INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapters addressed US security requirements and major military forces. This chapter outlines the status of arms reduction talks and discusses military space activities, Department of Defense (DOD) warfighting organization, defense manpower, international terrorism, European troop strength, and DOD support to drug interdiction.

ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

The United States participates in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on arms control to protect US and allied security interests, build global stability, and promote favorable international relationships. These negotiations are an integral part of the US national security strategy. Equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements can contribute to security at reduced force levels. However, arms control cannot substitute for necessary force modernization; both efforts are mutually reinforcing elements of our national security and contribute significantly to the enhancement of stability and deterrence.

Any agreement is only as good as the willingness of the signatories to comply with the obligations assumed. A double standard of compliance cannot be allowed to develop. Soviet non-compliance with the major arms control agreements to which both sides have committed themselves is a continuing matter of serious concern and must be taken into account in the development of US defense programs and approaches to arms control. The Soviet violations place stumbling blocks in the way of new arms control agreements.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The United States and Soviet Union were involved in strategic nuclear, intermediate-range nuclear, and antisatellite negotiations prior to 1985, but the last of these negotiations ended when Round V of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) adjourned in December 1983 without Soviet agreement on a resumption date.

In January 1985, both countries jointly announced agreement to begin new negotiations on a complex series of questions concerning strategic and intermediate-range space and nuclear arms. The purpose of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which commenced in Geneva in March 1985, is to reach agreements aimed at reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability.

At the 11-12 October 1986 meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, both leaders introduced significant new proposals aimed at deep reductions of the two sides' nuclear weapons. The sides agreed in principle to reduce by 50% their strategic offensive nuclear arms by 1991. The US also proposed a ten year commitment of non-withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty if the Soviets would agree to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. The Soviets countered with a proposal to eliminate all strategic offensive arms by 1996. The sides also agreed to reduce their longer range intermediate-range nuclear missiles (LRINF) to an equal global limit of 100 warheads on these missiles. Soviet systems would be deployed in Soviet Asia; US systems would be deployed in the United States. LRINF in Europe would be reduced to zero. Because of the Soviet insistence on adding new restrictions to the ABM Treaty, final closure on the agreement was not possible.

The Soviet proposals contain several unacceptable provisions. For example, restricting Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI) testing to the laboratory is a more restrictive provision than is contained in the ABM Treaty and would preclude determining the feasibility of SDI systems. They would not permit transition to defense if advanced space-based strategic defenses prove feasible and would eliminate all strategic offensive arms rather than offensive ballistic missiles. They would not permit the United States to match Soviet shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) missile forces in Europe and would not constrain Soviet SRINF missile forces outside Europe. They link the three negotiations on strategic offensive systems, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space systems in such a way that not one agreement can be signed until agreements are reached in all.

Following the Reykjavik meeting, the United States (in October) and the Soviets (in November) formally tabled at the Geneva negotiations, positions embodying their Reykjavik proposals, and the proposals were discussed in Vienna by the foreign ministers of the two sides. Within the limits permitted by confidentiality of negotiations, the proposals made by the two sides are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Strategic Arms

The primary objective of the United States in the

ducing significantly the numbers of their heavy ICBMs. In addition, an important compromise was reached on how to count the weapons on bombers.

Unfortunately, because of the Soviet package deal approach to arms control, the new Soviet proposals still appear to attempt to hold START hostage to US concessions on intermediate-range weapons and Soviet insistence on increasing the testing and research limitations of the ABM Treaty.

To provide the Soviet Union the opportunity to join the United States in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the President declared in June 1985 that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint, corrected its noncompliance, ceased its inordinate military build up, and actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. On 27 May 1986, the President announced that the United States must base decisions on future strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) structure which had been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union. The President further stated that, assuming no significant change in the threat faced, as the strategic modernization program is implemented the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. The United States remained in technical observance of the terms of SALT II until the 131st heavy bomber was equipped for cruise missile carriage on November 28, 1986.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

In 1981, the United States initiated, and now continues, intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations in fulfillment of NATO's 1979 decision to pursue a dual-track policy of force modernization and negotiated arms control. Toward this end and in close consultation with its allies, the United States has offered various proposals to achieve its stated objective of the complete worldwide elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet LRINF missiles.

In an effort to build upon the positive accomplishments of the 11-12 October 1986 Reykjavik meeting

between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the United States INF Delegation tabled in Geneva the US proposal from Reykjavik:

• An LRINF missile warhead ceiling of 100 warheads for each side, made up of zero warheads in Europe, 100 Soviet warheads deployed outside of Europe in Soviet Asia, and 100 US warheads deployed in the United States.

Specific verification measures, including: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data; (2) on-site inspection of elimination of excess systems covered by the agreement; and (3) effective monitoring of remaining inventories, including on-site inspection.

Also, the United States proposed the following provisions needed to form the basis for a complete INF agreement:

. An equal global ceiling on US and Soviet
warheads on SRINF missiles at the current
Soviet level with negotiations on reductions
of SRINF missiles to begin within 6 months
after an initial INF agreement is reached.

. An interim INF agreement of unlimited
duration and providing for negotiations on
further reductions.

In Geneva, the Soviet side eventually tabled its version of the Reykjavik agreements. The offer represented a step backwards. Not only was progress in INF once again being held hostage to resolution of Defense and Space and START issues, but unacceptable elements of previous Soviet positions reemerged. For example, SRINF missiles would be frozen only in Europe at current levels meaning no constraints on Soviet SRINF missiles outside Europe and no US right to equality.

In spite of apparent Soviet reluctance to build on the progress made in Reykjavik, the United States continues to seek an acceptable outcome in the negotiations at Geneva that would provide equal, verifiable, and reduced global limits of LRINF and SRINF missile warheads and to consult actively with its allies in this effort.

Defense and Space

Although the United States and Soviet Union held three rounds of antisatellite negotiations during the 1978-1979 period, the current Defense and

Space talks, which began in March 1985, have a much broader scope. In the six rounds of the current Geneva negotiations since March 1985, the US approach focused on the need to address the instability that exists in the current strategic situation and the desire to explore a joint transition to a greater reliance on effective defenses for strategic deterrence. Stressing the importance of reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty and correcting Soviet actions that violate existing arms control agreements, the United States explained its view of the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the potential contribution of defensive forces to its mutual security, and if new defensive technologies prove feasible -the need to manage jointly a stable transition over time toward increased reliance on defenses and elimination of ballistic missiles.

At the beginning of Round III of the NST which began in mid-September 1985, the Soviets, in connection with their first nuclear arms reduction proposal of the current talks, reiterated their proposal for a ban on development (including scientific research), testing, and deployment of "space-strike arms." Failing to gain US acceptance of their basic proposal to ban "space-strike arms" during round four, the Soviets proposed in May and June 1986 a series of "partial measures" that included strengthening the ABM Treaty via a 15- to 20-year nonwithdrawal agreement, banning antisatellite (ASAT) systems of all basing modes, and banning the deployment of space-based systems to attack terrestrial targets. The President responded in a July 1986 letter to the Soviet General Secretary with a proposal that was subsequently tabled in Geneva in October 1986. The US proposal was that both sides confine themselves for 5 years (through 1991) to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defenses are technically feasible. After 1991, if either side desires. to proceed to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system, that side must first offer a plan to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides. If after 2 years of negotiations the plan is not agreed on by both sides, either side will be free to deploy its system unilaterally after 6 months notice is given to the other side.

Following the Reykjavik discussions, the United States tabled a new proposal calling for a US-Soviet

commitment, in the context of an agreement to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period through 1996, except for reasons of supreme national interest, or to respond to a material breach, or other circumstances recognized under international law. During the first 5 years, through 1991, the US and the USSR would reduce their strategic offensive forces by 50 percent to an equal level of 1600 SNDVs and 6000 weapons. During the next 5 years, through 1996, both sides would eliminate their offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges. During the 10-year period, both sides would adhere to the provisions of the ABM Treaty continuing the research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty. At the end of the 10-year period, either side could deploy advanced strategic defenses if it so chose unless the parties agreed otherwise.

The Soviets continued to insist, in their postReykjavik proposal at Geneva, that the US must agree to restrictions on SDI that would virtually halt the US program.

Other Nuclear Arms Control Actions

In 1986, in other bilateral nuclear arms control actions with the Soviet Union, the United States participated in two separate sets of expert level meetings, one on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and another on nuclear testing.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The longstanding negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact have the objective of achieving a more stable balance of forces at lower levels between East and West and the strengthening of peace and security in Europe through mutual reductions of forces and armaments with undiminished security for both alliances. Both sides have submitted draft treaties, but they remain far apart on the fundamental issue of verification. In December 1985, the United States and its allies proposed a modification to the 1982 Western draft treaty to break the impasse on initial force levels. This proposal would require exchange of information on forces remaining after reduction in a first-phase, time-limited agreement. The West, which dropped its longstanding requirement for data agreement on Eastern Forces, continues to press for a strengthened verification package.

The East's counterproposal, presented in Feb

ruary 1986, was essentially a repackaging of previous Warsaw Pact proposals and was considered totally inadequate by NATO. The most significant problem with the latest Eastern proposal is the absence of substantive provisions to satisfy Western concerns about verification of residual forces, particularly in light of the Western concession to defer agreement on data prior to reductions.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe The Conference on Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe, commonly known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), began in January 1984 and terminated in September 1986. The conference was mandated by the 35 participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to develop a set of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe. These measures were to be designed to clarify intentions, to reduce the chance of miscalculation during crisis and to reduce the risk of surprise attack. The concluding document preserved the basic principles and objectives promulgated by the West and will form the foundation upon which further steps in the process of openness can be based. Of particular note, the Warsaw Pact has, for the first time in negotiations focused on the standing forces in Europe, accepted the concept of on-site inspection, both ground and aerial, with no right of refusal. At the CSCE review conference, which began in November 1986, progress in the CDE agreement will be reviewed as a part of the assessment of the overall CSCE process. After this review and if consensus is reached, a new mandate may be structured to guide participating states in a subsequent phase of CDE.

Halifax Statement on

Conventional Arms Control

Taking account of Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's expressed readiness to pursue conventional force reduction from the Atlantic to the Urals, NATO has commissioned a high-level task force (HLTF) to pursue bold new steps in conventional arms control. The HLFT presented a final report to the NATO Ministers at their meeting in December 1986. At this meeting the Ministers issued a declaration which reasserted NATO's objective as originally stated in the Halifax Communique of 30 May 1986, of strengthening stability in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the establishment of a veritifiable, comprehensive, and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. To this end, the Ministers expressed a readiness to open East/West discussions