elements of surprise and large-scale penetration of NATO territory. The major forces facing NATO are depicted in Figure III-3 with axes showing probable routes of attack. Warsaw Pact armies could be reinforced with larger numbers and in a shorter time than NATO, particularly if the West had little warning. Figure III-4 illustrates this Warsaw Pact advantage. In the past year, the capability of US combat forces in Europe to support military operations has continued to improve. However, corresponding Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) improvements require continued increases to maintain a viable deterrence posture within NATO. One critical challenge.

confronting US European Command (USEUCOM) and NATO is the congressionally mandated European Troop Strength (ETS) ceiling and its adverse impact on force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. Abolishment of the ETS ceiling as an arbitrary manpower ceiling and establishment of a force structure based upon geostrategic principles and the ever-increasing threat would enhance NATO's deterrence capabilities.

The ability to reinforce forward-deployed US forces rapidly is also a key factor in supporting NATO commitments.

NATO continues to have an advantage over the Warsaw Pact in numbers of tactical air-to-ground systems, but still faces a significant numerical disadvantage in air-to-air fighters. Although the qualitative advantage of NATO's tactical air weapon systems helps offset imbalances in total numbers of aircraft, aircraft survivability remains a major NATO concern. The lack of a NATO identification system (NIS), which includes an improved identification friend or foe (IFF) capability, hampers the employment of NATO's air defense aircraft. Agreement on the use of the operating frequencies has been achieved; however, until the equipment is fielded, airspace control will remain a difficult problem. Also, the Warsaw Pact has a greater number of hardened shelters for its aircraft than does NATO. Actions continue within the Alliance to expedite the aircraft shelter program.

Modernization programs have allowed NATO naval forces to maintain an overall advantage over the Warsaw Pact; nevertheless, Soviet naval forces remain capable of threatening US and allied forces operating in the maritime approaches to Europe and of posing a threat to reinforcement and resupply shipping in the Atlantic Ocean.

The successful defense of the NATO Alliance remains highly sensitive to the time available for mobilization, early decisions by NATO political authorities, force allocations, en route survivability, and the adequacy of munitions and other consumables. Critical to the ability of the United States to reinforce the European theater will be the availability and sustainability of such bases as Iceland and the Azores along with its ability to protect and defend Atlantic, Caribbean, and Mediterranean sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Middle East and Southwest Asia

The security of the Middle East and Southwest Asia is vital to the economic health of the Free World and, consequently, to the security of the United States. Regional stability, Free World access to oil resources, and the limitation of Soviet influence remain important US objectives. Figure III-9 identifies current areas of concern.

Fully mobilized-includes North American reinforcements and all Warsaw Pact forces located west of the Ural mountains. Excludes artillery divisions.

As of 30 September 1986

FIGURE III-6

ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues, although some small steps have been taken to reach an accommodation, as in the Taba dispute. Several Arab states remain approachable in an attempt to establish a framework for peace, but other rejectionist Arab states continue actively sponsoring terrorism and the isolation/elimination of Israel. Much work remains to establish a climate in the Middle East where the legitimate rights of all parties, including the Palestinians, can be equitably addressed. However, the most imminent regional threat is posed by the Iran-Iraq war. In the past year, the scope and intensity of the war has widened. The escalating trend by both parties toward attacking targets of increasing economic value poses a real threat to US and allied interests in the region.

Soviet forces facing Iran and Eastern Turkey are reorganized as a major offensive force of some 30

divisions, 5,400 tanks, and 965 tactical aircraft. These forces are controlled by an operational high command - theatre of military operations (TVD) that includes 116,000 Soviet forces occupying Afghanistan and facing Pakistan. In Afghanistan, Soviet occupation and oppression continue with large-scale combat operations conducted against local civilians as well as the resistance forces. Forced population relocations and violations of the sovereign borders of neighboring states also contribute to severe regional tensions that cannot be resolved until Soviet forces are withdrawn. The Soviets have sought to extend their influence in the region through major military assistance programs complemented by diplomatic efforts. They have a

dominant role in Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including access rights that provide facilities and anchorages for a permanent Soviet naval presence in the Arabian Sea.

The United States participates in a number of programs to promote peace and stability in the region. Security assistance is provided to friendly nations in order to build up their capabilities to protect themselves and to help deter intraregional conflict. The United States continues to maintain naval forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and US ground and air forces periodically conduct exercises with nations of the region. US allies, such as France and the United Kingdom, also provide security assistance and a limited military presence. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), is responsible for coordinating all US military activities in the Southwest Asia region. A forward headquarters element of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues to operate from a US Navy ship in the Persian Gulf area. Figure III-11 shows selected forces present in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. In the Indian Ocean, the Commander-in-Chief, US