The CHAIRMAN. That looks like the best place to start. You have the Antarctica Treaty. Why can't you start there, Bourke? Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not know, it is a question of the chicken or the egg, where you start. I do not know, but we have one or two ways to go, I think. In the long pull, that is the foreseeable future long pull, whatever that may be, we either have to go out after outer space or we have to get into some kind of enforceable agreement to control it. We have no other choice in the matter. Senator HUMPHREY. That is exactly my feeling. The CHAIRMAN. It is much cheaper to try to control it. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know it is, but there are difficulties, too. NEED FOR A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BUREAU Mr. FOSTER. There are great difficulties, but we are devoting a good deal of time to this, which is one of the reasons we need a scientific and technical bureau, and we have a very good group in this. We are working very closely with Aerospace, which I formed for the Air Force and which I used to be chairman of before I took this job, and they are devoting some of their own money to this relationship in an attempt to help us out. They have set aside, I think, $50,000 to $75,000 to work with us in just this area. The CHAIRMAN. In this field you would not have the problem of inspection that you do in conventional weapons, would you? Mr. FOSTER. You always have the problem of inspection, but there are plans to run vehicles which could inspect. Such a vehicle might cost, the first copy might cost, $2 or $3 billion, but this is still something that has not yet lost the opportunity of our getting hold of it, so we are devoting a good deal of time to it. We have also discussed with NASA this field in great detail, and they have asked the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to set aside a number of men working with us in this field. We are in this field, we recognize the potential. I mean, we are devoting some major resources out of our very modest budget toward this end. I agree with you, Senator Hickenlooper, that if the Soviet Union or we were to devote tremendous resources to this environment, we could make a very important step toward controlling a lot of things the other fellow could do, and it therefore must be gotten ahold of early. THE PRIMROSE PATH OF DISARMAMENT Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think we should devote our total energies to one or the other, to one to the exclusion of the other, necessarily, because we could be led down the primrose path of disarmament in this field, and if we neglect the other we can be bamboozled, or we could devote our energies to the outer space field and neglect some of these other things, and we could have a lot of trouble. It has its difficulties. Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I am not posing as a spokesman for anybody, but the whole purpose of this tension is to force us to break through in outer space exploration and travel, and if Mr. Foster will put this into effect, get this agreed to and make it effective, I am afraid our progress in outer space would slacken some what. In fact, if it had not been for tension we would still be using, at best, the bow and arrow. Mr. FOSTER. Well, this would be something good to work back toward. Senator A.KEN. You once let us get complacent, let us be sure of what tomorrow is, and we would find progress slowed almost to the stopping point. As I say, I am not speaking for anyone in particular. Mr. FOSTER. NASA, of course, has very substantial funds for developing outer space for peaceful uses. This would accompany any restrictions we would be able to produce, but I still feel you would have progress that might lead to space travel. Senator AIKEN. But I think in disarmament you still have got to nibble. Mr. FOSTER. We have to go both ways. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS Senator HUMPHREY. One point that might bear some investigation, since all of these things seem somewhat remote on occasionboth the United States and the Soviet Union or the respective blocs, the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Western bloc, grant substantial amounts of economic aid to so-called underdeveloped areas. Much of this aid today is consumed in what we call defense support, and then it is ultimately consumed in what you call military assistance. It might not be so foolish, or let me put it this way, it might be good to see if you could explore with the Soviet representatives at a conference, like at Geneva, some agreement that when economic aid is granted to an underdeveloped area, the underdeveloped area to which this aid is granted signs a contract with the lender or the donor that none of this money shall be used for military purposes, nor will there be any military assistance. These countries cannot afford this stuff. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Hubert, it will interfere with their sovereignty and their sovereign rights, and they would not want any strings tied to this. Senator HUMPHREY. I am for a few strings, and I always have been. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am for a few strings myself. REDUCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE Senator HUMPHREY. It just seems to me what has happened is that both the Soviets and ourselves are getting caught up in socalled economic assistance or foreign aid that is being adulterated, watered down, and diluted by the drain of the military upon it. This is characteristic in one area of the world after another. I do not know whether anything like this has any possibilities of success, but it is worthy of exploration. This is in indirect disarmament by preventing the armament. You take this Middle Eastern area; talk about public opinion. We have always talked about that; we are concerned about public opinion. Even the Soviets at times have been concerned about public opinion, some people think. Is it not possible to bring the bearing of the whole world of public opinion upon this Middle Eastern area and say, "Look, no more arms. Money, yes; but no more arms.” If you could ever get the Soviet Union to agree with us that there would be no more arms shipped into the Middle East, just that much of an agreement, it would be a substantial step forward. I would not try to say to the Soviet Union that they should not send in technical assistance or economic assistance; that would be their business if they wanted to. I do not know whether these things have possibilities, but they are no more remote of possibility of success than some of the other proposals that are made. When you talk to the Soviets about reducing their armed forces and reducing their missiles, which we hope that we can do, we have about as much, I think we have a greater, chance of success in getting the Soviets to reduce some of its military assistance. Mr. FOSTER. I do not think this is impossible at all. I think this is something that might be done if they really wanted to go down this road. I would hope that perhaps we could talk to them about this kind of thing. I do not see any immediate probability of their taking any action until we get some agreement on these other measures, but it is one we can do in parallel with the other. MORE HOPEFUL IN PRIVATE THAN IN PUBLIC The CHAIRMAN. Why is it, do you think, they speak more apparently hopefully in private than they do in public? It would seem to me that if there was any propaganda, it would be in public. Mr. FOSTER. I speak hopefully in public because I think the pressure on the Soviet Union is increasing. I think it is in their interests to get this kind of an accommodation because I think then they will be able to do a better job in agriculture; I think they will be able to give their people more. The CHAIRMAN. That is clear. Why don't they come out in public and say some of the things they say in private? Are they afraid of their people at home? Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid so. I hope, Mr. Chairman, you will consider this suggestion at some point, if we move ahead, of assigning a couple of your members to visit us in Geneva. The CHAIRMAN. You let me know when you think the time is ripe to where there might be something that would warrant their being there. I am sure we can get some candidates. Mr. FOSTER. I should be very happy to. [Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] MINUTES WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON African Affairs, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met in executive session at 9 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB. Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman). Testifying on the Congo situation, at his own request, was Benjamin Ginzburg, of Arlington, Va. For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript. [The subcommittee adjourned at 9:30 a.m.] (404) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1962 WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, The Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman and Symington. Also present: Carl Marcy and Darrell St. Claire, of the committee staff. [This hearing was published in 1962 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.] STATEMENTS OF HON. PHILLIPS TALBOT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS; HON. WILLIAM S. GAUD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; AND WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS The CHAIRMAN. This chart on page 179 doesn't have the military assistance. Can you supplement that? For example, how much military assistance do we have for Pakistan? Mr. BUNDY. That material, Mr. Chairman, is in our blue book, the military assistance, page 119, if you want to put it alongside. The amount is $53 million for Pakistan, which is about what it has been, a little down. We are going to take a very firm basis of sticking to past commitments for Pakistan, not adding any more. The CHAIRMAN. There is quite an increase in Iran, $63 million. SITUATION IN IRAN [P. 174] Mr. BUNDY. There is an increase in Iran. And we are at the point of making major decisions in connection with the Shah's visit. Perhaps that figure will go up a little over what is shown there. But what we are trying to do—and I think Mr. Talbot can speak more in detail on it-is to try to get the Shah to reduce the size of |