formerly neutral. In July 1940, less than a month after the fall of France, Winston Churchill had the British fleet attack the French, Britain's recent ally, at the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, killing 1,300 French sailors and sinking a number of ships. Others escaped to British harbors, to join the Free French, or to Toulon. More significantly, in November 1942, American troops landed in and occupied French North Africa, then under the control of Vichy France. To be sure, after our troops had entered French North Africa, we did receive an invitation to come in. Thus, as the record suggests, in time of war, restrictions on preemption are loosened.

I have gone into this issue at some length, Mr. Chairman, for I fear that it has generated more heat than light, and needlessly so. We must not allow conceptual disputes to obscure the underlying reality. The United States has been for a decade and is now deeply engaged in the conflict with Iraq. We should like the support of other nations as we approach the decisive moment. Strong backing of the President by Congress will elicit stronger support from other nations at the U.N.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be happy to answer any questions that you or other members of the committee may have. [The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

I thank the committee for its invitation to appear before you today to discuss the question of United States policy towards Iraq. The issue before you is more than a test of the United Nations, it is equally a test of the unity and resolve of the American government. The greater the degree to which the President and Congress are united in purpose with respect to Iraq, the greater is the likelihood that the United Nations will take a firm and appropriate stand towards Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, as the President has stated, this is a test of whether the United Nations in the face of perennial defiance by Saddam Hussein of its resolutions and, indeed, of his own promises-will, like the League of Nations over half a century ago, turn out to be simply another institution given only to talk. For more than 11 years, since the end of the Gulf War, the record is replete with U.N. resolutions condemning Iraq for "serious violations," "continued violations," and "flagrant violations." For that entire period, Saddam Hussein has regularly and successfully played that game of defiance. In 1998, Congress adopted a strong resolution approving the use of force to bring Saddam Hussein into compliance. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary General reached agreement with Saddam Hussein in a Memorandum of Understanding that promised “immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access." Failure to do so would result in "severest consequences." Some months later, Saddam Hussein excluded American inspectors, and by October had ceased cooperation with U.N. inspectors entirely.

In September of 2002, recognizing the growing pressure stemming from the United States, Saddam Hussein has once again informed the United Nations that he is willing to "allow unconditional return" of the inspectors. His intention, quite obviously, is again to repeat that all too familiar cycle. I think it is clear, Mr. Chairman, in light of our previous experience that we should observe that old adage, "once burned, twice shy!"

Will the United Nations prove as feckless as the League of Nations? Mr. Chairman, in 1935, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. The League of Nations took note of this challenge to the international order. Day after day, week after week, the League deliberated what to do. These sessions went on endlessly. After each session, there was a press conference. After some weeks, one of the reporters present summarized the situation as follows: "On the surface, very little is happening-but beneath the surface, nothing is happening."

Today the United Nations faces a test whether or not it can act more effectively than did the League. The League failed because its key members wanted it to failendless talk at the League was safe, while action under the League's auspices might have been dangerous. There are some members of the U.N. who have the same idea today, that talk is safer than action. If there is to be a difference, it will arise from

a conviction that the U.S. President and Congress-are determined that action will take place: either action by Saddam Hussein to disarm, or action under U.N. auspices to disarm him, or, if necessary, action outside the U.N. framework.

Mr. Chairman, discussion of this need for action has been muddied up by the issue of "pre-emption." To be sure, the President at West Point used the word, preemption, in connection with the longer-term design of U.S. policy. Other officials have, from time to time, used the phrase in connection with Iraq. Nonetheless, whatever the merits or the demerits of a policy of pre-emption in the longer run, it has little to do with Iraq. Pre-emption implies a surprise attack or preventive war. Surely in the speculations about Iraq, the word surprise cannot be employed when one continuously reads about our supposed war plans in the daily newspapers. In the case of Iraq, pre-emption is limited to the obvious, and rather circumscribed, meaning that, if we are to deal with Iraq, we should do so before Saddam Hussein acquires nuclear weapons in number.

Iraq is a special case. We have been engaged in an on-going conflict with Iraq since 1990. Vigorous action in the course of an on-going conflict hardly constitutes preventive war. At this time, U.S. (and British) aircraft are overflying the Northern No-fly zone, and the Southern No-fly zone. They are overflying some 60 percent of the country. Iraq has been firing anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at our aircraft. Our aircraft have attacked Iraqi air defense and other targets. Indeed in recent months, Saddam's air defense forces have shot down three of our Predator aircraft. Moreover, the United States has established a virtual protectorate for the Kurds who live in Northern Iraq. Surely we can acknowledge that in these conditions of on-going and continued conflict, the word pre-emption does not really apply. Iraq, whatever the merits or demerits of pre-emption for long-run policy, remains a special case.

In an on-going conflict, the issue of pre-emption appears close to meaningless. Indeed, historically, we have regarded pre-emption as permissible even in the far more difficult case of the formally neutral. In July 1940, less than a month after the fall of France, Winston Churchill had the British Fleet attack the French (Britain's former ally) at the Naval Base of Mers-el-Kebir, killing 1,300 French sailors and sinking a number of ships. Others escaped to British harbors (to join the "Free French") or to Toulon. More significantly, in November 1942, American troops landed in and occupied French North Africa, then under the control of Vichy France. To be sure, after our troops had entered French North Africa, we did receive an invitation to come in. Thus, the record suggests that in time of war restrictions on preemption are loosened.

I have gone into this issue at some length, Mr. Chairman. For I fear that it has generated more heat than light-and needlessly so. We must not allow conceptual disputes to obscure the underlying reality. The United States has been for a decade, and is now, deeply engaged in a conflict with Iraq. We should like the support of other nations, as we approach the decisive moment. Strong backing of the President by Congress will likely elicit stronger support from other nations in the U.N. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to answer any questions that you or other members of the committee may have.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

Senator Warner, do you have an opening statement?

Senator WARNER. I will withhold and submit my statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming these two distinguished public servants before our committee. Both of these gentlemen have served our Nation with great distinction, and continue to do so. I especially want to welcome Dr. Jim Schlesinger back before the committee. In addition to having served as a cabinetlevel officer in three different administrations, Dr. Schlesinger has been one of our Nation's most productive citizens, as a professor, an economist, a leader, and a gifted strategic thinker. I am fortunate to be able to count him as a personal mentor and close friend.

We, as a Nation, are fortunate that these two gentlemen are contributing to this important Iraq debate.

Över the past several weeks, our President has courageously focused world attention on the defiant, illegal conduct of the brutal, ruthless dictator Saddam Hussein.

In 1991, after his defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein accepted-in writing— U.N. terms for the suspension of military operations and committed to comply with all relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and submitting to intrusive inspections to verify this disarmament. Eleven and a half years later, we are still waiting for Saddam Hussein to comply with international mandates, as reflected in 16 United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The clear message Saddam Hussein has communicated to the world for the past 11 years is that he cannot be trusted, under any circumstances. Our President is, rightfully, seeking a strong statement of American and international resolve that clearly conveys to Saddam Hussein that he has to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions and disarm himself of weapons of mass destruction now, or accept the consequences of his actions. Clearly, a resolution from Congress authorizing the use of force and a resolution from the United Nations describing the consequences if he fails to comply will strengthen the hand of the diplomats who are trying to resolve this matter without force. Resorting to the use of force should be the last step, but it is a step we must be willing to take-collectively with the support of the United Nations, but alone, if necessary. It is also a step those who threaten us and those who continually defy international will must clearly understand that we are willing to take, and are authorized to take, quickly and decisively, if necessary.

President Bush has asked Congress for a very strong resolution authorizing the use of force. I support the President on this resolution. We will have a debate in the Senate on this resolution and while we may make minor adjustments to the precise language proposed by the President, it is imperative that the final product clearly shows that the President, Congress, and the American people are united and willing to do whatever is necessary to end this longstanding and growing threat to our national security, as well as regional and international security.

The threat posed to the United States, the region, and the entire world by Saddam Hussein is clear. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair, laid out a compelling case before the House of Commons yesterday: we know Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction; we know he has used these weapons before; and, we know he will use them again, and can do so on as little as 45 minutes notice. President Bush called these revelations "frightening." We cannot wait for a future attack before we respond to this frightening and growing danger. Saddam Hussein must be stopped-by military force, if necessary.

Many have reacted as if this is a new crisis with Iraq. It is not a new crisis. It is the continuation of a crisis that Saddam Hussein initiated when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and attempted to snuff out the existence of an entire nation. This crisis has ebbed and flowed, most recently in 1998 when Saddam Hussein expelled U.N. weapons inspectors. We in Congress all agreed at that time that we must act to end this menace to world peace. We did not solve the problem in 1998, however, and now we must confront it again. Saddam Hussein has had 4 more years to accumulate more of these terrible weapons. It is time to act-forcefully-to end this crisis, once and for all.

Again, thank you for your participation in this process as we prepare for deliberations in the Senate.

Chairman LEVIN. We'll go right to questions, and we'll follow the procedure that I outlined before.

Let me ask both of you a question about the type of U.N. resolution that would be the most constructive. Mr. Berger, can you tell us how you feel the U.N. can act in a way which would be the most effective, have the greatest chance of forcing Saddam's compliance or capitulation without war, that would then use the possibility of force if he does not comply? Could you outline for us what that resolution would contain?

Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, I think that we should seek a resolution which-as I say, in the current context, in the context of the contemplation of military invasion of Iraq, which is not the historical context-strongly reaffirms the commitment of the international community, not just the United States or the British, that Saddam Hussein should be in compliance, particularly with his obligations for weapons of mass destruction, number one.

Number two, it should impose upon him or reaffirm that this is his affirmative obligation. It's not the obligation of inspectors to find; this is the obligation of Saddam Hussein to affirmatively comply.

Number three, in my judgment, it should spell out, to the extent possible, what "unfettered access" means so there's no question that some of the cobwebs that developed around UNSCOM during the late 1990s, of concerns about Iraqi sovereignty and other pretexts for obstruction were not what the United Nations had in mind.

Now, it would be good if, in addition to that, the resolution authorized all necessary means, the magical language that explicitly authorizes military action. I don't think that is necessary. I don't think that's essential. In 1998, we acted pursuant to a Security Council resolution that talked about severest consequences. I think it's the act of the international community affirming in this context the obligation to comply and the rights of the inspectors that, I think, is what gives us the capability to build broader support if there's noncompliance and to act with legitimacy in that event.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you believe that, at this time, we should notify the United Nations and the world that if the United Nations does not act in the way that you've outlined, that we would either keep the option open to act alone or, as an alternative, notify them that we will act on our own if they do not act, whether they authorize action and get the world to pull together behind their action or not, or some other approach? In other words, do we say at this time, "Hey, we're not going to give you a veto, but we're going to keep that option open, on the one hand, to go it alone," or do we notify them and decide right now that, "Hey, if you don't act, we're going to do it," or some other formulation?

Mr. BERGER. I think that the United States always reserves the option to act alone under extreme circumstances, and I don't think that we can forego that option. I don't think that it is particularly and certainly that option lingers in the wind, it's out there, but I don't think we necessarily help ourselves at this stage by indicating that we're going to go alone.

I think we ought to put the responsibility here where Dr. Schlesinger has put it, on the Security Council, in the first instance. I think there probably are members of the Security Council who would like to see our nose bloodied by acting largely alone and let them pick up the pieces. So let's leave the burden there.

In the event that the Security Council doesn't act, I think we have the time then to try to still build an international coalition and act, to the greatest extent possible, collectively.

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Schlesinger, in your November 2001 National Interest article, you assert that, "the bases in Saudi Arabia are almost a necessity for successful action against Saddam Hussein." The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia recently stated that all members of the U.N. are bound by Security Council resolutions, suggesting that if there is a resolution, we would have access to the bases, but that without a U.N. resolution, we could not count on, and indeed, he suggested we could assume that there would not be-assistance from Saudi Arabia and the use of our bases.

Is that your position still? Is there any change in that in the last year or so, that bases in Saudi Arabia are almost a necessity for successful action against Saddam Hussein?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The conditions in the field have changed somewhat, Mr. Chairman. As this committee is keenly aware, we have built base structure elsewhere. It would be desirable for us to be able to use Saudi bases, but it is no longer essential. From other areas in the region, we could go into Iraq.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. My time's expired.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome both of our distinguished witnesses. We've had the pleasure, you and I, of many years of association with these fine Americans who continue their public service. Thank you.

First, to Mr. Berger. I look back on the Clinton administration, and we worked together very closely. I remember so well when Tony Blair was elected Prime Minister, the President had him to Washington. I was privileged to be involved in one of the first meetings that the President had with the Prime Minister. My recollection is you had a close working relationship with him. Am I correct on that?

Mr. BERGER. Yes, absolutely.

Senator WARNER. Yes. But I pick up this morning your statement, "nuclear weapons potential"—and we all recognize it's a potential-"concerns me the most." Yet the Prime Minister has reported in today's paper-says as follows, "Iraq could deploy nerve gas and anthrax weapons within 45 minutes of an order from President Saddam Hussein or his son." Do I see a difference in priorities between you and the Prime Minister?

Mr. BERGER. No, I think what Prime Minister Blair is describing there is Saddam's capabilities. I have no reason to question that he's right. He also, I think, shares my view that Iraq is a potential threat to the stability of the region and the United States. But I don't think that necessarily goes to what the probability is that he would launch a preemptive attack. I think that is-with biological weapons-always a possibility. It's something I think we have to continually reevaluate. But I think it is also a distinct possibility that he would launch a biological attack in response to our military operation as well.

Senator WARNER. Speaking for myself, having gone through a series of briefings with my colleagues here, I'm gravely concerned about his significantly enhanced inventory of weapons of mass destruction in the two categories of biological and chemical. Let's just dwell on the biological.

There's open testimony to the effect that Saddam has this enhanced capability. It is mobile. To me, that indicates that he could put small quantities in the hands of third parties in the terrorist regime. Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense, in open testimony, linked Iraq with al Qaeda. That could work its way to the shores of the United States. Those small quantities of biological weapons could be released in 45 minutes, or some figuratively similar period. That's my main concern.

It seems to me our President has no alternative, as Prime Minister Blair indicates, to initiate preemptive actions, if that is nec