restrained or unrestrained basis and sort of e-mail them down to the Executive Branch. I don't quite understand what the basis of that is, because the Constitution very clearly gives Congress, and Congress alone, the responsibility and the authority to declare war. But I'll leave that aside.

But it does, I think, give special weight to these resolutions, because that's really become what Congress does, and then the Executive Branch is tasked with making the very momentous decisions of how to exercise that authority.

But in the case of the Gulf War, the resolution required that the President, when he made a determination that military force is necessary, before exercising that authority, should provide to the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senatein other words, Congress-his determination that the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in Subsection A, and, two, that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

I guess my question, gentlemen, is, in terms-the President understandably wants to be unrestrained in terms of preparing for military action if and when he determines that that is necessary. This resolution will clearly give him that authority. Are these kinds of conditions applied? How do they impact the military planning, the buildup, the preparedness? Are the kind of conditions that the 1991 resolution attached-do those constraint, or do those prevent the military planning and preparedness and buildup, or not? I'd give each a you a turn and ask

General SHALIKASHVILI. Very briefly. I feel very uncomfortable making judgments on this resolution having glanced at it for 5 minutes. These are issues that need to be debated by lawyers, by senators, by your staffs

Senator DAYTON. I'm really asking more in terms of the 1991 resolution.

General SHALIKASHVILI. To the best of my understanding, I do not see how a difference between that resolution in 1991 and this one here, that somehow that resolution in 1991 unduly constrained the military planning or that this one is necessary to do the necessary planning to be able to do military operations against Iraq. I think the issue here is—and, again, I apologize to you, because I ought to know better than comment on as important a document as this after two glances at it. What seems to be the issue is not whether you can plan against Iraq, but whether it gives the President authority to go much beyond Iraq, should circumstances arise. Again, constitutional lawyers have to answer whether the President has that authority anyway, once he's involved in military operations in the region and something unexpected arises. But I'm way beyond my competence on this issue.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

General Clark and others?

General CLARK. It is a matter for Congress to determine. I would hope that before we would use force, as authorized here, we would have exhausted all other means. If there's a way of incorporating

that in the resolution, I think it makes the resolution stronger, not weaker.

Senator DAYTON. Does it impair the military planning and preparedness?

General CLARK. Not in the language that you just read. I do think that, of course, the President, as the Commander in Chief, always has the right to self defense from whatever that threat may come from. But the more the planning is narrowed and the more the focus of the operation is made clear and circumscribed, the greater the ability of the United States Government to win support for that operation and to offset the countervailing propaganda that will come out against our aims and purposes in the region. So I think it's in our own self interest to have a very tightly focused, tightly worded resolution authorizing the operation.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

General Hoar.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. As I said a moment ago, I'm not in favor of one that is quite so broad. I would be much more comfortable with the 1991 resolution, for all the reasons that my colleagues point out. I would point out to you that the military is not encumbered now in planning for this operation. It's in the open press all the time. They're going apace to make sure that when the President has the authority and he tells them to execute, they'll be able to do it.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

General MCINERNEY. Sir, I had read it, because, as a FOX news military analyst, I was prepared to comment on the news on it, so that's why I had a little advantage over General Shalikashvili, but not over General Clark, of course. [Laughter.]

The reason I feel it's important is-in its broadness-we want to send a signal that there is trust between this august body and this administration, and everybody knows it. You have many ways to prevent an administration from moving out and doing things. There's no doubt about it. But if you water this down, you are going to send a signal out to al Qaeda-you may not want to, but you're going to send it-you're going to send it to Saddam and say, "Well, we don't quite trust him. There's a little waffling. We're not serious." Okay? I mean, he puts us into the club that I call

Senator DAYTON. Wait, wait, General, let me ask-without having it in front of you, but would the language I recited in the 1991 resolution, would you consider that watering it down?

General MCINERNEY. Since I didn't read that in great detail-I heard what you said, but I read this in detail, because, as I said, I was going to be quizzed on it on the air. So I'm very comfortable with this broad language. I would have been more comfortable if the language that you put out a year ago against Afghanistan would have been broader. The President and any administration's people always come back to you. You control the purse strings.

The signal you want to send, Senator, is, "This nation is united." You want to send that to the U.N., because I happen to believewhich is different than General Clark-this strong signal, Mr. Chairman, will ensure that we have a better chance of getting it through the U.N.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired. Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of you for your service to our Nation, in uniform and as you continue to perform service to our Nation. Thank you very much. The way that our Armed Forces are currently structured and as we approach the task of defeating Iraq in the near term, are we going to be, at the same time, able to sustain the global war against terrorism? What's your opinion on that? General Hoar?

General HOAR. My view, of course, is that the global war on terrorism will only be won through the close coordination with our friends in Europe and, indeed, in the whole Muslim world, because integrated intelligence from all sources, police work as a cooperative effort, law enforcement working with other friendly countries, and certainly the ability to shut down finances are critical to our success at the end of the day. But we have to have that kind of support for the some 90 countries that are working actively with us today. I should point out to you that the recent successes in Pakistan and Morocco and Yemen, as well as Europe, are a good example of that cooperation.

Senator BILL NELSON. So when the moms and dads come up to me at home and say, "How can we do a war in Iraq and, at the same time, go against all the other bad guys?" you don't have any heartburn on this?

General HOAR. I do indeed, sir. I think that the war against al Qaeda is the first priority. My colleague says we can have more than one priority, and I agree with that, but when it's your first priority, you don't do anything that impairs your ability to execute the first priority.

We have a lot of people around the world in those 90 countries that don't agree with the way the United States conducts foreign policy or their military policy, and those countries have constituencies they must respond to. In my judgment, we need to do the al Qaeda thing first.

General MCINERNEY. Senator, here is my difference, and I want to make it clear. I believe in this coalition. I believe in the 90, but I don't want 5 or 10 or 20 to determine what we do. We are the target. Let's go back. We are the target, and they are coming after us, and there must be a sense of urgency. So that's why I can assure you on the air side, the B-2s aren't flying against al Qaeda right now, the B-52s aren't, the B-1s aren't. It's a small effort with ground forces. The Third Armored Division is not committed. The third corps is not committed. There are a lot of forces that aren't. I think there's an important role for the simultaneous nature to be working on these fronts.

We can handle more. The campaign against al Qaeda has now been moved mostly back into very good police and special operations work. So that's why when we're talking about this force and the signal we send, the rapidity of this campaign is extremely crucial, because I think it will cut down the number of recruits that go to al Qaeda. When Rome is strong, the provinces are quiet.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Clark, you were about to say something?

General CLARK. I was going to say that I think it depends on how we do it. I think it is clear already that we have engaged this issue. This issue is on the table. Now, if we go in with a strong coalition, if we go in with a U.N. resolution behind us, if we go in with the fullest possible weight of international law and international opinion, then I think it can reinforce what we're doing against al Qaeda, even though there will be some distraction on the part of the commanders and the national leadership who are involved in the campaign. But, on balance, you might get a reinforcement.

I think if it had gone the other way, if we had not gone to the United Nations, if we had decided to iron horse this and go in unilaterally at the outset, I think it would have distracted us from our campaign. How it eventually turns out, I think, is still up in the air right now.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think that militarily it should be doable to engage both in a war against terrorism and to fight the al Qaeda issue and to go into Iraq, as least that's what I think the thinking of the military leaders in the Pentagon is, to the point that I understand it. I agree with that, although there might be some particular enabling capabilities that would be stretched more than we would like.

But politically, it's different. Politically, how much it would detract from our effort against al Qaeda in the war against terrorism in the broader sense depends very much on how successful we are in building a strong, large coalition, and that, in turn, would be based on how successful we are in getting a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, should inspections prove fruitless.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you for that.

General Hoar, you're a former commander of Central Command. Last Thursday in front of this committee Secretary Rumsfeld stirred up a hornets' nest when, in essence, he said—this is the essence of his message; I'm not quoting him directly-that he wants to move Central Command into the Central Command AOR. We've had it outside of the area of the Central Command for some period of time, even going back to the Gulf War, for a specific reason. I would be very curious to hear your comments, please.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. I've been directly associated with Central Command since 1988 when I went down, first, as Norman Schwarzkopf's chief of staff, and this has been a subject that has been discussed perenially. I think that Norm Schwarzkopf amply demonstrated the ability to go forward and set up and operate on relatively short notice, if there was a requirement.

The truth of the matter is that the availability of information is such that you could do it from Tampa. But any commander that is worth his salt wants to be out on the ground talking to the sergeants, corporals, lieutenants, and captains that are flying the airplanes and doing the work out on the ground and going out to the ships to see what's happening out there. So if there is going to be a campaign, the theater commander ought to be in the theater, and it appears to me that the first steps have been taken for that. The ability to put a couple of thousand people with their families, cars,

cats, and dogs, and all of the other things that it would take to make that a permanent headquarters someplace in the region, is another issue. While I'm not absolutely familiar with this issue today, I would say that I would go very slowly on that one. But clearly it can be done on very short notice if the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief decide that's the best way to do it.

Senator BILL NELSON. Your colleague, General Zinni, agrees with you. Here's a quote from General Zinni: "It would be a magnet for people who want to kill Americans overseas," with regard to a large permanent headquarters. The temporary headquarters-which is already underway, by the way-they've moved 600 folks over to Qatar right now.

Mr. Chairman, I have one further question, but the blue slip

came.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it a brief question to one of our witnesses, or a long question to all four of them?

Senator BILL NELSON. It's a brief question, but I'm entirely happy to wait, if you'd like.

Chairman LEVIN. Everyone's been going over a little bit. No reason why you shouldn't if you have one quick question. Try to limit it to one of our witnesses, if you could.

Senator BILL NELSON. The Scott Speicher family is from Jacksonville, and I have been in the middle of this. Now we have a defector that said that he drove him to the hospital. Even the Defense Department has said that they've moved his position from killed in action to missing in action. There's even some that are talking about changing his status to prisoner of war.

You can't plan a war around a prisoner of war, but what advice would you give to the senator who represents the family, as we approach this Iraq campaign? It's a tough one.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Since none of my colleagues are volunteering, let me give it a stab, because certainly the Speicher case was something that was very much on the table when I was chair

man.

We started out, at the time, when the Department of the Navy had declared him as killed in action, and the first thoughts were surfacing that maybe that was not the correct step. So lots of discussion occurred whether we should send a mission in to verify or not.

I come down at it, at this point, very simply. If there is the slightest question whether one of our people could possibly still be alive, then we need to do everything we can to verify that and, if at all possible, obviously, gain his release.

I do not think that this is in conflict at all with perhaps having to conduct combat operations against Iraq. We have found ourselves very often in the past having prisoners of war in the hands of our potential enemy when we entered into combat operations, but there are an awful lot of channels, from the international Red Cross to friends, that could help. Certainly the Russians, with their relationship now with Iraq, all of that ought to be put-if it isn't already on full-court press to try to resolve that issue. After all, there's a family involved and a wife involved and children involved