Senator WARNER. So I judge that you feel if there are the conditions I laid out—a ceasefire and an invitation for them to come in— that the presence of the NATO peacekeepers could contribute to the basis for negotiations over a period of time.

Mr. BERGER. I think-with the consent of both sides.
Senator WARNER. That's correct. That's integral.

What about the NATO forces in terms of being in consultation with the Iraqi issue?

Mr. BERGER. Well, I was disturbed to read one administration official said he never even considered the idea of asking NATO to be involved. Of course, in Kosovo, it was a European issue, but it was the unity of NATO. Even Italy and Greece, where public sentiment was overwhelmingly favorable to the Serbs, it was the unity of NATO that ultimately defeated Milosevic. So that obviously may be difficult to obtain in this circumstance, but it does go, again, to legitimacy.

We acted with legitimacy, I believe, in Kosovo, even though we didn't have a Security Council resolution, because we acted in the context of 19 NATO members with diverse viewpoints.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger, your thoughts on, first, my scenario in the Middle East, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the involvement of NATO by invitation, and second, the consultation of NATO in regard to the ongoing events in Iraq.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. On the first question, I have no objection to the scenario that you laid out and the suggestions that NATO might want to participate. NATO members have not been eager to provide forces, as opposed to providing advice, and that is always a problem.

This history of peacekeepers in the neighborhood of Palestine and Israel, or in the neighborhood of Israel and her Arab neighbors, is mixed. It was a success, of course, in the Sinai, but that was because the Egyptians wanted it to be a success. It's not clear to me that we have the basis there.

Senator WARNER. They have been a success in Bosnia, NATO forces, in Kosovo. NATO is a coalition that is in place, it is ready to roll. It could be there in 72 hours.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I'm not suggesting that NATO would not be useful in the Middle East.

The other point that I would make is that, even though these subjects do tend to overlap, Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are separable. For many of the Arab states, their inaction with regard to Palestine has been a major contributor to the problem, and that's true over a period of 50 years.

What we have seen since September 11 is a tendency to use Israeli conduct toward the Palestinians as an excuse to continue to avoid the responsibilities that other Arab states might have toward the Palestinians. It has changed what had previously been the antagonism to the United States as the protector of regimes that were impure and that the Islamists wanted to change into a new focus, or a renewed focus on Israel-Palestine. So I think that it is important for us to recognize that much of the antagonism to American policy is not due to our support of Israel.

Senator WARNER. One last quick question to the panel, Mr. Chairman, and that is on the doctrine of preemption.

Mr. BERGER. Well, let me just say that I agree with that final statement by Dr. Schlesinger. I don't want there to be any mistake about that. I agree with the final statement of Dr. Schlesinger about it not being because of our support for Israel. We've been supporting Israel since 1947.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Mr. BERGER. Every President since Richard Nixon has been deeply engaged in trying not only to support Israel, by not only protecting it, but also by trying to reduce violence and bring about some kind of a more durable peace.

Senator WARNER. Well, I associate myself with those remarks. Dr. SCHLESINGER. For that, we get no credit. Madrid, Oslo, the first President Bush's actions

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, I associate myself with the comments of Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger.

Last question. The doctrine of preemption has gotten, understandably, people stirred up. Our country has never sought, in its 215-216 year history, to take a square foot of land permanently from any other nation, and we have used our Armed Forces, I think, judiciously through the years. But what has changed is technology. As Tony Blair says, within 45 minutes they could begin to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

The doctrine of preemption grew out of the state-sponsored belligerencies where we then had time to declare war and go through these motions. We haven't declared war since World War II, but we have moved swiftly under a number of presidents to intercede where our security interests were involved. Today, cyber-security is reaching such a dangerous proportion that cyber-terrorists could strike America in a matter of a minute's time through our computer systems and shut down power grids and shut down the flow of water and all kinds of things.

To me, this underlies the President's need to move out and tell the American public and the world that we can't sit and wait for the smoking gun, as did President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis with that picture of that missile headed into a position to be pointed against the United States. There may be no one left here to see the smoke after the gun is fired.

So technology, in my judgment, underlies the need to change our doctrine and to move more toward preemption where it has to be done, and done quickly. Does anyone have a comment on that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think your observation is unanswerable. I think that the point of those who have raised questions has been preemption does not conclude containment or deterrence, that these are tools that work together.

Of course, whatever we have said in the past, when we thought it necessary, we took action. President Reagan moved into Grenada, not by consulting the British. Indeed, President Kennedy, whom you just referred to, when he had that picture, engaged in what was an act of war under international law: to wit, the quarantine of Cuba. That is preemption, even though it did not involve an exchange of fire. So over the past, when we saw ourselves menaced, we were prepared to act.

I think the question here is, should we be emphasizing preemption as our primary tool that displaces containment or deterrence.

Mr. BERGER. I think the option of preemption is one that every president has had, must have, to act in circumstances where the United States is immediately threatened. I think it is counterproductive to elevate that to an organizing doctrine or the organization doctrine of America's strategic policy, for several reasons. Number one, I think it tends to lower the threshold of use, because it puts governments on notice that "you'd better use them or you're going to lose them." Number two, I think it provides a rationale for other countries to act against their perceived opponents and enemies saying "this is our doctrine of preemption."

I think it changes the perception of the United States in the world. I think that basically it says, to do this to articulate this now is to say that Iraq is the rule, not a special case, as Dr. Schlesinger said; İraq is the template. I think that makes it much more difficult for the United States in the world.

So, option? Absolutely. Option we've used in the past? Absolutely. Organizing doctrine of American strategic policy? I think it's counterproductive.

Senator WARNER. Is there a difference between preemption, the use of the doctrine of preemption against state versus non-state? Like, September 11 was non-state, so far as we know. It seems to me that should be unfettered, and it's to our advantage to tell them we're going to use preemption against non-state. Now, state, there is, I think, a debate, even though I support the President's time frame.

Mr. BERGER. I think it goes to the imminence of the threat to the United States. It, again, ought not to be elevated to the organizing principle.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger, I must remind you, the clock's ticking. You said you have to leave.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I will leave in 5 minutes, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions has a turn coming, so we hope you'll save some time for his questions if they're addressed to Dr. Schlesinger.

Senator SESSIONS. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. I think, Dr. Schlesinger, if you want to just quickly wrap that up, I don't want to stop you from doing it, but make it quick.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I agree with Senator Warner with regard to terrorist organizations. We should tell them we will do whatever we can to blunt your activities. If you are even partially successful, we will continue to hunt you down wherever you are.

With regard to the issue of nations, I think that you are absolutely right on the facts, the administration is right on the facts. It would be better to play this in a somewhat lower key than we have.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that sums up the point pretty well. I agree with Senator Warner that it's good that the President has raised preemption and made it quite clear we are not going to sit by and allow ourselves to be vulnerable.

Dr. Schlesinger, I tend to agree with you that we don't have to go to preemption in Iraq. We have such a continual history of viola

tion of U.N. resolutions and basically continued warfare since 1991, we're in a state of conflict with them.

My question is, the President has taken this issue to the U.N. He has asked for their support and met with leaders around the world. Iraq, feeling this pressure, playing its game again it would appear. Iraq has written to the U.N. to say they would unconditionally allow themselves to be inspected; however, in that very document (Saddam Hussein's letter to the U.N.) they state: "The Republic of Iraq reiterates the importance of the commitment of all states, members of the Security Council, and the United Nations to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Iraq.”

Well, any vigorous form of inspections, by its very nature—I'll ask you two experts-aren't those inspections, by their very nature, infringements of territorial integrity and sovereignty?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. He has abandoned the question of sovereignty. In fact, he is attempting to reassert the question of sovereignty in principle. It just doesn't fly. As a general proposition, we are going to see Saddam Hussein attempt to evade, as he has in the past, the commitments into which he has entered, and we are engaged in a game similar to that of Lucy and Charlie Brown and the footbail, in that, will once again this autumn we be fooled, as Charlie Brown is? I don't think we will be, but in our quest for international support, the international community may once again be fooled.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Berger, in your statement-I think you were correct, you went to heart of it; you said we have to have an honest commitment to inspections and a renunciation of weaponry. I believe you used the word "unfettered access." Would you agree that term contradicts this letter in which Saddam Hussein continues to insist on his sovereignty and territorial integrity?

Mr. BERGER. Senator, as I said, one of the reasons why I think a UN Security Council resolution is important is so that the United Nations defines "unfettered." not Saddam Hussein, and we get rid of some of the cobwebs that grew up around UNSCOM around this notion of sovereignty and special sites. Let the UN. say what unfettered" is: let the international community say, “unfettered means anytime, anyplace, anywhere." Then, having defired, as an international community, what unfettered" means, if Saddam does not comply with that, it seems to me we are on much stronger ground.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Schlesinger, in that regard, you expressed some pessimism or some concern, as I do, about whether or not we can get clarity out of the UN on this question. How do you see it playing out?

Let's say the inspections don't come unfettered, and what do we de? How do we get to the point where we either act or not act?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We are. I believe, going to ultimately see action. We prefer that action to be from the UN. But if not, we are going to see action. We do not have to advertise that or blatantly Say it. as Mr. Berger has indicated. But I think that that is understood

I think that it was a remark attributed to Samuel Goldwyn that “prediction is difficult, especially about the future." I always find

it a little difficult to predict what is going to come out of the United Nations. But it is clear that we must have a clear understanding of what "unfettered" means, that it does not mean that these palaces, or alleged palaces, of Saddam Hussein are off-limits to the inspection. They can go anywhere at any time, on demand.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Berger, how do you see events unfolding? Any prospects for clarity out of the U.N., or will it remain feckless? Mr. BERGER. I believe we could, I believe we can, Senator, get a resolution from the United Nations Security Council that reasserts, in this current context, the need for compliance, particularly with the weapons of mass destruction disarmament obligation, that calls for unrestricted inspections, and that defines that in U.N. terms, not in Saddam Hussein terms.

I am actually less concerned about whether or not there is the operative "all necessary means" language in the first instance, because I think that getting that clear statement from the international community now, today, in these terms enhances our position. It puts Saddam with a clear choice. Either he complies with the world or there will be consequences of some nature.

Senator SESSIONS. On the question, Mr. Berger, of Israel, several people have expressed concern about their situation. Israel has made it clear that this would be a decision for the United States, for it to go or no go, and they would be prepared to accept the risks that that might occur. They're not asking us not to go forward, are they?

Mr. BERGER. As far as I know, Senator, they're not asking us not to go forward with respect to Iraq, although I think they are reserving, as a national decision, how they would respond if they were attacked.

Senator SESSIONS. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Before Dr. Schlesinger leaves, and I think we're going to wind it up right now, let me thank both Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger. It's been a very useful, very helpful hearing to this committee and I hope to Congress and the country.

We would invite both of you, if you so chose, to give us specific suggestions relative to any modifications in the resolution that has been presented to us by the White House. I think both of you have had some suggestions here. You may want to give us some additional thought. Feel free to do so if you wish and to submit those to this committee.

[The information referred to follows:]

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I have nothing to add to my testimony regrarding the White House resolution on Iraq.

Mr. BERGER. I have made some suggestions in my testimony on proposed changes to the resolution. I am available to discuss more specific language with any member of the committee at his or her request.

Senator WARNER. I'd just join you, Mr. Chairman, in your observation. It's been an excellent hearing.

Chairman LEVIN. You have one more question? Okay. Senator Sessions?

Senator SESSIONS. Would you care to hazard a guess as to whether or not Saddam Hussein would, in fact, agree to unfettered access?