the Senator from Arizona, the Presiding Officer, was there. They have gone throughout the Arab world, and now they are in Russia.

He tells me that he believes that when they return, Secretary Cohen and the two Senators will bring a great deal of helpful information to the Senate and to the American people about what they have heard in the Arab world and what they have heard from our allies in those areas' meetings. They believe that they will be able to answer some of the very important questions that Senators have been asking. So we will look forward to their return.

I had hoped that we could get to the point where we could pass a resolution this week on Iraq. But we really developed some physical problems, if nothing else. Senator Warner and Senator Levin would like very much to be a part of the discussion about what the situation will be and how we should proceed on Iraq. They would like to be here. Other Senators are necessarily not going to be able to be here beyond this afternoon.

So we have decided that the most important thing is not to move so quickly but to make sure that we have had all the right questions asked and answered and that we have available to us the latest information about what is expected or what is going to be happening with our allies in the world.

I was noting, I say to Senator Daschle, that I just talked to Senator Warner in Russia, and he was telling me that Secretary Cohen and Senator Warner and Senator Levin are looking forward to coming back and giving us a full report on their trip to the Arab world. Now they are in Russia today.

Mr. President, I have no doubt that the entire world is watching the current crisis between Iraq and the international community unfold. This is another showdown caused by Saddam Hussein.

The Iraqi dictator has decided that his weapons of mass destruction program is more important than the welfare of his own people. At a time when we have been getting reports-in fact, we have seen children suffering from malnutrition-this dictator has been building $1.5 billion in additional palaces. He has already endured 7 years of sanctions so that he can develop biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons-and the means to deliver them.

This is a very serious matter. For some time we-and I mean America and our allies—have been working to develop a resolution on Iraq that has broad bipartisan support and also one that would bring the situation under control there by diplomatic efforts hoping to avoid military action. But that has not happened yet.

I believe we are moving toward a consensus in the Senate on a number of the key issues that must be addressed as we look to the future. Here they are.

First of all, Saddam Hussein does pose a real threat to the region and to the entire world. I believe the Senate recognizes that. I hope that the American people recognize that. This is not a hypothetical danger that has been dreamed up by some armchair strategists. There is a long track record in this area of actions by Saddam Hussein. He poses a clear and present danger without equal in the post-cold-warworld. He is dangerous. He is a threat to his neighbors. He is a destabilizing force in the whole region. Yes, he is actually a threat all over the world including the United States. This is a man who has already invaded two of his neighbors. Iraq has used chemical weapons inside and outside its borders. It has launched missiles against Saudi Arabia and against Israel. Hussein tried to murder former President George Bush in 1993.

Now, we should not make any mistake and think that a military action, if it comes to that, is going to rehabilitate Saddam Hussein or even eliminate him. He does not have any desire to join the civilized world, apparently, and he has shown that he can survive even when the whole world has concerns with his conduct and has taken unified action to stop his aggression.

Second, I think there is a consensus in the Senate that military force is justified if diplomatic actions fail in responding to the threat that Saddam Hussein poses. The threat is serious and our response must be serious.

Now, any military force that is used does entail risks, to our military, to our allies and even to our country if there is an attempt at retaliation. The American people need to understand that, and we need to think about it carefully. We need to talk about the risks that are involved. That is one reason why, when we bring up a resolution, if it is necessary-and I assume it will be-we must make sure that every Senator who wants to be heard can be heard.

I remember when we had a similar debate back in the early 1990s. I think some 80 Senators spoke. Now, this time we won't have 500,000 troops amassed on the ground ready to go in, but it is still a very serious matter, and I want to make sure that we don't try to restrict Senators. In fact, we could not. Senator Daschle knows if we asked unanimous consent to bring this resolution up today and vote on it in 4 hours, we would not get it; the Senate is known for its deliberate actions. The

longer I stay in the Senate, the more I have learned to appreciate it. It does help to give us time to think about the potential problems and the risks and the ramifications and to, frankly, press the administration. I feel better this week than I did last week because of the responses we are getting about how this is being thought out and what would be the military action and what will be the long-term plans to deal with Saddam Hussein. We are beginning to get some answers now. I believe the administration is thinking harder about what those answers should be because the Senate, Republicans and Democrats, has raised these questions, not in a critical way, not in a threatening way, but in an honest way of saying, have you thought about this? What about this approach? Can we do more? I think that has served a very positive purpose.

Some people have said to me, even back in my own State, "This is not a threat to us. Let them deal with that over there.' Who? Who is going to deal with it? If America does not lead, who is going to lead? Nobody else.

Now, our allies can, should, and, I believe, will join us if action is necessary. But we are going to have to lead the way. We are going to have to make the tough decisions. People need to understand that this threat could even apply to us. While it may be a direct threat of a Scud missile in the region with a chemical warhead even, it could very easily be a threat to Paris or some city in the U.S. involving anthrax that's been produced by Saddam Hussein.

These are terrible things to even think about, but you are dealing with a person who has already used terrible actions against his own people. So he is not so far removed. We are the ones who have to provide the direction. We have to make sure people understand it is a threat to the whole world.

In my view, the decisive use of force against Iraq coupled with the long-term strategy to eliminate the threat entails less risks in the long run than allowing Saddam Hussein's actions and ambitions to go unchecked. You cannot do it when you are dealing with a situation like this. In the words of former Secretary of State Jim Baker, "The only thing we shouldn't do is do nothing.' We cannot allow that to be the result or what we do is nothing.

The administration has agreed with us that funding for the operations in and around Iraq require supplemental appropriations. We had very grave concerns by the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens, and Senator Domenici about how much will this cost? How is it going to be paid for? We cannot continue to say just take it out of your hide' to the Pentagon; it is having an effect on morale, quality of life, on readiness and modernization. We already have a very high tempo for our military men and women in the Navy and Air Force. We are satisfied that they now have made a commitment that they are going to come up and ask for funding for both these purposes, in Bosnia and, if necessary, in Iraq. These will be emergency requests so it will not come out of necessary improvements in barracks or spare parts for aircraft, which are very important.

There is a consensus on seriously examining now I believe long-term policy_options to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein. The administration and Congress and our allies all look forward to dealing with a post-Saddam regime. But the question is how to get there.

That is intended not to be a threat or say we should violate the law; it is intended to start the discussion, start the thinking about how can we increase these pressures. We have to have a strategy to deal with whatever comes after the military option. Many things have been suggested. Toughen sanctions-not loosen sanctions, toughen sanctions. What about an embargo, what about expanding no-fly, no-drive zones? What about the support of opposition forces?

There is a long list of suggestions, some that I will not even put in the record here, but they are worth thinking about. Our model should be the Reagan doctrine of rollback, not the Truman doctrine of containment in this instance. I don't mean that as critically as it sounds. It is just that there are two different doctrines, and the doctrine here should be rollback, not containment.

Despite our areas of agreement that we have clearly reached-Senator Daschle and I have been working together making sure every word is sanitized in the potential resolution-it is obvious we cannot get it done this week for physical reasons as much as anything else. I remind my colleagues and the American people it was 5 months after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, 5 months before Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to expel him. In this case, we have a bipartisan effort, trying to make sure that the right thing is going to be done and that the right language is developed. Unlike what we had in the early 1990s when the Speaker and majority leader were working to defeat the administration's policy, you now have a Speaker and a majority leader and the Democratic leader and the minority leader in the House all working together with the administration to make sure that the language is right and that the actions are right.

Yes, more time may be needed for diplomacy and more time to think about the long-term plans, but a point will come when time will run out and action must go forward. When that comes, when U.S. Armed Forces are sent into harm's way, by the President of the United States, they will have the backing of the Senate and the American people. If the President makes the decision to deploy military force against the threat posed by Iraq, America will be united, united and praying for the safety of our men and women in uniform, united in hoping casualties are kept to a minimum, and united in hoping for and supporting a successful effort.

I just want to make that point clear today. Nobody should interpret the fact that we don't vote on a resolution today as meaning that we are not united in the fundamental principles. We are. But we want to make sure that when we do take military action, we have thought about all the ramifications and the resolution that we come up with will have the involvement of 100 Senators, with 100 Senators being present and voting, and that every word is the appropriate word that reflects the best interests of the American people.

So I am pleased to stand here this afternoon and make this statement and to assure my colleagues that I will continue to work with every Senator on both sides of the aisle to make sure we take the appropriate action, if it is necessary, when we return week after next.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and I am looking forward to hearing Senator Daschle's comments on this subject.

Senator DAYTON. I would just go on to point out that it was not until 6 months later, August 14, 1998, that President Clinton signed a resolution that had been passed by Congress along these lines and that it was one that did not, in fact, authorize the use of force against Iraq. It urged the President to take appropriate action. But 2 months later, on October 31, 1998, the so-called Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 was passed, which stated-and references have been made to this today and elsewhere that it is the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, but it specifically did not authorize the use of force to carry that aim out. In fact, the President was attacked and criticized harshly by members of this body in December of 1998 when he initiated the bombing of Iraq, which I don't have time to go into.

But I just guess in light of all this the precedent in 1991 and 1998 was that this body take the caution and the care and the deliberation necessary. What is it that overrides all of that and is compelling us now to make a precipitous decision and take precipitous action authorize precipitous actions?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Dayton, first, thank you for your generous comments.

Second, it bothers me greatly to hear those words you've used in a hearing that General Myers and I are participating in. As you indicated, neither he nor I would ever use words like you've repeated twice. Nor would the President, nor do I believe anyone in the administration would, and I think any implication to the contrary would be an enormous disservice.

I have no idea where you heard those words, but I would bet a dollar to a dime that no one in this administration would say that, and I can assure you I wouldn't, nor would I think it.

Senator DAYTON. I take that as seriously as you do, sir.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The issues that you've raised are important issues. The issues that the country is seizing are important issues. They need to be talked about. They need to be debated. They need to be discussed. I have raised this issue repeatedly before this committee and elsewhere for over a year. These are complicated questions. They are breaking new ground.

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There is, in my view, nothing precipitous at all about what's being discussed here. President Clinton discussed it with a great deal of urgency. Eleven years have passed. I have personally discussed it here and with members of the House and with members of the Senate on numerous occasions.

We have moved into a new national security environment. It is different. The history you cited is interesting. It is important. It's relevant. But the circumstance we're in is notably different than when that history was written.

I'd take slight exception, although it's maybe a matter of semantics, but if you go back and think about the attack on Afghanistan. Afghanistan didn't attack us; al Qaeda did. They just happened to have been trained in Afghanistan, and we took anticipatory self-defense. We took a preventive action. We made a conscious decision that that country was a haven for those people, and they were training thousands of them and sending them all over the globe. They killed 3,000 of our people. So when one asks what's happened, what's different? What's different is 3,000 people were killed using admittedly unusual techniques, but basically conventional techniques, not weapons of mass destruction.

What's new is the nexus between terrorist networks like al Qaeda and terrorist states like Iraq, Syria, Iran, and others, and the fact that there are suicide bombers, who, if they start using weapons of mass destruction, are going to impose damage on our country and our friends and our allies around the world that will not be 3,000 but 30,000 people dead. In answer to the question what's different, what's happened, what's changed, I would say that's changed.

Second, go back to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union didn't stick missiles in Cuba. They didn't shoot missiles at the United States from Cuba. They tried to. They got started. President John F. Kennedy looked at it and allowed as how he thought that wasn't a very good idea. What did he do? He imposed a quarantine, a blockade, they used a euphemism for international law reasons and called it a "quarantine." That was preemptive. That was not waiting to be attacked. That was a decision that the risk to our country was sufficiently great that that administration, with the support of Congress, made a conscious decision to interject itself into it at great risk of a nuclear exchange and stopped it, not after it happened, not after people were dead, but before people were dead. Enormously important.

You have an important responsibility. Everyone here today has said this is a serious, critical judgment that each member of the House and Senate is going to be making. Each one should make it any way they feel best. They've got to do what they have to do. They have to think, search their soul, and make a judgment.

There are people today, as I have said earlier, in the Intelligence Committee, trying to connect the dots about September 11. How did it happen? What did we know? What evidence did we have? What was the immediacy? What should somebody have done? If we had had evidence on September 9 or 10, would I have favored an anticipatory self-defense? You bet.

Senator DAYTON. That's what I'm asking in the question, sir.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator DAYTON. What evidence, because you're right and there are times when a decision of that magnitude has to be made that suddenly. As you said, President Kennedy did so with full expectation at that time that it might very well result in a nuclear holocaust. Again, I'm not a historian, but many would say that's as close as we ever came to such. He was certainly aware of the enormity of the decisions that were being forced upon him by the events, and I guess I'm asking again the events are forcing the rapidity of this decision upon us

Secretary RUMSFELD. I accept that.

Senator DAYTON. I accept that.

Secretary RUMSFELD. See, I don't see it as a rush to judgment myself. It seems to me 11 years is a long time, 16 resolutions violated is a long time, and 4 years since the inspectors were thrown out. Each year that goes by, those weapon programs are developing further and further, and, let there be no doubt, that's a fact.

Senator DAYTON. I'm not aware that we've been discussing, however, in the times we've been here and the like and you've obviously had your attention focused elsewhere. Again, I don't question at all the assessment of the seriousness of this.

Secretary RUMSFELD. No, I know you don't.

Senator DAYTON. Until sometime in August, this Senator was not aware of this kind of military initiative being seriously contemplated for as soon as it was now being discussed.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, if you go back to President Clinton's statement in 1998 or 1999

Senator DAYTON. But in the last year and a half that

Secretary RUMSFELD. -it's hard to fashion a statement that could have reflected a greater degree of urgency than the one that was just read.

Chairman LEVIN. I think we're going to have to end this.

Senator DAYTON. All right. I'm sorry. I guess I was over time.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I finish my thought?

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, if you could just finish the thought, because we want to get to Senator Akaka.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I will.

If someone is looking for the kind of evidence that would be used in a court of law to prove something beyond a reasonable doubt, it isn't going to happen. The only certainty we'll have is if, in fact, such an attack takes place, and that's too late.

The task of connecting the dots before the fact is a whale of a lot harder than doing it after the fact, and look how hard it is for the Intelligence Committee to try to look at those scraps of information and piece it together. Someone's going to have to take the evidence that I've submitted, that the President presented at the United Nations, that Secretary Powell is presenting today, and think about it and ask, how do we feel about moving into the 21st century, a world of weapons of mass destruction, and moving away from where we had traditionally, as you said, absorbed an attack, let it happen, and then marshalled our forces and gone on, and knowing that we were going to lose thousands of people? How do we live in the 21st century, when it isn't thousands, but potentially tens of thousands? That is not an easy question. I don't suggest it is. As far as I'm concerned, any member of the Senate or House can