Introduction I can assure you that no stone will be left unturned to make sure that Secretary of State Colin Powell The graphic images of torture and other abuse by U.S. forces that emerged from Iraq last spring have prompted increased attention, both in the United States and around the world, to US. detention and interrogation operations in the "war on terror." When the photos from Abu Ghraib prison came to light, senior U.S. officials were outspoken and unanimous in condemning the behavior they revealed. And both Congress and the executive branch pledged to conduct thorough investigations into what happened. why, and how to ensure that such abuses never happen again. Just over four months later, US authorities have indeed launched more than 300 official investigations criminal, military, and administrative in nature into US practices since September 2001 in detaining and interrogating foreign nationals. 1 The investigations have been aimed both at addressing individual instances of wrongdoing, and at inquiring into whether systemic failures contributed to the torture and abuse of U.S.-held detainees Among other things, these inquiries have revealed a problem far greater in scope than that reflected in the pictures of a handful of U.S. soldiers torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib. Since the fall of 2001. there have been approximately 300 reported alleged instances of torture or other abuse by U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. To date, about two-thirds of these have been investigated by the military, which thus far has verified 66 cases of detainee abuse by U.S. forces (three in Afghanistan, eight at 3 Guantanamo, and 55 in Iraq). There are still nearly 30 pending investigations into detainee deaths in U.S. custody, the military has determined thus far that five of these were the result of torture or other abuse. (Many more than 30 detainees have died in US custody, but the military reports the additional deaths were the result of natural causes or enemy attacks.5) 4 6 Human Rights First has welcomed the investigations both completed and still underway into the circumstances surrounding the abuses that occurred during U.S. detention and interrogation. Even so, months after the Abu Ghraib photos were published - and nearly two years after the first abuse-related deaths in U.S. custody in the "war on terror" - we are still not in a position to say that we know how to ensure that such abuses never happen again. As evidence of the scope of the problem has increased, so has the need for a comprehensive, independent investigation into U.S. detention and interrogation operations in the war on terror" an investigation neither organized nor conducted by an agency that itself is the focus of the abuse allegations. Each one of the major investigations to date, as discussed in this report, has suffered from both structural and particular failings that have prevented either full identification of the widespread abuses, or meaningful recommendations to address them. For example, the scope of the investigative reports by Lt. Gen. Anthony Jones, and Maj. Gens. Antonio Taguba and George Fay, were circumscribed narrowly Maj Gen Taguba's report looked only at the role of U.S. military police at Abu Ghraib. Maj. Gen. Fay's report looked only at the role of military intelligence forces at that facility. And Lt. Gen. Jones was tasked only with looking at “organizations or personnel" involved in events at Abu Ghraib "higher than the 205 Military Intelligence Brigade chain of command. ..7 These investigators also have been limited by their respective places in the chain of command, by the nature of the inquiry (Army investigations like those of Taguba and Fay generally do not require sworn statements or provide subpoena power), and by their institutional inability to inquire beyond the four walls of the military itself. Yet cach of their accounts has suggested that a critical part of what went wrong at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere was the relationship - and failures in command structure - between military intelligence and police operations, and between military personnel and personnel from other agencies outside the Department of Defense. The two broader military investigations conducted to date - one by the Army Inspector General, and one by a panel led by former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger suffer from structural constraints of their own. They also were limited to the role of military forces in detention and interrogation; indeed, both reports expressed frustration with their inability to inquire into the role. and relationship with the Army, of other U.S. actors, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Inspector General's report in particular was designed to be, in its terms, "a functional analysis" of Army operations, "not an investigation of any specific incidents or units. And the Schlesinger panel's report, written without the benefit of subpoena power and lacking a single internal citation or footnote, suffers badly from an absence of real independence the pancl having been handpicked by the current Secretary of Defense. ..9 8 In addition to flaws inherent in their design, some or all of the investigations suffer from particular flaws, which are surveyed in this report. These include failures to investigate all relevant agencies and personnel; cumulative reporting (increasing the risk that crrors and omissions may be perpetuated in successive reports); contradictory conclusions; questionable use of security classification to withhold information; failures to address senior military and civilian command responsibility, and, perhaps above all, the absence of any clear plan for corrective action. Introduction The ome has come to do better Establishment of an macpondent body with broad investigative authority, like the just-concluded September ii Commission was become a standard way for the LS government to try to get at the truth underlying an event of great public significance and consen This is in part recognition of the practical realry that conducting a far-reaching investigation into a complex series of events requires considerable time and attention With dedicated time and resources, a commission with a strong full-time staff can be empowered to study nick just what happened, but why it happened. It can recommend corrective action. And it car iclp secure the accountability of those responsible. Equally important an independent commission is macpencioIN As a group of distinguished. retired military officers recently, wrote in a leder to President Bush urging the creation of such a commission "Americans have never thought it wise or fair for one branch of government to pouce nself Such a commission need not be constrained by hierarchies internal to the organization, it is reviewing, or the omits of departmental or institutional divisions of labor. It is able to operate with a level of objectivity that those closer to events and institutions cannot achieve Crocally, it can be designed to avoid other the reality or appearance of partiality or institutiona protection For these reasons, and those set forth in the report that follows, we urge the creation of a comprehensive. independent commission to investigate and report on US detention and interrogation practices in the "War on terror." The commission should be charged with investigating the full range of actors involved. It should describe what happened and why And it should chart a course for speedy correction and certain accountablary - so that the American pcoplc, and our friends and allies around the world, can truly be assured that these abuses will never happen aga.n Michael Posaer and Deborah Pearlstem September 2004 The Investigations to Date Each of us has had a strong interest in getting the facts out to the 12 10 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld May 7, 2004 Of the hundreds of inquiries launched so far into torture and other forms of abuse in U.S. custody, the majority are investigations aimed at assessing wrongdoing by particular individuals. This category thus includes, for example, the military justice prosecutions of seven low-ranking members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at Abu Ghraib many of whom appeared in the photos that were so widely publicized. It also includes charges recently brought against four Navy Special Forces personnel for abusing an Iraqi detainee who later died at Abu Ghraib." It includes criminal investigations opened by the Justice Department into the actions of civilian personnel at U.S. detention facilities. And it will include the case investigations of some two dozen soldiers who Army criminal investigators say will face criminal or administrative punishment related to the deaths of two U.S.-held prisoners in Afghanistan in December 2002.13 These individual investigations - whether through the military justice system or through civilian federal prosecution - arc essential both to ensure that those responsible for wrongdoing are held accountable, and to ensure that U.S. military and civilian personnel still working in detention and interrogation operations understand the limits of lawful conduct. Because proper handling of serious and complex crimes becomes more difficult with the passage of time - as witnesses become harder to track down and evidence trails grow cold - it is essential that these cases move forward promptly. It is thus a significant failure that it has taken almost two years for individual |