We are somewhat better off than we were a decade ago. The protective equipment has improved over time. It's still cumbersome, more cumbersome than it should be, but it's much better than it was a decade ago, and much better than when I was wearing it out in the field.

We have better early warning and netting of our sensors today, so better detection capability and to tell what kind of attack we're under. Of course, one of the things you'd think about doing would be attacking his delivery means or his weapons of mass destruction. As the Secretary said, we don't know where all of that is, so that would be problematic. But as it develops, that would be one of the things that General Franks would pay a lot of attention to. If he ever has do this, he would pay attention to them getting ready with their weapons of mass destruction.

Senator WARNER. I think what you are saying is reassuring and important to have as a part of this record.

I'd like to go to a second point. Of recent, there are individuals who have expressed a knowledge that within the Pentagon today there's considerable dissent, or whatever quantum they said, among senior officers as to the advisability of initiating the use of force in Iraq, should that become necessary. I'd like to explore that. I go back again to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which this committee wrote and we carefully put in there many years ago, that the views of senior officers can be shared with Congress. Now, I remember 12 years ago, on September 11, 1990, in a situation_remarkably similar to the hearing we're having today, I then asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, this question, quote, "The law now provides for individual members of the Joint Chiefs to express their views if they have views inconsistent with those of the Secretary and the Chairman."

In this instance, I presume there is full consultation among all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, I can understand, from my experience in the Pentagon during Vietnam, the seniors were asked to give their different views. As a matter of fact, it's some of those views that were given to Secretary Laird, Secretary Schlesinger and others that resulted in our policies in those days. I remember those meetings very well. I think that's proper.

But I guess I'm probing to determine whether or not there's any significant level of dissent which causes you trouble in coming forward today and saying, "We are prepared to undertake such missions as may be directed by the President."

General MYERS. Senator Warner, I'll just keep it real short. Absolutely not.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, anyone with any sense has concerns about the use of force, because you simply do not put people's lives at risk without have a darn good reason and having thought it through. General Myers, General Pace, and I spend a good deal of time looking at the things that can go wrong the down sides like what could be a problem, what could be a difficulty, what is the worst case here, and the worst case there. I don't know a single civilian or military person who's involved in thinking about these

problems in the Department of Defense who doesn't have concerns. One would be a fool not to.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I read what you read in the paper. I think it's inaccurate. I meet with the Chiefs. I meet with the Vice Chiefs. I meet with the combatant commanders. I hear what they say and I know what they think. I meet with civilian leadership. My impression is that there are people across the spectrum, both in the uniform and outside the uniform, and I urge the committee to call up anyone you want and ask them anything you want. Let's hear what they have to say.

Senator WARNER. I think that's clear.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, in response to the earlier question, you indicated that Saddam Hussein can't use these weapons of mass destruction himself. He has to persuade other people and he needs other people. Is it your intelligence now that he has persuaded other people and that they are in a go mode, or hasn't he done that at this time? Secretary RUMSFELD. We have no way to know. My impression is that if you asked any of those high level people today, they would say they're totally loyal to their leader, and one will not know until one gets to that moment.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I guess your answer then is, if he says go, they'll go. Is what I'm just hearing back from you?

Secretary RUMSFELD. No, you're misunderstanding me. What I am saying is, if he says go, those people better think very carefully about whether that's how they want to handle their lives.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I want to join with those that recognize the great danger of Saddam Hussein and commend the President for going to the United Nations to try and find out a way of dealing with these weapons of mass destructions. Clearly there are risks if we take no action. We know that Saddam has used the weapons before, but many analysts believe that Saddam's on notice now and that he'll use these weapons only if his regime is about to fall. In that case, he will use everything at his disposal.

My question is, what is the basis of your judgment that there's a higher risk if we don't go to war than if we do, since many believe that Saddam will use the weapons of mass destruction if his back is against the wall and his regime is about to fall?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, let me reverse it. If the argument goes "one must not do anything because he has weapons of sufficient power that they could impose destruction on us that would be at an unacceptable level," then the next step would be that, if that's the conclusion, then in 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and he has even more powerful weapons, a nuclear weapon, and longer-range capabilities, then he is able to use those weapons of terror to terrorize the rest of the world, including the United States. It's kind of like feeding an alligator hoping it eats you last.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I'm asking the question. This might not be 1 year, 2 year, 3 years; this may be in 1 month, 2 months, 3 months. It's, as I understand, a very real possibility. Many of the

analysts believe, that when his back is up against the wall, he'll throw everything at us, including weapons of mass destruction. Secretary RUMSFELD. It's possible.

Senator KENNEDY. It's very possible, you recognize. So it is possible; we'll leave it at that. It is possible that he'll use them.

Now, there's certainly a possibility that he'll use them against Israel, as well. There is a possibility that Israel would respond with nuclear weapons, as well. This isn't the best nor the worst-case scenario, but all those are real possibilities. What kind of situation do you see then, in terms of Arab countries that may not have joined us in the war but are joining us now in the war on terrorism? What's going to happen, and how do you want to see this play out in terms of the situation both in Iraq and what we're going to be left with?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Those are all considerations that have to be very carefully thought through by the President, the Secretary of State, and others. We already do know that Saddam Hussein is willing to use weapons of mass destruction, because he's used chemicals on his own people and on the Iranians. This is a man who isn't shy about using those things.

Senator KENNEDY. So we shouldn't be shy to think that he wouldn't use them if his back is against the wall, and we wouldn't go in there not to win as you pointed out. We'd go in there hard and fast to remove Saddam Hussein. Is that correct? Or his regime. Secretary RUMSFELD. That's right, if that decision is made. Senator KENNEDY. Whatever decision is made, those that are going to be able to be in command and control of those weapons of mass destruction will use them. That's why we'd be going in there, to minimize the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.

As you pointed out, the weapons against his own people and against the Iranians.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly.

Senator KENNEDY. So what makes you believe that he wouldn't use them if he knows that he's going down?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I didn't indicate that I believed he would not use them. I said I did not know, and it would be a function of how successful we were in persuading the Iraqi people, who I am convinced large fractions want to be liberated. That is a terrible life they have, and they're frightened of this man.

Senator KENNEDY. They've been unsuccessful.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That's right.

Senator KENNEDY. It's just fear they've got. They've been unsuccessful in doing it. Let me ask this question.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I answer on Israel?

Senator KENNEDY. Good, go ahead.

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is possible. He has fired missiles at four of his neighbors. We know what he did to Israel in the Gulf War. In my view, it was in Israel's interest to stay out of the Gulf War. In my view, it would be overwhelmingly in Israel's interest to stay out in the event that a conflict were to occur prospectively.

With respect to the Arab countries you asked about, they know what Saddam Hussein is. There isn't one of his neighbors who doesn't want him gone. You've talked to them. We know that. They live in the neighborhood, and he's about several times stronger

than they are, so they're careful about what they say publicly. I don't blame them, but they have to know that he threatens their regimes. He tries to occupy their countries. So they would be enormously relieved if that clique running Iraq were gone.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think there's more of a chance or less of a chance for Saddam Hussein to make his weapons of mass destruction more available to terrorist organizations or to al Qaeda if we were to become involved in a war? Does that increase the dangers of proliferation of these weapons or not? How does this fit into your calculations?

Secretary RUMSFELD. In my view, the only way you can prevent Saddam Hussein from providing weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks is to disarm Iraq and not have them have those weapons while he's leading the country.

Senator KENNEDY. Just one last point since my time is up. If there were to be an attack on Israel, the Israelis have the Arrow and the Patriot missiles to try to shoot those down. However, those weapons may very well have bio-terrorism material, so it isn't like shooting an explosive. The products could very land in Israel, and I would imagine that that would cause a serious kind of reaction, which would have been different from the previous war, would it not?

Secretary RUMSFELD. What you have stated is a possibility.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Hutchinson.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General Myers, welcome. As I read the White House discussion draft on a joint resolution that was sent over, it just struck me that there is absolutely no more serious or sober decision that Congress ever makes than voting on a resolution like this that would authorize and stamp approval upon the use of force. I appreciate that it was in that spirit that General Myers spoke a moment ago that is a very serious and sober discussion that we're having.

I appreciate the President's very forceful and convincing case that he made before the United Nations that we must deal sooner rather than inevitably later with Saddam Hussein and the threat that he poses. I applaud his leadership in reminding the world community about Saddam's long record of support for terrorism, the pursuit of the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the repression of his own people.

I believe that Saddam Hussein, in fact, does present a clear and present danger, not only to the security of the United States, but to his region and to the security of other nations in that part of the world. You have made a very clear case that he not only possesses weapons of mass destruction, but continues to accumulate and grow those weapons. I think that the doctrine of preemptive defense, as the President outlined it, when the risk is high and the evidence is overwhelming, becomes a moral imperative.

My constituents want to know-as Senator Kennedy pointed out, as the Chairman has pointed out, and others-that there is an enormous risk in going in when this dictator, this brutal international outlaw, has weapons of mass destruction-I think they want to know that by going in and taking that risk that this

world's going to be safer and that their children and their grandchildren are going to have a safer and more secure country and world to live in-the idea of inspectors, where we're waiting 5 months or a year, and then we'll only not really deal with the issue at hand, which is the destruction of those weapons of mass destruction.

He has always sought to cause us to delay, to cause us to dawdle. Mr. Secretary and General Myers, if we do nothing, and 5 years passes, what kind of arsenal, what kind of threat would Saddam Hussein, at that point, pose for the world in which we live?

General MYERS. Five years hence-a lot of this is hypothetical. Senator HUTCHINSON. A lot of the questions have been hypothetical today.

General MYERS. Right.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Let's hypothesize that if we do nothing. General MYERS. We're a long way out, though, and I think you had the benefit of Mr. Tenet's testimony, as I mentioned, and Admiral Jacoby.

Clearly, 5 years from now, where Iraq's interest in nuclear weapons might finally materialize into a weapon, would create considerably more strategic concern. There's already strategic concern; it would just make a bad situation much, much worse if he had that. We know he's continuing to produce chemical and biological weapons. We have some idea of what they have, and I think you were briefed on what kinds we think the regime has. There are other ones out there that he doesn't have that in 5 years possibly he could find. Then you have to worry about the delivery means. Right now, they think they have some missile delivery means, interest in other ways to deliver them. By then, who knows? There would be other, more easily obtainable delivery means, cruise missiles and so forth, that could make it a lot more problematic.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything you could add to that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes. If one looks at their capabilities over the last decade, they declined for a period when the no-fly zones were robust, when the economic sanctions had some traction, and when inspectors were on the ground. In the last 4 years, there have been no inspectors on the ground, the northern and southern nofly zones have been less robust, and the sanctions have dissipated. Their borders are porous. There is no question but that they went down for a period in the first part of the decade to the middle. By 1998, they were starting to come back up. Their conventional and their weapons of mass destruction capabilities are improving, and they're improving every day, every month.

A great deal of this dual-use capability that's moving into the country-massive numbers of dump trucks-they take the tops off the dump trucks, and they put artillery on the back of it. As General Myers mentioned, they're doing lots of things that are not in the WMD category, like fiber optics.

General MYERS. The last point I would make on Iraq's capability 5 years from now is that there's a great danger there that the nexus between those states that produce and conduct research and development on weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organizations will become a greater threat in the future. We're dealing