Westlaw. 5/20/05 NYT A1 The New York Tinies Page 16 STATEMENT TO ARMY INVESTIGATORS, AUG. 2, 2004 coming from top down, and There was a lot of pressure to get more intelligence probably the perception, on occasion, was that we weren't being as aggressive as we should have been." Capt. Carolyn A. Wood Operations officer in charge of interrogations at Bagram Control Point, July 2002-Jan. 2003 STATEMENT IN COMMANDERS CLASSIFIED INVESTIGATION, JAN. 17, 2004 "Would like to get additional legal guidance. We would like to know what our left and right limits are in respect to stress positions and sleep adjustment, for instance." Former Sgt. James A. (Alex) Leahy Interrogation team leader STATEMENT TO ARMY INVESTIGATORS, JAN. 15, 2004 "Due to the lack of clear policy concerning the legality of safety positions and the sleep adjustment schedules, we did not keep records of it." (pg. A12) INDEX REFERENCES NEWS SUBJECT: (HR & Labor Management (1HR87); Legal (1LE33); Business Management (1BU42); Strikes & Work Stoppages (1ST12); Judicial (1JU36); Prisons (1PR87)) INDUSTRY: (Commercial Construction (1C015); Aerospace & Defense (1AE96); Defense (1DE43); Construction (1C011); Correctional Facilities (1C072); Ground Forces (1GR94); Military Forces (1M137)} REGION: (North America (1N039); Western Europe (1WE41); Latin America (1LA15); Cuba (1CU43); Europe (1EU83); Central Europe (1CE50); Utah (1UT90); Iraq (1IR87); Arab States (1AR46); Western Asia (1WB54); Afghanistan (1AF45); Americas (1AM92); New Jersey (1NE70); Asia (1AS61); Middle East (1M123); USA (1US73); Switzerland (1SW77); Caribbean (1CA06)) Language: EN OTHER INDEXING: (Golden, Tim) (377TH; 377TH MILITARY POLICE CO; ALLAH; ARMY; ARMY FIELD; COMMANDERS; CONVENTIONS; GENEVA CONVENTIONS; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE; MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION; NEW YORK TIMES; PASHTO; PENTAGON; RED CROSS; SAUDI; SHY DETAINEE; TALIBAN; TESTOSTERONE GANG; UTAH; UTAH NATIONAL GUARD) (A1; Abdul Ahad Wardak.; Abdur Rahim, Afghan, Ahmad Ahmadzai; Ahmadzai; Al Qaeda; Alan J. Driver Jr.; Ali M. Baryalai; Anthony M. Morden; Atwell; Bacha Khel; Baerde; Baryalai; Beiring; Betty J. Jones; Bibi Rashida; Bobby R. Atwell; Boland; Brian E. Cammack; Britton T. Hopper: Built: Bush; Westlaw. 5/20/05 NYT Al The New York Tinies Page 17 Callaway; Cammack; Camp Salerno; Carolyn A. Wood; Christopher M. Beiring; Corey E. Jones; EDITION: Late Edition - Final Word Count: 8016 5/20/05 NYT A1 END OF DOCUMENT ARTICLE, TIM GOLDEN, "THE BAGRAM FILE: ARMY FALTERED IN INVESTIGATING DETAINEE ABUSE,” NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 22, 2005, AVAILABLE ON WESTLAW AT 2005 WLNR 8112977 Copyright (c) 2005 The New York Times. All rights reserved. May 22, 2005 Section: 1 THE BAGRAM FILE: Second of two articles. Army Faltered In Investigating Detainee Abuse TIM GOLDEN Despite autopsy findings of homicide and statements by soldiers that two prisoners died after being struck by guards at an American military detention center in Bagram, Afghanistan, Army investigators initially recommended closing the case without bringing any criminal charges, documents and interviews show. Within days after the two deaths in December 2002, military coroners determined that both had been caused by "blunt force trauma" to the legs. Soon after, soldiers and others at Bagram told the investigators that military guards had repeatedly struck both men in the thighs while they were shackled and that one had also been mistreated by military interrogators. Nonetheless, agents of the Army's Criminal Investigation Command reported to their superiors that they could not clearly determine who was responsible for the detainees' injuries, military officials said. Military lawyers at Bagram took the same position, according to confidential documents from the investigation obtained by The New York Times. I could never see any criminal intent on the part of the M.P.'s to cause the detainee to die," one of the lawyers, Maj. Jeff A. Bovarnick, later told investigators, referring to one of the deaths. "We believed the M.P.'s story, that this was the most combative detainee ever." The investigators' move to close the case was among a series of apparent missteps in an Army inquiry that ultimately took almost two years to complete and has so far resulted in criminal charges against seven soldiers. Early on, the documents show, crucial witnesses were not interviewed, documents disappeared, and at least a few pieces of evidence were mishandled. While senior military intelligence officers at Bagram quickly heard reports of abuse by several interrogators, documents show they also failed to file reports that are mandatory when any intelligence personnel are suspected of misconduct, including mistreatment of detainees. Those reports would have alerted military intelligence officials in the United Westlaw. 5/22/05 NYT 11 The New York Tinies Page 4 Instead, statements showed, they pointed to indications that both detainees had some existing medical problems when they arrived at Bagram, and emphasized that it would be difficult to determine the responsibility of individual guards for the injuries they sustained in custody. "No one blow could be determined to have caused the death," the former senior staff lawyer at Bagram, Col. David L. Hayden, said he had been told by the Army's lead investigator.. "It was reasonable to conclude at the time that repetitive administration of legitimate force resulted in all the injuries we saw." Both Major Bovarnick and Colonel Hayden declined requests for comment. As late as Feb. 7 -- nearly two months after the first autopsy reports had classified both deaths as homicides the American commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Daniel K. McNeill, said in an interview that he had "no indication" that either man had been injured in custody. General McNeill, who has since been promoted, declined repeated requests to clarify his remarks. In retrospect, the investigators' initial interviews with guards, interrogators and interpreters at the detention center appear cursory and sometimes contradictory. As transcribed, many of the statements are little more than a page or two long. Most of the guards who admitted punching the detainees or kneeing them in the thighs said they did so in order to subdue prisoners who were extraordinarily combative. But both detainees were shackled at the hands and feet throughout their time at Bagram. One of them, Mr. Dilawar, weighed only 122 pounds and was described by interpreters as neither violent nor aggressive. Both detainees also complained of being beaten and seemed to have trouble walking, some witnesses said. The early interviews also included statements by two of the interpreters that they had been so troubled by the abusive behavior of some interrogators that they had gone to the noncommissioned officer in charge of the military intelligence group, Staff Sergeant Loring, to complain. One of the interrogators, Specialist Damien M. Corsetti, refused to speak to the agents at all, and another told of the guards' beating one of the detainees who died. Even so, investigators failed to interview some crucial witnesses, including the officer in charge of the interrogators, Captain Wood, and the commander of the military police company, Captain Beiring. They also neglected an interrogator who had been present for most of Mr. Dilawar's questioning. When he finally went to investigators at his own initiative, he described one of the worst episodes of abuse. Many of the guards who later provided important testimony were also initially overlooked. Computer records and written logs that were supposed to record treatment of the detainees were not secured and later disappeared. Blood taken from Mr. Habibullah was stored in a Westlaw. 5/22/05 NYT 11 The New York Tinies Page 5 butter dish in the agents' office refrigerator, from which it was only recovered "seized" as a report explains it -- when the office was later moved. or The record of the investigation indicated that Army investigators almost entirely stopped interviewing witnesses within three weeks after Mr. Dilawar's death. And although Major Bovarnick, the detention center's legal adviser, said he told Captain Beiring after the first death "that there would be no shackling to the ceiling ever again," the issue was largely ignored in the initial investigation. While the Army's criminal inquiry continued, General McNeill ordered a senior officer, Col. Joseph G. Nesbitt, to conduct a separate, classified examination of procedures at the detention center. That led to changes including prohibitions against the shackling of prisoners for sleep deprivation and interrogators' making physical contact with detainees. Documents from the criminal investigation suggested that Colonel Nesbitt was also dismissive of the notion that the two deaths pointed to wider wrongdoing. He concluded that military police guards at the detention center "knew, were following and strictly applying proper rules on the use of force, documents showed, and he cited a "conflict between obtaining accurate, timely information and treating detainees humanely." Senior officials at the Criminal Investigation Command's headquarters took a different view. On April 15, 2003, they rejected the field agents' proposal to close the case, sending it back "for numerous investigative, operational, administrative and security classification-related issues, which required additional work, pursuit, clarification or scrutiny. Four months later, the headquarters officials reassigned the case to the task force that eventually implicated the 27 soldiers. Photos: Two Afghan detainees died from their injuries in December 2002 after being shackled and beaten at the American military base in Bagram, Afghanistan, above. (Photo by Wally Santana/Associated Press) (pg. 18) Chart/Photos: "Time Lag: Detainee Deaths and Military Investigations" 519TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION July 2002 -- The 519th M. I. Battalion arrives at the Bagram detention center in Jan 2003 -- Interrogators from the battalion return home to Fort Bragg, N.C. The operations officer, Capt. Carolyn A. Wood (left), is awarded a Bronze Star for meritorious service. March July - - Personnel from the battalion deploy to Iraq. Personnel from the battalion take over interrogations at Abu Ghraib prison under the direct leadership of Captain Wood. |