with a view to the establishment of a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms controls covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In mid-December 1986, the HLTF initiated preliminary work in preparation for mandate discussions on an alliance-to-alliance basis with the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Other Multilateral Negotiations Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate in other multilateral forums, including the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD). Among the CD agenda items are the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) and a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. Concerning a CTB and as a result of the suspension of negotiations among the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union on such a treaty, some members favor negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban within the CD. However, the US position is that such testing remains essential to the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent. Therefore, the long-term goal of a CTB must continue to be viewed in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions; improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; and maintenance of a modern, effective deterrent force. In 1984, the United States tabled a draft treaty on a total chemical weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament. Soviet and surrogate violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 justify continued US insistence on effective verification of a total ban of chemical weapons. The Soviets and many other nations, including some Western allies, consider verification and compliance provisions of the US draft treaty as too intrusive and therefore unacceptable. The Soviets have stated that a challenged state must have some right to refuse an on-site challenge inspection of a suspected violation if that state believes its security interests would be jeopardized from such an inspection. The Soviets hold that verification should be accomplished through national technical means and self-inspection. The United States requires onsite inspection without right of refusal. An unverifiable chemical weapons ban would seriously endanger US and allied security. Therefore, the United States must establish and maintain an effective chemical retaliatory capability until a verifiable ban can be concluded. In 1975, the United States ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in which 98 countries agreed to prohibit development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to destroy any agents on hand. However, because biological weapons in 1975 were not seen as a threat, the BWC contained no clear standard for consultation and cooperation among parties to resolve compliance problems, or verify compliance. In 1982, the United States accused the Soviets of BWC and Geneva Protocol violations in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan (use of "Yellow Rain") and in Russia (a 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak caused by a suspected biological warfare munitions facility accident). The USSR denied the US accusations, and attempts to confirm biological agent use were hampered. A review conference of the BWC was held in September 1986 to review the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty. The BWC called a special meeting of experts to examine ways to implement strengthening and supporting measures agreed at the conference. MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES Recognizing the increasing role of space in supporting national interests, the United States has developed a comprehensive space policy for both civil and military uses. A complete review of this policy is under way encompassing necessary revisions due to the CHALLENGER accident, SDI research progress, and Soviet advances in space. Additionally, the revision will include policy statements regarding the US space station and the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles. Space-based systems have clearly demonstrated their value in support of the planning and execution of US military operations, thereby contributing to deterrent and defense capabilities. Figure VI-2 depicts some of the current military uses of space. The National Command Authorities (NCA) and US military forces depend heavily upon space systems in peacetime, crisis, and conflict. Space Control Space control activities ensure freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when directed, denying it to the enemy. The Department of Defense will develop and deploy a comprehensive space control capability with initial operations at the earliest possible date. Both the United States and the Soviet Union depend on space systems for military operational support. The United States must be able to counter or nullify the effectiveness of enemy space systems and ensure that US space assets can function in a hostile environment. Force Application Force application is the potential to apply force from space to defend the United States and its allies. Space support activities involve operations associated with launching and deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining space vehicles while in orbit, and recovering space vehicles, if required. Centers being developed and improved to support such missions include a Consolidated Space Operations Center and ground facilities for the Satellite Control Facility and its associated ground stations. To overcome dependence on foreign-based ground stations, the United States is developing the capability to process information onboard spacecraft and then perform the necessary data relay. Systems being developed to deploy satellites include new upper stages and expendable launch vehicles. Systems used or under development to transfer satellites from a low orbit to high orbit include the Inertial Upper Stage, the Payload Assist Module, and the CENTAUR Upper Stage. The United States is actively pursuing an assured launch capability despite past failures of a TITAN 34D and the shuttle, which have greatly reduced our access to space. This capability calls for development of complementary expendable-launch vehicles for shuttle-class payloads and a new medium lift booster and refurbishment of older TITAN Ils for smaller payloads. These expendable launch boosters, along with the Space Transportation System, will provide a balanced mix of launch vehicles ensuring access to space to support the mission needs of national security. At Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Shuttle Launch Complex was officially dedicated in October 1985. Because of the CHALLENGER loss, Vandenberg shuttle facilities have been placed in an operational caretaker status. Upon production of the fourth orbiter, Vandenberg will be returned to full operational status, probably in 1992. Soviet Space Efforts The Soviets continue their vigorous space efforts. Although they still lag behind the United States in some areas of space technology, the Soviets lead in directed energy weapon technology, space medicine, effects of weightlessness, and other human endurance areas. The Soviet's annual space budget growth rate has exceeded their overall military budget growth rate in recent years. Growth in the Soviet space budget is expected to continue for at least the next 5 years. Most of their space effort is purely military, and much of the remainder involves joint civil-military programs. The Soviet logistic base is the largest in the world. The Soviets have sustained an average annual launch rate of approximately 100 space launch vehicles during the past few years, indicating a significant logistic production capability. Launch rate differences between the United States and the Soviet Union can be explained partially by the Soviet need to replace satellites more frequently because of the shorter average lifetime of their satellites. However, the Soviet launch rate also provides a very robust launch and replacement capability in crisis and conflict situations. The Soviets continue to make important technical advances in their satellite programs. The Soviet Union presently maintains nearly a three-to-one margin over the United States in mandays in space. The new MIR space station will be manned for extended periods. Research and development, reconnaissance, testing and operation of weapons and sensors and other military missions could be performed from such stations. The introduction of the Soviet reusable manned orbital shuttle is expected by the late 1980s. The Soviet orbiter is nearly identical to the US Space Transportation System orbiter which was first launched in 1981. The Soviets are currently developing two new launch systems. The heavy lift vehicle will support the manned orbital shuttle and other heavy payloads, and the medium lift vehicle may support a manned space plane, as well as serve as the strap-on booster for the heavy lift vehicle. The Soviets are also continuing to improve their space-based reconnaissance systems. Some existing Soviet space assets pose a threat to US satellites and ground forces. The Soviet operational co-orbital ASAT interceptor system is designed to engage low-altitude satellites. Additionally, Soviet ABM and ICBM systems have inherent ASAT capabilities and could augment the co-orbital system. Some US satellites may also be vulnerable to interference from jammers or damage from ground-based lasers. Soviet space systems have potential application during crises and situations short of general nuclear war because they provide command authorities with order of battle, warning, target location, and battle damage assessment information. Soviet radar intelligence ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSAT) are capable of transmitting real-time targeting data on large naval vessels to selected deployed forces. US Command Arrangements For Space The Soviet emphasis on space as a warfighting medium and the increasing US reliance on space systems caused the United States to reevaluate its military command structure supporting space operations and resulted in the formation of a new unified command. Establishment of the US Space Command (USSPACECOM) in September 1985 placed DOD space forces into a single, joint military organization. USSPACECOM enhances the deterrent posture of the United States by providing timely support to the NCA and forces assigned to the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) through greater control over space systems in peace, crisis, and war. A direct tie to the NCA through Commander in Chief, US Space Command (USCINCSPACE) ensures that space forces are singly led and prepared to fight as one. The command is charged with operating and protecting space systems and, when directed, denying adversaries the use of their space systems during war; providing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment of space, missile, and air attack on CONUS; and operational planning for defense against ballistic missiles. MILITARY ORGANIZATION In June 1986, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed their review of JCS Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces." This review of the military command and control system has resulted in a completely revised document. It reflects a positive step toward more effective direction and operational integration of the armed forces. This comprehensive revision, the first major revision since 1959, incorporates significant changes that provide authority and flexibility to the combatant commanders (CINCs). JCS Pub 2 sets forth a system for providing military advice that is responsive to the needs of the National Command Authorities. These policy revisions will significantly enhance joint warfighting effectiveness and fully support the stated goals of the President and the Secretary of Defense in directing the implementation of the recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission). The changes made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken full account of the work of the Packard Commission, Congress, and this Administration in charting the future course of the Department of Defense. These changes also benefited from the advice and comment of the CINCS. Drawing upon all these sources, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed a broad range of issues head-on and produced a sound blueprint for the US military command structure. Under broad policy direction from Washington, the CINCS will have greater latitude and full authority to organize assigned forces as they deem necessary to accomplish their missions. They will also have full authority to delegate operational control and aspects of their operational command authority to subordinates. Service components will be required to communicate through the CINC on matters over which he exercises operational command and to inform him on other matters as he may direct; furthermore, CINCS will exercise approval authority over assignments of individuals in key staff positions and of immediate subordinate commanders. The CINCS will influence proposed Service logistic programs in their areas of responsibility that significantly affect CINC operational capabilities or sustainability. Also, the CINCS' directive authority in joint training was expanded and clarified. The changes also provide options for shortening the chain of command during contingencies short of war and providing the flexibility to deal with situations that overlap established boundaries between commands. Over the past few years, CINCS have played an increasingly important role in the programming phase of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). This evolving role has successfully moved CINC warfighting requirements to the forefront of our resource allocation deliberations. This role is among the areas periodically addressed to ensure the continuing responsiveness of the combatant commands to meet national security requirements. Departmental directives now provide the greater authority and participation needed by CINCS without diverting their focus. from the primary tasks of deterrence and warfighting. As directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, these revised policies and procedures clarify authority and responsibility, improve responsiveness, and enhance control and flexibility for the CINCS and the National Command Authorities. The changes codify, strengthen, and broaden existing practices within the Department of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made numerous modifications to the statutes that govern the Department of Defense. The Department has taken action to implement provisions of the new law. Many changes have already been implemented. However, some others will take months and in some cases several years to implement fully. The new law gives the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, significant new responsibilities. One of the major provisions of the act focuses on joint officer personnel policy. The legislation creates a joint duty specialty for officers that will require major changes in the way officers are selected, educated, promoted, and assigned to joint duty positions. It also establishes joint duty as a prerequisite for higher rank, strengthens the focus of all professional military education on joint matters, and specifies promotion objectives for joint officers and review of selection board results by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure board results are consistent with guidelines developed by the Secretary of Defense. DEFENSE MANPOWER Overview In recent years, the advancements in technology and the resulting modern high technology weapon systems have increased demands on the US military to recruit and retain top quality young men and women. If the Military Services are going to maintain the level of readiness necessary for the future, they must preserve and improve on the gains already made in personnel readiness. Meeting the personnel goals provides the foundation for the US military readiness posture. The challenge will be to do this in the face of severe budget constraints and diminishing resources. Recruitment The Department of Defense continues to be successful in achieving its accession goals (Figure VI3) despite the continuing decline in the eligible youth population, an improved economy, and reduced youth unemployment. This success is due to the emphasis the Services have placed on recruiting to attract the number and quality of people they need and to the incentives, including cash enlistment bonuses and educational benefits Congress has provided. Although a few high-technology skills remain difficult to fill, the overall quality of recruits is high (Figure VI-4). Retention Retention of quality people continues to be good. Even though the Services have pursued policies of reenlistment screening and selective retention, the retention rates have remained high since 1982 (Figure VI-5). The successes in retention are directly related to benefits and quality of life programs that are given the highest priority by each of the Services. If the level of readiness required is to be maintained, efforts to restore pay comparability and sustain the package of institutional incentives commensurate with the unique demands associated with military life must be continued. The impact of recent changes to the military retirement system remains to be seen; every effort will be made to ensure that further erosion of this important compensation element does not occur. |