are being upgraded to improve performance and to protect against high-altitude nuclear detonation effects. Additionally, an ELF communications system is being developed to improve strategic connectivity to SSBNs. The Nuclear Planning and Execution System will enhance data processing capabilities for the National Military Command System (NMCS) and CINCS. Deployment of the Nuclear Detonation Detection System on Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. will significantly improve assessment capabilities; however, the launch schedule for GPS satellites has been affected by the Challenger accident. Strategic Defense Strategic Defense Forces The Soviet Union has pursued a full range of strategic defensive programs to protect leaders, preserve vital functions of government, and limit damage from retaliation. The US strategic defensive programs have been less comprehensive and have focused primarily on surveillance, warning, aircraft modernization, and limited air defense. Deployment of effective US strategic defensive systems would enhance deterrence by increasing the Soviets uncertainty about the possible outcomes of nuclear conflict and undermining their confidence in success. The United States is reexamining the potential contributions of strategic defense toward a more stable deterrent. In the past, US strategic deterrence relied largely upon an assured retaliation capability. Both the Soviet and US strategic forces were relatively secure from a disarming attack. The continued Soviet strategic modernization and buildup threatens this stable environment. Effective US defenses can increase the uncertainty of the outcome of a Soviet preemptive attack and help strengthen deterrence. New technologies must be evaluated for US strategic defense. Missile Defense The Soviets continue to modernize their ABM system around Moscow and have a strong development program that could permit relatively rapid deployment of a widespread ABM network supported by a network of radars like the one at Krasnoyarsk. In fact, the recent addition of 3 ABM radars appears to complete the guidance and tracking requirements of such a system. In addition, vigorous Soviet directedenergy research and development efforts could lead to a ground-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability in the 1990s. To complement their BMD efforts, the Soviets have developed an extensive TW/AA capability based on launch detection satellites and over-the-horizon and phased-array radars. Advances in defensive technology based on research supported by all administrations over the past two decades justify the current research efforts of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In the 1960s, there were no credible concepts for boost-phase intercept. Today, there are multiple approaches based on both directed-energy concepts and kinetic energy kill mechanisms. Midcourse intercept was hampered in the 1960s by a lack of credible approaches for decoy discrimination, unmanageable signal and data processing loads, the cost per intercept, and the undesirable collateral effects of nuclear weapons used for the interceptor warheads. Multispectral sensing of discriminants, birth-to-death tracking in midcourse, and small hit-to-kill vehicles that promise inexpensive interceptors are among the concepts that appear to offer capabilities that overcome the earlier limitations in midcourse. In the 1960s, an inability to discriminate against penetration aids (penaids) at high altitudes and limited interceptor performance resulted in very small defended areas for each terminal defense site and gave the offense unacceptable leverage over the number of interceptors needed. Today, technology provides the potential to discriminate at high altitudes, and improved interceptor technologies should allow intercepts at these higher altitudes. When these improvements are coupled with the potential for boost-phase and midcourse intercepts to disrupt pattern attacks, robust terminal defenses seem attainable. Finally, 1960s' technology in computer hardware and software and signal processing was incapable of supporting battle management of multitiered defense. Today, the rapid advancement of these technologies is believed to permit realization of the complex command and control systems needed. Although the ABM Treaty allows limited defense of one site, the United States abandoned this approach in the 1970s (Figure IV-7). If reinstituted, an active US defense will require a survivable TW/AA system that provides, in addition to detection and warning, the capability to discriminate weapons from nonthreats and the capability to perform battle-management functions. The SDI is addressing the protection of both civilian and military assets. The research seeks to exploit inevitable technological evolution and is a necessary and prudent response to active Soviet research and development activities in ballistic missile defense. The Soviet Union has deployed a nuclear armed ABM system around Moscow as permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. In addition to this permitted system, the Soviets have tested and deployed critical long leadtime elements, such as the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk, that violate the ABM Treaty and are crucial elements to have in place in order to deploy a territorial ABM system rapidly. The United States, on the other hand, has no deployed ABM system. In contrast with Soviet actions, the US SDI is a research program being conducted in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty and is intended to provide the United States with enough information to determine whether to proceed with the development and deployment of an ABM system. This program provides a prudent technological hedge against a possible Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty, holds the promise of a better way to deter aggression, to strengthen stability, and to increase US and allied security. The US Space Command assumed the responsibility for BMD planning and requirement development in September 1985. Air Defense The Soviets emphasize air defense and continue to upgrade their capabilities. The Soviets have over 4,000 fighter/fighter-interceptors capable of air-to-air combat in defense of the Soviet Union of which approximately 1,200 are dedicated to a strategic defense mission. Deployment of the FOXHOUND, the first Soviet fighter-interceptor to have full lookdownshootdown and multiple-target engagement capabilities continues. Operational deployment of the FLANKER, the Soviets newest lookdown-shootdowncapable fighter-interceptor occurred in 1986 while. deployment of the new FULCRUM continued to gain momentum. The Soviets have deployed over 9,000 strategic surface-to-air (SAM) missile launchers. Equally important, they continue to develop and deploy improved SAM systems. The SA-10 is estimated to be effective against small, low-altitude targets. SOVIET FULCRUM For surveillance of their airspace, the Soviets have deployed early-warning aircraft and over 10,000 search and track radars at over 1,200 sites. The Soviets are also producing and testing the MAINSTAY airborne warning and control aircraft. Forward air defense capabilities will be significantly improved with deployment of MAINSTAY, especially when it operates with lookdown-shootdown-capable aircraft such as the FOXHOUND, FULCRUM, and FLANKER. Soviet air defenses will continue to pose a major challenge for the US bomber force. The United States and Canada share continental air defense responsibilities under the provisions of the North American Air Defense Agreement. Both nations assign forces to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Current US air defenses are composed of surveillance radars, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, interceptor aircraft, and an integrated command and control system. Deployment of North Warning System (NWS) and over-the-horizon. backscatter (OTH-B) radars will improve the detection capability against airbreathing threats. The effectiveness of OTH-B in detecting cruise missiles is promising. OTH-B radars can provide surveillance of potential attack routes from 500 to 1,800 miles. AWACS patrols can provide added coverage until the present Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line radars are replaced by the NWS. The NWS searching north and OTH-B radars searching east, west, and south will provide a capability for tactical warning at ranges that allow increased response time against aircraft and cruise missiles. Peacetime surveillance of continental airspace has been strengthened by the integration of selected civilian and military radar sites into the Regional Operations Control Centers that compose the Joint Surveillance System. The system would provide regional air defense command and control during the initial stages of an attack. Improvements in surveillance capability have been accompanied by upgrading interceptor aircraft. USAF active strategic air defense forces have been upgraded with the F-15 aircraft. US F-106 and eventually F-4 aircraft are being replaced by more capable modified F-16 air defense aircraft. Additionally, Canada's CF-101 interceptors have been replaced with CF-18 aircraft. The addition of the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) will improve the ability of air defense aircraft to engage low-altitude aircraft. in a lookdown-shootdown ECM environment. Further, the AMRAAM will give the F-15s the added capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously. This capability will become increasingly important as the Soviets expand their cruise missile inventory. Figure IV-9 illustrates the modernization of the US and USSR interceptor aircraft. Space Defense The Soviet Union has the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system. The Soviets' ASAT is a weapon capable of attacking satellites in near-earth. orbits. Additionally, GALOSH antiballistic missile interceptors have an inherent ASAT capability when used in a direct ascent mode. Vigorous Soviet research and development efforts in ground-based high-energy lasers at Sary Shagan and space-based directed-energy technology have potential ASAT applications. The United States is continuing to develop ASAT weapon systems to deter Soviet ASAT attacks of US satellites and Soviet deployment of low-earth orbiting space weapons. Should deterrence fail, US ASAT systems must be able to hold at risk corresponding Soviet space assets. The initial US capability has been demonstrated and is expected to be provided by the Miniature Air-Launched System, a small missile launched from F-15 aircraft. This program is currently constrained by a Congressionally imposed test moratorium against an object in space. Other Defense Measures Both the United States and the Soviet Union have given missile silos and essential command and control systems their first priority in programs to harden strategic systems against overpressure from a nuclear detonation. The results of hardening are evident in the characteristics of strategic targets. The Soviet Union has significantly improved its strategic capability by dispersing critical facilities, hardening structures, and developing mobile systems. For the most part, the United States has not extended hardening to economic or government facilities beyond those actually involved in strategic intelligence and command and control operations. The Soviet Union places far more emphasis on civil defense than does the United States. The Soviets view civil defense as an integral part of their strategic posture and invest heavily in the protection of their key leadership, essential work force, critical economic facilities, and general population. Soviet programs include construction of protective relocation facilities, organizational planning, training, and the commitment of manpower to the civil defense structure. US efforts do not provide for adequate support of a dispersed population or protection of war-supporting industry and its labor force. Strategic Defense Summary Assessment Figure IV-10 illustrates the key features of the US and Soviet strategic defense force postures. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES The United States must possess a broad spectrum of nuclear force options to deter aggression and defend its interests should deterrence fail. Nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) provide an escalatory or retaliatory response below the level of strategic nuclear forces. NSNF consist of land-based systems for battlefield support and intermediate-range strikes and sea-based systems for land strike and antiship, antisubmarine, and antiair warfare. NSNF support conventional forces by providing a major deterrent to conventional, theater nuclear, and chemical attack and are essential to a strategy of flexible response. NSNF provide a range of employment options that create uncertainty for potential aggressors concerning US and allied response. Such forces could deny the enemy sanctuary to mass forces behind the immediate battle zone and break up the momentum of an offensive. Although US NSNF are available for deployment worldwide, the majority of these forces are located in Europe. The primary NSNF threat to US and allied forces is also located in Europe, although SS-20 missiles based in eastern and central USSR and Soviet sea-based nuclear forces pose a growing threat to Asia. The NSNF are structured differently for their missions in Europe and Asia. NATO NSNF are deployed in a relatively confined geographic area and are primarily land-based. US NSNF in the Pacific are geographically dispersed and more dependent on sea-based capabilities. The following assessments of NSNF are provided in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) include land-based missiles and aircraft capable of striking targets beyond the general area of the battlefield, but not capable of intercontinental range. Longer Range Intermediate- Longer range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) missiles have ranges between 1,800 and 5,500 km. In late 1983, NATO began implementing its 1979 decision to modernize LRINF with initial deployments of PERSHING II and ground-launched |