Art. 12.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

ABOUT the middle of September reports emanating from various neutral sources intimated that movements of hostile troops were being effected in Germany and AustriaHungary. The transit of letters and newspapers from Austria-Hungary to neutral countries was said to have been interrupted. The Dutch-Belgian frontier was closed; passenger traffic between Holland and Germany was restricted and closely scrutinised; and similar measures were in operation to prevent the leakage of news from Germany to Switzerland. Such information admitted of various interpretations, and on some previous occasions had proved misleading. Statements of a less authentic nature referred to the passage of trooptrains through Aix la Chapelle towards France, and to a concentration of troops on the northern frontier of Serbia.

As had previously happened in similar circumstances, there were rumours of a withdrawal of German and Austrian troops from the eastern front, which, in the absence of any official corroboration, were clearly conjectural. Although there were signs that the enemy's offensive campaign in Russia was coming to an end, it seemed unlikely that the hostile armies would be materially weakened until a defensive line were secured which would give some promise of being held successfully by reduced forces against the growing strength of Russia, while the offensive was being pursued in another theatre of war. The chief requirements of such a line, under present-day conditions, would be fulfilled by insurmountable obstacles on either flank, and a lateral railway at a safe and convenient distance behind the front, to facilitate the distribution of supplies and the movement of reinforcements from point to point. It was apparent that the Germans, after they had failed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russian armies, had set their minds on gaining possession of Rovno and the railway leading thence across the Pinsk Marshes, and through Baranowischi and Wilna, to Dwinsk. The acquisition of the line of the Dwina between Dwinsk and Riga would then enable them to establish their left flank securely on the sea, while their right flank would rest on the neutral frontier of Roumania.

The enemy were still far from having attained these objects. The lateral railway was in their possession between Baranowischi and the neighbourhood of Dwinsk; and on this portion of the front they were constructing strong entrenchments, and laying field railways to facilitate the local distribution of supplies. But the Russians were successfully defending the line of the Dwina, and in Wolhynia and Galicia they were holding the AustroGerman armies at bay on the Styr and the Strypa. The Russians, in fact, had the best of the situation on the most important sections of the front; those, namely, where they may take the offensive under the most favourable conditions, strategically, when the weather and their increasing resources admit of the resumption of operations on a large scale.

To obviate reverting to the Russian theatre of war, it may be recorded in this place that the position remains practically unchanged. The Russians have defeated all attempts to capture Dwinsk, and are in firm possession of the line of the Dwina. They have improved their positions by driving the Germans back in the coast region to within a few miles of Tukkum, where they are threatening the Windau-Mitau railway and the left flank of the hostile forces encircling Riga. No material change is anticipated on this portion of the front until the spring; for, although the freezing of the rivers and marshes might be expected, in a normal season, to admit of a resumption of activity, an exceptionally heavy fall of snow about the beginning of December is said to have made the movement of large forces impracticable. In Wolhynia our Allies remain in possession of the Styr, and in Galicia they continue to hold Bothmer's AustroGerman army behind the Strypa. It would seem that the enemy feel their position in these regions insecure ; for it was reported early last month that they were engaged in removing their magazines from Lemberg, and in fortifying the line of the San.

Although the enemy's operations on the eastern front were in an unfinished state, and the general situation was unfavourable, there were no doubt cogent reasons which made the German General Staff decide to withdraw a number of troops from that front for employment partly in the western theatre, and partly in

performing the next item in their programme, namely, the invasion of Serbia. The troops were probably taken from the strongly-fortified line between Wilna and the Pripet, where Mackensen's army appears to have been broken up when the Field-Marshal left to assume the chief command in the Balkan operations. The numbers transferred were at first insignificant in relation to the large forces engaged in the Russian campaign, which were unofficially stated to comprise 128 divisions. There is no official information as to the numbers withdrawn; but, from statements published at Petrograd, they appear to have amounted to sixteen divisions, of which one half went to France-where the Allied offensive which began on Sept. 25 caused the Germans some anxiety-and made their presence felt in Artois and Champagne early in October; while the remainder were sent to the Danube to make up, with the troops already in observation, the armies placed under Mackensen's command, the strength of which did not, probably, exceed 200,000 men.

To what extent the Allied Governments were surprised by the new German move in the Balkans is uncertain, but there is no doubt that they were unprepared for the situation to which it gave rise. There were many circumstances which pointed to Serbia as the next objective after the conclusion of the offensive operations in Russia. Apart from the avowed intention of the Germans to force their way through Serbia to Constantinople, which might have been designed to divert attention from other quarters, it was plainly a military necessity to bring assistance to the Turks, who were in want of ammunition, and to put an end to the Allies' diplomatic attempts to entice Bulgaria to their side. Should these attempts be successful, Roumania would certainly follow suit, with the result that the position of the Austrian right flank in Galicia would become untenable. Even if the Allies' Balkan diplomacy should fail, the defeat of the Turks in Gallipoli, which might occur at any moment, would probably result in their withdrawal from the Central Alliance, and cause the Balkan Powers to espouse the Allied cause. Again, even if Bulgaria remained neutral, the participation of Roumania and Greece on

the side of the Allies would have enabled them to invade Hungary with a million men, with consequences which may be imagined. The Balkan-Hungarian frontier, in fact, has been the only vulnerable flank of the Teutonic Powers, and its security has depended on the attitude of the Balkan States. The Germans have throughout the war fully appreciated the significance of this situation, and in consequence have neglected no expedient-by stimulating the Turkish resistance in Gallipoli, and by bribes to Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece, seconded during the past summer by a display of troops on the Roumanian frontier-to secure themselves against attack on that side. The invasion of Serbia, as a first step to the military domination of the Balkans, was therefore expedient as a defensive measure, apart from ulterior aims.*

These were military considerations which it needed no great perspicacity to see. But it seemed to the outside observer unlikely that the invasion of Serbia would be undertaken while the operations in Russia were incomplete. Austria, in her attempt last winter, had employed over 300,000 men and failed. The attempt would hardly be renewed except with much larger numbers; and, for strategical reasons, it would have to be made from both the Save-Danube and Dwina fronts simultaneously. Both fronts were naturally very strong; and the attack on the Dwina front would present exceptional difficulties, on account of the mountainous character of the country, and the presence of the Montenegrin army on the flank. It seemed unlikely that the enemy could spare enough troops to ensure success, or, if that were possible, that the large forces required could be manœuvred in the mountainous country unless they were provided with pack transport and mountain artillery, which the Germans do not possess.

The Allied Governments, however, should have been better informed. The course of the negotiations with Bulgaria, and such knowledge as they must have possessed of the relations existing between that State and Germany, can hardly have failed to warn them of the probability that Bulgaria would join the Central Alliance, which, as

* For these aims, see below, pp. 229-230.

†They were, in fact, put forward in the April number of this Review.

recent operations have shown, would give the military situation quite a different aspect, by reducing the strength of the Austro-German force required, and by exposing the Serbians to attack in flank from their eastern frontier by an army at least 200,000 strong, accustomed to, and equipped for, mountain warfare. They appear, however, to have relied up to the last moment on the success of their diplomatic overtures to Bulgaria or, if these should fail, on the loyalty of Greece to her treaty obligations, which bound her to give military aid to Serbia in the event of an attack by Bulgaria. In both respects they were deceived.

The Allies' negotiations were directed to the revival of the Balkan League, which had been broken up when Bulgaria turned upon her allies at the end of the war of 1912-13. These negotiations, being dealt with in another article, need not be further discussed here. The Allies offered their final terms on Sept. 1. A fortnight later Bulgaria asked for certain explanations, and at the same time began to mobilise. On Sept. 24 M. Radoslavoff declared to the British and Russian ministers at Sofia, that the mobilisation was only intended to facilitate diplomatic action with a view to satisfying Bulgarian aspirations, and that no hostile intention existed with respect to Serbia. How the Allied Governments regarded this assurance does not appear, but they seem to have taken no definite notice of the Bulgarian mobilisation till the end of September, when a joint note was presented, warning Bulgaria that the Quadruple Entente would come to Serbia's assistance if she were attacked by Bulgaria. The Serbians, more clear-sighted, proposed to forestall the treacherous attack which they foresaw, by taking the offensive against Bulgaria while mobilisation was still in the initial stage; but the Allies objected on the ground that, by taking the initiative, Serbia would forfeit the assistance of Greece, whose engagement was only operative in the case of Serbia being attacked.

By this advice, which was quite in accordance with the 'wait-and-see' military policy affected by the Allies, the latter assumed a very serious responsibility. The Serbian army was already in the field, and by a rapid

* Allowing for a force to watch the Roumanian frontier.