essary, to stop that transit. I mean, we're still struggling here in this country to know who put anthrax in the Senate. If this is put into the hands of the terrorist organization worldwide, we may not be able to quickly link Saddam Hussein directly to having perpetrated an attack on the United States.

Therefore, I just want to get your consensus as to how dangerous you think this biological threat is and the fact that materials can be put into the hands of terrorists and readily distributed and transported to our shores.

Mr. BERGER. Senator, I, too, am concerned about Saddam's biological capability and his continued efforts to enhance that capability. I think that has to be a concern of the United States. I think that the point I was making goes to whether we have time-not years, not 5 years or 10 years-to try to do this in a way that maximizes the extent to which we have international support. I believe that we do have that time.

Senator WARNER. But you had firsthand experience with this inspection regime. You had to deal with it and make some tough decisions when-in your phrase, “unfettered inspections"-fell apart. But that cooperation by Iraq is absolutely an essential ingredient if the U.N. is to have any degree of success over and above what was experienced in the previous 11 years. Am I not correct? Mr. BERGER. Absolutely.

Senator WARNER. Do you see any indication from Iraq that they are going to cooperate? Because to go down this path of additional inspections without some strong indication that they're going to cooperate, to me, is futile.

Mr. BERGER. Well, I don't see any particular indication. As I said in my statement, Senator Warner, I'm skeptical that an inspection regime will result in disarmament without cooperation. To me, an inspection regime could conceivably slow down and disrupt his effort. But the most important reason for us to seek a Security Council resolution that calls for and describes "unfettered inspections" and then tests them in a rigorous way is to gain the support of the international community so that we're acting here in concert with others.

Senator WARNER. Let me turn to Dr. Schlesinger's closing comments with which I strongly associate myself, and that was as he observed Congress now looking at a resolution and, at the same time, the U.N. working on their resolution. Am I correct, Dr. Schlesinger, in the summary, that the extent that the congressional resolution is strong, clear, and decisive and shows no difference between the course of action chartered by the President and that by Congress supporting him through the resolution, that is the extent to which we're most likely to get a strong resolution in the United Nations. Have I stated that correctly?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You have stated it perfectly correctly. Any clear signs of equivocation in U.S. policy will, I think, weaken the willingness of the United Nations to have a strong resolution.

Senator WARNER. Your worry, Mr. Berger, was an interesting one: let's get a congressional resolution sharpened. I accept that word, "sharpened." To me that makes it stronger and in no sense weaker than what the President submitted to Congress.

Mr. BERGER. Yes, Senator Warner. My view is that a more focused resolution that has genuinely broad support shows greater credibility than a broader resolution that has narrower genuine support.

I'm not talking about what the number of votes may be.

Senator WARNER. No, I understand that, but I liked your word "sharpened." To me that means more forceful. In no way should we try and weaken any of the provisions that are presently submitted to Congress by the President.

Mr. BERGER. I think the draft-and the President was quite clear this was a draft of the White House

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Mr. BERGER.- that was submitted, I think is overly broad. I think that we're talking here about something that could take place for a very long time. We learned once before, many times before, how important it is to have American public support for the long haul. We ought to know that-the American people ought to know what we're getting in for. Therefore, we ought to describe that authority, I think, in a sharp way and a focused way and ask the President, as President Bush Sr. did in 1991, to come back to Congress before exercising that authority with certain determinations, for example, with respect to what a post-Saddam regime would look like.

Senator WARNER. Well, I certainly accept, let's sharpen it. Let's not dull the draft.

I thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. I want to thank both of you, as well, and thank our leaders in the committee for giving us the opportunity to listen to two experienced and thoughtful individuals that have been so concerned about our security and defense.

Obviously, as has been pointed out, Saddam is the danger, and obviously the weapons of mass destruction are the basic problem. But there's also al Qaeda and the strength of al Qaeda out there. There's also what is happening in Afghanistan now with the potential of deterioration in Pakistan, as Mr. Berger pointed out, if Musharraf is displaced.

We have, according to the Secretary of Defense, some 90 nations that are cooperating with us now, giving us important information and intelligence. This battle, I believe, is going to go on and poses a very serious threat.

Now, my question is this. If we were to see the actions that are going to be taken against Iraq-first of all, I listened to Tony Blair yesterday. I didn't associate his remarks with the actions of al Qaeda and the dangers of terrorism, providing these weapons of mass destruction. I might have missed something. I've listened carefully to the intelligence reports. We don't have intelligence reports, at least that I have seen, that say that Iraq is providing weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda now. If that happens, we ought to know about it. I'm concerned that if Saddam Hussein's back is against the wall, he may provide them. That's a danger.

But let me get back to my question. What are the implications in the battle with al Qaeda between a United Nations involvement

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in terms of Iraq and the United States going alone? Is there a difference in terms of the kind of cooperation we're going to have from the intelligence field and from the military cooperation that we are receiving now in the battle against al Qaeda? Will there be any differences, and how should we measure it?

Mr. BERGER. Senator, I think that there are two implications here. That doesn't deny the fact that we have to deal with Iraq, as I said earlier. But I think one is the focus of decision makers, and the other is the support of the international community.

We debate whether or not the military has the capability to fight two wars. I'm not sure whether or not the senior leadership of a government has the capability of fighting two wars without some distraction. So question number one is whether we lose focus here. That, obviously, will be a more serious problem if we're acting largely alone, and, therefore, in my judgement, with a much more serious burden to bear and much more serious consequences.

The second reason why I think that it reinforces the notion that we want to try to do this with the legitimacy that comes from international support is that we're entering a phase of the war against terrorism and the war against al Qaeda. I believe al Qaeda remains a real threat, a clear and present danger to the United States, a virulent threat. I believe that we most likely will be attacked again, and we cannot lose that sense of urgency.

We're now in a phase of this war which requires cooperation: military cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and political cooperation. Much of this involves rooting out cells that are in third countries. We're not going to, presumably, drop the Special Forces into Hamburg or the perhaps after the election, that might be, some people in the White House may be discussing that.

So, I think it's extremely important that the world is marching together on the major security threats that are not only threats to the United States, but to the world.

Senator KENNEDY. Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, you quite rightly point to the al Qaeda problem. It will be with us for a long time. Al Qaeda has been disrupted. It's on the run. It has lost its safe haven. It has lost its training facilities, but it is still there, and it will be for a long time. Pakistan, as Sandy Berger has indicated, is a serious potential problem, and you've reiterated that.

What would be the consequences of going into Iraq? It depends upon the effectiveness of a move into Iraq. If we have a quick success-and I pointed this out in the article that the Chairman cited-in Iraq, we will be surprised at the number of countries who are eager to help us. It just isn't politics. We'd have a bandwagon at that point. If it is a botch, the reverse will be true and we will not be in a position to arrest a decay, let us say, in Pakistan.

A triumph of American and other arms will, as in November of last year, alter public opinion in Pakistan. A failure or semi-failure of American arms will lead to a revival of support for Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. There are the risks that are involved, and it depends how effective a campaign against Iraq might be.

Senator KENNEDY. In the strong likelihood of the involvement of Israel in this conflict-we saw Prime Minister Sharon indicate that if Israel was attacked, that, unlike the previous conflict, they would

respond. Given the kind of information that Senator Warner pointed out, as Prime Minister Blair mentioned, the 45-minute ability to be able to use weapons of mass destruction, the real possibility of that kind of activity, Israel's response-what additional kind of a risk does that provide to this kind of endeavor in terms of both the United States and the United Nations?

Mr. BERGER. Senator Kennedy, first of all, if existentially threatened, I think that the possibility of Saddam launching an attack at Israel, perhaps a chemical or biological attack at Israel, is very real.

Number two, I think that Israel, and perhaps any sovereign democratic country attacked by chemical or biological weapons, would be hard pressed not to respond. Whether it responds conventionally or in some other fashion will be a judgment that the Israelis will make. So I think they will respond. All the more reason, it seems to me, to embark on this to the extent, if it's at all possible, with the acceptance of the Arab world.

The Saudis have indicated that they will support or accept something done with some form of a U.N. blessing. I don't know that they really are the language here is all that critical. If we are seen as the United States and the British, I think the danger, under the circumstances you've described, of this situation breaking along an Arab-Israeli fault line is much more serious. Under those circumstances, I think Dr. Schlesinger's concern about effectiveness becomes more difficult.

Senator KENNEDY. Just to finish that thought, and the impact of that kind of division on the war against al Qaeda, would that have implications in terms of our ability to be more effective in terms of the war against al Qaeda? Would this diminish our ability if that were to happen?

Mr. BERGER. Well, certainly we need support and cooperation from countries in this region to fight the al Qaeda threat, which is, in a sense, the cockpit of the crucible of this threat. We're receiving that support from some, less from others, but I would not want to see the situation evolve in a way in which these countries believe that a hard anti-American position was necessary for their survival.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Hutchinson.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing today. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses today for their contribution to this very important national debate on how we address the threat that is posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

Mr. Berger, some of the issue is, from your testimony, the currency of the threat, the immediacy of the threat, and you've indicated that you believe that we have some time and that it would be uncharacteristic of Saddam to attack us with biological weapons. If I understood your testimony correctly, it was based on, number one, his desire to survive, and number two, the likelihood of detection and then subsequent annihilation.

Following on what Senator Warner has said-I mean, we've been waiting over a year now attempting to detect the source of the anthrax attacks upon our country. Given Prime Minister Blair's re

port yesterday to the British Parliament and the dossier that they released that biological weapons could be released within 45 minutes on the order of Saddam Hussein and what I believe is a current link between Saddam Hussein and terrorists-I mean, it is widely reported that some members of al Qaeda have taken refuge in Iraq. Saddam has been an active and vocal supporter of Palestinian extremists, provided sanctuary for some of the most notorious terrorists over the last 2 decades-that those links are already established.

So it seems to me if we wait until we know that he's provided al Qaeda with biological weapons, then we've waited too long, and that the immediacy or the currency of the threat, I mean, that is at the very heart of this debate as to how quickly the United States should move and how much time we really have. Could you respond to that?

Mr. BERGER. Well, first of all, Senator, I think the threat is real. When I say that we have some time, I don't mean some time to do nothing. I mean some time to begin to act in a way that puts ourselves in the best position here to secure either disarmament of Saddam of Iraq, one way or the other. On that, I think that we have enough time to vigorously seek the support of the international community. If we obtain that support, or at least acceptance or understanding of the nature of the threat, I think the risks are much diminished.

The potential that Saddam Hussein would preemptively use biological or chemical weapons against us or through a terrorist is not something that can be dismissed. I believe that is a possibility. But he would have to be fearful that we would detect that, knowing that every intelligence resource of the United States is trained on that.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Have we not done that over the last year on the anthrax attacks?

Mr. BERGER. Well, we have different intelligence bodies working on those two matters. But that's for another committee, I think.

I'm not saying that we would certainly be able to detect it, but it would be something that he would have to take into account, and I think that he would recognize that that would result in annihilation.

If I could just say one last thing, he's had these weapons, of course, for many years, he's had chemical weapons for 20 years, and has not used them preemptively. Again, I don't suggest here, Senator, that this is not something that is a real threat, something we should be genuinely concerned about. It simply, in my judgment, does not mean we have to act here without trying to lay the groundwork.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Hutchinson, if you would just yield for one moment, we have the first of two votes now that has started. I'm going to leave and try to come back immediately and then vote at the end of the second vote. After Senator Hutchinson is completed, Senator Akaka would be next on our side, and then Senator Sessions would be next. But we'll try to keep this going.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Collins was ahead of me.