STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. COLLADAY, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEEMAN FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. COLLADAY. Mr. Chairman, I would not endorse the wish of Mr. Hildreth which Senator Wherry hit into unknowingly.

I will say, in behalf of the Republican organization of the District of Columbia, which I have represented on the National Committee since 1917, uninterruptedly, that throughout that entire period resolutions and planks and all meetings of the quadrennial convention of the Republican Party of the District of Columbia, have endorsed and advocated both representation by the citizens of the District of Columbia and the Congress of the United States and in the electoral college.

They also used to include the request for the status of a citizen in the Federal court. That has been granted. That is one step in the right direction, and citizens of the District of Columbia now can constitute one end of litigation the same as citizens of a State, and have the right in the Federal court to remove from the State court a suit brought against him.

We have always appeared before the resolutions committee of the Republican National Committee and advocated the insertion therein of a plank granting or favoring representation of the District of Columbia in the Congress and in the electoral college.

Unfortunately, the gentlemen who have sat on that committee have felt that other matters were more important, and that the Republican platform should be kept within useful bounds. Therefore, I am unable to report that a plank has appeared in the Republican National platform on this subject.

Many favorable comments and assurances of support have been obtained on the occasion of those arguments, but it has not been deemed of sufficient importance by the distinguished members of the parties who have made up the committee on resolutions to write our request into the platform.

However, step by step, a number of representatives in the House Judiciary Committee and the number of Republicans in the Senate Judiciary Committee considering this resolution has been increasing and we predict that if this committee should not bring out a favorable report, the next Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, having a Republican majority, will do so. [Applause by Senator Wherry.]

Senator HATCH. Any questions, gentlemen?

Senator WHERRY. No questions.

Senator HATCH. Well, I may observe, just give you time and you will eventually catch up with the Democratic Party.

Mr. COLLADAY. It always has happened, Senator.

Senator HATCH. In all seriousness, I want to say that, to me, the questions involved here present no partisan issue whatever. It is not a question of Republicans or Democrats; it is a question of the fundamental rights of American citizens, and I believe both Republicans and Democrats try to stand for fundamental rights.

Senator WHERRY. I am afraid I will have to agree with you.
Senator HATCH. Mr. Suter, who is your next witness?

Mr. SUTER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. James R. Kirkland, of the local bar.
Senator HATCH. Senator Capper, do you want to add anything?

Senator CAPPER. I do not know whether they have brought out this fact of what happened to the soldiers from the District of Columbia at the last election. Now, my State, and every State that I know anything about, made provisions for those soldiers from their State to be given a vote out across the seas from their camps, but as for the District of Columbia, which has something like 80,000 soldiers there, I think, these boys got no recognition whatever, insofar as a voting privilege is concerned, while all the States' soldier boys were given what they were entitled to have: The opportunity to cast a vote.

Senator HATCH. We had a very fine young man, a lieutenant from the Navy, here just a while ago, who testified on that point, and some others.

Senator CAPPER. I am glad to know that. I was out.

Senator HATCH. It has been developed.

All right, Mr. Kirkland, we will be glad to hear from you now.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. KIRKLAND, MEMBER, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR AND PROFESSOR AT THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

Mr. KIRKLAND. My name is James R. Kirkland. I am a member of the District of Columbia bar and a practicing attorney here in the District, and also professor of law at the George Washington University Law School.

I want to address myself solely to the question of the legal effect of Joint Resolution 9, and in order to save the time of the committee I reduced it to writing.

With regard to Senate Joint Resolution 9, I desire to discuss the legal effect of the proposed constitutional amendment on the question of the status of the District of Columbia.

Comprising approximately 60 square land miles with a population approaching a million persons, the District of Columbia is the most unique political area over which the American flag flies. It is my judgment that it is essentially a quasi American State. It is not a full-fledged State, nor a Territory, county, nor municipality. It is the only district created by the sovereign will of the American people and expressly provided for in section 8 of article I of the Constitution wherein Congress is empowered

To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding 10 miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States;

* * *

The Maryland cession occurred in 1788 and that of Virginia in 1789 but of the total 100 square miles, approximately 30 square miles were retroceded to Virginia in 1846.

Historically, in the Bill of Rights presented by the colonists to the British Parliament and setting forth their grievances, it was stated— That the foundation of English liberty and of all civil government is the right in the people to participate in their legislative councils.

The same thought is repeated in the Declaration of Independence wherein, in charging the King, the colonists said:

He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.

These same general democratic principles have found their way into the philosophy of the United Nations Charter and have become worldwide in general acceptance-except to the District of Columbia.

These thoughts were undoubtedly in the mind of the framers of the Constitution. Perhaps the incident in 1783 when Pennsylvania troops at Lancaster marched on Philadelphia to threaten the Pennsylvania State Assembly into passing increased Army pay legislation, and causing the Congress to adjourn to Princeton was the reason why it was decided that Congress should have complete sovereignty and control of the District of Columbia.

That same incident may have caused Madison in the Thirty-second Essay of the Federalist, to say:

The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted with impunity; but a dependence on the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the Government and dissatisfaction to the members of the confederacy.

However, the scholarly Madison continues and pointed out that congressional sovereignty did not carry with it disenfranchisement of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia when he states:

* * *

The extent of this Federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature as they will have had their voice in the election of the Government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes derived from their own sufferages will, of course, be allowed them.

Indeed this was the accepted practice followed not only by Congress but the sovereign States of Maryland and Virginia. Prior to the permanent location of the District of Columbia, the act of July 16, 1790 (1 Stat. L. 130) provided that the laws of the State within such District should not be affected until a time fixed for the removal of the Government thereto.

In the Maryland election of October 6, 1800, the Fifth District polling area included "all that part of Montgomery County lying within the Territory of Columbia."

By its act of February 27, 1801 (2 Stat. L. 103), Congress continued the laws of Maryland and Virginia in force in the District of Columbia. While the mayor of Washington was appointed by the President, the charter of May 15, 1820 (3 Stat. L 583) provided that he should be elected by the people.

Suffrage continued under the Territory form of government created by the act of February 21, 1871, (16 Stat. L. 419) and although all elective offices were abolished by the act of June 20, 1874, (18 Stat. L. 116) the right of suffrage was not expressly taken away but has remained dormant ever since.

The commissioner form of government was established by the act of June 11, 1878, (20 Stat. L. 102) and the District of Columbia continued to have a nonvoting delegate in Congress until March 4, 1875.

Politically, the District of Columbia cannot become a sovereign State because the people of the United States created it specifically and expressly gave Congress the sole legislative power therein. It

therefore is without power to levy taxes and to spend them for such benefits as it might choose. Nor is it permitted to change the judicial procedure or to streamline its own administration.

Although there can be no doubt that the framers of the Constitution never intended to discriminate against the residents of the District of Columbia in the Federal courts, the fact remains that until the recent passage of legislation by the Congress that the District of Columbia was not regarded as a State and its residents did not have the right on the grounds of diversity of citizenship to bring suits in the several district courts (Hepburn v. Ellzey (2 Cranch 445, 452); Geofrey v. Riggs (133 U. S. 238, 269)). The Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia was to be regarded as a State for the purpose of direct taxation (Loughborough v. Hennick (129 U. A. 141-147); Capital Transit Company v. Hof, (174 U. S. 1, 5); Kendall v. United States, (12 Pet. 524, 619).

Similarly, recognition of the District as a separate political community possessing an organic, social, and political life of its own is to found in other cases in which the Supreme Court has placed the District for certain purposes in the same category as the States of the Union. (Geofrey v. Riggs, (133 U. S. 258, 269); Metropolitan Railroad Company v. D. C. (132 U. S. 1, 9.)).

However, the acts of the District Legislative Assembly were ultimately denied authority by the old Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon the ground that Congress was incapable of delegating to another body the legislative powers conferred on it by the Constitution (Roach et al, v. Van Riswick, (MacArthur & Mackey's Reports 11 D. C. 117); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick (129 U. S. 141-148)).

These political and judicial arguments strengthen the contention that the District of Columbia is a unique political area. It is the only world capital where its residents are denied national suffrage. Nevertheless, Congress has in some instances treated it as a branch of the United States Government by applying to it the act classifying salaries of Federal employees and also providing for the retirement of Federal employees.

The District also has two separate systems of courts-the municipal court of the District of Columbia, and the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. In one, violations of ordinances of a municipal nature are prosecuted by the Corporation Counsel and in the other, both Federal statutory crimes and crimes at common law, inherited from the State of Maryland, are prosecuted by the United States Attorney. No other Federal court in the entire Federal judiciary prosecutes for common-law offenses in view of the fact that a common law was especially denied to the Federal juiciary in the creation of the Federal Government.

The Metropolitan Police Department enforces both municipal ordinances and crimes against the United States while the United States Park Police is a separate entity and has jurisdiction only in the Federal area where the parks and the public buildings are located.

It is inevitable that the people of the District of Columbia will gradually inherit a complete local court where all local matters such as domestic relations, the probate of wills and their administration, the prosecution of local crimes, and other internal matters will be disposed of.

There is a growing movement under way in this direction and we have recently had installed the very excellent municipal court of appeals which is the first genuine local appellate court created in the District of Columbia. All of this points to the fact that while the District of Columbia is a Federal sovereignty, there is an unusual commingling of the national and the local judicial and administrative affairs.

The District of Columbia has been a politically organized community for almost a century and a half. In the estimated census of July 1, 1944, it had a population of approximately 926,000, was larger than 12 States, paid more national taxes than 29, and had a larger quota under the Selective Service Act of more than 16 States. It is the eleventh largest city in the country and it is certainly entitled to national representation in Congress.

While residents under the proposed amendment would individually acquire a political status in national affairs, the District of Columbia would not become a sovereign State. It would be merely a quasiAmerican State. It would have no part in the ratification of future constitutional amendments, unless such amendments were submitted to assemblies as was the procedure in adopting the twentieth Amend

ment.

The extent of representation in the House and the Senate and the qualification of voters would be subject to congressional legislation to be modified or repealed as experience indicated.

The proposed amendment is merely an enabling act and Congress could entirely omit to pass any supporting legislation. Nor would the District of Columbia be able to bring suit against a State since it is not a State within the congressional meaning. Obviously, sovereignty is lacking and the supreme constitutional legislative power of Congress is not challenged by the American.

Senator HATCH. Thank you very much.

Mr. SUTER. Now, Mr. Chairman, next on our list of speakers is Mr. Guilford Jameson, a member of the local bar and a man who was for some years the clerk of the House Committee on the Judiciary, and then served as one of the commissioners in the Court of Claims, and is now practicing law here in private practice.

Senator HATCH. Mr. Jameson.

STATEMENT OF GUILFORD JAMESON APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE CITIZENS JOINT COMMITTEE AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREST HILLS CITIZENS ASSOCIATION

Mr. JAMESON. Mr. Chairman, I appear in support of this resolution at the invitation of the Citizens' Joint Committee and also as the representative of the Forest Hills Citizens' Association.

I have a very brief statement. I would like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that a more complete statement made by me appears in the House hearings on this matter.

I think I should point out that no one should be misled into measuring the interest in this matter by the brevity of today's hearing. As the members of the committee know, the fact is that extensive hearings have been held by Congress in previous sessions, and I submit that there is hardly a phase of this matter that has not been cov