A critical component of the information needed by our warfighting commanders is to monitor and detect the presence of chemical and biological agents in the tactical environment. Today, our forces have an improved ability to detect suspected Iraqi chemical and biological agents.

Our command and control systems have also improved. Today, U.S. Army ground commanders have vastly improved capabilities for tracking the real-time locations of their tactical units. Our air operations have undergone an improved ability to track key enemy forces, friendly units, and to obtain faster assessment of the effects of our attacks. The Joint Force Air Component Commander in Operation Enduring Freedom repeatedly demonstrated the ability to re-task all aircraft while airborne and strike emerging targets quickly, in some cases in as little as 2 hours. Also, our Maritime Component Commanders can now plan a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile mission in a matter of a few hours, when a decade ago it required at least 2 days. The Nation's ability to get to a crisis, with the right forces, to execute operations on our timeline has improved over the past decade. With the strong support of Congress, we invested in our deployment infrastructure and equipment to allow operational units to deploy faster and arrive better configured to fight. Since 1991, congressional support of strategic power projection capabilities such as the C-17 aircraft, Large-Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ship program and both afloat and ground based, pre-positioned combat unit sets, contribute significantly to our combat capability.

Additionally, we continue to work with the Nation's medical experts at the Health and Human Services Department to ensure every member of our Armed Forces will be fully prepared medically with immunizations against potential biological threats. This September, we resumed immunizations against anthrax for military personnel in select units.

These improvements allow our Nation's military to gather intelligence, plan operations, deploy, and execute combat missions much faster than 11 years ago. These improvements ensure that we have a faster decision cycle than our opponent. These enhancements equate to flexibility and agility in combat, which directly translates into a superior force.

Equally dramatic has been our improvement in the combat power of our forces. In Operation Desert Storm, only 18 percent of our force had the ability to employ laser guided bombs (LGBs). Of the more than 200,000 bombs employed, only 4 percent were LGBs. Today, all of our fixed-wing combat aircraft have a range of precision attack capability. In addition, all of our bombers and 5 of our 7 primary airto-ground fighter weapon systems have all-weather precision attack capability with the Joint Direct Attack Munition.

The results of these enhancements are measured in numerous ways. For example, on the first night of our combat operations in Afghanistan, we employed 38 fighter and bomber aircraft to attack 159 separate targets. All aircraft employed precision weapons. Had we relied on a Operation Desert Storm equipped force, we would have needed roughly 450 aircraft to gain the same level of destruction. In Operation Desert Storm, we could not have afforded this size force against so few targets. So in 1991, we used selected precision weapons from F-111s, F-117s, and A-6s on key targets that had to be destroyed. On the rest of the targets, we accepted a lower degree of damage. In 1991, our attacks required good weather between the aircraft and its target. In Afghanistan, weather was often not a major factor.

The combat power of our Army and Marine forces has improved as well. We have significantly improved the quality and quantity of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with wide-area and GPS aided missiles. Our Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has significantly improved its fire rate. Our M-1 tanks continue to have the ability to identify and destroy an Iraqi T-72 tank at twice the range that it can identify and fire at our tanks. Our Bradley Fighting Vehicles, equipped with upgraded fire control systems, now have the ability to fire accurately while on the move. The addition of the Longbow to Apache helicopter units has given those forces the ability to destroy twice as many enemy vehicles in roughly half the time-with improved survivability. Finally, some of our soldiers and marines now have the Javelin fire-and-forget anti-tank system that adds a dramatic new weapon to their fight.

Today, we have made similar improvements to virtually all aspects of our joint team. Through tough, realistic training, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen are a ready, capable fighting force. Individually, these improvements are significant. Combined, they reflect an improved joint warfighting team. We still have much to do in regards to fully transforming our forces for the 21st century, but there should be no doubt that, if called upon, our Armed Forces will prevail in any conflict.

Our Armed Forces are capable of carrying out our defense strategy. We do have sufficient capability to conduct effective operations against Iraq while maintaining other aspects of the war on terrorism, protecting the U.S. homeland, and keeping our commitments in other regions of the world. Our on-going operations require approximately 15 to 20 percent of our major combat units, such as carriers, fighter and bomber aircraft, and heavy and light Army divisions. The chart below reflects the major combat forces currently deployed to operations or committed overseas.

There are some unique units that are in high demand. Such capabilities mainly involve command and control assets, intelligence platforms, Special Operations Forces, Combat Rescue Forces, and similar select units. Mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces has been key to mitigating the current stress on some of these units. If our operations on the war on terrorism are expanded, we will be required to prioritize the employment of these enabling units. In this regard, our coalition partners may facilitate our combined operations by having similar units or forces. Where possible, we will leverage the best available capability to the mission required.

We also have sufficient resources to logistically support our combat operations. For example, our current stockpile of precision weapons has been increased in recent months due to the solid support of Congress and the tremendous potential of our Nation's industrial base. Along with the significant improvements in deployability I mentioned earlier, we continue to exploit the best of logistics information technologies to ensure we know what the combat commander in the field needs, where those supplies are located world-wide, and to track those supplies from the factory or depot to the troops at the front.

Our military planning will include operations to facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil affairs. Our efforts in Afghanistan have demonstrated that these efforts can be as important as conventional operations on the battlefield.

Our ability to accomplish our current missions is predicated on the availability of funds for current operations. To continue Operation Noble Eagle and to prosecute the War on Terrorism into fiscal year 2003, it is imperative that our Armed Forces have access to the full $10 billion War Operational Contingency Reserve Fund that is part of the fiscal year 2003 Defense Budget Request. Moreover, it is vital that these funds be made available strictly for warfighting as requested, so that our forces will have the maximum flexibility to react to dynamic operational requirements and to address emerging needs, as they arise.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs and I are confident that we can accomplish whatever mission the President asks of our Armed Forces. We are prepared to operate with our coalition partners. As before, we will be prepared to operate in a chemical or biological environment. Every day, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen have dedicated their lives and their professional skill to protect American lives and our interests worldwide. The men and women wearing the uniform of our Nation have translated the technologies I described into combat power that will allow us to protect our Nation and interests. With the support of the American public and Congress, we will prevail in any conflict.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Myers. As I indicated, we'll have a round of 6 minutes, on the early-bird rule.

Secretary Rumsfeld, you said in June that because we have underfunded and overused our forces, we find: we're short a division; we're short aircraft; we've been underfunding aging infrastructure facilities; we're short on high-demand, low-density assets; the aircraft fleet is aging at a considerable and growing cost to maintain; the Navy is declining in numbers; and we are steadily falling below

accepted readiness standards. It's been pointed out by a number of people regularly, and General Myers today, who testified that if our operations on the war on terrorism are expanded, we'll be required to prioritize the employment of enabling units.

Both of you have testified that we are stretched mighty thin already, and I'd like you to explain, if you can, how we can carry out this significant additional commitment with the forces that we now have that are already stretched thin?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I'd make four points. One is that the executive branch and the legislative branch have, in the past two periods, increased the budget of the Department of Defense in a considerable amount.

Second, under the emergency authority of the President, we've called up something in excess of 70,000 Reserves and some 20,000 stop losses of people who would normally have gotten out who have not gotten out.

Third, we have been in the process of trying to move more and more people in uniform out of activities that don't require a person in uniform and back into things that do require people in uniform. Fourth, we have been drawing down our forces. For example, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and in other parts of the globe where we felt it was a static situation, we began moving them out in ways in cooperation with our allies and our friends.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Myers, some have suggested that the U.S. military invasion of Iraq would be a "cakewalk." Give us your characterization, if you would, of what we can expect.

General MYERS. The senior leadership, civilian or military, does not think that any combat operation is a cakewalk. Certainly if the President were to ask us to conduct combat operations in Iraq, that's certainly not how I would characterize it. Anytime you put the lives of our sons and daughters at risk, calling it a cakewalk is doing a disservice to them and to the country.

What we do know-and it's in my written statement—that the Iraqi forces over the past decade, for the most part, are less effective than they probably were 10 years ago. That is in all sectors like their command and control. They've done a lot of work in fiber optics, so they're probably a little bit better there along with their air defenses. Clearly in their weapons of mass destruction, they have improved. They've had since 1998 to continue and increase their production of weapons of mass destruction, and that would be one of the things you'd be concerned about in a potential conflict. On the other hand, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the United States forces are much better, as well.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, in your judgment, is there any chance at all that Saddam Hussein would open Iraq to full inspections and disarmament if the alternative that he knew he faced was to be destroyed and removed from power?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I suspect that anyone's guess on that is as good as anyone else's. There certainly have been leaders in the world-dictators particularly-who have seen their run end and the game play out; they've taken their families and some of their

close supporters and gone and lived in another country in some sort of asylum. That's, I supposed, a calculation.

The other calculation would be to admit to the world that for the last period of years he had been lying and he does, in fact, have these capabilities, but say, "That's all right, the world can come in now." It would have to come in such large numbers and so intrusively just to find the weapons of mass destruction. They're so well buried, they're so well dispersed, and they're in so many different locations that it would take a massive intrusion into his country and his way of life. I just don't know which choice he might take as an alternative.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree with the intelligence community that the retention of power is Saddam Hussein's number one goal? Secretary RUMSFELD. He certainly is a survivor. I mean, he killed people to get into the job in a coup, and he's managed to kill off a lot of people to stay in there. I suspect that one of the first things he thinks about when he gets up in the morning is retaining power.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it the last thing he thinks about when he goes to bed at night?

Secretary RUMSFELD. He seems to go to bed at night in a different bed every night.

Chairman LEVIN. Wherever he goes to bed, do you believe, with the intelligence community, that that is the first and last thing he thinks about during the day?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I guess I'm not part of the intelligence community. But there's no question, he's survived.

Chairman LEVIN. Given that you believe and testified that agreeing to inspections is a dance or a ruse, is there any purpose in a return of U.N. weapons inspectors?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I think that's really a question for the President and Secretary Powell. Colin is working on that with his U.N. colleagues, and the President, needless to say, is addressing it with him and with the National Security Council. The U.N. inspection program was much stricter in the first period when it was called UNSCOM than it was more recently when it was called UNMOVIC, and there have been a lot of instances where they've walked back and weakened the inspection program that existed in that earlier period.

There's no doubt in my mind that the inspection program that currently is on the books wouldn't work, because it's so much weaker than the earlier one. We know the earlier one had some real successes and did end up destroying a good deal of material. But we know that there were enormous quantities of things that were unaccounted for.

One of the problems is that you get information from defectors and people who are willing to tell you something. Unless their families are outside of Iraq, they're not going to tell you, because they're going to be killed and their families are going to be killed. So it's a very complicated problem; I'm not an expert on it, so the Department of State's working on it with our U.N. colleagues. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. My time has expired.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, General Myers very forthrightly just said that the conventional forces possessed by Saddam Hussein today are somewhat less than he had in the 1990/1991 period-I think we all agree with that-but that his inventory of weapons of mass destruction has risen appreciably to a level far greater than any he'd ever require for defensive actions to protect the sovereignty of his country. So he's using them, or amassing these weapons, in all likelihood, for offensive action and possibly export. But as the calculus is made, should force be needed-but I repeat, our President has said he didn't declare war when he spoke out the U.N.; he's only seeking action by them despite the loose talk about war. The point I wish to make is if Saddam's conventional is down, is he more likely then to have to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction should military action be taken? What are the increased risks to those in uniform who undertake that action? Are we prepared? Secretary RUMSFELD. I'll let General Myers comment on the precautions that are taken so that men and women in uniform can function in the event of such an attack.

To go the first part of your question, he can't do it himself. He can't use weapons of mass destruction by himself. He's running, he's moving around, and he's constantly looking out for his own life. He would have to persuade other people. It would be our task to do everything humanly possible to explain to the Iraqi people that we recognize that the bulk of the Iraqi people are hostages to a very vicious regime. If you think back to Operation Desert Storm, the Gulf War, something like 70,000 to 80,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered in the first three and a half days. Several hundred tried to surrender to a newsman who didn't even have a weapon.

There are an awful lot of people who aren't very pleased with the Saddam Hussein regime, and he has to use some of those people to use weapons of mass destruction. We would have to make very clear to them that what we're concerned about in Iraq is the Saddam Hussein regime, and the regime is not all the soldiers and it's not all the people, and that they ought to be very careful about functioning in that chain of command for weapons of mass destruction.

Senator WARNER. Do we read in that there's a presumption that he has delegated the authority to initiate the use of those weapons, in all probability, to a level below him involving one or more persons?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't want to get into that question of command and control in that country. I will say this, that you cannot physically do it yourself, just like the President of the United States can't physically fly an airplane, make a ship go from one place to another, launch a rocket, or drop a bomb. You need other people. Those people I don't believe think very highly of that regime.

Senator WARNER. General Myers, as to the military analysis, as the conventional forces come down, he has to rely on weapons other than conventional to a greater degree, correct?

General MYERS. Senator Warner, I think the answer is that it's really unknowable how the regime would use weapons of mass destruction, but you'd have to plan on worst case. You'd have to assume they would be used.