Even though his title appears on the document, which also carried the logo of Combined Joint Task Force-7, the U.S.-led coalition force in Iraq, General Sanchez denies having seen or approved the rules of engagement posted at Abu Ghraib (although he acknowledged that in twenty-five separate instances, he approved holding Iraqi prisoners in isolation for longer than thirty days, one of the methods listed in the posted rules). Keith B. Alexander, the head of the Army intelligence, however, said that they were the approved policy for interrogations of detainees in Iraq.9? 97 What is clear is that U.S. military personnel at Abu Ghraib felt empowered to abuse the detainces. The brazenness with which the soldiers at the center of the scandal conducted themselves, snapping photographs and flashing the “thumbs-up” sign as they abused prisoners, suggests they felt they had nothing to hide from their superiors. The abuse was so widely known and accepted that a picture of naked detainees forced into a human pyramid was reportedly used as a screen saver on a computer in the interrogation room.98 According to Maj. Gen. Taguba, “interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. ... [The] MP Brigade [was] directed to change facility procedures to “set the conditions” for military intelligence interrogations. Taguba cited the testimony of several military police: "One said the orders were 'Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure he has a bad night. Make sure he gets the treatment.' .” Another stated that "the prison wing belongs to [Military Intelligence] and it appeared that MI personnel approved the abuse.” That MP also noted that "[t]he Ml staffs, to my understanding, have been giving Graner [an MP in charge of night shifts at Abu Ghraib] compliments on the way he has been handling the MI [detainees]. Example being statements like ‘Good job, they're breaking down real fast.""" General Sanchez announced on May 14, 2004, that he had barred the use of coercive interrogation techniques including “stress positions,” “sleep deprivation,” and the use of hoods, that had previously been available, though it is still not clear what he had previously approved. 97 Editorial, "Reveal the rules," Washington Post, May 23, 2004. 98 Kate Zernike, "Only a few spoke up on abuse as many soldiers stayed silent," New York Times, May 22, 2004. Acknowledgements In move was worten by Reed Brody, Special Counsel with Human Rights Watch an a meant assistance and review was provided by interns Reyko Huang and Pure Busson, Sam Zia-Zarifi, Deputy Director of the Asia Division, John stron, st researcher, Ian Gorvin, consultant, Tom Malinowski, Washington. Advocacy Jeramie Feiner, Director of US program, Wendy Patten, US advocacy director, Grusco, Senior Military Analyst; Ali Davan Hasan, Pakistan researcher, and Jos Jute & astig on director of the Middle East and North Africa Doison Widney Brown Denum Program Director, edited the report, James Ross, not laye Adukot orvidt & Comprehensive legal review. Leila Hull, associate with the Moda Fast and Ver Amca drvision, prepared the report for publication. Andra Holicy prokuraturan a fect for Human Rights Watch, and Fitzroy Hepairs, masi mat appe production of this report. Human Rights Watch would also like to thank the kranı an namerne T MacArthur Foundation, Sedeng berang, N NOVE IM Kaplan Fund, Oak Founders tho kua Vize Boy, by walk a Dai and Luce Packard Foundation, and the migh, mate at nig Human Rights Watch's Iraq emergenov fund REPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “STILL AT RISK," APRIL 2005 The Legal Prohibition against Returns to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment. U.N. Convention against Torture. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights... 3 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.... International Humanitarian Law. Customary International Law. Regional Human Rights Law. European Convention on Human Rights... 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 14 The Nexus between the Nonrefoulement Obligation and Diplomatic Assurances..... 15 Council of Europe Commissioner for I luman Rights.... U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture.... 15 16 U.N. Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and The Principle: Diplomatic Assurances Undermine the Nonrefoulement Obligation.. 27 Developments Regarding Diplomatic Assurances Since April 2004. North America United States... Case of Yemeni Detainees and Transfers from Guantánamo Bay. 28 28 28 30 33 Renditions and Assurances: U.S. Acknowledges “No Control” Post-Transfer ..... 36 Legislative Initiatives...... 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act... Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act: Markey Bill. Convention against Torture Implementation Act 2005: Leahy Bill. 38 40 40 41 44 |