Congress and the American people will be critical to maintaining improvements in military preparedness.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

The proposed defense program for the fiscal year (FY) 1988-89 Budget and the FY 1988-92 Defense Program will have a significant impact on the readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure posture of US military forces. Fiscal constraints will cause modernization efforts to be stretched out over a longer period of time, force structure to be diminished, and reduced training and support activities for our forces. The net result of these reductions will be to erode the qualitative edge of our military posture and to diminish past trends toward risk reduction relative to the projected threat. Adequate resources must be provided to ensure that our essential warfighting capabilities are not impaired and we continue to provide a credible deterrent. The zero/negative real growth in FY 1986 and FY 1987 defense spending must be reversed to meet future US defense needs.

The United States continues to place a high priority on the modernization of its strategic forces. The aim of this vital effort is to make command, control, and communications systems more survivable and endurant while maintaining and improving all legs of the Triad. The development and deployment of the PEACEKEEPER missile, the small intercontinental ballistic missile (SICBM), the TRIDENT II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missile system (SLBM), the B-1B, the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), the AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), and the shortrange attack missile (SRAM II) will make the US strategic deterrent more effective, survivable, and reliable. These nuclear weapon modernization programs are important contributions to deterrence and enable the United States to enter meaningful arms reduction agreements.

A major effort is under way to address the feasibility and desirability of developing defenses against ballistic missiles. Under the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, research is being conducted on potential technologies that might provide a defense against ballistic missiles.

Emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear force modernization continues with the deployment of modernized field artillery warheads and the fielding of sea-launched nuclear TOMAHAWK land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM/N) and ground-launched cruise mis

siles (GLCMs). Improved command, control, and communications will increase the survivability, flexibility, and deterrent capability of deployed nonstrategic nuclear forces.

The modernization of conventional forces is another key objective of the US defense program. Land forces are undergoing organizational changes to improve their flexibility and maximize the effectiveness of recently introduced or improved weapons, such as the ABRAMS tank, BRADLEY fighting vehicle, AH-64 (APACHE) and UH-60 (BLACKHAWK) helicopters, multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), and PATRIOT air defense system. As a result of organizational improvements, the Army's 17 Active and 9 Reserve component divisions have been restructured to 18 Active and 10 Reserve component divisions.

COMMITMENTS

INTRODUCTION

US military strategy requires resources to maintain readiness, modernize for the future, and provide a recognized capability to rapidly mobilize additional. forces. The US Armed Forces must, therefore, be supported by an efficient, effective national resource base. This chapter provides an overview of the US and Soviet resource bases that support military requirements.

The heavy Soviet investment in nuclear and conventional forces provides evidence of the high priority Soviet leaders place on military requirements. The United States devotes a smaller percentage of its national resources to its military posture, partly because of the defensive nature of the US military strategy, of the structural differences in the two economies, and of the different national security strategies. The Soviet system of centralized planning has led to an overall weaker economy and a relatively smaller economic base than that of the United States but has allowed greater Soviet focus to be placed on areas of priority. Despite this smaller economic base, the Soviet Union has decided to direct a larger percentage of its peacetime resources to military requirements than does the United States. In addition to being able to spend a larger percentage of its resources, the Soviet Union can focus more resources for force structure and weapon systems hardware than the United States. In particular, the cost of manpower is significantly less for the Soviet Union than the United States (the US budget submission for Fiscal Year (FY) 1987 earmarked approximately 24 percent for military compensation).

RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Overview

A nation's economy must support its national security objectives effectively. The industrial base must be capable of producing the required military equipment from available materials and be supported by adequate manpower. Further, the industrial base. must be responsive to critical wartime needs and be able to respond to surge requirements. The necessary raw materials must be available under all conditions. The United States requires a strong technological base to ensure that its forces continue to be equipped with qualitatively superior weapons.

the introduction of new and qualitatively improved systems. Although the decline in US defense spending has been reversed, its percentage of GNP has remained fairly constant over the last few years, as shown in Figure 11-2. Defense spending, though, has experienced non-real growth in FY 1986 and FY 1987, and the Budget Authority must be increased in real growth to meet future needs. Strong and sustained support for defense activities will be necessary in light of the Soviets' inventory expansion and continuing high rate of investment.

STRATEGIC FORCES** 8.1%

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES***

31.8%

DEF RELATED**** 2.6%

* Includes theater (nonstrategic) nuclear forces

Does not include RDT&E for SDI or nonstrategic nuclear forces

*** Includes RDT&E for SDI

10

0

71 73 75

77

79 81 Fiscal Year

83 85 87

Subsequent chapters will address in some detail improvements and developments of these forces. However, budget cuts will have an immediate adverse impact on the readiness of our forces and their ability to implement military strategy. They will undo many of the gains achieved.

Industrial Base

The military potential of nations can be measured, in part, by peacetime production bases and the capability for rapid conversion to wartime needs. The Soviet defense industry is now the world's largest, both in numbers of facilities and output capacity. If the full industrial capabilities of both nations were mobilized for military production, the United States would initially be unable to match Soviet industrial production. Over time, however, the United States,

because of its much greater industrial base, could surpass Soviet capabilities in terms of both size and output. The timing and degree of emphasis the United States places on mobilization of its industrial base would be critical to the successful outcome of a major protracted conflict with the Soviet Union.

Soviet weapon plants and war-related production facilities are continually active; as old weapon programs are phased out, new ones are begun. As a result, the Soviet arms industry is in a constant high state of readiness and is capable of rapid wartime expansion. In the United States, however, the increased emphasis on high technology manufacturing and the growth of service industries, combined with the decline of heavy industry and traditional manufacturing required for arms production, have reduced the capacity to increase military production rapidly during periods of crisis.

US defense planners have taken several steps in the past few years to improve the ability of the US industrial base to support the military strategy. The Services are provided prioritized lists of systems identified by field commanders as most critical to their immediate requirements. Additionally, industrial preparedness planning is receiving increased attention, and industrial mobilization is being addressed extensively in exercises. Incentive programs are stressing efficient and competitive peacetime production to meet the demands of wartime sustainability. A continuing need exists for investments to ensure that the necessary improvements are made to the US industrial base.

Natural Resources To Support Defense

The ability to mobilize and increase wartime production depends in part on the availability of critical raw materials. These materials must be indigenous to the country, stockpiled, or available over secure lines of communication (LOCs) in time of war. The Soviet Union, which has extensive and varied mineral resources and a policy of self-sufficiency, relies on imports for only a few strategic raw materials, as shown in Figure 11-4. The United States, on the other hand, relies on foreign sources for most strategic minerals. Both industry and government in the United States must anticipate problems in maintaining critical raw material stocks for military production in wartime and take necessary actions in peacetime to minimize that impact. The effect of the proposed sell-off of non-critical strategic minerals is currently under study.

Energy in Support of the Industrial Base Energy resource and capabilities are vital to the support and maintenance of the defense industrial base. The Soviet Union, the primary threat to the United States, is the only major industrial and military power that is energy self-sufficient. In the past few years the USSR has surpassed the United States in the total production of primary energy while remaining second in total consumption. Production of natural gas and electricity and nuclear powerplants are the two fastest growing sectors of energy. An energysufficient Soviet Union with an exportable surplus has far-reaching military and economic ramifications for the United States and its allies in the near- and mid-terms.

Manpower in Support of Defense

Both the United States and the Soviet Union depend on large labor pools to staff their armed forces and provide skilled labor to support their bases. Although Soviet military forces are 2-1/2 times larger than those of the United States, the Soviet primary mobilization pool of 18- to 50-year-old males is only 12 percent larger. Approximately 2 million males reach age 18 annually in each country.

Conscription is the principal source of Soviet military manpower. The period of service is normally 2 to 3 years. Soviet conscription significantly reduces