the succeeding March, and therefore asked for time until the commencement of the next session of Congress.

The application was denied, and he was required to answer on the 4th of February succeeding, and five days before the expiration of the time declared by him to be necessary, the case was concluded by an acquittal, so complete had been the preparation.

In the case of Judge Peck, he appeared on the retarn day, three days after the service of summons, and applied for and was granted time to answer. In this Case, however, notwithstanding the rule of the Senate requiring the filing of the answer then, they were met with an application for forty days.

The Senate allowed ten days for the answer. In that answer he found the strongest argument against any delay of this case, the respondent therein, had a right under the Constitution, as among his just powers to do the very acts charged against him at the bar of the Senate. This in ordinary cases might not be a weighty consideration, but here the respondent was not only to obey the law like all citizens, but to exeeute it, being clothed with the whole executive power of the nation,

In the opinion of the House of Representatives he had not discharged that duty as required by his oath of office, and for that failure and for a positive breach of the law, they arraigned him at this bar. With the admission in the answer he asked time to make good his declarations, holding in his hands this immense Executive power, no provision having been made for its surrender-holding that power over the nation with which he has disturbed and is disturbing the repose of the Republic. They felt it their duty to urge a speedy progress towards the trial of this case, which should guarantee the rights of the people, at the same time observing the rights that belong to the accused.

But for the order adopted by the Senate on the 18th inst., this application could not have been made, but the case must have been discussed on the threshhold. That order had now the effect of this rule:"Ordered, That unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immedialy after the replication be filed." He submitted that there was not sufficient cause shown in this application to justify the Senate, in the exercise of a sound discretion, in granting the time asked for. That discretion was not without the rule itself. It must act upon some rule, and put itself within the bounds of reason, and he denied that this was such an application as to justify its exercise in giving one hour's delay.

It would be observed that the respondent was carefully kept out of this motion. In all the cases of which he (Mr. Wilson) had any knowledge in this country, the respondent, even when judges ta ken from the bench, had asked in their own names for delay, supporting the application by affidavits, covering the features of the case and unfolding the line of their defense, asking a reasonable time in which to prepare for trial. We therefore ask, he continued, that when this case is thus kept out of the ordinary channel, the Senate will regard in the same degree the voice of the House of Representatives as prescribed by the managers, and put this respondent upon his speedy trial, to the end that peace may be restored to the country by the healing of the breach between the two departments of the government, and that all things may again move in this land as they did in times past, and before this unfortunate conflict occurred. Therefore, sir, in the name of the Representatives, we ask that this application, as it is now preBented, may be denied.

Mr. HENDERSON moved to postpone the decision of the question.

Mr. STANBERY on behalf of the President, said:On the 13th of this month we entered our appearance, and this honorable court made an order that we should have till the 23d (this day), to file an answer. It gave the managers leave to file their replication without limit as to time, but provided that on the filing of their replication the case should proceed to trial, unless reasonable cause were shown for further delay. The honorable court, therefore, meant us to have time to prepare for trial if we should show reasonable ground for the application. Now what has happened, Mr. Chief Justice.

What has been stated to this honorable court, composed in a great measure of members of the bar, by members of the bar on their professional honor, we have stated that since we had this leave to file the answer every hour and every moment of our time has

been occupied in preparing it. Not an instant has been lost. We refused all other applications and de voted ourselves exclusively to this duty day and night; and I am sorry to be obliged to say that even the day sacred to other uses has been employed in this duty.

Allow me further to say to this honorable court, that not until within a few minutes before we came into court this morning, was the answer concluded. Certainly it was intended on the 13th to give us time, not merely to prepare our answer, but to prepare for that still more important thing, the trial. I hope I shall obtain credit with this honorable court, when I say that we have been so pressed with the duty of making up the issues and preparing the answer, that we have not had an opportunity of asking the President what witnesses he should produce.

We have been so pressed that the communications. which we have received from the honorable managers in reference to the admission of testimony and facilities of proof, we have had to reply to by saying:-"We have not yet, gentlemen, a moment's time to consider it; all that we know of the case is, that it charges transactions not only here, but in Cleveland, St. Louis and other distant points, and the managers have sent us a list of witnesses who are to testify in matters of which they intend to make proof against us. But we have not had an upportunity of knowing what witnesses we are to produce. We have not subpoenaed

any.

Now mark the advantages which all this time the honorable managers have had over us. As I under stand, and it will not be denied, almost ever day they have been engaged in the preparation of this case Their articles were framed long ago. While we were engaged in preparing our answer they have been, as I understand, most industriously engaged in preparing their witnesses. Day after day witnesses have been called before them and examined. We had no such power and no such opportunity. We are here without any preparation- without having had a moment's time to consult with our client or among ourselves.

The managers say that our anxiety is to prepare ourselves, whereas they are all prepared-completely prepared. So far as counsel is concerned, I am very happy to hear that they are. I should be very far from saying that I am equally prepared. I have had no time to look at anything else except this necessary and all-absorbing duty of preparing the answer. Now, if the Senate says we shall go on when this replication comes in to-morrow, it places me in a position in which I never have been before in all my practice, with a formidable array of counsel against me, and yet not a witness summoned, not a document prepared, all unarmed and defenseless.

I beg this honorable court to give us time. If it cannot give us all the time we ask, let it give us some time at least, within which, by the utmost diligence, we can make what preparations we deem necessary, and without which we cannot safely go to trial. Gentle men of the other side complained that we should have been ready on the 13th, and read against us a rule that that was the day fixed for not only the appearance, but filing the answer. They read out of the rule that old formula which has come down from five hundred years back, in reference to appearing and answering. It is the same language adopted in those early times when the defendant was called upon and answered by parole; but then our ancestors would not answer on the day of appearance, but always asked and had time for answer.

Mr. BINGHAM, one of the managers, rose to reply. The Chief Justice intimated that when counsel make any motion to the court, the counsel who make the motion have invariably the right to close the argu.

ment.

•

ever tried in the Senate of the Under States under the Constitution, the case of Blount, although the accused had interposed a plea to the jurisdictions, the argument was closed by the manager on the part of the House. I had risen for the purpose of making some response to the remarks last made; but as the presiding officer has interposed the objection to the Senate, I do not deem it proper for me to proceed further until the Senate shall have passed on the question.

Senator HOWARD said he rose to move to lay the motion of the counsel on the table.

Mr. BOUTWELL, one of the managers, remarked that it seemed to the managers, and to himself, especially, a matter of so much importance as to whether the managers should have the closing argument, that he wished, and they wished, that to be decided now.

Senator HOWARD said that it was not his intention to shut off debate or discussion, either on the part of the managers or on the part of counsel for the accused, and if there was any desire on the part of either to proceed with the discussion he would withdraw his moto lay on the table.

Mr. BINGHAM then said-I deeply regret, Mr. President, that the counsel for the accused have made any question here, or any intimation, if you please, that a question is made or intended to be made by the managers touching the entire sincerity with which they ask this time. I am sure that nothing was further from our purpose than that. The gentleman who last took his seat (Mr. Stanbery) spoke of having presented this application on their honor. No man questions their honor-no man who knows them wiil question their honor-but we must be pardoned for saying that it is altogether unusual, on questions of this kind, to allow continuance to be obtained on a mere point of Lonor.

The rule of the Senate which was adopted on the 13th inst., is the ordinary rule in courts of law, namely, that the trial shall proceed unless for cause shown further time Bhall be allowed. I submit that a question of this magnitude has never been decided on the mere presentation of counsel in this country or any other country. The point of continuance arising on a question of this sort, I venture to say, has never been decided affirmatively, at least in favor of such a proposition, on the mere statement of counsel. If Andrew Johnson will say that there are witnesses not within the process of this court, but whose attendance he can hope to procure if time be allowed him; and if he will make affidavit before this tribune that they are ma terial, and will set forth in his affidavit what he expects to prove by them. I concede that on such a showing there would be something on which the Senate might probably act, but instead of that he throws himself back on his counsel, and has them to make their statement here that it will require thirty days of time in which to prepare for trial. He sent those gentlemen at the bar of this tribunal on the 13th inst., to notify the Senate, on their honor, that it would require forty days to prepare an answer, and now he sends them back, upon their honors, to notify the Senate that it will require thirty days to prepare for trial. I take it, sir, that the counsel for the accused have quite as much time for preparation, if this trial shall proceed tomorrow, as had the managers on the part of the House, who are charged with duties by the people which they are not permitted to lay aside from day to day, in the other end of the Capitol. I think, on the showing made here this day by the President of the United States, unless very good cause is shown, and that, too, under the obligation of his own oath at the bar of the Senate, that not another hour's continuance should be allowed him after the case shall have been put at issue. We asked leave to suggest to the Senate that we hoped on to-morrow, by leave of the 'people's representatives, to put this case at issue by filing a replication. That is all the delay we desire.

They have had the opportunity for process ever since the 13th inst.. and they are guilty of gross neglect-I do not speak of the counsel, but of the accused-in not having the witnesses subpoenaed; and yet not a single summons has been required by him, under the rule and order of this tribunal, to bring to the bar a single witness on his behalf. He has shown a total neglect; and yet he comes here with a confession and avoidance of the matters presented by the House of Representatives, and tells the Senate, and tells the country that he defies their power, thus trifling with the great power which the people, for various purposes, have reposed in the hands of their Representatives and Senators in Congress assembled. What is this power of impeachment if the President of the United States, holding the whole executive power of the nation, is permitted, when arraigned at the bar of the Senate, in the name of all the people, and charged with high crimes and misdemeanors, in that he has violated his oath, in that he has violated the Constitution of the country, in that he has violated the peoples' laws, and attempted by his violation to lay hands upon the peoples' treasury? What, I say, is this great defensive power worth if the President, on a mere statement of counsel, be permitted to postpone for further inquiry for thirty days, until he prepare to do what?

Until he prepare to make good his elaborate statement Bet forth in his answer that the Constitution is but a ca

binet in his hands, and that he defiés our power to restrain him When I heard this discussion going on, I thought of the weighty words of that great man whose luminous in tellect shed lustre on the jurisprudence of his country and the great State of New York for more than one-third of a century, when he wrote it down in his commentaries on the laws-commentaries that will live as long as our language lives that if the President of the United States will not be restrained from abusing the trust committed to him by the people, either by the obligations of his oath or by the written requirement of the Constitution, that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, or by the other provision that his term of office is limited to the short tenure of four years; nor yet by the decent respect to the public opinion of the country, there remains the tremendous power lodged by the people under the Constitution in the hands of their representatives to' arrest him by impeachment in the abuse of the great trust committed to his hands.

Faithful to the duties imposed upon us by our oaths as, the representatives of the people, we have interposed that remedy by arresting the man. He comes to-day to answer us, and he says to us, "I defy your impeachment; by the Executive power reposed in me by the Constitution, I claim, in the presence of the Senate and in the presence of the country, the right. without challenge, let or hindrance, to suspend every Executive officer of this government, at my pleasure."

I venture to say, before the enlightened bar of public opinion in America, that by those motives incorporated, in his answer the President is as guilty of malfeasance and misdemeanor in office, as ever man was guilty of malfeasance and misdemeanor in office since the nations. began to be on earth. What, that he will suspend all the executive officers of the government at his pleasure, not by force of the Tenure of Office act, to which he makes refer ence, and which he says is void and of no effect, but by force of the Constitution of the United States; that, too, while the Senate is in session, What does he mean by it? Let the Senate answer when it comes to vote on this proposition for the extension of time. Does he mean by it that he will vacate the offices and not fill them? Does he mean by that, your money appropriated for carrying on and administering the government shall remain locked up in the vaults of the Treasury, and shall not be applied, or does he mean by it that he will repeal what he has already done in the presence of the Senate and in violation of the Constitution and the laws, and will remove without the consent of the Senate, and will appoint while the Senate is in session, without its consent and advice, just such persons as will answer his own purpose? Is that what he means by it? If it is, it is a very easy method of repealing the Constitution of the United States. I admit that it is a time honored rule of law, the gathered wisdom of a thousand years, that the accused has the right to a speedy and impartial trial.

I claim that the people also have a right to a speedy and impartial trial, and that the question pending here touches in some sort the rights of the people. In their name we demand here a speedy and impartial trial. If the Presi dent is not guilty, we ask in behalf of the country that he shall be declared innocent of the offenses of which he stands charged. If it be the judgment of the Senate that he has laid violent hands on the Constitution of the country, and rent it to tatters in the presence of its custodians, the sooner that judgment is pronounced the better. In this view of the case the public interests demand that the triat shall proceed until, by the solemn oath of the accused, made at the bar, it shall be made to appear that he cannot proceed on account of the absence of witnesses material to him, and until he states what he expects to prove by them.

I venture to say that he can make no showing of that sort which we are not ready to meet, by saying that we will admit that his witnesses will swear to his statements, and let him have the benefit of that, Nearly all the testimony involved in the issue is documentary. Much of it is official. It will occur to the Senate that as this trial progresses, they will have as much time for preparation by the time that the case closes on the part of the government as we have had. We make no boast of any superior preparation of this matter. We desire simply to discharge our duty as best we can. We assume no superiority over counsel, as was intimated by the gentleman (Mr. Stanbery). We desire simply to discharge our duty here; to discharge it promptly, to discharge it faithfully.

We appeal to the Senate to grant us the opportunity of doing so, that justice may be done between the people of the United States and the President of the United Stases; that the Constitution which he had violated may be vindicated, and that the wrong he has committed against an outraged and betrayed people may be speedily redressed. Mr. BUTLER, another of the managers, said he would like to call the attention of the Senate to the position in which the managers would be placed if the question of time were not settled now. If a replication were made at all, he thought he could say for his associates that it would be simply a gaining of issue to the answer, and therefore, and for that purpose, it might be considered already filed. The managers would have to be ready at all hazards by tomorrow to go on with the case, with the uncertainty of having the court, or rather, "he begged pardon," the Senate postponing the trial for thirty days.

He therefore agreed with the counsel for the defense, that it was better for all that the questipn should be settled now. He knew he spoke for the managera and for the House of Representatives when he urged that the question should be settled now. Our subpoenas, said he, are out. Our witnesses have been called. We want to

know when to bring them here. We have got to come here sure, and we will be here. (Laughter, which was promptly suppressed by the Chair.) That is all we ask. Therefore I trust that the Senate will fix, at this time, the hour and the day that this trial shall certainly proceed.

1

Senator HENDERSON offered the following:Ordered, That the application of counsel for the President to be allowed thirty days to prepare for the trial of Impeachment, be postponed until after the replication is filed.

The question was taken by yeas and nays, and resulted as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Authony, Buckalew, Cattell, Cole, Dixon, Doolittle. Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill (Me.), Norton, Patterson (Tenn.), Ross, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Trumbull, Van Winkle and Vickers

-25.

NAYS-Messrs. Bayard, Cameron, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Davis, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Nye, Patterson (N. H.), Pomeroy, Ramsey, Stewart, Sumner. Thayer, Tipton, Willey, Williams, Wilson and Yates-21, Senator HOWARD moved that the motion of the counsel for the accused be laid on the table.

Senator DRAKE made the question of order that it was not in order to move to lay on the table a proposition of the counsel for the accused, or of the managers.

The Chief Justice sustained the point of order, and the motion was received.

The question recurring on the application of counsel for the President that they be allowed thirty days to prepare for the trial.

The question was taken by yeas and nays, and resulted yeas, 11; nays, 41, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolit tle, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson, of TenuesSaulsbury and Vickers. Bee

NAYS.-Messrs. Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cenkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry. Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Har lan, Henderson, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill (Me.), Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Nye, Patterson (N. H.), Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Trumbull, Upson, Van Winkle, Willey, Williams, Wilson and Yates.

The application was rejected.

Mr. EVARTS then submitted the following:Counsel for the President now move that there be allowed for preparation to the President of the United States for the trial, after the replication shall be filed and before the trial shall be required to proceed, such reasonable time as shall be now fixed by the Senate,

Senator JOHNSON inquired whether it was in order to amend that motion.

The Chief Justice informed him that it was in order to submit an independent proposition.

Mr. JOHNSON-I move, then, that ten days be allowed after the filing of the replieation.

Mr. SHERMAN then moved that the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, adjourn till to-morrow at one o'clock.

The motion was agreed to.

The Chief Justice thereupon vacated the Chair, which was resumed by the presiding officer of the Senate, and the Senate, at 4'45 P. M. adjourned.

ment.

Replication.

Replication of the House of Representatives of the United States to the answer of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the articles of impeachment ex hibited against him by the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives of the United States have con-idered the several answers of Andrew Johnson, Presi dent of the United States, to the several articles of impeachment against him by them exhibited in the name of themselves and of all the people of the United States, and reserving to themselves all the advantage of exception to the insufficiency of the answer to each and all of the several articles of impeachment exhibited against the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do deny each and every averment in said several answers, or either of them, which denies or traverses the acts, intents, crimes or misdemeanors charged against the said Andrew Johnson in said articles of impeachment, or either of them, and for replication to the said answer do say that the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, is guilty of the high crimes and misdemeanors mentioned in said articles, and that the House of Representatives are ready to prove the same.

At the conclusion of the reading, Senator JOHNSON said:-Mr. Chief Justice, I move that an authenticated copy be presented to the counsel for the Presi dent. The motion was agreed to.

Time for Preparation

The Chief Justice-Last evening a motion was pending on the part of the counsel for the President, that such time should be allowed for their preparation as the Senate should please to determine; thereupon the Senator from Maryland (Mr. Johnson) presented an order which will be read by the Secretary.

The Secretary read the order providing that ten. days time be allowed.

Mr. SUMNER-Mr. President, I send to the Chair an amendment, to come immediately after the word "ordered," being in the nature of a substitute.

The Secretary read the amendment, as follows:That now that replication has been filed, the Senate, adhering to its rule already adopted, shall proceed with the trial from day to day, Sundays excepted, unless otherwise ordered or reasons shown.

Mr. EDMUNDS-I move that the Senate retire to consider that order.

Senator SUMNER, and others-No, no.

The yeas and nays were demanded and ordered, re sulting as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Fre linghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Howe, John son, McCreery, Morrill, (Me.); Morrill, (Vt.); Norton Patterson, (N. H.); Patterson, (Tenn.); Saulsbury, Sprague, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey and Williams-29. NAYS-Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conk ling, Conness, Cragin, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Sherman, Stewart Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull and Wilson-23. So the Senate retired for consideration at 1.25.

Consultation.

After the Senators had retired, Mr. Stevens was dis covered sitting to the left and rear of the President's desk, having entered unnoticed during the proceedings. In the meantime the galleries, hitherto very quiet, rippled with fans and chit-chat, in the assurance that the curtain was down, while on the floor the seats sacred to Senators were invaded by knots of members and others in conversation.

The Private Consultation.

When the Senate had retired for consultation, Mr. JOHNSON modified the resolution he had previously submitted in the Chamber, by providing that the trial of the President shall commence on Thursday, April 2 Mr. WILLIAMS moved that the further consideration of the respondent's application for time be postponed until the managers have opened their case and submitted their evidence.

This was disagreed to by a vote of 42 nays to 9 yeas, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anthony, Chandler, Dixon, Grimes, Hap lan, Howard, Morgan, Patterson (Tenn.) and Williams.

NAYS.-Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Cameron, Cattell, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Cragin, Davis, Doolittle, Drake Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Henderson, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill (M), Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Norton, Nye, Patterson, (N. H.) Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Saulsbury, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey and Wilson.

Sherman,

Absent or not voting.-Messrs. Corbett, Wade and Yates. Mr. SUMNER had offered the following amendment, which ie subsequently withdrew:

Now that replication has been filed, the Senate, adher

ing to its rule, already adopted, will proceed with the trial from day to day, Sundays excepted, unless otherwise or. dered, or reason shown.

Mr. CONKLING moved an amendment to Mr. Johnson's resolution, by striking out Thursday, April 2, and inserting Monday, March 30, as the time when the trial shall commence.

This was agreed to. Yeas, 28; nays, 24, as follows:YEAS.-Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Cragin, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill (Me.), Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Nye, Patterson (N. H.), Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Willey, Williams, Wilson-28.

NAYS. Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson (Tenn.), Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Trumbull, Van Winkle and Vickers-24. Absent or not voting. -Messrs. Wade and Yates. Other modifications were made to the original resolution, when it was adopted as read in open Senate, Return of the Senate.

At 3.25 P. M. the Senate reappeared, having been out exactly two hours. Order having been restored, the Chief Justice said:

I am directed to inform the counsel that the Senate has agreed to an order, in response to their applica tion, which will now be read:

"Ordered-That the Senate will commence the trial of the President, upon the articles of impeachment exhibited against him, on Monday, the 30th day of March inst., and proceed therein with all despatch under the rules of the Senate sitting upon the trial of an impeachment."

After a momentary pause the Chief Justice asked:Have the counsel for the President anything to pro pose?

The counsel bowed in acquiescence to the decision. Mr. BUTLER, of the managers-If the Chair will allow me, I will give notice to the witnesses to appear here on Monday, the 30th inst., at 12 o'clock.

The Court Adjourns.

On motion of Senator WILSON, the Court was then adjourned till the date named, at half-past twelve o'clock, and the Chief Justice vacated the Chair, which was immediately resumed by the President pro tem.. Mr. Wade, who called the Senate to order.

PROCEEDINGS OF MONDAY, MARCH 30.

WASHINGTON, March 30.-At 19:30 the President pro tem of the Senate vacated the Chair, which was immediately taken by the Chief Justice.

The Sergeant-at-Arms made a proclamation commanding silence.

The President's counsel entered and took their seats as before, at 12:45, and the Sergeant-at-Arms announced the managers on the part of the House of Representatives, who took their places, with the exception of Mr. Stevens, who entered soon afterward, and took a seat slightly apart from the managers' table.

The House of Representatives was then announced, and the members appeared headed by Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, on the arm of the Clerk of the House, and were seated,

The minutes of the last day of the trial were read, and Mr. Butler commenced his opening at a quarter before one o'clock.

Opening Argument of Mr. Butler.

Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Senate:-The onerous duty has fallen to my fortune to present to you, imperfectly as I must, the several propositions of fact and of law upon which the House of Representatives will endeavor to sustain the cause of the people against the President of the United States, now pending at your bar.

The high station of the accused, the novelty of the proceeding, the gravity of the business, the importance of the questions to be presented to your adjudication, the possible momentous result of the issues, each and all must plead for me to claim your attention for as long a time as your patience may endure.

Now, for the first time in the history of the world, has a nation brought before its highest tribunal its Chief Exeentive Magistrate for trial and possible deposition from office, upon charges of maladministration of the powers and duties of that office. In other times, and in other' lands, it has been found that despotisms could only be tempered by assassination, and nations living under constitutional governments even, have found no mode by which to rid themselves of a tyrannical, imbecile, or faithless ruler, save by overturning the very foundation and frame work of the government itself. And, but recently, in one of the most civilized and powerful governments of the world, from which our own institutions have been largely modeled, we have seen a nation submit for years to the rule of an insane king, because its constitution contained no method for his removal.

Our fathers, more wisely, founding our government, have provided for such and all similar exigencies a conservative, effectual, and practical remedy by the constitutional provision that the "Psesident, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The Constitution leaves nothing to implication, either as to the persons upon whom, or the body by whom, or the tribunal before which, or the offenses for which, or the manner in which this high power should be exercised; each and all are provided for by express words of imperative command.

The House of Representatives shall solely impeach; the Senate only shall try; and in case of conviction the judg ment shall alone be removal from office and disqualification for office, one or both. These mandatory provisions became necessary to adapt a well-known procedure of the mother country to the institutions of the then infant republic. But a single incident only of the business was left to construction, and that concerns the offenses or incapacities which are the groundwork of impeachment. This was wisely done, because human foresight is inadequate, and human intelligence fails in the task of anticipating and providing for, by positive enactment, all the infinite gradations of a human wrong and sin, by which the liberties of a people and the safety of a nation may be endangered from the imbecility, corruption and unhallowed ambition of its rulers.

It may not be uninstructive to observe that the framers of the Constitution. while engaged in their glorious and, I . trust, ever-enduring work, had their attention aroused and their minds quickened most signally upon this very topic. In the previous year only Mr. Burke, from his place in the House of Commons, in England, had preferred charges for impeachment against Warren Hastings, and three days before our convention sat he was impeached at the bar of the House of Lords for misbehavior in office as the ruler of a people whose numbers were counted by millions. The mails were then bringing across the Atlantic, week by week, the eloquent accusations of Burke, the gorgeous and burning denunciations of Sheridan, in behalf of the oppressed people of India, against one who had wielded over them more than regal power. May it not have been that the trial then in progress was the determining cause why the framers of the Constitution left the description of of fenses, because of which the conduct of an officer might be inquired of, to be defined by the laws and usages of Parliament as found in the precedents of the mother country, with which our fathers were as familiar as we are with our own?

In the light, therefore, of these precedents, the question arises, What are impeachable offenses under the provi sions of our Constitution?

To analize, to compare, to reconcile these precedents, is a work rather for the closet than the forum. In order, therefore, to spare your attention, I have preferred to state the result to which I have arrived. and that you may see the authorities and discussions, both in this country and in England, from which we deduce our propositions, so far as applicable to this case, I pray leave to lay before you, at the close of my argument, a brief of all the precedents and authorities upon this subject, in both countries, for which I am indebted to the exhaustive and learned labors of my friend, the honorable William Lawrence, of Ohio, mem ber of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represen tatives, in which I fully concur and which I adopt.

We define, therefore, an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor to be one in its nature or consequences subsersive of some fundamental or essential principle of government, or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a violation of the Constitution of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act com mitted or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives, or for any improper purpose.

The first criticism which will strike the mind on a cursory examination of this definition is, that some of the enumerated acts are not within the cominon-law definition of crimes. It is but common learning that in the English precedents the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" are universally used; but any malversation in office, highly prejudicial to the public interest, or subversive of some fundamental principle of government by which the safety of a people may be in danger, is a high crime against the nation, as the term is used in parliamentary law.

Hallam, in his Constitutional History of England, certainly deduces this doctrine from the precedents, and especially Lord Danby, case 11, State Trials, 600, of which he

ence to the orders of his sovereign. He is answerable for the justice, the honesty, the utility of all measures emanating from the Crown, as well as for their legality; and thus the executive administration is, or ought to be, subordinate in all great matters of policy to the superinten dence and virtual control of the two houses of Parliament. Mr. Christian, in his notes to the Commentaries of Blackstone, explains the collocation and use of the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" by saying:

When the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" are used in prosecutions by impeachment, the words "high crimes" have no definite signification, but are used merely to give greater solenfnity to the charge.

A like interpretation must have been given by the framers of the Constitution, because a like definition to ours was in the mind of Mr. Madison, to whom more than to any other we are indebted for the phraseology of our Constitution, for, in the first Congress, when discussing the power to remove an officer by the President, which is one of the very material questions before the Senate at this moment, he uses the following words:

The danger consists mainly in this:-That the President can displace from office a man whose merits require he should be continued in it. In the first place, he will be impeachable by the House for such an act of maladministration, for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust.

Strengthening this view, we find that within ten years afterwards impeachment was applied by the very men who framed the Constitution to the acts of public officers, which under no common law definition could be justly called crimes or misdemeanors, either high or low. Leav ing, however, the correctness of our proposition to be sustained by the authorities we furnish, we are naturally brought to the consideration of the method of the procedure, and the nature of the proceedings in cases of impeachment, and the character and powers of the tribunal by which high crimes and misdemeanors are to be adjudged or determined.

One of the important questions which meets us at the outset is, Is this proceeding a trial, as that term is understood so far as relates to the rights and duties of a court and jury upon an indictment for crime? Is it not rather more in the nature of an inquest of office?

The Constitution seems to have determined it to be the latter, because, under its provisions the right to retain and hold office is the only subject that can be finally adjudi cated; all preliminary inquiry being carried on solely to determine that question and that alone.

All investigations of fact are in some sense trials, but not in the sense in which the word is used by courts. Again, as a correlative question:

Is this body, now sitting to determine the accusation of the House of Representatives against the President of the United States, the Senate of the United States, or a court? I trust, Mr. President and Senators, I may be pardoned for making some suggestions upon these topics, because to us it seems these are questions not of forms, but of substance. If this body here is a court in any manner as contra-distinguished from the Senate, then we agree that many, if not all the analogies of the procedures of courts must obtain; that the common-law incidents of a trial in court must have place; that you may be bound in your proceedings and adjudication by the rules and precedents of the common or statute law; that the interest, bias or preconceived opinions or affinities to the party, of the judges, may be open to inquiry, and even the rules of order and precedents in courts should have effect; that the managers of the House of Representatives must conform to those rules as they would be applicable to public or private prosecutors of crime in courts, and that the accused may claim the benefit of the rule in criminal cases, that he may only be convicted when the evidence makes the fact clear beyond reasonable doubt, instead of by a preponderance of the evidence.

We claim and respectfully insist that this tribunal has none of the attributes of a judicial court, as they are commonly received and understood. Of course, this question must be largely determined by the express provisions of the Constitution, and in it there is no word, as is well known to you, Senators, which gives the slightest coloring to the idea that this is a court, save that in the trial of this particular respondent, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court must preside. But even this provision can have no determining effect upon the question, because, is not this the same tribunal in all its powers, incidents and duties, when other civil officers are brought to its bar for trial, when the Vice President (not a judicial officer) must preside? Can it be contended for a moment that this is the Senate of the United States when sitting on the trial of all other officers, and a court only when the President is at the bar? solely because in this case, the Constitution has designated the Chief Justice as the presiding officer?

The fact that Senators are sitting for this purpose on oath or affirmation does not influence the argument, because it is well understood that this was but a substitute for the obligation of honor under which, by the theory of the British Constitution, the peers of England were supposed to sit in like cases.

A peer of England makes answer in a court of chancery upon honor, when a common person must answer upon oath. But our fathers, sweeping away all distinctions of caste, require every man alike, acting in a solemn proceeding like this, to take an oath. Our Constitution holds all good men alike honorable, and entitled to honor.

The idea that this tribunal was a court seems to have crept in because of the analogy to similar proceedings in trials before the House of Lords.

Analogies have ever been found deceptive and illusory. Before such analogy is invoked we must not forget that the Houses of Parliament at first, and latterly the House of, Lords, claimed and exercised jurisdiction over all crimes, even where the punishment extended to life and limb. By express provision of our Constitution all such jurisdiction is taken from the Senate, and "the judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as from time to time Congress may ordain and establish." We suggest, therefore, that we are in the presence of the Senate of the United States, convened as a constitutional tribunal, to inquire into and determine whether Andrew Johnson, because of malversation in office, is longer fit to retain the office of President of the United States, or hereafter to hold any office of honor or profit.

I respectfully submit that thus far your mode of proceeding has no analogy to that of a court. You issue a summons to give the respondent notice of the case pending against him. You do not sequester his person-you do not require his personal appearance even; you proceed against him, and will go on to determine his canse in his absence, and make the final order therein. How different is each step from those of ordinary criminal procedure.

A constitutional tribunal solely, you are bound by no law, either statute or common, which may limit your constitutional prerogative. You consult no precedents, save those of the law and custom of parliamentary bodies. You are & law unto yourselves, bound only by the natural princi ples of equity and justice, and that salus populi suprema est lex.

Upon these principles and parliamentary law no judges can aid you, and, indeed, in late yeare, the judges of England in the trial of impeachment. declined to speak to a question of parliamentary law, even at the request of the House of Peers, although they attended on them in their robes of office.

Nearly five hundred years ago, in 1338, the House of Lords resolved, in the case of Belknap and the other judges, that these matters, when brought before them, shall be discussed and adjudged by the course of Parlia ment, and not by the civil law, nor by the common law of the land used in other inferior courts." And that regulation, which was in contravention of the opinion of all the judges of England, and against the remonstrance of Richard II, remains the unquestioned law of England to this day.

Another determining quality of the tribunal, distin guishing it from a court and the analogies of ordinary legal proceedings, and showing that it is a Senate only, is that there can be no right of challenge by either party to any of its members for favor or malice, affinity or interest.

This has been held from the earliest times in Parliament, even when that was the high court of judicature of the realm, sitting to punish all crimes against the peace,

In the case of the Duke of Somerset (1 Howell's State Trials, p. 521), as early as 1551, it was held that the Duke of Northumberland and the Marquis of Northampton and the Earl of Pembroke, for an attempt upon whose lives Somerset was on trial, should sit in judgment upon him against the objection of the accused because "a peer of the realm might not be challenged."

Again, the Duke of Northumberland, (ibid, 1st State Trials, p. 765.) Marquis of Northampton and Earl of Warwick, on trial for their crimes, A. D. 1553, before the Court of the Lord High Steward of England, being one of the prisoners, inquired whether any such persons as were equally culpable in that crime, and those by whose letters and commandments he was directed in all his doings, might be his judges or pass upon his trial at his death. It was answered that:

"If any were as deeply to be touched as himself in that case, yet as long as no attainder of record were against them, they were nevertheless persons able in the law to pass upon any trial, and not to be challenged therefor, but at the Prince's pleasure.

Again, on the trial of the Earls of Essex and Southamp ton (ibid., 1 State Trials, p. 1335) for high treason, before all the justices of England, A. D. 1600, the Earl of Essex de sired to know of my Lord Chief Justice whether he might challenge any of the peers or no. Whereunto the Lord Chief Justice answered 'No.'"

Again, in Lord Audley's case (ibid 3 State Trials, page 402. A. D. 1631), it was questioncd whether a peer might challenge his peers, as in the case of common jurats. It was answered by all the judges, after consultation, "he might not." This case was of more value, because it was an indictment for being accessory to rape upon his own wife, and had no political influence in it whatever.] The same point was ruled in the Countess of Essex's case, on trial for treason. (Moore's Reports, 621.)

In the Earl of Portland's case, A. D. 1701 (ibid, State Trials, page 288), the Commons objected that Lord Sommers, the Earl of Oxford and Lord Halifax, who had been impeached by the Commons before the House of Lords for being concerned in the same acts for which Portland was being brought to trial, voted and acted with the House of Lo Is in the preliminary proceedings of said trial, and were upon a committee of conference in relation thereto. But the lords, after discussion, solemnly resolved "That no lord of Parliament, impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors, can be precluded from voting on any occasion except on his own trial."

In the trial of Lord Viscount Melville, A. D. 1806, (ibid. 29 State Trials, p. 1398), some observations having been made as to the possible bias of some portion of the peers (by the counsel for defendant), Mr. Whitebread, one of the ma nagers on the part of the Commons, answered as follows:→