Zealand, and Mr. G. Heaton Nicholls, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, attended to represent their respective government for this purpose. The chairman, however, announced the receipt of a letter from the Yugoslav Delegation informing the Council that they had only just reached London and that their leader Dr. Kardelj, the Yugoslav Vice Premier, was indisposed.

The Council thereupon decided to postpone until tomorrow morning the hearing of views from the invited governments upon the ItaloYugoslav frontier question and continue its consideration of the directive which will guide deputies in their preparation of a draft peace treaty with Italy. This draft is to be submitted to the Council at its second session.

[Communiqué released to the press by the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 18]

At the morning meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers over which the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh presided, the views of the Yugoslav Government upon the question of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier were presented by Dr. Kardelj, the Yugoslav Vice Premier. The United States Secretary of State Mr. James F. Byrnes presided over the afternoon meeting when Dr. Kardelj concluded his statement and Count de Gasperi, the Italian Foreign Minister, presented the views of his government. It was decided to hold a further meeting later in the evening to hear the view of the British Dominion representatives.

[Communiqué released to the press by the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 19]

The Council of Foreign Ministers met twice today. Mr. Ernest Bevin presided in the morning and Mr. Molotov in the afternoon. Both meetings were devoted to further examination of the terms of the peace treaty for Italy. The Council agreed that the deputies should consider and report on the problem of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste with the following terms of reference:

(A) To report on the line which will in the main be the ethnic line leaving a minimum under alien rule on the understanding that appropriate investigations will be carried out on the spot before the final delineation of the frontier;

(B) To report on an international regime which will assure that the port and transit facilities of Trieste will be available for use on equal terms by all international trade and by Yugoslavia, Italy and the states of central Europe as is customary in other free ports of the world.

86. Meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers: Statement by Secretary of

State Byrnes, October 2, 1945"

[Released to the press October 3]

The Council of Foreign Ministers at its initial series of meetings dealt with many matters in accordance with the directive from the Berlin Conference to continue the preparatory work for the peace settlements with a view to submitting their conclusions to the United Nations. The present meeting is the first meeting of the principal Allies to be held since the fighting has stopped, and there emerged differences of views which had not appeared so long as the first imperative was to preserve fighting unity. There was a considerable area of agreement. The differences which developed were explored in a spirit of conciliation, and there is good reason to believe that with continued patience and understanding on all sides agreement on essentials can be attained. We are determined upon that outcome. Toward the conclusion of the present series of meetings procedural difficulties arose. The Soviet Delegation came to feel that treaty discussions should be confined in each case to the signatories of the surrender terms as contemplated by the first and narrow provision of article II 3. (ii) of the Berlin agreement rather than under other and broader provisions of the Berlin agreement.88

The Soviet Delegation on September 22 took the position that the Council should rescind or withdraw its September eleventh decision whereby France and China were invited to participate in all discussions. This would have meant the elimination of China from the pending discussion of the European peace treaties and the similar elimination of France except in the case of the treaty with Italy. The Secretary of State of the United States took the position that he would be reluctant to see such narrowing of participation in the pending work on the European peace treaties and the elimination therefrom of two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. He would, however, accept any preliminary treaty-making procedure which was consistent with the Berlin agreement provided the Council agreed as authorized by article II 4. (ii) of the Berlin agreement to call a peace conference of the principally interested states. Such a conference should include the permanent members of the Security Council, the European members of the United Nations, and non-European members which supplied substantial military contingents against the European members of the Axis. The conference

37 Made in London (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1945, p. 513). Ante, p. 160.

38

would review the preliminary treaty work of the Council. The Soviet Delegation took the position that without personal consultation with their Government they could not make any commitment with reference to such a future peace conference. In the circumstances, work of the Council will be held in abeyance. If, as we confidently hope, agreement regarding future procedure is obtained, the drafting work of the deputies can then go forward on the basis of directives already given the deputies by the Council.

87. Report on First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers: Address by Secre

tary of State Byrnes, October 5, 1945"

[Released to the press October 5]

The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers closed in a stalemate. But that need not, and should not, deprive us of a second and better chance to get on with the peace.

In the past I have been both criticized and commended for being a compromiser. I confess that I do believe that peace and political progress in international affairs as in domestic affairs depend upon intelligent compromise. The United States Delegation acted in that spirit at Berlin. We acted in that spirit at London. And we shall continue to act in that spirit at future conferences.

That spirit is essential in international conferences where action can be taken only by unanimous agreement. When any one member can prevent agreement, compromise is a necessity. Men and women. who have served on a jury can appreciate that.

Compromise, however, does not mean surrender, and compromise unlike surrender requires the assent of more than one party.

The difficulties encountered at the London conference will, I hope, impress upon the peoples of all countries, including our own people, the hard reality that none of us can expect to write the peace in our own way. If this hard reality is accepted by statesmen and peoples at an early stage of the peacemaking process, it may at later stages save us and save the peace of the world from the disastrous effects of disillusionment and intransigences.

Regardless of how Americans may differ as to domestic policies, they desire unity in our foreign policies. This unity will be essential in the days ahead of us when we may expect differences in views by

39 Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System from Washington on Oct. 5, 1945 at 9:30 p. m. E.S.T. (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1945, p. 507.)

various governments as to peace settlements. However, the political party in power cannot expect this unity unless it freely consults representatives of the opposing political party.

Believing this, I requested Mr. John Foster Dulles, one of the bestinformed Americans in the field of foreign relations and a loyal Republican, to accompany me to London in an advisory capacity. He has been more than an adviser; he has been a partner. Between us there have been no secrets. At the Council table and in private conference he has participated in the making of all decisions. Our accord serves to show that in foreign affairs Republicans and Democrats can work together and that in vital matters of foreign policy we Americans are united.

When it was agreed at Berlin to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers 40 I think we all had in mind the precedent of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. There, representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States worked together to prepare draft proposals for the United Nations Charter as a basis for discussion with other nations. France was not present at Dumbarton Oaks only because France had not yet been liberated. Her right to permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council was not questioned.

Experience reveals that a certain degree of understanding among the major powers is essential to secure general agreement among many nations. When understanding among the great powers is not achieved in advance of a conference participated in by many nations, it usually has to be secured informally during the conference.

At the Versailles Conference, for example, it took the Big Three and the Big Five so long to agree among themselves that the complaint was made that the smaller powers had little more time to consider the treaty than was given to the Germans.

The Berlin agreement envisaged the naming of highranking deputies who could carry on the work of the Council in the absence of their chiefs, the Foreign Secretaries. The Council, as President Truman and I understood it, was to be a sort of combined staff to explore the problems and prepare proposals for the final peace settle

ments.

At Berlin it certainly was never intended that the three powers present or the five powers constituting the Council should take unto themselves the making of the final peace. The Berlin declaration setting up the Council begins with the statement "The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements."

40 Ibid., Aug. 5, 1945, p. 153.

The Council was not to make the peace settlements but to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements. It certainly was not my intention to agree to any final treaty without first getting the views of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate which must pass upon all treaties before ratification.

The first session of the Council, so far as the personal participation of the Foreign Ministers was concerned, was intended to provide directives for the deputies in the preparation of treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

This work was exploratory-to find out on what points we were in agreement, on what points we differed, and on what points further study and data were required. It is a little naive to suppose that when really vital differences emerge, one nation or another is likely to abandon its position on the first interchange of views.

At this stage it is as important to know and understand wherein we and our Allies differ as wherein we agree. We must understand our points of difference before we can intelligently consider means of reconciling them.

So far as the Italian treaty was concerned I think we made very good progress toward agreement on directives to govern the work of our deputies.

There was ready acceptance of our proposal that Italy should undertake to maintain a bill of rights which will secure the freedoms of speech, religious worship, political belief, and public meeting envisaged for Italy in the Moscow declaration of November 1943 and which will confirm the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

There was some difference among the conferees at the start as to providing for the limitation of armaments. But it was our feeling that Italy should rely on the United Nations for protection against aggression and should not engage in competition in armaments when all her resources are badly needed to restore her civilian economy. And this view gained general acceptance.

While the very controversial boundary dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy was not settled, it was encouraging to find that it was possible to agree that the line should in the main be governed by ethnic considerations and that regardless of its sovereignty there should be a free port at Trieste under international control.

The Council was in general agreement that the Dodecanese Islands should go to Greece although the assent of one member was qualified pending the study of certain questions by his government.

There was general agreement that the Italian colonies should come under the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter. Various views were expressed as to the preferred form of trusteeship for the colonies.