Art. 2. SOME AFTER-WAR PROBLEMS.

IN the crisis through which this country is passing, a Coalition Ministry has no doubt some advantage; but if, as there is too much reason to fear, the present Coalition has been formed on the principle of concentrating upon war problems and of excluding from consideration all matters likely to give rise to party controversy, it involves a serious danger. We have seen during the war how heavily a nation is handicapped, if its rulers have failed to foresee the particular emergency which in fact arises and to think out the policy to be pursued and the measures to be taken to meet it. The war took us unawares. Whether it was probable or improbable only those who had access to official information were in a position to judge; but it was at least a reasonable possibility and, if it occurred, it required no extraordinary degree of wisdom to foresee the various problems which would arise. The necessity of creating and equipping a vast army, the colossal war expenditure, the need for economy, the disorganisation of our industries by the withdrawal of men for purposes directly or indirectly connected with the war, the decline in our power to produce goods for export coupled with the growing necessity for imported goods, the general rise in prices, the attitude of the various labour organisations with regard to wages and war profits-all or at any rate most of these problems must have occurred to any one who sat down to think out the situation. But no one will contend that the policy to be pursued or the measures to be taken to deal with any one of them had been adequately thought out or matured.

The object of this article is not, however, to emphasise the mistakes which have been made in the past, but to urge the necessity of avoiding similar mistakes in the future. The war may have been improbable, but peace will certainly come, and with it a number of problems which, if dealt with by impromptu or opportunist measures only, may easily entail on our posterity calamities even greater than those entailed by the war itself. The danger that peace will find us as unprepared to meet the problems which it will bring as we were

admittedly unprepared to meet the problems arising out of the war, is greatly increased by the existence of a Coalition Ministry which deliberately avoids the discussion of all questions touching on party controversies. Most, if not all, of the problems which will arise after the war fall under this category and are susceptible of being treated on party lines. We are at last beginning to realise that the continued existence of the British Empire depends on the issue of the struggle in which we are engaged, but we have yet to realise that its continued existence will depend also on the policy to be adopted when the war is over. If for the purposes of the war it be imperative to sink party controversies, it is equally imperative to sink such controversies in order to decide on the policy to be adopted and the measures to be taken in dealing with the problems which peace will bring.

Let us for a moment consider the several factors which will determine the situation we have to face. First and foremost we shall find that about 3,000,000 or nearly one-third of the industrial workers of this country have been withdrawn from industrial life for military service, and that about 1,000,000 more have been diverted from their ordinary pursuits to the production of munitions or other things, the demand for which will cease when the war is over. Most of these men will desire to return to their former occupations, but many of them will find that their places have been taken by others and, to a large extent, by women. Meanwhile, by reason of the scarcity of labour and other causes, large sections of our working classes will have been in receipt of wages on a scale unprecedented in their history; and the families of those engaged in military service will, by reason of liberal separation allowances, have been enjoying an affluence to which in many cases they had hitherto been strangers. With the peace this scale of wages must inevitably fall and separation allowances will cease. It is far easier to increase than to reduce expenditure; and there is little reason to hope that there has, during this period of prosperity, been any substantial saving to meet the less prosperous days to come. Moreover, the war has caused an unparalleled dislocation in the industries of the country. Many of

these have been brought to a complete standstill. Others have been converted for war purposes. If after the war these industries are to be restarted or reorganised, time and capital will be required. With so many seeking work, time is of the essence of the problem; and, by reason of the colossal expenditure entailed by the war, capital will be scarce and, if obtainable at all, will only be obtainable on onerous terms. Further, when the war is over, we shall have to face a struggle for the markets of the world keener than anything we have yet known. If we fail in this struggle our industries, and with them our national prosperity, must decline. Lastly, it is by no means clear that for the purposes of this competition we are not in a worse position than even Germany herself. It may probably be taken that during the war we have been exporting everything we could possibly export, in order to pay in part for our increased imports. Germany, on the other hand, by reason of our control of the sea, has had during the war little export trade at all; and, even if she has experienced a dislocation of industry equal to or greater than our own, it is not improbable that she has been able to accumulate considerable stores of merchandise with which to start her new industrial campaign. By placing these stores of merchandise on the markets of the world at cost price or even less, she might gain an initial advantage which it would take years to counteract.

It is obvious that these factors, taken together, must produce a situation which, unless wisely and firmly handled, may easily give rise to general discontent, extensive want of employment, grave labour difficulties and even civil discord. It is therefore a matter of paramount importance that we should consider beforehand and determine upon the policy to be pursued and the measures to be taken to meet the several problems which will arise.

The most immediate and obvious of these problems are those connected with the demobilisation of our military forces. These are the least likely to be the subject of party controversy, and accordingly the most likely to be considered by the present Government. We have the authority of the Paymaster-General for saying

that they are now being considered. It is apparently proposed to grant each soldier a month's furlough on full pay, all separation allowances being continued for the same period. It is further proposed to give to each soldier an insurance against unemployment for one year and possibly a money gratuity. It may be admitted that these provisions will go far to prevent actual distress arising from want of employment, but they will not assist any one to obtain employment. For this purpose the Government propose to rely on the machinery of the Unemployment Insurance Department, the Territorial Forces Associations, and the Labour Exchanges. It may be doubted, however, whether these three bodies are in a position to give the assistance required. They are independent bodies with no common organisation. No one of them is likely to have at its disposal the information necessary in dealing with the problem. In order to return so large a body of men to industrial life with the least possible friction and in the shortest possible time, we surely need some central executive body in close touch with those requiring work on the one hand and with their possible employers on the other; a body which will not content itself with helping individual applicants but will itself take the initiative in the matter. Such a body might well contain representatives from the Unemployment Insurance Department, the Local Territorial Associations, and the Labour Exchanges. It will probably have to act through local committees, but, before it can act to any useful purpose, it must make itself fully acquainted with the material facts. It will have to ascertain and classify those who, when the war is over, will desire to obtain employment, with their qualifications and preferences as to locality and otherwise. It will have in like manner to ascertain and classify the various industries throughout the country which, after the war, will require labour, and the extent to which and the time at which this labour will be required.

An enormous mass of useful information will be found in the national register; but unfortunately this was compiled at so late a stage in the war that it will have to be supplemented, as to all who joined the colours before Aug. 15, 1915, from other sources. Possibly there

are War Office records which may be useful. But, in order to ascertain the various industries throughout the country which will require labour after the war, it will no doubt be imperative to make local enquiries founded on the statistics in the possession of the Board of Trade or of such institutions as the Garton Foundation. It may also be advisable to consider what industries ought, from the standpoint of financial credit, to be reorganised first; for example, whether for this purpose our export industries should not take precedence of those which minister to home consumption, more especially if these latter are concerned with the production of luxuries rather than necessaries. It will also have to be considered whether and how far it may be desirable for the State to use its credit for the purpose of raising the capital which may be required for reorganisation purposes.

Moreover, it appears at least questionable whether, instead of turning our citizen soldiers adrift with an insurance policy and money gratuity, it would not be wiser to retain some control over them until their return to industrial pursuits be ensured. There can be nothing more demoralising than want of employment, even if actual distress arising from this cause is precluded by State allowances. Not only does unemployment entail incessant anxiety for the future, but, worse still, a man who day after day seeks work in vain soon comes to the despairing conclusion that there is no place or use for him in the body politic. Those who have served in the army ought, to some extent, to have realised the value of discipline and cooperation for national ends, but this lesson would in a period of enforced idleness be soon unlearnt. There would appear to be no insuperable difficulty in the services of those who cannot be immediately reabsorbed in industrial life being temporarily utilised by the State. If, during this interval, the men could be made familiar with the outline of the imperial policy to be adopted after the war and the several elements essential to its success it would be all to the good. It should be noticed, too, that the Government scheme, as outlined by the Paymaster-General, apparently ignores the large number of workers of both sexes who are now engaged in the production of munitions, but will be