personnel costs and guarantees a sizable trained manpower source for mobilization. Of the estimated 50 million personnel within the Soviet reserve forces, 9 million have served on active duty during the last 5 years.

On balance, the Soviet manpower advantages lie in the numbers of personnel already under arms or involved in defense production and the trained military mobilization pool. The size of the US labor pool should be sufficient to meet the demands of both the armed forces and military production because the United States has a less labor-intensive production base. However, the ability of the United States to meet both demands will depend, in part, on the availability of adequate response time.

OVERCOMING A

QUANTITATIVE DISADVANTAGE

Technological Leadership

As a result of a larger peacetime military force, greater equipment and manpower reserves, and the ability to mobilize rapidly, the Soviet Union has forces with a quantitative advantage over those of the United States. One US approach to countering numerically superior enemy forces is to field qualitatively superior forces of its own, concentrating resources to produce technology-intensive combat and combatsupport forces capable of achieving decisive results. This approach requires the United States and its allies to maintain the lead in critical military technologies and to deploy, in a timely manner, weapon systems reflecting their capabilities. Technological progress increases the deterrent value of US forces and provides a hedge against a Soviet technological breakout. US advanced technology also imposes strategic costs on the Soviets by causing them to divert resources from more easily produced systems in order to counter new, more capable US systems. The importance of technology has never been more obvious than it is today. Yet, as Figure II-5 indicates, the US lead in several key technologies is slipping. Strong US and allied technological bases must be maintained if their qualitative lead in fielded systems is to be retained.

US and allied technological leadership and cooperation are even more important now because the Soviets have fielded new equipment that is technologically comparable to, and in some cases more advanced than, that produced in the West. Since

The list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall US and USSR basic technology The list is in alphabetical order. These technologies are "on the shelf" and available for application. (The technologies are not intended to compare technology level in currently deployed military systems.)

The technologies selected have the potential for significantly changing the military capability in the next 10 to 20 years. The technologies are not static, they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements; new technologies may appear on future lists.

The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

The judgements represent overall consensus for each basic technology area. The USSR may be superior in some of the subtechnologies making up each basic technology.

These average assessments can incorporate a significant variance when individual components of a technology are considered.

Emphasis must be given to technologies that provide the greatest advantage and increase in capability while ensuring the readiness of current forces. However, high technology cannot provide the solution to all military requirements. Technically superior equipment can only complement, not replace, superior planning, sound doctrine, proper training, and sustained support. Every proposed application of new technology must strike a balance among technical sophistication, essential readiness, cost, utility, and endurance if it is to be effective in our force structure.

The maintenance of a US technological advantage also depends heavily upon efforts to prevent the transfer of such technology from the United States and other advanced nations to the Soviets and other potential adversaries. The acquisition of critical technology by potential adversaries reduces their cost of obtaining new capabilities, allows them to deploy new systems sooner, and provides data that can be used to counter the effectiveness of US weapon systems and equipment.

Allied Forces

Strong alliances are an important part of the US military strategy. US and allied defense efforts must be integrated effectively to ensure that their collective capabilities are realized. The need persists for greater interoperability between US and allied equipment, ammunition, and techniques, as well as command, control, communications, and intelligence (C31) systems. The strong air defense alliance maintained with Canada continues to improve. The United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies are continuing to improve capabilities for mutual support and coor

dination through mechanisms such as armaments cooperation and the NATO Wartime Reallocation Agreement, which has recently been negotiated between the United States and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Interoperability with friendly and allied Asian countries is improving through equipment and procedure modifications and frequent combined military exercises. In Japan, single service and joint/combined doctrinal, material, conceptual, and logistic interoperability issues are now reviewed semiannually by bilateral interoperability steering committees.

Strong alliances, combined with a continuing number of important initiatives that are beginning to result in industrial expansion and modernization, enable the United States to counteract the Soviet threat. Positive results from policies and programs established in recent years are being seen. One example is sharing of technology with NATO countries and Japan to reduce redundancy of expenditure in research and development (R&D) efforts.

In addition, Congress has supported increased funding for surge industrial responsiveness. Further activity involves an Industrial Modernization Incentives Program to provide contract incentives that encourage industry to make capital investments that enhance productivity. A healthy and responsive industrial base and overall economy have been, and will continue to be, important elements of US national security. In the case of the industrial base, vigilant attention to quality, productivity, and efficiency, while maintaining a sufficient reserve capability to meet any potential crisis, are vital to our enduring national defense.

INTRODUCTION

World events have demonstrated that potential adversaries of the United States are willing to use military force in the pursuit of their objectives. Turmoil in underdeveloped areas of the world threatens the flow of resources among nations and provides the Soviet Union opportunities to expand its influence at the expense of the Free World. Instability is most prevalent in the Central American-Caribbean region, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the area stretching from Libya to Afghanistan. Nations within these regions are confronted by social, economic, and political problems that defy easy solution and often lead to insurgency and intraregional strife.

Intraregional conflict poses the risk of involving both neighboring nations and major powers outside the area. The United States must stand ready with other nations to deter regional conflicts or limit them should deterrence fail.

This chapter addresses the global military environment from a regional, maritime, and security assistance perspective.

GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Soviet Posture

Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe, together with other Warsaw Pact forces, constitute the major

military threat to the Western allies. Major air, land, and naval forces also face Southwest Asia, China, and the Northwest Pacific (Figure III-1). The Soviets maintain a significant military presence in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Cuba, in addition to a substantial fighting force in Afghanistan. Further, they provide security assistance on an extensive scale and use surrogate forces to project their military power.

US Posture

The effectiveness of the US strategy depends not only on a system of forward-deployed forces but also on close cooperation with regional allies. In addition to their own military forces, these allies may also provide basing and staging facilities, overflight rights, ashore pre-positioning sites, and host-nation support to assist US forces. Figure III-2 shows the current deployment of major US air, land, and naval forces. The majority of the remaining US active component forces and virtually all reserve component forces are located in the continental United States

(CONUS). These latter forces provide the flexibility to shift forces as required by various contingencies or world developments.

REGIONAL FORCES

NATO and Western Europe

Warsaw Pact conventional forces are being modernized at a pace that threatens to overcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) longstanding advantages in quality. The United States and its NATO allies have made significant improvements in their conventional capabilities, but strong and sustained efforts are still required to meet Alliance force goals.

The Warsaw Pact's military strength is far in excess of that required to defend its territory. The Warsaw Pact's conventional forces are organized, equipped, and trained to conduct offensive operations, and their doctrine and exercises continue to emphasize the