July. In 1878 the Russian Government received no support from Germany in its fight for a big Bulgaria which, stretching far south of the Balkan mountains, appeared to give Russia an overwhelming preponderance in the peninsula; nevertheless, Russia received Bessarabia, and the violent denunciations of Germany that appeared in the Russian press after the Congress are explicable only on the erroneous assumption that Bismarck had promised to favour Russian ambitions at the expense of Russia's opponents. There is no evidence to support belief in such a betrayal; and though Bismarck, in the autumn of 1879, formed the Dual Alliance with Austria for joint opposition to an attack on either of the Central Powers by Russia, he showed anxiety to return to friendly relations with Russia, and succeeded in restoring the three powers to the amicable relationship of 1876. In the Alliance of the Three Emperors of 1881 it was recognised in principle (Art. II) that Austria reserved the right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina at whatever moment she might deem opportune, and that the three powers would not oppose the eventual reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia if that question should come up by force of circumstances. In 1884 the Alliance of the Three Emperors was renewed and the friendly conversations of the Emperors of Austria-Hungary and Russia at Kremsier, in August 1885, provided further evidence of Bismarck's skill in reconstituting the understanding between the three empires which had seemed hopelessly shattered after the Congress of Berlin. pressed the idea of a division into spheres of influence at each successive crisis or discussion over Balkan affairs, and in the Reinsurance Treaty of June 18, 1887, promised not only to recognise the legitimacy of Russia's influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, but also to accord benevolent neutrality and moral and diplomatic support if the Tsar should find himself under the necessity of assuming the task of defending the entrance of the Black Sea. All these agreements are consistent in their approval of Russia's movement towards Constantinople, and his policy would present no difficulties but for the fact that numerous agreements exist which appear to commit Germany to equally definite opposition to all Russia's Balkan ambitions. When the disturbances in

He

Bulgaria, between 1885 and 1888, made a Russian occupation a possibility, the 'Mediterranean' group of Austria, England, and Italy, formed to maintain the status quo in lands bordering on the Mediterranean, received Bismarck's undoubted support.

The controversies which have continued since Bismarck's dismissal have hitherto failed to give any really satisfactory explanation of this contradiction; but a fresh turn to the discussion has been given since the war by Prof. J. V. Fuller, who, in a more elaborate study of Bismarck's later diplomacy than any hitherto attempted, has arrived at conclusions concerning the negotiations of 1885-88 which differ in many essentials from any hitherto advanced. Approaching the Near Eastern question from the point of view of German policy, he argues that when the question was reopened in 1885 three possible courses presented themselves to the German Chancellor. 'Germany might support Austria unreservedly from the start, announcing boldly that she would be on her ally's side in the event of war. She might espouse Russia's claims and persuade Austria, for a consideration, to concede them. Or she might keep in the background, letting Austria go ahead on her own responsibility, only endeavouring to assure her the support of some other combination, not openly including Germany, which in the end would balk Russia of her desires.'. The first course, threatening as it did a great struggle between Slav and Teuton, of which Constantinople should be the prize, and which would certainly precipitate the Franco-Russian alliance that it was his lifelong struggle to avoid, was inconceivable so long as Bismarck stood at the helm of the German ship of state. The third possible course, the indirect blocking of Russia's advance, had most to recommend it. The situation was probably as difficult as any with which Bismarck was ever called upon to deal. The Bulgarian question was reopened and must be boldly faced. Further temporisation was useless: the solution might as well be sought once and for all.' The second course, that of compromise and mutual aggrandisement for both Russia and Austria, would only result in a temporary solution. That any such arrangement could be made † Ibid, p. 80.

• Fuller, p. 77.

to the permanent satisfaction of Russia was a practical impossibility.' Bismarck therefore determined to solve the Near East question, once and for all.' By engineering his secret diplomacy skilfully, he could serve all Austria's interests and yet avoid breaking with Russia. Germany could thus keep France and Russia apart and maintain her own advantageous position as the mutual friend of both Russia and Austria. An obvious objection to this view that would be advanced by any one familiar with the published material for German diplomatic history in this period is that Bismarck's correspondence nowhere contains any statement-made either to his own diplomatic agents or to the Austrian Government— which can reasonably be construed as an admission of such a policy. Prof. Fuller goes to some trouble to explain this difficulty. He considers that the explanation is largely personal: Bismarck had not much confidence in Kalnoky's discretion. His opinion of the Austrian's ability fell particularly low after the Serbo-Bulgar war of 1885, and the behaviour of such an undependable colleague could be better regulated by keeping him in the dark, and even in a little anxiety. The tone of his communication was always that Germany's support was strictly limited, that real danger existed from the side of France, and that the maintenance of existing ties with Russia and with Italy was a matter, not of manoeuvring for advantages, but of life and death.'† This statement of policy coincides almost exactly with the explanation of Bismarck's policy put forward by Raschdau and other survivors of Bismarck's diplomatic corps: perhaps because they also, for some reason not easy to discover, could not be admitted by Bismarck to the inner secrets of his diplomacy.‡

Prof. Fuller argues that this method, the indirect blocking of Russia's advance, had, in fact, been employed with success at the time of the Russo-Turkish war and Congress of Berlin, to the profit of Austria, without any commensurate Russian gain.§ The conclusion that Bismarck may have followed the same line after 1885 is

* Fuller, pp. 76, 79, 80.

† Ibid, pp. 81, 82.

↑ Raschdau, 'Der deutsch-russische Rückversicherungsvertrag' in Grenzboten' (April 1918), p. 32.

§ Fuller, p. 80.

an attractive one within certain limits; but Prof. Fuller's analysis of his position in the 'eighties attributes a power of initiative to the German Chancellor which the history of the Eastern question after 1878 does not generally suggest. The judgment of German writers, which agrees with that of Dr Gooch in England, certainly does not attribute to Bismarck either the opportunity or the inclination for this exclusively Austrian policy, and the opposition to Fuller's view is clearly expressed in Prof. Pribram's summary of the position after the conclusion of Bismarck's many and conflicting engagements in 1887.

This security on all sides and against every eventuality enabled Prince Bismarck to pursue toward allies and opponents alike those tactics of threats and promises, admonitions and pleadings, pacifications and elucidations, by means of which he attained the goal he held unswervingly before him, the maintenance of the peace of Europe. It was a dangerous game that he was playing. Only a master like himself could hope to bring the ship of state through all the rocks and shoals into safe harbour.' *

6

Any fresh Near Eastern crisis after 1878 would have presented Bismarck with the three alternatives enumerated by Fuller if Bismarck accepted the view that further temporisation was useless: the solution might as well be sought once and for all.' Prof. Fuller remarks further that the question reopened was in reality that of the re-establishment of Russian influence in Bulgaria and its possible extension even farther— perhaps to Constantinople itself.' And on a later page, the final reckoning would be only postponed by an understanding confined to Bulgaria and Serbia.'† How far does Bismarck's diplomacy before 1885 bear out this forecast? It is difficult to believe that Bismarck, after the events of 1878 and 1879, could have seriously believed it possible to engineer the permanent defeat of Russian Balkan ambitions and still retain the friendship of Russia: he was too close a student of Russian affairs not to know how readily Russian opinion translated every disappointment in foreign affairs into hostility to Germany. This would have been an obvious deduction from the events of the Congress period, and in fact † Fuller, pp. 76, 79.

* Pribram, II, 84. Vol. 251.-No. 497.

B

Bismarck is complaining of the Russian press before the end of 1886; anti-German feeling was strongly expressed from this point onward, and by the end of 1887 it was widely believed that war was in sight.* It is possible to argue that Bismarck was prepared to accept the consequence of Russian ill-feeling, but not that he was ignorant of it. And even if the Russian press could have been persuaded that the defeat of Russia was not due to German machinations, it would have been most unlikely that Russian diplomatists would not have gained some inkling of the truth. Further, we may well ask how Bismarck was to bring into existence a coalition of governments in opposition to Russia without letting those governments know that he was doing so? Prof. Fuller, nevertheless, explains the lack of direct evidence in the published German documents for his view by saying that Bismarck considered it best not to inform Kalnoky of his intentions. As a matter of fact Kalnoky was well informed as to Bismarck's activities, even in the obscure instance of Dr Langenbuch's visit to Alexander of Battenberg in March 1887.t

Even if we accept the hypothesis that Kalnoky was kept in ignorance the problem remains of finding what motive Bismarck would have in supporting Austria if Austria was to be told nothing about it. Presumably the truth was to be revealed when the defeat was finally accomplished. Prof. Fuller does not deal with this point, and if Kalnoky's temperament was so undependable that he could not be employed even as conscious auxiliary in fighting his own battles, it is doubtful if he could have been safely entrusted with a secret which would obviously have had to be hidden very carefully from the suspicious Russians. Dr Trützschler, indeed, goes further, and maintains that Bismarck had no such doubts as to Kalnoky's reliability. At any rate, unless we can find reasons for disbelieving Bismarck's repeated statement that Germany had no direct interest in the Near East we must assume that desire to gain the self-interested gratitude of Austria would play a large part in such a

Die Grosse Politik,' III, 2; v, 96, etc.

+ Corti, Alexander von Battenberg,' p. 295.

Trützschler, Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr des Jahres 1887,' Appendix, p. 153.