such as, for example, when a great musician or mathematician is born of apparently commonplace parents. Such sudden sports of nature are the delight of the re-incarnationist; he points triumphantly to the utter absence of musical capacity or mathematical power in the immediate ancestors of the celebrated man, and asks how any theory of inheritance can account for this gifted soul, which, according to him, has been developed in a previous existence, and has taken possession of the body. But he is in the following dilemma: If, according to him, and as we are all prepared to admit, a spirit must find a congenial body in which to act, then by some means the lissom finger, the delicate ear, the musicallysensitive brain-or, in the case of the mathematician, the brain-capacity for abstract reasoning-must have been prepared in the unconscious infant. How has this been done? He may reply that the spirit enters gradually from the moment of conception, and moulds the body to its purpose. But this is in direct contradiction to the striking facts of inheritance in all ordinary cases, which prove that the germs of capacity must be and are passed on from the parent; for the metempsychosist has already denied that the parents are gifted in the necessary direction, and indeed this assertion forms the basis of his argument. In a word, he cannot adopt one theory or another according as it suits his purpose. Either the soul entering. at conception moulds the body to its own nature, and then inheritance goes for nothing, and genius is in the pre-existing soul; or the germs of capacity are inherited, and there is no indication of an individuality entering from with

out.

To the evolutionist, on the con

trary, who considers that the bodily organs have been developed pari passu with the musical or mathematical soul from power accumulated during past generations, such apparently spontaneous developments of genius present no real difficulty. Every student of nature knows how complicated are the factors involved in the explanation of the simplest physical facts; and in a human being, the descendant of countless generations of ancestors, and inheriting germs of almost infinite varieties of capacity in different degree, we cannot expect to trace the source of all effects; any more than we can explain the curious strength of atavism which causes a slaty-blue pigeon to appear occasionally as the offspring of breeds having in them. no trace of this type of bird. This would appear like a new creation, if we were not acquainted with the original blue rock-pigeon from which the various breeds have descended; and, if we were equally informed as to the original stock and various developments of the human race, many apparently new varieties might doubtless be traced to their natural starting-point.

Neither must we forget that two natures are blended in the production of every living being, and that previous to experience it is as impossible to predict what neutralising or strengthening effects may thus be produced, as it is to foresee the nature of the reaction of certain chemicals which have never before been tested.

A striking warning as to our ignorance upon this subject is furnished by Mr. Francis Galton's investigations into the similarity and dissimilarity of twins in face and disposition. He shows that when the two children are contained in separate sacs, and are therefore clearly the result of separate ova, they present the

ordinary amount of likeness of children of the same family. But when both children are contained in one sac, arising probably from two germinal spots in the same ovum, they are invariably of the same sex, and are either exceedingly alike in body and mind, or so absolutely unlike, with startling differences in complexion, feature, and disposition, as to be complementary the one to the other. Now, whatever may be the causes which lead to these striking factsand it would be tedious to discuss them here*-the facts themselves show how remarkable similarities or dissimilarities in disposition and feature are dependent upon purely natural conditions. And if we allow the whole being of a child to be inherited from his parents, the possible combinations are so infinite that we have a sufficient explanation of all sudden varieties; and it is not only unnecessary, but irrational, to call in a previously developed soul to account for mental characteristics.

If we have thus fairly disposed of those abnormal cases which are the stronghold of the metempsychosist, it will be unnecessary to cite the overwhelming evidences of marked inheritance, both in body and mind, which tell entirely against him. In fact, the whole series of facts which were incomprehensible on the theory of soul creation, and which drove the ancients into the theory of transmigration, now find their natural explanation in evolution, as a compound of inheritance and the accumulated experiences of each new individual. Reminiscence, ancestral likeness, race characteristics, animal passions, the struggle between the higher good, and the lower nature in which mere pro

pensities have become conscious evil when higher possibilities have been developed all these are explicable on the theory of evolution; while metempsychosis, in the light of modern science, is less positively overthrown than rendered totally unnecessary, in accounting for the modes of expression of consciousness as exhibited in the present life.

There remains, however, for consideration, the more metaphysical aspect of the justification of metempyschosis upon moral grounds, and as the only system of immortality that philosophy can listen to." Its claims on these points can best be discussed by comparison with the third doctrine, that of Traducianism or inheritance of souls. This theory was held under various forms by many of the early Fathers of the Church. Tertullian advocated it; so did St. Gregory; and St. Augustine inclined towards it, as offering the only feasible explanation of an inherited sinful nature. It was condemned, however, by the Church, as implying a certain materiality of the substance of the soul, and would certainly have been still more vehemently repudiated if it had been allied with the present theory of evolution, which has put in such a striking light the community in mental and moral nature between ourselves and animals. But material substance in the light of modern science assumes a totally new aspect. Force or energy lies behind all matter, and is the only fact which we can recognise; and it has been well said that the only clue we have to the origin of force is in our own will-power, and that, consequently, the most rational conception that we can form of force acting without ourselves is

that it is the result of a great unknown Will - Power or First Cause.

The question, therefore, whether the soul is material, and has come down to us from the earlier forms of creation, is indifferent so far as its source is concerned, and we need not fear to yield to the almost overwhelming evidence afforded by inheritance that it has so come to us. The difficulty is not in establishing the theory of Traducianism (for it presents itself at once as the most natural), but in linking it with the doctrine of immortality.

Mr. Knight has well said that, "if the human race has been gradually evolved out of a prior type, we have, as regards immortality, only three alternatives to choose from: either the whole series is mortal, or the whole is immortal, or a point was reached when immortality was evolved." The mortality of the whole series is maintained by two sets of thinkers, namely, the materialists on the one hand, who, however, as we have seen, are unable to account for consciousness at all; and on the other those who believe in the absorption of the vital principle into the general fund at death. With these last we shall deal presently, while with the materialists we have already joined issue, because they can afford no real explanation of living phenomena. There remain, therefore, two alternatives; and one of these, namely, that immortality is evolved out of mortality, is, as Mr. Knight points out, impossible, since the one is separated from the other "by the whole diameter of being."

But, startling as it may seem, the second alternative, that the whole series is immortal, is quite a tenable position (although Mr. Knight repudiates it without argument), and one which may in the end prove to be true.

This

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It is quite scientific to assume such a power, since, when we have weighed and measured all the mechanical forces of the body, and even that which is expended in the work of the brain, we obtain no clue to the power which combined these forces into a living being, and directs them in accordance with its wants, and we are compelled to assume something behind them which we call life. Now, if this life-principle (which, but for the confusion attaching to the word, would be most conveniently called spirit") exists, we must suppose, on the theory of evolution, that it is passed on from flower to seed, from animals to their offspring, from parent to child, and that during each lifetime it draws in fresh supplies from the general fund of sprit, in the same way that the material body takes up matter with its various inherent forces to add to the organism. It would thus be a power which has never localised itself in so-called material substance, but which permeates the organic form, in the same way as ether is supposed to pass between the grosser atoms of matter. And thus, while it would be affected by the vibrations of the molecular structure of the body, and would also, in its turn, cause vibrations

among the molecules, yet it would be in no way dependent upon them for its existence, but only for its expression in the material world.

And here we should have a satisfactory explanation of the formation of fitting organs for the expression of inherent tendencies. In plants the wonderful facts of variation and inheritance can only be explained by a kind of "habit" acquired in the struggle for existence. Now, in the inorganic forces we have no sign of habit induced by experience, nor passed on in the material substance. Crystals do not develope new qualities, nor can we find any change in their mode of growth from the earliest geological age up to the present time.

But in the lowest plant-life this "habit" exists. Together with the power of working up inorganic matter into organic structure, we have the first indications of this possibility of passing on to the next generation experience accumulated in the living organism. And this principle is not inherent in the particles of matter themselves; for, once let the body return to the inorganic state, and it is lost forthwith and for ever. Neither the organic form nor its characteristics can spring up again from the materials (as a crystal does after it has been dissolved), until the inorganic particles have been again absorbed into a living being. Nor would this argument be touched even if the facts of spontaneous generation were clearly established: for the possibility of causing the life-principle to act upon particles in certain combinations is conceivable; but, if the properties were inherent in the particles themselves, then, instead of the lowest forms, we ought to have in spontaneous generation development of the highest kind. The impression, therefore, of

"habits" must, so far as we can argue, be not upon the material, but upon the life-force permeating the organism. We have striking proof of this in the fact that consciousness appears gradually, so that we scarcely know where it begins in the animals, and yet it is in no way explained by mere molecular action.

If, then, we can conceive permanent impressions accumulating through countless generations of animals, leading to developed instincts, emotions, and passions, and thus on to the complex nature of man, who through savage life gains new experiences; then the upward struggle, with all its difficulties and pain, finds an explanation and a moral justification. If any creature existed in this life so well adapted for its circumstances, and so completely in harmony with its environment, that it never experienced dissatisfaction, but, without any effort of its own, was in a state of complete contentment, that creature might not suffer, but it would also not progress. Where it suffers or feels dissatisfaction, it is not in harmony with its life, and by its struggles to become so it developes powers and characteristics which form its individuality. So far as these are successful, through being made in a right direction, they become permanent and afford it satisfaction. So far as they are in a wrong direction, they can exist only for a time (even if that time be much prolonged); for in the course of succeeding generations they must become eradicated in the race by natural selection, and in the individual by experience, if we assume it to exist indefinitely.

Thus, although every newlyborn individual comes into life with good and evil tendencies, yet, as in every case it must gain some experience, and move at least in some

degree in the right direction (since otherwise it would soon cease to exist), it must at the end of life have gained something in its passage through the world.

But now what as to immortality? Science has amply proved that there is no such thing as destruction of force in our portion of the universe; and if, as we have assumed, life-force comes by a different channel, and is not convertible into material forces, then there is nothing in the dissolution of the body to affect it, except as regards this present world. True, we might assume that at death each individual portion of the life-principle went back to the general fund; but we have seen that the experiences of this life have developed characteristics in this principle, and it must go back with those impressions which have modified it during its gradual development in the body. In this an organic being differs from inorganic bodies, such as a drop of water or a grain of sand. These have no different properties, whether they stand alone or are absorbed into the general mass. Even in lower forms of plant and animal life, individuality may be said to be very feeble, and we are so profoundly ignorant as to questions of sensation among the less highly developed animals, that we have no means of saying whether their individuality is a conscious individuality or not. But in ourselves and in the higher animals this consciousness, and the moral responsibility attending it, have as certainly been developed, as a backbone has been developed in all vertebrata, though they are descended from invertebrata in whom it was wanting. And since such development of consciousness has taken place originally, not in the material of the organism, but

in the life which permeates it (for in it alone is it possible to find the motive power for variation in the organism), there is nothing in the destruction of the body which can destroy this characteristic.

The spiritual evolutionist, therefore, adopting Traducianism, may come to look upon the life-principle as gradually individualising itself, and going back with certain qualities impressed upon it, to carry on in a future existence the development of its powers, whatever these may be; and we have no reason for assuming that there may not be as much need for various grades of life elsewhere, in a future existence, as there is here. Moreover, since one of the special developments in man and the higher animals is consciousness, it would be an actual destruction of an active principle, in a universe where nothing is destroyed, if the power of consciousness once developed were to

cease.

To this theory of individualisation of the life-force the physicist may no doubt reply that the balance of forces in the universe must be equal, and that this continuous individualisation will tend to an undue predominance of the living principle over the inorganic forces. But in all such speculations it will be found that the reasoner makes a kind of mental picture of an exact quantity of each force. If he will try for a moment to realise an infinite quantity of each force in an infinite universe (and all allow we can conceive of no limit), he will find that there can in this case be no balancing of forces. If force is infinite, every form of it can increase to infinity without encroaching upon another.

Thus the constant individualisation of spirit seems to be an equally tenable hypothesis with that of a fixed quantity of souls appearing again and again upon