At half-past twelve o'clock the Chair announced that according to rule all legislative and executive business would cease, and directed the Secretary of the Senate to notify the House. Mr. TRUMBULL (Ill.) called for the reading of the rule, saying that he understood that one o'clock was the hour appointed, The rule was read providing that on the day set apart for the trial the Senate shall cease Executive business and legislation, and proceed to the trial of the impeachment. Mr. EDMUNDS (Vt.) called attention to a subsequent order introduced by Mr. Howard, of the Committee of Seven, adjourning the court until one o'clock to-day. This, he said, was the day set apart for receiving the answer, not for proceeding to the trial. Several Senators suggested to leave it to the decision of the Chair. The Chair decided that the rule was imperative, and business must now cease. Mr. EDMUNDS respectfully appealed from the decision of the Chair. The Chair announced the question to be, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the Senate, but at the suggestion of Mr. TRUMBULL, Mr. Edmunds withdrew the appeal, and the Secretary of the Senate was again directed to notify the House that the Senate was ready to proceed with the trial of the impeachment. During the interreguum Mr. Stevens entered quietly at a side door, and took his seat at the manager's table. Chief Justice Chase Enters. At 1 P. M. the President pro tem. vacated the chair, the Chief Justice entered by the side door te the left of the chair, and called the Senate to order. The Sergeant-at-Arms made the usual proclamation commanding silence, whereupon the managers appeared at the door. The Sergeant-at-Arms announced "the managers of the impeachment on the part of the House of Representatives," and the Chief Justice said, "The managers will take the seats assigned by the Senate." Messrs. Bingham and Boutwell led the way up the aisle, and they took their seats. In the meantime Messrs. Stanbery, Curtis, Nelson, Evarts and Groesbeck seated themselves at their table in the order named, Mr. Stanbery occupying the extreme right. The Sergeant-at-Arms then announced "the House of Representatives," and the members of the House appeared, preceded by Mr. Washburne, on the arm of Mr. McPherson, Clerk of the House, and took their seats outside the bar. By direction of the Chief Justice, the Secretary of the Senate then read the minutes of the proceedings of Friday, the 13th inst. Mr. DOOLITTLE (Wis.) was called by the Clerk, and came forward and took the oath. Senator DAVIS (Ky.) said-Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to make the same proposition to this court that I made to the Senate. I think now is the appropriate time, before the Senate proceeds to make up the case. I, therefore, submit to the court a motion in writing. The Secretary read as follows:Mr. Davis, a member of the Senate in the Court of Impeachment, moved the court to make this order :That the Constitution having invested the Senate with the sole power to try the articles of impeachment of the President of the United States, preferred by the House of Representatives, and having provided that the Senate shall be composed of two Senators from each State, to be chosen by the Legislature thereof; and the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia. Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana and Florida, having each chosen two Senators who have been excluded from their seats respectively: Senator HOWARD-Mr. President The Chief Justice-The question must be decided without debate. Senator HOWARD--I object to the receiving of the paper. Senator CONNESS (Cal.)-I desire to submit a motion which will meet the case. I move that the motion be rot received, upon which I call for the yeas and nays. Senator HOWE (Wis.)-I rise to submit a question of order. of order. The Chief Justice-The Senator will state his point Senator HOWE-I would ask if the motion offered by the Senator from Kentucky be in order? The Chief Justice-The motion comes before the Senate in the form of a motion, submitted by a member of the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment. The twenty-third rule requires that all the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of rule seven. The seventh rule requires the presiding officer to, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a divison, all questions of evidence and incidenial questions, but the same shall, on demand of one-fifth of the members present, be decided by yeas and nays. The question then, being on a proposition submitted by a Senator under the twenty-third rule, it is in order. Mr. CONNESS-Mr. President, is the motion submitted by me in order? The Chief Justice-No sir. The call for the yeas and nays were ordered, and they were called. Messrs. Davis and McCreery only voting yea. Messrs. Saulsbury, Bayard and Wade did not vote. So the motion was not agreed to. Mr. STANBERY then rose and said-Mr. Chief Justice, in obedience to the order of this honorable court, dent should be filed to-day, we have it ready. The made at the last session, that the answer of the Presi counsel for the President, abandoning all other business-some of us leaving our courts, our cases and our clients have devoted every hour to the consideration of this case. The labor has been incessant. We have devoted, as I say, not only every hour ordinarly devoted to business, but many required for necessary rest and recreation have been consumed in it. It is a matter of regret that the court did not allow us more time for preparation; nevertheless, we hope that the answer will be found in all respects sufficient. Such as it is, we are now ready to read and file it. Mr. CURTIS proceeded to read the answer. The President's Answer. To the Senate of the United States sitting as a court of impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States. The answer of the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the articies of impeachment › exhibited against him by the House of Representatives of the United States. Answer to article 1. For answer to the first article he says that Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January, 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, during the first term of his Presidency, and was commissioned according to the Constitution and the laws of the United States to hold said office during the pleasure of the Presi dent; that the office of Secretary for the Department of War was created by an act of the First Congress in its first session, passed on the 7th day of August, A. D. 1789, and in and by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on and intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope of the said department; and furthermore, that the said Secretary shall conduct the business of the said department in such a manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct; and this respondent, further answering, says that, by force of the act aforesaid and by reason of his appointment, the said Stanton became the principal officer in one of the Executive Departments of the government, within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States; and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States, and in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United States, the said Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, must continue to be one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President touching the department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity subordinate to the President, the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, made responsible; and this respondent further answering, says;-He succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon and by reason of the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid, and not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment_and_commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned, and at no time received any appointment or commission, save as above detailed. And this respondent further answering, says that on and prior to the fifth day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States, responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War without hazzard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President. And thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the business of that Executive Department of the government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, and this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States to give effect to such, his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of which the following is a true copy: "Sir:-Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted. To which note the said Stanton made the following reply: WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 5, 1867.-Sir: Your note of this day has been received, stating that public considerations of a high character constrain you to say that my resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted. In reply, I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress, Very respectfully, yours, (Signed) EDWIN M. STANTON. This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary; and having regard to the paramount executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office. This respondent was informed, and verily believes, that it was practically settled by the first Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and uniformly and in great numbers of instances, acted on by each Congress and President of the United States in succession, from President Washington to and including President Lincoln, and from the first Congress to the Thirty-ninth Congress; that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the President, as part of the Executive power, and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the Executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that consequently it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity, he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question did, in good faith, and with an honest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinon, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States, by a message dated on the second day of March, 1867, a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A, that the power last mentioned was conferred, and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty; nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole, and this has ever since remained, and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced, as aforesaid, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office. This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows: That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided. *Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed; that the power to remove executive officers for cause might, by law, be taken from the President, and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above expressed, and veritably believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last mentioned act was and is whoily inoperative and void, by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States; yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to be examined and decided whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act, or if within it, whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretery for the Department of War, and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act. And this respondent further answering, says, that although a case thus existed which, in his judgment, as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the Executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above And this respondent, further answering, says that shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from regulate the tenure of certain civil offices, that the it is provided in and by the second section of an act to the said office was vested in the President of the President may suspend an officer from the performUnited Stetes; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the ance of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first the Senate, and until the case shall be acted on by the section of the last-named act; and although each of Senate; that this respondent, as President of the the said opinions had been formed by this respondent United States, was advised, and he verily believed and upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judg-from office confided to him by the Constitution as still believes, that the executive power of removal ment and determination thereon, yet the respondent, aforesaid, includes the power of suspension from of as President of the United States, desired and deter- fice at the pleasure of the President; and this respon mined to avoid if possible any question of the construc-dent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said tion and effect of the said first section of the last-named Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the act, and also the broader question of the executive Senate or until the Senate should have acted upon the power conferred on the President of the United States case, but by force of the power and authority vested by the Constitution of the United States to remove one in him by the Constitution and laws of the United of the principal officers of one of the Executive Depart-States, indefinitely, and at the pleasure of the Presi ments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this re-dent; and the order, in form aforesaid, was made spondent also desired and determined that, if from Causes over which he could exert no control, it should known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more fully become absolutely necessary to raise and have in some hereinafter stated. way determined either or both of the said last-named And this respondent further answering, says in and questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and was required of the by the act of February 12, 1795, it was among other President thereby, that questions of so much gravity in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, things provided and enacted that in case of vacancy and importance, upon which the Legislature and Executive Departments of the government had disagreed, shall think it necessary to authorize any person to it shall be lawful for the President, in case that he which involved powers considered by all branches of the government during its entire history down to the perform the duties of that office, until a successor be year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution appointed, or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding of the United States to the President, and to be neces- advised and believing that such law was in full force, the term of six months; and this respondent being sary for the complete and proper execution of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way sub- and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867, mitted to that judicial department of the government of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it, to the duty, not only of determining of War ad interim, in the form of which similar autho finally the Constitution and effect of all acts of Con-rity had theretofore been given,not until the next meetgress, by comparing them with the Constitution of the ing of the Senate, and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject United States, and pronouncing them inoperative when to the limitation of six months in the found in conflict with that fundamental law which the only people have enacted for the government of all their said last mentioned act contained, and a servats, and to these ends: of the last named order was made known to |