a general advance. The household food budget a couple of months ago was 26 per cent. more than it was at the corresponding date of 1914; that is to say, the cost of food had risen 43 per cent. since just before the war. The better qualities of meat, fish, eggs, butter, bacon and cheese are fetching prices that must be a severe tax to people of small incomes. Fish, in particular, is 100 per cent. dearer in the big towns, granulated sugar is 97 per cent. dearer, fresh eggs 77 per cent., chilled beef (flank) 70 per cent., frozen mutton (breast) 68 per cent., household flour 39 per cent., tea 50 per cent., bread 40 per cent., bacon 32 per cent., and fresh butter 31 per cent. Not only food, but coal, drugs, woollen goods, and rents in munition areas, have risen. It is fortunate that industrial activity enables so many of the workingclasses to earn good wages with which they can pay the increased prices without too severe a strain. Mr McKenna, speaking in the House of Commons a little while ago, said: 'The fact is, the consuming power of the nation, notwithstanding the increased taxes, appears to be as great as ever.'

How long it may be possible to tell this flattering tale nobody knows. It may yet become necessary to put heavier taxes on tea and tobacco and to gather other household commodities into the fiscal net, with additional cost to the unhappy consumer. An extension of the war areas may make new and urgent demands upon our shipping, and neutralise, or at any rate lessen, the benefits contemplated by the new Orders in Council. We must not delude ourselves into the belief, or even encourage the hope, that the worst of our troubles are over, and that the rough places are suddenly going to be made smooth. There is no sign that the war is nearing its end, or that the pace of war expenditure will slacken. The dead weight of our debt must soon go very far beyond its present total of 2,000,000,000l., and the annual interest far beyond 80,000,000l. There can be no pause in the energy or expenditure of the Allies until victory, decisive and complete, is achieved; and no shrinking from sacrifice must interfere with this sacred duty.

Britain's position as the world's monetary centre makes it inevitable that the greater part of the immediate financial burden should fall upon her shoulders. While

it is difficult to anticipate with any confidence what is going to happen in the next year or two, one thing is at least certain, namely, that we ought to be organising with a view to the development of our export trade directly the opening occurs. The almost daily reminders to 'concentrate on the war,' excellent though their object is, have the characteristic British fault of belittling, or pushing into the background, other important duties. We are late in nearly every enterprise we undertake, and more than once we have been too late. Putting every ounce of our strength and will into the war need not prevent a diligent study of the commercial map with the object of planning future action. Perhaps we ought to say 'present action,' for surely, if figures ever had any lesson to teach, this is the case with those of our foreign trade. It is a lesson of vital interest not only to the present generation, but to those who will come after. For on the growth of her industrial enterprise and manufacturing exports the future of Great Britain depends. Germany is wide enough awake, and is already preparing schemes for the recapture of her lost foreign trade. What are we doing? Mr Asquith has assured the House of Commons that 'a great deal of preliminary investigation is taking place,' and that he is fully alive to the urgency of exploring these problems by skilled experts in advance. This is, so far, encouraging, for if we sit down and fold our hands and wait till the war is over we may find that the golden opportunity has been lost. To win the war is not enough; we must be ready to take occasion by the hand' and win in the more prosaic fields of Peace and Commerce.

H. J. JENNINGS.

Art. 6.-SOUTH AFRICA AND HER GERMAN NEIGHBOUR.

1. Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military Expedition against German South-West Africa (April 1915). [Cd. 7873.] Wyman.

2. Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression (April 1915). [Cd. 7874.] Wyman.

3. Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression [U. G. 10. 15]. Pretoria, 1915.

4. The Germans and Africa. Their aims on the Dark Continent, and how they acquired their African colonies. By Evans Lewin. Cassell, 1915.

5. The Afrikander Rebellion. South Africa to-day. By J. K. O'Connor. Allen & Unwin, 1915.

THERE is one remarkable contrast between the attitude of Great Britain and that of South Africa before the outbreak of war in Europe. In England hardly any one expected war; in South Africa the Government appear to have been fully alive to the dangers. The Blue Book on the subject issued from Pretoria opens with the phrase, 'With many in this country (as elsewhere throughout the world) it had become an accepted belief that war between the two countries-England and Germany-was inevitable, and that at no distant date they would be engaged in a deadly struggle for supremacy.' Nor did South Africans fail to acquaint their friends in England with the grounds which led them to this conclusion, so that proposals were made during the sittings of the Imperial Conference of 1911 for co-operation between London and Pretoria should an emergency arise. General Smuts was appointed Minister of Defence, and carried through the Cape Town Parliament a carefully drafted Defence Bill, which has admirably served its purpose. The war, therefore, found South Africa ready, first of all, to release the British troops stationed at Cape Town, then to suppress a serious rebellion, and finally to beat a German army in South-West Africa.

The Protectorate known as German South-West

Africa was founded on certain treaties with the Bastaards, Hereros, and other natives, which were arranged by German missionaries, of whom the best known was a Pastor Büttner, who earned for himself the high-sounding title of 'Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the German Emperor.' Great Britain had recognised Germany's claims on the coast in 1884, and her protectorate over the hinterland in 1890; but the inexperienced German colonists and their rulers soon found difficulties in the management of the native tribes. In 1893 Hendrik Witboi broke out into rebellion; and in 1896 the Hottentots and Hereros rose in arms because the Germans refused to respect the natives' rights over land. Gradually, however, the blacks were dispossessed and driven back to less fertile districts, while anger and thirst for revenge filled their breasts. After the Boer war there arose still graver unrest among these natives. The Hereros' Chief had been persuaded to dispose of his tribal lands to some German speculators; and, although this transfer was contrary to native law and custom, the German authorities desired to enforce the bargain So as to have land for German immigrants. The Hereros presented a touching petition to the German Governor, begging that all their lands remaining to them should be set aside in reserves, as is done in parts of British South Africa. The Government accepted the proposal in theory but not in practice; and some very irregular methods were adopted for inducing the ousted native to become a manual labourer.

When, therefore, the great war broke out between the Germans aad the Hereros, it was a cruel and bloody business. The natives began, as has always been their way in such cases, with an endeavour to exterminate the Germans by killing men, women and children; and reprisals of a gruesome character were thought necessary by the Germans. In spite of these reprisals, nothing would induce the Hereros to surrender. Proclamations of all sorts were issued; clemency and threats were tried; rewards were offered to other native tribes to capture the Herero Chief; the Herero women and children were driven away into British territory. At last the trouble and expense compelled the attention of the Reichstag. The Germans were then employing a well-equipped army

of 19,000 trained men with machine-guns and vast quantities of war stores. Debates took place at Berlin as to whether the expenditure was justified; and to all objections one reply was given which soothed all criticism, viz. that a possible war with England had also to be considered, so that military railways must be constructed and military stores piled up, to meet all emergencies.

It is difficult to say whether the Government were only excusing themselves for their failure to effect a reasonable settlement with the natives, or really had in mind even then a military expedition against Cape Colony. However that may be, the German Government was unable to conquer the Hereros. The native leaders would cross the borders into British territory, and from our side of the frontier they carried on a guerilla warfare which broke the spirit of the German soldiery. In 1907 the German Emperor found himself compelled to appeal to England for assistance against the natives; and the Colonial Office took the view that it was our duty to help the German Empire against the African native. They appealed to Cape Colony to send the Cape Police along the borderland; and in a short time the Herero leader, Marengo, was captured by Major Elliott, who was decorated by the Kaiser in honour of his exploit. This was surely evidence of our willingness to live at peace with Germany in South Africa. The Herero war caused unrest among our own natives, who were also disturbed by the Chinese miners, so that General Botha at the Imperial Conference (1907) proposed to our War Office a scheme whereby the British garrison should co-operate with civilians in case of trouble. Lord Methuen was then sent out to settle details; and this was the germ of the Union Defence Act (1912).

During the Boer war some of the Republicans had escaped across the frontier and urged Germany to come to the aid of their kinsmen. Had any one been able to form a coalition against this country, the request might have been granted; but attempts in this direction failed, and Germany had solid reasons for remaining neutral. The Boers were vexed that the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger turned out to be a mere scrap of paper, but the local German colonists showed much kindness to the refugees; and there was plenty of work for them.