited in that respect, and even that omnipotent body could not make a man judge in his own case. it would shock humanity, if it would violate every feeling of justice throughout the world, for the Vice President to act, would it have less effect in relation to the presiding officer pro tempore? No language could depict the impropriety of a Senator acting as a judge in a case which, in a certain event, was to place him in the Presidential chair.

The President of the United States could not

waive his objection in this case. It was a question in which the people of the United States were doubly interested, and it must be decided by the laws and Constitution, and by the great rules of right. The objection was not as had been argued. It was premature, for there were many preliminary questions on which, if the Senator from Ohio were now sworn, he might proceed to vote. If there was anything desirable in a trial it was that, in the first place, it should be impartially just, and that, in the second place, it must appear to the public mind that it was impartially just.

If the Senate were to decide that the Senator from Ohio, who is to be benefitted by the deposi tion of the President, could take part in the trial, in the public mind of the fairness of the trial. there would certainly be some doubt entertained If history should have to record that fact, the sympathies of the civilized world would be with the deposed President.

Mr. Hendricks Withdraws His Chàllenge.

Mr. HENDRICKS said that in making the objection, he did not question the general proposition of the right of the Senator from Ohio to vote on all proper questions, but he claimed that by his own acts he had accepted a position which disqualified him from sitting as a judge in this case.

It was, therefore, his own act, and not the act of the Senate, that disqualified him. This question necessarily arose often in the organization of bodies composed of many members. It often occurred in the House of Representatives, when members were called to be sworn, and it had necessarily to be decided before the organization was complete. The question must, therefore, be decided here. Substantially this body was a court. It had not to consider legislative questions at all. The judgment of each Senator was controlled altogether by questions of law and fact, and the body was, therefore, in its very essence and nature, a judicial body. The Senate ceased to be a body for the consideration of legislative questions, and became a body for the consideration of judicial questions.

The first step in passing from one character to the other character was the appearance of the Chief Justice of the United States in the chair. The next step was that Senators should take the oath that as judges they would be fair and just, and the question arose in this stage as to the competency of a certain Senator. The question was whether the Senator from Ohio could participate in the trial. He (Mr. Hendricks) had held in the Stockton case that a Senator might vote on a question where he had an interest, but the Senate had decided differently, and he held to the decision of the Senate. He was somewhat surprised to hear the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Sumner) argue now in the contrary view. He believed that the objection was made at the proper time, but as some of the Senators who had sustained the general objection, particularly the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Bayard), seemed to

intimate that the objection might be reserved and made at another time, he would withdraw it. Mr. HENDRICKS having thus withdrawn his objection, the motion offered by Senator Johnson and the question of order submitted by Senator Howard fell to the ground.

Senator Wade Sworn.

Senator Wade thereupon came forward and took the oath administered by the Chief Justice. The other Senators who had not already been sworn were called on one by one, and took the oath, and then, the Chief Justice, rising, said, "All the Senators having taken the oath required by the Constitution, the court is now organized for the purpose of proceeding with the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. The Sergeant-at-Arms will make proclamation."

A Proclamation.

The Sergeant-at-Arms then made the formal proclamation in these words:-"Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silence on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States is sitting for the trial of articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States."

Mr. HOWARD-I submit the following order:Ordered, That the Secretary of the Senate inform the managers of the House of Representatives that the Senate is now organized.

Mr. Howard's Motion Adopted. The Chief Justice-Before submitting that question to the Senate the Chief Justice thinks it his duty to submit to the Senate the rules of procedure. In the judgment of the Chief Justice the Senate is now organized as a distinct body from the Senate sitting in its legislative capacity. It performs a distinct function; the members are under a different oath, and the presiding officer is not the President pro tempore, but the Chief Justice of the United States. Under these circumstances the Chair conceives that rules adopted by the Senate in its legislative capacity are not rules for the government of the Senate sitting for the trial of an impeachment, unless they be also adopted by that body.

In this judgment of the Chair, if it be erroneous, he desires to be corrected by the judgment of the court or the Senate, sitting for the trial of the impeachment of the President-which in his judgment are synonymous terms-and therefore, if he be permitted to do so, he will take the sense of the Senate upon this question, whether the rules adopted on the 2d of March shall be considered as the rules of proceedings in this body.

Cries of "question," "question." The Chief Justice put the question. There was but one faint "no," apparently on the Democratic side.

The Chief Justice-The yeas have it, by the sound. The rules will be considered as the rules of this body.

To Mr. Howard-Will the Senator have the goodness to repeat his motion?

Mr. HOWARD repeated his motion, given above, which was put, and declared adopted.

Entrance of the Managers. After a few minutes' delay, at a quarter before three o'clock, the doors were thrown open. The Sergeant-at-Arms announced "The Managers of the impeachment on the part of the House of Representatives," and the managers entered and proceeded up the aisle, arm in arm, Messrs. Bingham and Butler in the advance. Mr. Stevens did not appear.

The Chief Justice The managers on the part of the House of Representatives will take the seats assigned to them.

They took their seats accordingly, inside the bar.

Order having been restored,

Mr. BINGHAM rose and said (in an almost inaudible tone, until admonished by Senators near him to speak louder)-We are instructed by the House of Representatives and its managers to demand that the Senate take process against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, that he answer at the bar of the Senate the articles of impeachment heretofore presented by the House of Representatives, through its managers, by the Senate.

Summons Against the President. Mr. Bingham having taken his seat, Mr. HOWARD offered the following:Ordered, That a summons be issued, as required by the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate Johnson, returnable on Friday, the 13th day of March when sitting in the trial of impeachments, to Andrew inst., at one o'clock P. M.

The question was put on agreeing to the order. It was declared carried and directed to be executed. Mr. HOWARD-I move that the Senate, sitting upon the trial of impeachment, do now adjourn. Several Senators addressed the Chair simultaneously, but Mr. ANTHONY was recognized. He offered an amendment to rule seven, to strike out the last clause, providing that "the presiding officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions; but the same shall, on the demand of one-fifth of the members present, be decided by the yeas and nays," and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"The presiding officer of the court may rule all questions of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the court, unless some member of the court shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the court for decision; or he may, at his option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the members of the court."

The amendment would restore the rule to its original form before the amendment. Mr. ANTHONY did not desire to press his amendment immediately, and at his suggestion it was laid on the table.

Mr. HOWARD then moved that the court ad

journ to the time at which the summons was made returnable, Friday, the 13th inst.

Mr. SUMNER-Before that motion is put I should like to ask my friend, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Anthony), whether, under the rule now adopted, he regards that as debatable? Mr. ANTHONY-NO.

Mr. SUMNER--By these rules it is provided as follows: All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record without debate, except when the doors shall be closed for discussion.

Mr. ANTHONY-I have not read the rules in reference to the question, and I do not desire to press the motion at present.

Adjournment of the Court.

The Chief Justice-There is nothing before the Senate but the motion to adjourn.

The motion to adjourn was carried, and the Chief Justice declared the court adjourned until Friday, the 13th inst., at 1 o'clock, and vacated the chair. The managers then retired.

The Summons Served.

The summons was served on the President by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, on the afternoon of Saturday, March 7. On receiving the document, Mr. Johnson replied, that he would attend to the matter.

PROCEEDINGS OF FRIDAY, MARCH 13.

The Reply to the Summons.

On Friday, March 18, the day fixed for the reply of the President to the summons of the Court of Impeachment, the favored ticket-holders to seats in the galleries commenced pouring into the Capitol by ten o'clock, and by eleven o'clock the ladies' gallery was packed by as brilliant an audience as upon a full dress opera night. None were permitted to pass the Supreme Court door without a ticket, and guards were placed at half a dozen points from thence on to the entrance of the galleries. A heavy police force was on hand, and the rules were rigidly enforced, and hundreds of strangers, ignorant of the necessity of obtaining tickets, were turned back disappointed. The Senators' seats were arranged as before. In the open space in front of the President's chair were two long tables, each furnished with seven chairs-one inter. ded for the managers, and the other for the counsel, Back of the Senators' seats, and filling the entire lobby, were about two hundred chairs for the accommodation of the members of the House, the Judiciary and others entitled to the floor.

Senators Howard and Anthony were in their seats early, and by one o'clock half the Senators had appeared and ranged themselves in little knots discussing the momentous business of the day.

It was noticeable that not a single negro was in the galleries. The section usually occupied by them was filled with ladies. There was no rush and no crowding of door aisles. Everything was conducted with perfect order and decorum.

The Chief Justice-The Sergeant-at-Arms will call the accused.

The Sergeant-at-Arms, in a loud voice:-"Andrew Johnson, President of the United States! Andrew Johnson, President of the United States! Appear and answer the articles of impeachment exhibited against you by the House of Representatives of the United States."

The doors were thrown open at this point, and every eye was turned that way for a moment, but Mr. Butler entered and took his seat with the other ma -nagers.

Mr. JOHNSON (Md.) rose and said something in a voice inaudible in the gallery, whereupon the Chief Justice said:-The Sergeant-at-Arms will inform the counsel of the President.

The President's counsel, Messrs. Stanbery, Curtis and Nelson, were ushered in at the side door, and took seats at the table to the right of the chair, Mr. Stanbery on the right, the others in the order named. Mr. CONKLING offered the following, by direction of the committee, in order, he said, to correct a clerical

error:

Ordered, That the twenty-third rule of the Senate for proceedings on the trial of impeachment be amended by inserting atter the word "debate," in the second line, the

following words: "Subject, however, to the operation of rule seven," so that if amended it will read as follows:23d. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of rule seven," &c.

Rule seven provides that the presiding officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions.

Mr. CONKLING explained that such was the original intention, but that the qualifying words were accidentally omitted. The order was adopted.

At twenty minutes past one o'clock the Sergeant-atArms announced the members of the House of Representatives, and the members entered and distributed themselves as far as possible among the chairs and sofas not already occupied by those having the entree. to the Chamber under the rules. Many, however, did not find seats at once.

The Plea of the President.

Mr. STANBERY then rose and said;-Mr. Chief Justice, my brothers Curtis, Nelson and myself, are here this morning as counsel for the President. I have his authority to enter his plea, which, by your leave, I will proceed to read.

Mr. Stanbery read the plea of President Johnson.

A Professional Statement.

Mr. STANBERY-I have also a professional statement in support of the application; whether it is in order to offer it now the Chair will decide.

The Chiet Justice-The appearance will be considered as entered. You can proceed.

Mr. Stanbery then read his statement as follows:In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts and Thomas A. R. Nelson, of counsel for the respondent, move the court for the allowance of forty days for the preparation of the answer to the articles of impeachment, and, in support of the motion, make the following professional

statement:

The articles are eleven in number, involving many ques→ tions of law and fact. We have, during the limited time and opportunity offered us, con idered, as far as possible, the field of investigation which must be explored in the preparation of the answer, and the conclusion at which we have arrived is that, with the utmost diligence, the time we have asked is reasonable and necessary. The precedents as to time for answer upon impeachment be fore the Senate, to which we have had opportunity to refer, are those of Judge Chase and Judge Peck.

In the case of Judge Chase, time was allowed from the 3d of January until the 11th of February next succeeding. to put his answer, a period of thirty-two days; but in this case there was but a single article.

Judge Peck asked for time from the 10th to the 25th of May to put in his answer, and it was granted. It appears that Judge Peck had been long cognizant of the ground laid for his impeachment, and had been present before the committee of the House upon the examination of the witnesses, and had been permitted by the House of Representatives to present to that body an elaborate answer to the charges.

It is apparent that the President is fairly entitled to more time than was allowed in either of the foregoing cases. It is proper to add that the respondents in those cases were lawyers fully capable of preparing their own answers, and that no pressing official duties interfered with their attention to that business.

Whereas, the President, not being a lawyer, must rely on his counsel; the charges involve his acts, relations and intentions, as to all which his counsel must be fully advised> upon consultation with him, step by step, in the preparation of his defense. It is seldom that a case requires such constant communication between client and counsel as this, and yet such communication can only be had at such intervals as are allowed to the President from the usual hours that must be devoted to his high official duties. We further beg leave to suggest for the consideration of this honorable court, that counsel, careful as well for their own reputation as of the interests of their client, in a case of such magnitude as this, so out of the ordinary range of professional experience, where so much responsibility is felt, they submit to the candid consideration of the court that they have a right to ask for themselves such opportunity to discharge that duty as seems to them to be absolutely necessary. (Signed)

March 13, 1868.

HENRY STANBERY,
BENJAMIN R. CURTIS,
JEREMIAH S. BLACK,

WILLIAM M. EVARTS,
THOMAS A. R. NELSON,

Counsel for respondent.