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own people and the Iranians. He has deadly stockpiles of biological weapons. The possibility that Saddam Hussein will use his biological and chemical weapons to attack us directly or in concert with terrorists cannot be dismissed. We must continually evaluate it in light of available intelligence. However, it would be uncharacteristic for a man who has placed the highest premium on self-preservation. There would be a significant chance of detection followed, quite simply, by his annihilation. It is certainly possible, but perhaps no more so than the possibility that he will use these weapons against our troops or our allies if we attack him.

It is his nuclear weapons capability that concerns me the most. I believe Saddam Hussein's strategic objective was and remains to assert dominance over the Gulf region. We stopped him in 1991. Amazingly, he tested our will again in 1994, moving troops in that direction. We deployed 30,000 U.S. forces to the region, and he pulled back. This region is critical for the United States and the world strategically and economically. I believe that a nuclear Iraq can change its fundamental dynamic, affecting how others behave toward us and toward allies such as Israel and emboldening Saddam Hussein to believe, rightly or wrongly, that he can attack his neighbors and, because of his nuclear capability, we will hesitate.

Hussein maintains an active and aggressive nuclear weapons program. Most analysts believe that for him to develop his own capacity to produce fissile material, nuclear fuel, it will require several years. Acquiring that nuclear fuel abroad could enable him to produce a nuclear weapon in 1 or 2 years, according to Prime Minister Blair's statement on Monday.

He has been seeking such material for many years. So far as we know, there has not yet been any case where significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material have been diverted. Experts such as the highly respected International Institute for Strategic Studies have concluded that obtaining this material remains a formidable challenge—not impossible, but unlikely.

I emphasize this point not to suggest that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is not unacceptably dangerous to the United States—indeed, I believe it is—but the trajectory of his nuclear program affects the “when” of the threat equation, whether we have time to proceed in a way that isolates Saddam, builds a broader international coalition, and minimizes, to the extent possible, the risks.

We most likely have the military power to do this virtually alone, but shifting the world's focus back to Saddam's intransigence will give us not only the power to act, but far greater legitimacy if we do so. The extent to which the legitimacy of our actions is recognized and accepted internationally, that we act collectively and not largely alone, is not an abstraction. It greatly reduces the risks of any future military action. Those risks are just as real and serious as the threat. They include inflaming an already volatile region in a way that undermines governments such as Jordan or Musharraf in Pakistan, and, worst case, leaves us with a radical regime in Pakistan with a ready-made nuclear arsenal. This increases the likelihood that a conflict breaks along a dangerous Israeli-Arab fault line, diverting us from the war against a terrorist threat that remains real and virulent at a time when cooperation-military, intelligence, and political—is essential, and undercutting burdensharing in what will certainly be a long, arduous task of maintaining stability in Iraq and rebuilding after Saddam Hussein, something that will not be easy or inexpensive.

That brings me to the essential question of how to go forward. How should we proceed in a way that maximizes our position?

First, I believe we should press forward, as Secretary Powell is doing, for a United Nations Security Council resolution that makes clear that the world, not just the United States and Great Britain, expects compliance by Iraq with its disarmament obligations within a fixed time period. It should make clear that disarmament is Iraq's responsibility, not the inspectors', requiring affirmative cooperation. Any resolution should spell out what "unfettered” means—any site, any time, without notice. It should clear away the cobwebs that encumbered the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), vague notions about Iraqi sovereignty or special sites that provide the Iraqi Government with a pretext for interference.

Yes, there are a string of broken resolutions, but we are in an entirely new circumstance here contemplating a military invasion of Iraq, and the world expects us to test the nonmilitary option before we move to the military one. We also owe that to the men and women who will be risking their lives if we decide to do so.

Unfettered inspections, Mr. Chairman, may not be the path to disarmament, but a serious effort to secure them is the path to isolating Saddam and gaining broader international support for what may be necessary if we fail, and we'd best obtain that legitimacy up front, because if military action is undertaken, we will be in Iraq for a long time.

Second, with such a resolution, I would urge the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the new U.N. inspection organization, to move expeditiously to test Saddam Hussein's intentions with hard sites, not easy ones. What is at question is not whether U.N. inspectors can find the needles in a haystack, but whether, faced with the current situation, the Iraqi Government will cooperate or obstruct.

Third, I hope that, as was done after September 11, the draft congressional resolution submitted by the administration can be sharpened and adopted in a bipartisan fashion.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we reserve the right to act primarily by ourselves if we have to, but I don't think we are at that point today, and doing so substantially increases the risks that we will wind up with a regime that is less stable with a region that is less stable rather than more peaceful and democratic. We can proceed in a strategic, methodical manner to put Saddam Hussein in a corner, not us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. SAMUEL R. BERGER Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the critical issues of Iraq faced by the United States and the international community.

I believe the Iraqi regime does pose a serious potential threat to stability in a combustible and vital region of the world and, therefore, to the United States. Doing nothing, in my judgment, is not an acceptable option. The challenge is to do the

right thing, in the right way, enhancing not undermining the stability of the region and the overall security of the United States.

It is important for us to be as sharply focused as we can in an uncertain world about the nature of the threat. We have focused a great deal on Saddam Hussein's capabilities, and properly so. But capability is not the same thing as threat, which also involves questions of intention and urgency. It is not just the "what,” but also the "why” and the "when." Threat is only half the equation for war. It must be balanced against the "how"—the costs and risks—of proceeding.

First, a few words about the "what” and the "why.” We know Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons—he has for nearly 20 years as we know only so well from his use of them against his own people and the Iranians. He has deadly stockpile of biological weapons.

The possibility that Saddam Hussein will use his biological and chemical weapons to attack us, directly or in concert with terrorists, cannot be dismissed. We must continually evaluate it in light of available intelligence. But it would be uncharacteristic for a man who has placed the highest premium on self-preservation. There would be a significant chance of detection, followed quite simply-by his annihilation. It is certainly possible, but no more so than the possibility he will use these weapons against our troops or our allies if we attack him.

It is his nuclear weapons capability that concerns me the most. I believe Saddam Hussein's strategic objective was, and remains, to assert dominance over the Gulf region. We stopped him in 1991. Amazingly, he tested our will again in 1994, moving troops in that direction; we deployed 30,000 U.S. forces to the region, and he pulled back.

This region is critical for the U.S. and the world-strategically and economically. I believe that a nuclear Iraq can change its fundamental dynamic, affecting how others behave toward us and toward allies such as Israel—and emboldening Saddam Hussein to believe, rightly or wrongly, that he can attack his neighbors and, because of his nuclear capability, we will hesitate.

Hussein maintains an active and aggressive nuclear weapons program. Most analysts believe that for him to develop his own capacity to produce fissile materialnuclear fuel—will require several years. Acquiring that nuclear fuel abroad—the "wild card”—could enable him to produce a nuclear weapon in 1 or 2 years, according to Prime Minister Blair.

He has been seeking such material for many years. So far as we know, there has not yet been any case where significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material has been diverted. Experts such as the highly respected International Institute for Strategic Studies have concluded that obtaining this material remains a “formidable" challenge-not impossible but "unlikely.”

I emphasize this point not to suggest that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is not "strategically unacceptably dangerous” to us; indeed, I believe it is. But the trajectory of his nuclear program affects the "when” of the threat equation: whether we have time to proceed in a way that isolates Saddam, builds a broader international coalition and minimizes, to the extent possible, the risks.

We most likely have the military power to do this virtually alone. But shifting the world's focus back to Saddam's intransigence will give us not only the power to act but far greater legitimacy if we do so.

The extent to which the legitimacy of our actions is recognized and accepted internationally—that we can act collectively and not largely alone is not an abstraction. It greatly reduces the risks of any future military action. Those risks are just as real and serious as the threat. They include:

• Inflaming an already volatile region in a way that undermines governments such as Jordan or Musharraf in Pakistan and—worst case leave us with a radical regime in Pakistan with a ready-made nuclear arsenal. • Increasing the likelihood that a conflict breaks along a dangerous IsraeliArab fault line. • Diverting us from the war against a terrorist threat that remains real and virulent, at a time when cooperation-military, intelligence, and political—is essential. • Undercutting burden-sharing in what will certainly be a long, arduous task of maintaining stability in Iraq and rebuilding after Saddam Hus

sein—something that will not be easy or inexpensive. This brings me to the essential question: the "how" of going forward. How should we proceed in a way that maximizes our position?

First, I believe we should press forward, as Secretary Powell is doing, for a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution that makes clear that the world- not just the U.S. and Britainexpects compliance by Iraq with its disarmament obligations within a fixed time period. It should make clear that disarmament is Iraq's responsibility, not the inspectors—requiring affirmative cooperation. Any resolution should spell out what “unfettered” means-any site, any time without notice. It should clear away the cobwebs that encumbered UNSCOÑ—vague notions about Iraqi sovereignty or special sites that provide the Iraqi government with a pretext for interference.

Yes, there are a string of broken resolutions. But we are in an entirely new circumstance contemplating a military invasion of Iraq-and the world expects us to test the non-military option before we move to a military one. We also owe that to the men and women who will be risking their lives if we decide to do so.

Unfettered inspections may not be the path to disarmament. But a serious effort to secure them is the path to isolating Saddam and gaining broader international support for what may be necessary if they fail. We better obtain that legitimacy up front, because if military action is undertaken, we will be in Iraq for a long time.

Second, with such a resolution, I would urge UNMOVIC to move expeditiously to test Saddam Hussein's intentions, with hard sites not easy ones. What is in question is not whether UN inspectors can find the needles in the haystack, but whetherfaced with the current situation—the Iraqi government will cooperate or obstruct.

Third, I hope that, as was done after September 11, the draft congressional resolution submitted by the administration can be sharpened and adopted in a bipartisan fashion.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we reserve the right to act primarily by ourselves if we have to. But I don't think we are at that point today and doing so substantially increases the risks that we will wind up with a region that is less stable, rather than more peaceful and democratic. We can proceed in a strategic, methodical manner to put Saddam Hussein in a corner, not us.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Berger.

Dr. Schlesinger, welcome. STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF ENERGY, AND DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank the committee for its invitation to appear before you today to discuss the question of United States policy toward Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, as the President has stated, this is a test of whether the United Nations, in the face of perennial defiance by Saddam Hussein of its resolutions and, indeed, of his own promises will, like the League of Nations over half a century ago, turn out to be simply another institution given to talk.

For more than 11 years since the end of the Gulf War, the record is replete with U.N. resolutions condemning Iraq for "serious violations," "continued violations,” and “flagrant violations.” For that entire period, Saddam Hussein has regularly and successfully played the game of defiance.

In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act approving the use of force to bring Saddam Hussein into compliance. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary General reached agreement with Saddam Hussein in a memorandum of understanding that promised, “immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access.” Failure to do so would result in, “the severest consequences.” Some months later, Saddam Hussein excluded American inspectors and, by October, had ceased cooperation with U.N. inspectors entirely.

In September 2002, recognizing the growing pressure stemming from the United States, Saddam Hussein has once again informed the United Nations that he is willing to “allow unconditional return of the inspectors.” His intention, quite obviously, is, again, to repeat that all-too-familiar cycle. I think it is clear, Mr. Chairman,

in light of our previous experience, that we should observe that old adage, "once burned, twice shy.”

Will the United Nations prove as feckless as the League of Nations? Mr. Chairman, in 1935, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. The League of Nations took note of this challenge to the international order. Day after day, week after week, the League deliberated what to do. The sessions went on endlessly. After each session, there was a press conference. After some weeks, one of the reporters present summarized the situation as follows: “On the surface, very little is happening. But beneath the surface, nothing is happening.” [Laughter.]

Today, the United Nations faces a test of whether or not it can act more effectively than did the League. The League failed because its key members wanted it to fail. Endless talk at the League was safe, while action under the League's auspices might have been dangerous.

There are some members of the U.N. who have the same idea today, that talk is safer than action. If there is to be a difference, it will arise from a conviction in the United Nations that the U.S. President and Congress are determined that action will take place, either action by Saddam Hussein to disarm or action under U.N. auspices to disarm him or, if necessary, action outside the U.N. framework.

Mr. Chairman, discussion of this need for action has been muddied up by the issue of preemption. To be sure, the President at West Point used the word "preemption” in connection with the longer term design of U.S. policy. Other officials have from time to time used the phrase in connection with Iraq.

Nonetheless, whatever the merits or the demerits of a policy of preemption in the longer run, it has little to do with Iraq. Preemption implies a surprise attack or preventive war. Surely in the speculations about Iraq, the word “surprise" cannot be employed when one continuously reads about our supposed war plans in the daily newspapers. In the case of Iraq, preemption is limited to the obvious and rather circumscribed meaning that if we are to deal with Iraq, we should do so before Saddam Hussein acquires nuclear weapons in number.

Iraq is a special case. We have been engaged in an ongoing conflict with Iraq since 1990. Vigorous action in the course of an ongoing conflict hardly constitutes preventive war. At this time, U.S. and British aircraft are overflying the northern no-fly zone and the southern no-fly zone. They are overflying some 60 percent of the country. Iraq has been firing anti-aircraft artillery and surface-toair missiles at our aircraft. Our aircraft have attacked Iraqi air defenses and other targets. Indeed, in recent months, Saddam's air defenses have shot down three of our Predator aircraft. Moreover, the United States has established a virtual protectorate for the Kurds who live in Northern Iraq. Surely we can acknowledge that in these conditions of ongoing and continued conflict, the word "preemption” does not really apply. Iraq, whatever the merits or demerits of preemption for long-run policy, remains a special case.

In an ongoing conflict, the issue of preemption appears to be close to meaningless. Indeed, historically we have regarded preemption as permissible, even in the far more difficult case of the

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