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curtail the ICRC's spot inspections, insisting that the ICRC should make
Guantánamo meets Afghanistan at Abu Ghraib In August 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, through his top intclligcncc aidc, Stephen A. Cambone, sent Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, who oversaw the interrogation efforts at the C.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to, in the words of Maj. Gen. Taguba, “review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence.”! Miller was tasked in essence with “Gitmo-izing” interrogation practices in Iraq, although the Bush administration recognizes that the Geneva Conventions are "fully applicable” in Iraq'' while it has said that they do not cover al-Qaeda detainees Guantánamu.?2
As Taguba highlighted in his report, Miller recommended that "the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees."); There is little clarity regarding what else Miller recommended. 94
Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, “Army tried to limit Abu Ghraib access," New York Times, May 20, 2004. The article also quotes Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, whose soldiers guarded the prisoners, as saying that senior officers in Baghdad had treated the ICRC report in "a light-hearted manner."
Taguba later decried Miller's idea of transporting interrogation techniques from Guantánamo to Iraq, noting that there were major differences between the status of the detainees in the two locations.
Douglas Jehl and Neil A. Lewis, "US disputed protected status of Iraq inmates," New York Times, May 23, 2004. See also, Alberto R. Gonzales, 'The Rule of Law and the Rules of War," New York Times, May 15, 2004 ("Both the United States and Iraq are parties to the Geneva Conventions. The United States recognizes that these treaties are binding in the war for the liberation of Iraq. There has never been any suggestion by our government that the conventions do not apply in that conflict.")
Miller testified that "no program" at Guantánamo "has any of those techniques that are prohibited by the Geneva Convention." But Sanchez, said that the procedures Miller brought from Guantánamo to Iraq "have to be modified because "the Geneva Convention was fully applicable" in Iraq, in contrast to Guantánamo, Editorial, "Reveal the Rules," Washington Post, May 23, 2004.
Taguba took issue with this proposal and noted that it would be “in conflict with the recommendations of the Ryder Report, a previous review of Iraqi prisons which stated that the engagement of military police in military interrogations to actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility."
According to Thomas Pappas, the U.S. army officer in charge of the prison cells at Abu Ghraib, one of Miller's recommendations was the use of military guard dogs in interrogations. Pappas also stated that the recommendation was approved by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the top U.S. military official in Iraq. Both Miller and Sanchez deny this. R. Jeffrey Smith, "General is said to Have Urged Used of Dogs," Washington Post, May 26, 2004; Scott Higham, Joe Stephens and Josh White, “Prison Visits by General Reported in Hearing: Alleged Presence of Sanchez Cited by Lawyer," Washington Post, May 23, 2004.
On October 12, Sancher implemented Miller's proposals, issuing a carsitet memorandum calling for interrogators at Abu Ghraib to work with militan police guards to "manipulate an interee's emotions and weaknesses" and to a ne control over the “lighang, heating - food, dothing, and shelter" of those they were questioning. 95 The full contents of the Sanchez memo have not been made pullne
In addition, between three and five interrogation teams were sent in Oktober trom Guantánamo to the American command in Iraq' “for use in the interrogation effort" at Abu Ghraib.56
Capt. Carolyn A. Wood, who oversaw interrogations at the Bapram detention centern Afghanistan where two prisoners died, apparently prepared the document titled "Interrogation Rules of Engagement” that was posted at Abu Ghraib bunding to the document, certain interrogation methods could be undertaken, but only if the "CO; *s" Sanchez's) approval was sought and obtained in writing. Depending on them se tual application, thesc mcthods would violatc thc Geneva Conventions prohibitions against abusive and coercive treatment of detainees. They included.
Change of scenery down (moving to a more barren cell)
The document also cautions that detainees “ w1 VEVER be touched in malicious so unwanted manncr” and that thc Gorica Conventions apply in Iraq,
* See R Jeffrey Smith, "Memo jave ntelligence bigger Ole increased pressure sought on prenners Washington Post, May 21 2004 *Dougas sehi and Andrea Elliott Cuba sase sent to interrogators o iraqi prison Now the lipsa ay 29 2004
Even though his title appears on the document, which also carried the logo of Combined Joint Task Force-7, the U.S.-led coalition force in Iraq, General Sanchez denies having seen or approved the rules of engagement posted at Abu Ghraib (although hc acknowledged that in twenty-fivc scparatc instanccs, hc approved holding Iraqi prisoners isolation for longer than thirty days, one of the methods listed in the posted rulcs). Kcith B. Alexander, thc hcad of the Army intclligcncc, however, said that they were the approved policy for interrogations of detainees in Iraq.o?
What is clear is that U.S. military personnel at Abu Ghraibh felt empowered to abuse the dctainccs. Thc brazcnness with which the soldicrs at the center of the scandal conducted themselves, snapping photographs and flashing the “thumbs-up” sign as they abused prisoners, suggests they felt they had nothing to hide from their supcriors. Thc abusc was so widely known and accepted that a picture of naked detainees forced into a human pyramid was reportedly used as a screen saver on a computer in thc intcrrogation room.98 According to Maj. Gen. Taguba, “interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorablc interrogation of witnesses. (The] MP Brigade (was) directed to change facility procedures to “set the conditions” for military intelligence interrogations. Taguba cited the testimony of several military police: “One said the orders were 'Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure he has a bad night. Make surc he gets thc treatment.”. Another stated that “the prison wing belongs to Military Intelligence) and it appeared that MI personnel approved the abuse.” That MP also noted that "lijhe MI staffs, to my understanding, have been giving Graner (an MP in charge of night shifts at Abu Ghraib) compliments on the way he has been handling the MI [detainees). Example being statements like 'Good job, they're breaking down real fast.”
General Sanchez announced on May 14, 2004, that he had barred the use of coercive interrogation techniques including “stress positions,” “sleep deprivation,” and the use of hoods, that had previously been available, though it is still not clear what he had previously approved.
Editorial, “Reveal the rules," Washington Post, May 23, 2004.
Kate Zernike, "Only a few spoke up on abuse as many soldiers stayed silent," New York Times, May 22, 2004.
IDE VE wuten by Reed Brody, Special Counsel with Human Rights Wallet 05 Seni 25xstance and review was provided by interne Reyke, Iluany, and kebuss im Zia-Lariti, Deputy Director of the Asia Diwin, Jotun nimi, **asz searcher, Ian Gurvin, consultant, Tom Valinowski, Walungti ti ti thy
ok teinet, Director of US program, Wendy Patten, lady sve me ylpeetist, 32.450 Senior Military Analyst, Ali Dayan Ilasan, Pakistan rss ar her, and se Free 1 asmen director of the Middle East and North Ateva Trnini Wory b. 19- Program Director, edited the report, James Reis,'*73°4 1 App, AS*** OEC. Stratehensive legal review. Terla Hull, axxute wth to "Axi'. I dok good!
152 crision, prepared the report for publicatur. Andra luty patrooms St Hurzan Rights Watch, and Firsson Hepere, sieni sisteme de present 173.0 of this report .
REPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “STILL AT RISK,” APRIL 2005
Human Rights Watch
April 2005 Vol. 17, No. 4(D)
Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture
Table of Cases..
1 Executive Summary
3 The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and III-T'rcatment.
7 International Law....
7 U.N. Convention against Torture.
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
9 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees..
10 International Humanitarian Law.
11 Customary International Law
12 Regional Human Rights Law
11 European Convention on I luman Rights...........
14 The Nexus between the Nonrefoulement Obligation and Diplomatic Assurances 15 Council of Europe Commissioner for I luman Rights...
15 U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
16 U. V. Independent Expert on the Protection of I luman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism
17 Diplomatic Assurances are No Safeguard against Torture.
18 The Limits of Diplomacy
19 Trusting States to Honor Unenforceable Assurances.
21 The Tacit Acceptance of Torture..
23 The Limits of Post-Return Monitoring..
21 False: Torture is Easy to Detect........
24 Talsc: Monitoring Provides an Accountability Mechanism.
26 The Principle: Diplomatic Assurances Undermine the Nonrefoulement Obligation. 27 Developments Regarding Diplomatic Assurances Since April 2004
28 North America
28 United States.
28 Case of Yemeni Derainees and Transfers from Guantánamo Bay.
30 Update: Case of Maher Arar.
33 Renditions and Assurances: C.S. Acknowledges “No Control” Post-Transfer...36 No Effective Opportunity to Challenge Reliability of Assurances...
38 Legislative Initiatives..
40 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act..
10 Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act: Markey Bill.
41 Convention against Torture Implementation Act 2005: Leahy Bill.