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and has ventured to interpret, in the sense of PanNeerlandism,' a movement whose true origin we have just disclosed. The movement is, however, in no sense Belgian. Of that fact the best proof is the consistent unanimity with which Belgians alike repudiate the efforts of the Germans to divide them, and support without flinching the burden of military occupation.

Summoned to aid in a war of conquest, German theorists have systematically ignored the truth in founding their scheme of political penetration' on a supposed incompatibility between the two sections of the Belgian conglomerate. In the course of centuries the union of Flemings and Walloons in common toil and common struggles has, without confusing their separate origins, created a national spirit. It is there, an actual fact, which it is as useless to explain or analyse as it is to attempt to gainsay it. It exists. Of its existence the war has furnished a most notable and sanguinary proof; and the German occupation strengthens it from day to day. Born in a moment of trial, the Belgian Union gains energy from the trial itself. If there have been deviations of conduct or of language on the part of certain individuals, such occurrences, condemned and repudiated as they have been by the public at large, have only served to emphasise still further the solid resistance of the nation as a whole. Those among the Flemings who are qualified to speak and who, being safe from the invader, can speak freely, express themselves with noble resolution. This is their reply to the German intrigue:

'The undersigned Belgian Flemings feel bound to make the following declaration :

'(1) They cannot accept, nor do they desire, any favour at variance with the law of Belgium which the German Government might wish to bestow on them.

'(2) They affirm that certain newspapers now appear here [in the occupied part of Belgium], which, under a show of attachment to the Flemish cause, serve quite other interests than those of Belgium, and represent no section of the Flemish movement.

'(3) They appeal to their compatriots, both Flemings and Walloons, to refrain from all dispute on the language question, so long as liberty of action in Belgium is fettered by a foreign occupation.'

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As for those who are condemned to silence under the military rule of the invader, it is a German organ which places upon record their unshakable loyalty. The 'Vorwärts' of July 29, 1915, in view of what has actually happened, condemns German expectations founded on Flemish sympathies. After remarking that 'It is precisely in relation to the Flemish movement that illusions in Germany have been plentiful enough,' the paper proceeds to make ponderous fun of the astounding ignorance of national psychology betrayed during the past year by various experts in German nationalism.

In order to complete our description of some of the recognised methods of German 'penetration' in Belgium after the invasion, we must not omit the curious advances made by certain Socialists of Berlin to the Socialists of Brussels. M. Emile Royer, a Belgian Socialist deputy, has recently published a pamphlet, excellent as an effort of propaganda, on the German social democrats and the war. In Chapter XI he describes the visits of 'citoyens' Noske and Koster to the 'Maison du Peuple' at Brussels:

During September the Brussels Socialists received at the Maison du Peuple a visit from two other militant social democrats, Noske, a member of the Reichstag, and Koster, the editor of the "Hamburg Echo." It appeared from the behaviour of these two "comrades" that they were in fact semi-official emissaries of the German authorities. They offered to interpose with the German civil governor in order to obtain the necessary flour required for the bakery of the Maison du Peuple. Their offer was declined, but there was some discussion and the Belgians heard some remarkable statements.

'Noske and Koster could not understand why the Belgian Socialists, like the rest of the nation, had opposed the German invasion, inasmuch as they would have got ample compensation for all damages, and would have received the benefit of universal suffrage as well as certain legislation relating to insurance which they had not succeeded in obtaining from their own Government.'

In addition to this mobilisation of revolutionary forces to persuade Belgian Socialists that it was to their advantage to become Prussians, there was a corresponding mobilisation of religious forces with a view to persuading

the Belgian clergy to share in the benefits of 'Gott mit uns.' The movement was insidious and multiform. We have not as yet such materials as would enable us to give particulars, but we can draw our conclusions as to the arguments from the machinery set in motion by the German propaganda in Spain and Italy with the object of convincing Catholics that it was necessary for religion that Germany should triumph. A complete stop was put to the movement at Christmas 1914 by a thunderbolt in the shape of Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter, followed as it was, after a short interval, by the solemn protest of the Bishop of Namur. From that time forward the Socialists, who had listened with amazement to the German emissaries in the service of the Kaiser, have frequented the churches and taken part in the manifestations of enthusiastic patriotism which have found a refuge there; and if any German professor, specialising in politics or theology, holds sanguine views as to the conquest of Belgium, founded on the political and religious differences so acute before the war, he, like his brother professors of ethnography and languages, is the victim of his own imagination.

For it is not everything to possess the first army in the world and the strongest civil administration; it is not even sufficient to possess an intelligence trained to blind obedience or to command the services of a multitude of picked men. To assimilate the soul of a people there are needed that moral superiority, that traditional pre-eminence in justice and truth, of which Germany is altogether ignorant. Above all there are needed a respect for honour and a sense of liberty which are not to be learnt in that school of arrogance and brutality which propounds the doctrines of Deutschtum. Belgium has served already as a stumbling-block to the German armies; her task at the present time is to sift out German errors. This is why Belgium lives and will live; and this is why the new Europe will be bound to welcome her as a united and powerful state.

HENRI DAVIGNON.

Art. 9.-THE CENSORSHIP AND ITS EFFECTS.

I. IN ENGLAND.

THE Censorship is a plant of foreign growth which could not be expected to take kindly to our soil. Britain has long cherished the belief that a free press, restrained and chastened by the law of libel, is the antiseptic of public life. With difficulty we conceived of a régime in which a press law puts newspapers at the mercy of the Government, and not the popular taste or an editor's judgment but 'reasons of State' determine the inclusion of news. We had fought our old wars with eminent correspondents ranging freely over the battle-fields, making and marring the reputations of generals, and enabling readers at home to follow a campaign as closely as they could follow a debate in the House of Commons. But the complex and mechanical character of modern war was bound to curtail this freedom; and the intense gravity of the present struggle-a contest for dear life between contiguous nations-made a rigid censorship a sheer necessity. The very fact that it was a strife less of armies than of peoples imposed reticence upon popular means of information and expression. But, since we were new to the business and highly unbureaucratic in temperament, we found many difficulties in our way. We had no very clear notion of what we wanted to be at; and, in consequence, our censors were apt to do those things which they ought not to have done and leave undone those things which they ought to have done. It may be worth while, after nearly eighteen months' experience of it, to try to clarify our views on this alien but indispensable institution.

A single principle, to which no exceptions can be admitted, must govern its working. The Censorship is to be used for the purpose of winning the war and for no other. This sounds a truism, but it has been by no means universally accepted. Military and naval information or criticism which may handicap our fighting strength must be suppressed. Political information or criticism which may cripple our diplomacy or make trouble with neutrals, or give any military assistance to our opponents, must be forbidden. But no public

man and no Ministry is entitled to shelter behind the Censorship and thereby escape that popular supervision which is essential to our system of government. It will be seen that the rule is easy enough to interpret when only military and naval matters are concerned, but that it becomes more difficult when we get to civil affairs. 'Considerations of public policy' is a resounding phrase, but it is capable of great abuse. It seems so reasonable at first sight to argue that attacks upon a Government which is conducting the war must tend to the weakening of that Government and so to the handicapping of the national effort. Both Lord Curzon and Lord Lansdowne, in the debate in the House of Lords on Nov. 8, 1915, used language which seems to bear this construction. They did not object, they said, to attacks upon Ministers as ordinary incidents of political warfare, but in time of war they reprobated such attacks as weakening the spirit and injuring the cause of the country.' In the debate on Nov. 3, the Lord Chancellor-formerly, as Sir Stanley Buckmaster, in charge of the Press Bureausaid frankly:

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'If newspapers are to be conducted on the principle of concentrating their fire at one moment upon one Minister in order to get rid of him, and then upon another Minister, it may well be a matter for further consideration whether the liberty hitherto enjoyed may not be even further curtailed.'

It is difficult to believe that these speakers had seriously considered the views to which they gave expression. For they amounted to nothing less than a claim for the immunity of every Minister from criticism during the course of the war. It is a claim which cannot for a moment be allowed, and for a very simple reason. In a democracy such as Britain, Ministers draw their power from the people; and the condition of their tenure is that the people can criticise and if necessary dismiss them. That is usually done by a General Election; but, if a General Election is undesirable, there is all the more reason for maintaining other channels for the expression of popular opinion. We have never professed to be governed by experts. Men win their way to office, not because they are competent administrators in this or that department, but because they have caught the fancy of

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