revet al of these cas with he exemten fla The mansences rated raters of fres How to added the append of the pubic report for are the mats of a f hese motorinar ekwows the core of the report The report makes fte en mocrat Asing Vær summanding off oon and Serca a ancus ends faict in for timesh bună fumest sorziouad directly or mareddy to detance abuse and that year and cart maten at the Department of Defense mare tus burden of resconstitES Despite its Juding the report ames so can al who shares rescoustics, and wwwbres aux que ony four eaters Bog Gen aus 1. Kapuse amander & te 60) M. czy Pozz Brigade, Col Thomas i Pappas, Commander of the Mionary basipao Bogado. Lt. Ca Jorry L. Ph_abaum. Commander of me 32° My Voice, Yamalion and if Col. Steven L. Jordan. Director, Joint Inazmogacon and Svet Cover a hos Grat Salemmar a Inday no evidence that organizations above the 800 MP Brigade or the 25* MI Bogate love were directly involved in the incidents at Ace Grab is incomplete the son of indirect involvement, or avolvement with abuse at other facilites. Wow, werficent the finding is not credible in light of evidence documented by the reports Schleyer reviewed and broadly available to the public in the mouths before the report's For example the Schlesinger report recognizes that Secretary Rumsteid publicly der and be dirais on detainee be held secretly at the request of the Director of Centrai This practice occurrod at Abu Ghraib and is a violation of US and international Sumarly the White House released a series of memoranda and a shide indicating cortam aparmaqdan terburuques that had been authorized for use by the Secretary of Defense. These we uded removal of clothing and "using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to hows dress These techniques are also barred by both international and domestic laws Yet Secretary Rumsfeld was aware that these techniques were used on at least one detainee Finally, all of the reports find Defense Department policies promulgated during the relevant period to varying degrees, vague and lacking. "inconsistent," and "confusing 104 This is rtainly true. But it is unlikely that scrious harm would have resulted from soldiers confused between two or three equally lawful policies. The "confusion" over interrogation policies 103 102 10 The Gaps That Remain - 17 105 contributed to abuse because some of the policies at various times authorized conduct that was not lawful. Under these circumstances, civilian command responsibility seems apparent. Failure to Present Game Plan for Corrective Action One of the principal functions of any of these investigations must be to recommend any corrective action necessary. To be effective, recommendations must not only include suggestions for change that respond directly to its findings of crror, but also identify a plan for implementation who is responsible for carrying the recommendation forward, when the recommended action must be taken, and how to verify that recommended changes have been made. While all of the major reports discussed here include recommendations for further action, almost all suffer from a failure to make these recommendations concrete. The Fay report. for example, is effective in identifying some individuals whose commanding officers should consider appropriate action or punishment. But recommendations accompanying larger policy problems suffer from inappropriate generality. For instance, Fay makes the very serious charge that "[s]electing Abu Ghraib as a detention facility placed soldiers and detainees at an unnecessary force protection risk. [and] resulted in the deaths and wounding of both coalition forces and detainees. But its recommendations are largely hortatory (aimed at no specific agency or individual): "[protect detainees in accordance with Geneva Convention IV by providing adequate force protection Whose responsibility is force protection currently?. And how should decisions about detainee location be made differently? ,,107 109 108 ,,106 The Inspector General's report is admirably clear in finding that the Army Staff Director should be responsible for assigning staff to implement the report's recommendations. And each recommendation is targeted at an identified agency or individual (c.g. "Commanders," "TRADOC," "CJTF-7,” etc.). But its recommendations are substantively inconsistent with its findings on the facts. For example, the Inspector General reports that "[o]nly 25% (4 of 16) facilities inspected maintained copies of the Geneva Conventions in the detainees' language. No facilities in Afghanistan complied with this Geneva requirement, while only 4 facilities in Iraq were compliant. But the report does not then recommend, for example, that commanders obtain and provide translated copics of the detainees rights. Instead, it recommends that "[c]ommanders continue to stress the importance of humane treatment of detainees and continue to supervise and train Soldiers on their responsibility to treat detainees humanely and their responsibility to report abuse. 110 112 5.111 More important, it remains unclear to what extent, if at all, the dozens of recommendations produced by these reports will be followed. On certain critical issues, it appears no action has yet been taken. For example, the reports dating back to February 2004 identify as a problem the U.S. practice of holding "ghost detainees" detainees kept off official records and hidden from Red Cross observers. Despite Maj. Gen. Taguba's finding nearly six months ago that the practice was "deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law,' it remains unclear at best whether the Red Cross has yet been afforded access to all detainees in US custody. On the contrary, it appears the Red Cross has not yet been afforded such access 113 114 A similar example is found on the issue of civilian contract linguists and interrogators. The Inspector General's report, the Fay report, and the Schlesinger report all recognize that there are significant problems arising from the use of such contract employees. The Schlesinger report in particular notes that "[olversight of contractor personnel and activities was not sufficient to 115 18- Getting to Ground Truth 116 9.117 ensure intelligence operations fell within the law and the authorized chain of command.' The Fay report puts it more plainly: "The contracting system failed to ensure that properly trained and vetted linguist and interrogator personnel were hired to support operations at Abu Ghraib.” Yet despite this conclusion and the apparent continuing presence of contractors in U.S. detention facilities overseas - none of the reports recommends a moratorium on the use of such contract employees until reforms can be implemented. Instead, the Schlesinger report states, without explanation, that "some use of contractors in detention operations must continue into the forcsccable future," and suggests contracts going forward include training requirements and be written in clearer terms. The Fay report recommends that the Army review (evidently, beyond the reviews already completed) the use of contract interrogators, and then consider implementing standards and training requirements. The Inspector General agrees, suggesting that civilian interrogators receive formal training in current military interrogation policy and doctrinc. These recommendations all make some sense. But there is no indication that protections such as these or of any kind have yet been put in place in the field to address the problem that exists. 118 119 120 A Way Forward We came into this process with strong opinions about what would Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist In light of the many hours and pages devoted to investigating the torture and abuse committed by U.S. military personnel, it is perhaps stunning to conclude that the United States is today still at risk of becoming embroiled in another scandal involving its treatment of detainees. Yet that is where we are. Because none of the investigations to date has been able to provide a comprehensive picture across govemment agencies and up and down the chain of command we have failed to get to "ground truth" about the scope of the abuses that took place, why they happened, and most important, how to chart a course for corrective action to ensure they will not happen again. Indeed, while we now know much more than we did four months ago when the graphic photographs of torture and other abuse at Abu Ghraib first emerged, we are no closer to ground truth on many of the most important questions than we were then. Most of the investigative reports have found that confusion about U.S. policy governing interrogation techniques and compliance with the Geneva Conventions contributed to an atmosphere of permissiveness and ambiguity that facilitated abuse. This confusion still reigns. Which memoranda, and which parts of memoranda, produced by administration lawyers in the Pentagon, the White House, and the Department of Justice - arguing that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to U.S.-held prisoners. and construing torture to require pain equivalent to "organ failure" - are still operative? Do the Geneva Conventions apply to all those captured in Iraq? Is ཡ་ it US policy to deny the International Ke Cos muy Perhaps the most important concussion x ma fate an Sr the current piecemeal approach will not get us show we migızı rouge via bod President Bush and Deputy Secretary of State Rent Ames to audi “sant” on America's honor and soul There is onion I am a macpendent investigative body with expert staff scrNITET MYE charged with determining all the facts and transas, xxxn of puses committed in U.S. detention and arrogaten. Such 2 200 m AR DIS happened, and how US policy can be corrected to ensure the art ar In order to overcome the gaps and deficiencies of recent canicet int ingong vestigimons. such a body must satisfy the following requests • It must be bi-partisan and led by recognized experts a mutary at ne ligeace spermons. as well as U.S.. international human rights, and humantran 1 • It must be fundamentally independent of so execute mænd, vt commisson mombors selected jointly by appropriate congressional and executive Seas • It must have unlimited access to classic empat in and all levels of authority, civilian and military • It must have the power to take testimony under out suppoera » messes. • It must have the authonty to offer whistleblower protection to anyone with relevant knowledge who may fear retribution for testifying truÜN • It must establish the facts independent of any other investigation • It should as far as possible, within the constraints of identified to sary rests, be open to the public. Some will argue that there has already been enough time and energy spent mestigating the misconduct and policy failures that led to the torture and deaths of prisoners in US custody, and that further attention to these matters distracts us from the challenge of securing the peace in Iraq and fighting the global war on terror. This argument is dangerously short-sighted. The abuses committed by U.S. personnel, and US policy that investigations to date suggest created the breeding ground for those abuses, has engendered deep rescritment towards the United States in the region and around the world. undermining US interests Without a full understanding and accounting of what went wrong, the risk of abusive conduct - and the profound risks that would pose to US interests remains In light of what we now know, farhure to conduct an independent investigation into these issues, and to identify corrective action, would be a gross dereliction of duty |