tive duty in reference to the said Stanton, without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President by the Constitu tion and laws, and without the necessity of raising judicially any questions respecting the same. And this respondent, further answering, says that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein, contrary to the settled convictions of the President formed as aforesaid, respecting the power confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid, that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President, that he could no longer advise with or trust, or be responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might, in the judgment of the President, be lawful and necessary to raise for a judicial decision the questions aflecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office, if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; to this end and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth; and this respondent proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in said first article, says:

He denies that the said Stanton on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton on the day last-mentioned was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled "An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or this re spondent's oath of office; and he respectfully but earnestly insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official daty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was in point of fact an imperative official duty; and he denies that any and all substantive matters in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do by law con stitute a high misdemeanor in office within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

Answer to Article 2.

For answer to the second article this respondent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, D. C., February 21, 1863. addressed to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington; and he further admits that the same was so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session, but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as a part of his answer to this article; and further denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and this respondent maintains and will insist:

First, that at the date and delivery of said writing, there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War. Second, that notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and well-established usage, to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim. Third, that if the said act regulating the tenure of civil officers be held to be a valid law, no provisions of the same were violated by the issuing of said order, or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

Answer to Article 3.

And for answer to said third article. this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles in so far as the same are responsive to the allega. tion contained in the said third article; and, without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article, as fully as if here again get out at length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War ad interm, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written authority set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered sid Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment. and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that department to act temporarily as becretary for the Department of War ad interim until an

appointment should be made; but whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violiate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order, the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term; he further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.

Answer to Article 4.

For answer to said fourth article, this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Lorenzo Thomas, or with the said Thomas or any other person or persons, with intent, by intimidations and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent the said Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of the provisions of the said act of Congress, in said article mentioned, or that he did then and there commit, or was guilty of a high crime in office; on the contrary thereof, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there lawfully the Secretary for the Department of War, this respondent' stated that his sole purpose in authorizing the said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War, ad interim, was, as is fully stated in his answer to the said first article, to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to hold said office, notwithstanding his said suspension, and notwithstanding the said order of removal, and notwithstanding the said authority of the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War, ad interim, to the test of a final decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the earliest practicable mode by which the question could be brought before that tribunal. This respondent did not conspire or, agree with the said Thomas. or any other person or persons, to use intimidation or threats to hinder or prevent the said Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; nor did this respondent at any time command or advise the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to resort to or use either threats or intimidation for that purpose. The only means in the contemplation or purpose of respondent to be used are set forth fully in the said orders of February 21, the first addressed to Mr. Stanton and the second to the said Thomas,

By the first order the respondent notified Mr. Stanton that he was removed from the said office, and that his functions as Secretary for the Department of War were to terminate upon the receipt of that order, and he also thereby notified the said Stanton that the said Thomas had been authorized to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and ordered the said Stanton to transfer to him all the records, books, papers, and other public property in his custody and charge, and by the second order notified the said Thomas of the removal from office of the said Stanton, and authorized him to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and directed him to immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office, and to receive the transfer of all the records, books, papers, and other public property from Mr. Stanton then in his custody and charge. Respondent gave no instructions to the said Thomas-to use intimidation or threats to enforce obedience to these orders.

He gave him no authority to call in the aid of the military or any other force to enable him to obtain possession of the office, or of the books, papers, records or property thereof; the only, agency resorted to, or intended to be resorted to, was by means of the said Executive orders requiring obedience, But the Secretary for the Depart ment of War refused to obey these orders, and still holds undisturbed possession and custody of that department, and of the records, books, papers and other public property therein. Respondent further states that, in execution of the orders so given by this respondent to the said Thomas, he, the said Thomas, proceeded in a peaceful manner to demand of the said Stanton a surrender to him of the public property in the said department, and to vacate the possession of the same, and to allow him, the said Thomas, peaceably to exercise the duties devolved upon him by authority of the President. That, as this respondent has been informed and believes, the said Stanton peremptorily refused obedience to the orders issued.

Upon such refusal no force or threat of force was used by the said Thomas, by authority of the President or otherwise, to enforce obedience, either then or at any subsequent time; and his respondent doth here except to the sufficiency of the allegations contained in said fourth article, and states for ground of exception that it is not stated that there was any agreement between this respondent and the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation and threats; nor is there any allegation as to the nature of said intimidation and threats, or that there was any agreement to carry them into execution, or that any step was taken, or agreed to be taken, to carry them into execution; and that the allegation in said article that the intent of said conspiracy to use intimidation and threats, is wholly insufficient, inasmuch as it is not alleged that the said intent formed the basis or became a part of any agreement between the said alleged conspira tors; and furthermore, that there is no allegation of any conspiracy or agreement to use intimidation or threats

Answer to Article 5.

And for answer to the said fifth article, this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, or at

any other time or times in the same year, before the said 2d day of March, 1868, or at any prior or subsequent time, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other place, this respondent did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas, or any other persons, to prevent or hinder the execution of the said act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," or that. in pursuance of said alleged conspiracy, he did unlawfully attempt to prevent the said Edwin M. Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War. or that he did thereby commit, or that he was thereby guilty of a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, begs leave to refer to his answer given to the fourth article, and to his answer given to the first article, as to his intent and purpose in issuing the or der for the removal of Mr. Stanton; and the said respondent prays equal benefit therefrom, as if the same were here again repeated and fully set forth. And this respondent excepts to the sufficiency of the said fifth article, and states his ground for such exception, that it is not alleged by what means, or by what agreement the said alleged conspiracy was formed or agreed to be carried out, or in what way the same was intended to be carried out, or what were acts done in pursuance thereof.

Answer to Article 6.

And for answer to the said sixth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas by force to seize, take or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, contrary to the provisions of the said acts referred to in the said article, or either of them. or with intent to violate either of them; respondent, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, not only denies the said conspiracy as charged, but also denies any unlawful intent in reference to the custody and charge of the property of the United States in the said Department of War, and again refers to his former answer for a full statement of his intent and purpose in the premises.

Answer to Article 7.

And for answer to said seventh article, r spondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did unlawfully conspire with said Thomas, with intent unlawfully to seize, take or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, with intent to violate or disregard the said act in said seventh article referred to, or that he did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office; respondent, protesting the said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, again refers to his former answers in so far as they are applicable to show the intent with which he proceeded in the premises, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again fully repeated. Respondent further takes exception to the sufficiency of the allegations of this article as to the conspiracy alleged, upon the same ground as stated in the exception set forth in his answer to said article fourth.

Auswer to Article 8.

And for answer to the said eighth article, this respondent denies that on the 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did issue and deliver to the said Thomas the said letter of authority set forth in the said eighth article, with the intent unlawfully to control the disbursement of the money appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War; this respondent, protesting that there was a vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, admits that he did issue the said letter of authority, and he denies that the same was with any unlawful intent whatever, either to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any act of Congress. On the contrary, this respondent again affirms that his sole intent to vindicate his authority as President of the United States, and by peaceful means to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary of War to to a final decision before the Supreme Court of the United States, as has been herein before set forth, and he prays the same benefit from his answer in the premises as if the same were here again repeated at length.

Answer to Article 9.

And for answer to the said ninth article, the respondent states, that on the said 22d day of February, 1868, the following note was addressed to the said Emory, by the private Secretary of respondent:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., Feb. 22, 1868.-General:-The President desires me to say that he will be pleased to have you call upon him as early as possible. Respectfully and truly yours,

WILLIAM G. MOORE, United States Army. General Emory called at the Executive Mansion according to this request. The object of respondent was to be advised by General Emory, Commandant of the Department of Washington, what changes had been made in the military affairs of the Department. Respondent had been informed that various changes had been made, which in no wise had been brought to his notice, or reported to him from the Department of War, or from any other quarter had he obtained the facts. General Emory had explained in detail the changes which had taken place. Said Einory called the attention of respondent to a general order which he referred to, and which this respondent then sent for. When it was produced it was as follows:

WAB DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 14, 1867.-General Orders, No. 17:-The following acts of Congress are published for the information and government of all concerned:

Public. No. 85. To making appropriations for the support of the army for year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes.

Section 2. And be it further enacted, That the head. quarters of the General of the United States Army shall be at the city of Washington, and sil orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through the General of the Army, and in case of his inability, through the next in rank. The General of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere than at the said headquarters, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate, and any orders or instructions relating to military operations is ued contrary to the requirements of this section shall be null and void; and any othicer who shall issue orders or instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office, and any officer of the army who shall tran mit, convey, or obey any orders or instructions issued contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing that such orders were so issued, shall be liable to impeachment for not less than two or more than twenty years upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction. Approved March 2, 1867.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. Official-Assistant Adjutant-General, A. G. O., No. 172. General Emory not only called the attention of respondent to this order but to the fact that it was in conformity with a section contained in an appropriation act passed by Congress. Respondent, after reading the order, observed, "this is not in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, which makes me Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, or of the language of the commission which you hold." General Emory then stated that this law had met respondent's approval. Respondent then said in reply in substance, "Am I to understand that the Presi dent of the United States cannot give an order but through the General-in-Chief or General Grant ?" General Emory again reiterated the statement that it had met respondent's approval, and that it was the opinion of some of the leading lawyers of the country that this order was constitutional, with some further conversation. Respondent then inquired the names of the lawyers who had given the opinion, and he mentioned the names of two. Respondent then said that the object of the law was very evident, referring to the clause in the Appropriation act upon which the order purported to be based. This, according to respondent's recollection, was the substance of the conversation had with General Emory.

Respondent denies that any allegations in the said article of any instructions or declarations given to the said Emory, then or at any other time, contrary to or in addition to what is hereinbefore set forth, are true. Respondent denies that in the said conversation with the said Emory he had any other intent than to express the opinion then given to the said Emory; nor did he then or at any time request or order the said Emory to disobey any law or any order issued in conformity with any law, nor intend to offer any inducements to the said Emory to violate any law. What this respondent then said to General Emory was simply the expression of an opinion which he then fully believed to be sound, and which he yet believes to be so that by the express provisions of the Constitution this respondent, as President, is made the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States, and as such he is to be respected; and that his orders, whether issued through the General-in-Chief or by any other channel of communication, are entitled to respect and obedience; and that such constitutional power cannot be taken from him by virtue of any act of Congress. Respondent doth therefore deny that by the expeession of such opinion he did commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent doth further say that the said article nine lays no foundation whatever forthe conclusion stated in thesaid article, that the respondent, by reason of the allegations therein contained, was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

In reference to the statement made by General Emory · that this respondent had approved of said act of Congress containing the section referred to, the respondent admits that his formal approval was given to said act, but accompanied the same by the following message addressed and sent with the act to the House of Representatives, in which the said act originated, and from which it came to respondent:

To the House of Representatives: The act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," contains provisions to which I must call attention. These provisions are contained in the second section, which, in certain cases, virtually deprives the President of his constitutional functions as Commander-in-Chief of the Armv. and in the sixth section, which denies to ten States of the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves, in any emergency, by means of their own militia. These provisions are out of place in an approsriation act, but I am compelled to defeat these necessary appropriations if I withhold my signature to the act. Pressed by these con. siderations, I feel constrained to return the bill with my signature, but to accompany it with my earnest protest against the sections which I have indicated. "Washington, D. C., March 22, 1867."

Respondent, therefore, did no more than to express to said Emory the same opinion which he had so expressed to the House of Representatives.

Answer to Article 10.

And in answer to the tenth article and specifications thereof, the respondent says that on the 14th and 15th days of August, in the year 1866, a political convention of delegates, from all or most of the States and territories of the Union, was held in the city of Philadelphia, under the name and style of the "National Union Convention," for the purpose of maintaining and advancing certain political views and opinions before the people of the United States, and for their support and adoption in the exercise of the constitutional suffrage in the elections of representatives and delegates in Congress, which were

soon to

Occur

in many of the States and territories of the Union, which said Convention in the course of its proceedings, and in furtherance of the objects of the same, adopted a declaration of principles, and an address to the people of the United States, and appointed a committee of two of its members from each State, and of one from each Territory. and one from the District of Columbia, to wait upon the President of the United States and present to him a copy of the proceedings of the Convention. That on the 15th day of said month of August this committee waited upon the President of the United States at the Executive mansion, and was received by him in one of the rooms thereof; and by their chairman, the Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then and now a Senator of the United States, acting and speaking in their behalf, presented a copy of the proceedings of the Convention, and addressed the President of the United States in a speech, of which a copy, according to a published report of the same, and as the respondent believes, substantially a correct report, is hereto annexed, as a part of this answer, and marked, exhibit C.

That thereupon and in reply to the address of said committee by their chairman, this respondent addressed the said committee so waiting upon him in one of the rooms of the Executive mansion, and this respondent believes that this, his address to said committee, is the occasion referred to in the first specification of the tenth article; but this re-. spondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech or address of this respondent upon said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but on the contrary this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said first specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court, as a high misdemeanor in office. within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contains, or correctly or justly represents. And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and on the 3d day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a large assemblage of his fellow citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand, he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration, and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the second specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that, if this honorable court shall deem the said article, and the said second specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contains, or correctly or justly represents.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and on the 8th day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a numerous assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand, he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration, and this respondent befieves that said occasion and address are referred to in the third specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said third specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that the said article and specification contains, or correctly or justly represents.

And this respondent further answering the tenth article, protesting that he has not been unmindful of the high duties of his office, or of the harmony or courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the government of the United States; denies that he has ever intended or designed to set

aside the rightful authority or powers of Congress, or attempted to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt or reproach, the Congress of the United States, or either branch, or to impair or destroy the regard or respect of all or any of the good people of the United States for the Congress or the rightful power thereof, or to excite the odium or resentment of all or any of the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted.

This respondent further says, that at all times, he has, in his official acts as President, recognized the authority of the several Congresses of the United States as constituted and organized during his administration of the office of President of the United States; and this respondent, further answering, says that he has from time to time, under his Constitutional right and duty as President of the United States, communicated to Congress his views and opinions in regard to such acts or resolutions thereof as, being submitted to him as President of the United States, in pursuance of the Constitution, seemed to this respondent to require such communication; and he has from time to time, in the exercise of that freedom of speech which belongs to him as a citizen of the United States, and in his political relations as President of the United States to the people of the United States as upon fit occasions a duty of the highest obligation expressed to his fellow citizens his views and opinions, respecting them as such, and proceed. ings of Congress, and that in such, addresses to his fellow citizens, and in such his communications to Congress he has expressed his views, opinions and judgment of and concerning the actual constitution of the two houses of Congress, without representation therein of certain states of the Union, and of the effect that in wisdom and justice, in the opinion and judgment of this respondent, Congress in its legislation and proceedings should given to this political circunstance, and whatsoever he has thus communicated to Congress, or addressed to his fellow-citizens or any assemblage thereof, this respondent says was and is within and according to his right and privilege as an American citizen, and his right and duty as President of the United States; and this respondent, not waiving or at all disparaging his right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, as hereinbefore or hereinafter more particularly set forth, but claiming and insisting upon the same.

Further answering the said tenth article, says that the views and opinions expressed by this respondent in his said addresses to the assemblages of his fellow citizens. as in said artfcle or in this answer thereto mentioned, are, not, and were not intended to be other or different from those expressed by him in his communications to Congress; that the eleven States lately in insurrection never had ceased to be States of the Union, and that they were then entitled to representation in Congress by loyal Representatives and Senators, as fully as the other States of the Union, and that, consequently, the Congress as then constituted was not, in fact, a Congress of all the States, but a Congress of only a part of the States. This respondent, always protesting against the unauthorized exclusion therefrom of the said eleven States, nevertheless gave his assent to all laws passed by said Congress, which did not, in his opinion and judgment, violate the Constitution, exercising his constitutional authority of returning bills to said Congress with his objections, when they ap peared to him to be unconstitutional or inexpedient.

But further, this respondent has also expressed the opinion, both in his communications to Congress and in his addresses to the people, that the policy adopted by Congress in reference to the States lately in insurrection did not tend to peace and harmony and union, but, on the contrary, did tend to disunion and the permanent disruption of the States, and that in following its said policy laws had been passed by Congress in violation of the fundamental principles of the government, and which tended to consolidation and despotism, and such being his deliberate opinions, he would have felt himself unmindful of the high duties of his office if he had failed to express them in his communications to Congress or in his addresses to the people, when called upon by them to express his opinions on matters of public and political consideration.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article, says that he has always claimed and insisted, and now claims and insists, that both in his personal and private capacity of a citizen of the United States, and in the political relations of the President of the United States to the people of the United States-whose servant, under the duties and responsibilities of the Constitution of the United States, the President of the United States is, and should always remain-this respondent had and has the full right, and, in his office of President of the United States, is held to the high duty of forming, and and on fit occasions expressing opinions of and concerning the legislation of Congress, proposed or completed, in respect of its wisdom, expediency, justice, worthi ness, objects, purposes and public and political motives and tendencies, and within and as a part of such right and duty, to form and on fit occasions to express opinions of and concerning the public character and conduct, views, purposes, objects, motives and tendencies of all men engaged in the public service, as well in Congress as otherwise, aud under no other rules or limits upon this right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, or of responsibility and amenability for the actual exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, than attend upon such rights and their exercise on the part of all other citizens of the United States, and on the part of all their public servants. And this respondent, further answering said tenth article, says that the several occasions on which, as is alleged in the

several specifications of said article, this respondent addressed his fellow citizens on subjects of public and political consideration, were not nor was any one of them sought or planned by this respondent, but on the contrary each of said occasions arose upon the exercise of a lawful and accusto med right of the people of the United States to call upon their public servants and express to them their opinions, wishes and feelings upon matters of public and political consideration, and to invite from such public servants an expression of their opinions, views and feelings on matters of public and political consideration. And this respondeat claims and insists, before this honorable court, and before all the people of the United States, that of or concerning this, his right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, and this his exercise of such rights on all matters of public and political consideration, and in respect of all public servants or persons whatsoever engaged in or connected therewith, this respondent, as a citizen or as President of the United States, is not subject to question, inquisition, impeachment or inculpation, in any form or manner whatsoever.

And this respondent says that neither the said tenth article nor any specification thereof nor any allegation therein contained touches or relates to any official act or doing of this respondent in the office of President of the United States, or in the discharge of any of its constitutional or legal duties or responsibilities, but that the said article and the specifications and allegations thereof wholly and in every part thereof question only the discretion or propriety of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech, as exercised by this respondent as a citizen of the United States in his personal right and capacity, and without allegation or imputation against this respondent of the violation of any law of the United States, touching or relating to the freedom of speech or Its exercise by the citizens of the United States, or by this respondent as one of the said citizens or otherwise; and be denies that by reason of any matters in the said article or its specifications alleged, he has said or done anything indecent or unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate of the United States, or that he has brought the high office of the President of the United States into contempt, ridicule or disgrace, or that he has committed or has been guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

And in answer to the eleventh article, this respondent denies that on the 18th day of August, in the year 1866, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, he did, by public speech or otherwise, declare or affirm in substance or at all, that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States, authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, or that he did then and there declare or affirm that the said Thirty-ninth Congress was a Congress of only part of the States, in any sense or meaning, other than that eleven States of the Union were denied representation therein; or that he made any or either of the declarations or affirmations on this behalf in the said article, alleged as denying, or intending to deny that the legislation of said Thirty-ninth Congress was not valid or obligatory upon this respondent, except so far as this respondent saw fit to approve the same; and as to the allegation in said article that he did thereby intend, or made to be understood that the said Congress had not power to propose amendments to the Constitution. this respondent says that in said address he said nothing in reference to the subject of amendments of the Constitution, nor was the question of the competency of the said Congress to propose such amendments without the participation of said States in any way mentioned or considered or referred to by this respondent, nor in what he did say had he any intent regarding the same, and he denies the allegation so made to the contrary thereof; but this respondent in further answer to, and in respect of the said allegations of the said eleventh article herein before traversed and denied, claims and insists upon his personal and official right of freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, and his duty in his political relations as President of the United States to the people of the United States, in the exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech in the same manner, form and effect 28 he has in this behalf stated the same in his answer to the said tenth article, and with the same effect as if he here repeated the same. And he further claims and insists, as in said answer to said tenth article he has claimed and insisted, that he is not subject to question of impeachment or inculpation in any form or manner, of or concerning such rights of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech, or his said alleged exercise thereof. And this respondent further denies that on the 21st day of February, in the year 1868. or at any other time, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, in pursuance of any such declaration as is in that beha!fin the said eleventh article alleged, or otherwise, he did, unlawfully and in disregard of the requirement of the Constitution, that he should take care that the laws should be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the execution of an act entitled "an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive measures by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of Secretary for the Department of War: or by unlawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive means to prevent the execution of an act entitled "an act making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year iding June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," approved Ma ch 2, 1867; or to prevent the execution of an

act entitled "an act to provide for the more efficient go vernment of the Rebel States," passed March 21, 1867.

And this respondent, further answering the said elevent article, says that he has in his answer to the hr-t artic Bet forth in detail the acts, steps, and proceedings done and taken by this respondent to and towards or in the matter of the suspension or removal of the said Edwin M. Stanton in or from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, with the times, modes, circumstances, intents, views, purposes, and opinions of official obligation and duty under and with which such acts, steps, and proceedings were done and taken; and he makes answer to this eleventh article of the matter in his answer to the first article, pertaining to the suspension or removal of said Edwin M. Stanton, to the same intent and effect as if they were here repeated and set forth.

And this respondent further answering the said eleventh article denies that by means or reason of anything in said article alleged, this respondent as President of the United States, did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, or any other day or time commit, or that he was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and this respondent further answering the said eleventh article, says that the same and the matters therein contained do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this respondent in his office of President of the United States; not the omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty in his office of President of the United States, nor does the said article nor matters there contained name, designate, describe or define any act or mode or form of device, contrivance or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance or means, whereby this respondent can know or under stand what act or mode or form of attempt, device, contrivance or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance or means are imputed to or charged against this respondent, in his office of President of the United States, or intended so to be, or whereby this respondent can more fully or definitely make answer unto said article than he hereby does. And this respondent, in submitting to this honorable court this, his answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him, respectfully reserves the right to amend and add to the same from time to time, as may be come necessary or proper, and when and as such necessity and propriety shall appear. (Signed)

ANDREW JOHNSON,
HENRY STANBERY,
B. R. CURTIS,
THOMAS A. R. NELSON,
WILLIAM EVARTS,

W. S. GROESBECK,

Of Counsel.

Messrs. Stanbery and Evarts successively relieved Mr. Curtis in the reading, which occupied until about three o'clock.

At the conclusion the Chief Justice put the qustion on receiving the answer and ordering it to be filed, which was agreed to.

Mr. BOUTWELL-Mr. President, by direction of the managers on the part of the House of Representatives, I have the honor to present a copy of the answer filed by Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the articles of impeachment presented by the House of Representatives; and to say that it is the expectation of the managers that they will be able, at one o'clock to-morrow, after consultation with the House, to present a fit replication to the answer. (Sensation in the galleries).

Mr. EVARTS, of counsel-Chief Justice:-The oounsel for the President think it proper, unless some objection show now be made, to bring to the attention of the honorable court the matter of provision for the allowance of time given for the preparation for the trial which shall be accorded to the President and his counsel, after the replication of the House of Representatives to the President shall be submitted to this court. In the application which was made on the 13th inst., for time for preparation and submission of answer which had been presented to the court, were included in our consideration of that time that we so asked, with the expectation and intention or carrying on with all due diligence, at the same time, the preparation of the answer and the preparation for the trial.

The action of the court, and its determination of the time within which the answers should properly be by this court, to devote our whole time to the prepapresented, has obliged us, as may be well understood

ration of the answer, and we have had no time to consider the various questions of law and offeet, and the forms for the production of the same, which rest upon the responsibility and lie within the duty of counsel in all matters requiring judicial consideration. We, therefore, if the honorable court please, submit now the request that the President and his counsel may be allowed the period of thirty days after the filing of the replication on the part of the House of Representa-1 tives to the answer of the President for the preparation for trial, and before it shall actually proceed; and I beg leave to send to the Chief Justice a written minute of that proposition, signed by counsel.

The Chief Justice stated the question to be on the motion of Mr. Boutwell, of the managers.

Senator SUMNER misapprehending the question, said:-Before the vote, I wish to inquire if the honorable managers on the part of the House desire to be heard?

The Chief Justice explained the question to be on the motion on the part of the managers, which was then put and agreed to..

The Secretary read the application of the counsel for the President, which was addressed "To the Senate of the United States, sitting as a Court of Impeachment," representing that after the replication to this answer shall have been filed, it will, in the opinion and judgment of the counsel, require not less than thirty days for preparation for the trial. Signed by counsel for the President.

Mr. HOWARD-If it be in order, I move that that application lie on the table until the replication of the House of Representatives has been filed.

Mr. BINGHAM-Mr. President, before that motion takes effect, if it be the pleasure of the Senate, the managers are ready to consider this application.

The Chief Justice was stating the question to be on the motion of Mr. Howard, when

Mr. HOWARD withdrew the motion.

3 Mr. LOGAN, of the managers, objected to the application, as not containing any reason to justify the Senate in postponing the trial, not that they desired to force it on with unnecessary rapidity, but because Auch reasons should be given in an application for time as would be adhered to in a court of law. Counsel had merely asked an opportunity to prepare themselves. They had had and would have had during the trial an equal opportunity with the managers for preparation. The application did not state that any material witnesses could not be procured, or that time for their procurement was required, before the commencement of the trial. The answer admitted the facts of the appointments, &c., charged in the first artrcle. They were within the knowledge of the President, who, being charged by these articles with high crimes and misdemeanors, his counsel, if there was any reason for this application, should have stated it.

On the trial of Judges Chase and Peck, and other trials here and in other countries, such applications were accompanied with reasons for asking delay, such as necessary witnesses, records. &c., at a distance, the examination of decisions, &c., and were sworn to by the respondent to the articles of impeachment. The learned counsel on the other side had, doubtless, examined the authorities on such trials, and knew that these things were requisite on an application for a continuance of a case in a court of law, because of the absence of a witness. It was usual to state on affidavit what it was expected to prove by the witness, his residence, that he could be procured at a certain time, and that the facts could not be proven by any other witness.

In this application none of these requirements were complied with; it simply asked time to prepare for the trial of this cause; that is, time to examine authorities, to prepare arguments, and for naught else. Time should not be given in this more than in any other case, unless for good canse shown, as provided by order of the Senate. Showing cause meant that necessity should be shown for the continuance of the trial. He reminded them, that in the trial of Judge Chase an application had been made for a period of time for four days more than proved to be necessary to try the whole cause.

In the trial of Queen Caroline' of England, in answer to an application for time to procure witnesses, &c., which was granted merely out of courtesy to the Queen, the Attorney-General protested against its becoming a precedent in the trial of future causes. He (Mr. Logan) insisted that no more time should be given in this case than is absolutely necessary to try the cause, since no necessity for an extension had been shown whereby the court could judge of its materiality. If it were granted, there would probably be, at the end of that period, an application for twenty or thirty days. more, for the purpose of procuring witnesses living in Sitka, or some other remote part of the country.

He would say, whether it was considered proper or not, that no more time should be granted in the trial of the President than in the trial of the poorest man that lives. They were amenable to the same laws, and subject to the same laws. The managers had accused the President of intentionally obstructing the

laws, and other serious offenses, which, if true, showed that it was dangerous for him to remain the chief magistrate of this nation, and, therefore, time should not be given unless sufficient reasons were shown.

To the allegation that time would be given to an ordinary criminal he would say, that the managers considered the President a criminal, and had so charged, but the counsel had not, as required in the case of ordinary criminals, shown reasons for the delay. Mr. Logan reiterated and enlarged upon the view that the nature of the crime charged was such that delay was dangerous.

The managers were here to enter their protest against any extension of time whatever, after the filing of their replication to-morrow, at one o'clock, at which time they would ask leave to state their case to the Senate, and follow it up with their evidence, the other side following with theirs. He asked that the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, extmine carefully whether or not any facts are shown to' justify this application, and whether due diligence had been employed in procuring witnesses and get ting ready for trial. They protested against such an application being made without even an affidavit to support it.

Mr. EVARTS denied that because courts other than those called for a special purpose and with limited authority, have established regulations bearing upon the right of defendant in civil or criminal prosecutions, having established terms of court, and weil recog nized and understood habits in conduct of judicial action, that should influence the proceedings of this body. The time had not arrived for the counsel for the accused to consider what issues are to be prepared on their side, and they felt no occasion to present an affidavit on matters so completely within the cogn zance of the court, obedient, said he, to the orders of the court.

Observant, as we propose at all times to be, of that public necessity and duty which requires on the part of the President of the United States and his counsel not less than on the part of the House of Representa tives and its manager, that diligence should be used, and that we as counsel should be withdrawn from all other professional or personal avocations, yet we cannot recognize in presence of this court, that it is an answer to an application for reasonable time to con sider and prepare to subpoena and produce, in all things to arrange, and in all things to be ready for the actual procedure of the trial. Nor, with great re spect to the honorable managers in this great pro cedure, do we deem a sufficient answer to our desire to be relieved from undue pressure of haste upon our part, that equal pressure of haste may have been en tailed upon them.

Mr. EVARTS proceeded to say that the ability of the counsel to proceed with the trial was not to be measured by that of the managers, the latter having the power, and having exercised it for a considerable period, of summoning witnesses and calling for papers. He thought if the court would give due at tention and respect to the statement of counsel, they would see that very considerable range of subjects and practical considerations presented themselves to their attention and judgment. They were placed in the condition of a defendant who, upon issue joined, de sired time to prepare for trial, in which the ordinary course was as a matter of absolute universal custom to allow a continuance.

They asked no more time than in the interests of justice and of duty should be given to the poorest man in the country. Measures of justice and duty had no respect to poverty or station whatever. If on the part of the managers, or of the accused, from any cause, a proper delay for the production of a witness was re quired, it would be the duty of the court to take it into consideration and provide for it. It would be a departure from the general habit of all courts if, after issue joined, they were not allowed reasonable time before they were called upon to proceed with the case.

Mr. WILSON, of the managers, said the managers had determined, so far as was in their power, this case should not be taken out of the line of the precedent, and would therefore resist all application for unreasonable delay, and they have prepared to meet the question now. The first step taken by the respondent's counsel, on the 13th inst., are the prece dents on the trial of Judge Chase. On the return day of the summons, he appeared and applied for time to answer, coupling with it a request for time to prepare for trial, which he supported with a solemn affidavit that he could not be prepared sooner than the 5th of