APPENDIX STATEMENT OF SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI, CHAIRMAN Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe In recent weeks, the tragedy which continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been overshadowed by events here at home, as well as in Haiti, Somalia and Russia. This testifies to the significance of these other events, but it also reflects a tendency to want to ignore long-standing problems. The problems in the former Yugoslavia confront us horribly day-after-day for more than two years now. There is a large gap between what we know needs to be done on the one hand, and what governments are politically willing to do on the other. Rather than meet the challenge before it, the world shifts it focus. This cannot be allowed to happen. People in Sarajevo, in Gorazde and elsewhere in BosniaHerzegovina are still being killed by sniper fire and by shelling. People are still being forced to flee, adding to an already tremendous refugee burden as winter approaches. The effects of aggression and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not disappear by turning off our television sets or turning to the next newspaper page. Not only will thousands more die this winter; resettlement, reconstruction and reconciliation will take years, perhaps decades, to achieve, when and if such efforts can be finally undertaken. Our hearing this morning focuses on the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We hope to gain insights into whether they will survive their second winter under siege, whether they want to end the conflict no matter what principles are sacrificed, whether they want to fight on to defend what is theirs, whether they will want to return to their home villages or move elsewhere, in Bosnia-Herzegovina or around the world. We have two outstanding witnesses before us this morning who can address these issues. Jose Mendiluce is the former special envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia, and currently the UNHCR representative in Brussels. His expertise in refugee matters, his experience in the former Yugoslavia and his personal candor are well known. Fred Cuny is an expert in disaster relief who has spent most of 1993 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, assisting efforts to keep an infrastructure under attack functioning so that people can survive. STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER, CO-CHAIRMAN Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Mr. Chairman, for eight and one-half years now I have been chairing or co-chairing this Helsinki Commission, which has traditionally focused not on political, military or economic affairs in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, but on people on people and their rights as individuals. There have been, during this time period, much frustration and anger over the denial of human rights and violation of humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Never, however, have we on the Helsinki Commission had to agonize and express such outrage over what was happening, and being allowed to happen, than in regard to BosniaHerzegovina during this last year and one-half. I think it is fortunate that we have this Commission to look at this tragedy regularly, to make aware and inform ourselves and the American public about what is happening. It is equally unfortunate that we have had to do so, and that the aggression and genocide occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not stopped a long time ago, as many of us strongly advocated. Perhaps the only redeeming value of all of this is the chance to meet people with courage and people who care, like the two witnesses we have before us. I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that there was one other such person who was invited to present testimony but was unfortunately unable to appear, Roy Gutman, the Pulitzerprize winning Newsday journalist who first exposed the systematic implementation by militant Serbs of the policy of ethnic cleansing, including the detention camps. His commitments as a journalist covering the former Yugoslavia precluded his presence here, but in responding to our invitation, he said that, if he were here, his main point would be to get all the information out on what has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, information which inevitably leads to the conclusion that this is genocide. Our State Department has released some of this information in eight reports to the United Nations, but, Mr. Gutman reports, there is more that can and should be released as well. I take the effort to establish an international war crimes tribunal seriously, and hope that this information can be used to prosecute those responsible, from the camp guards, murderers and rapists freely roaming the hills of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the political leaders in Pale and Belgrade which devised and directed the larger strategy of which they were a part. I have said many times before that an important, long-term factor affecting the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including their chances for reconciliation, is the satisfaction and deterring example of justice served. It is also important to do this for the sake of those engaged in relief operations, who are frequently attacked in Bosnia-Herzegovina in contravention of international humanitarian law. Given the willingness to tolerate or even deny the existence of genocide, I am somewhat skeptical of the willingness of the international community to prosecute those responsible for it. But a prosecutor, a Venezuelan, has just been nominated by the Secretary General, and, subject to his approval, I think our government should do all that it can to assist and encourage him in his job. Certainly, this Commission is strongly behind such an effort. I look forward to hearing what our witness have to say about this, and about the needs of the Bosnian people for the coming winter. I hope, however, that they can also focus on their direct experiences in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina and give us some sense of what these people are thinking, and what they want. In the end, it is their fate with which we are concerned, and I believe strongly that we must help them to the fullest extent possible. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Presentation by José Maria Mendiluce Former Special Envoy of the High Commissioner in Former Yugoslavia (United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees) Hearing, 21 October 1993 (to be checked against delivery) 1. 18 months have passed since the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, we live a scenario not even the more pessimistic could have predicted. A scenario of hatred, displacement, destruction, systematic human rights violations and atrocities, of civilians killed, wounded, taken hostage, trapped or in detention/concentration camps, a situation that constitutes one of the most dramatic humanitarian tragedies of recent times. 2. At the time of preparing this hearing, no perspective of peace can be detected and we are approaching a second winter. Deliberate attacks on humanitarian convoys and staff, lack of access, open hostility, increasing numbers of displaced persons, lack of respect for the humanitarian character of UNHCR activities,... are creating additional problems for the operation led by UNHCR in cooperation with UNPROFOR. 3. In view of the prevailing situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it seems appropriate to analyse what was wrong in the approach of the International Community to confront the crisis. More than 200,000 people killed (many of them civilians); 4,2 million victims (among them more than 3 million refugees and displaced, hundred of thousands trapped, under siege and shelling), hundreds of villages destroyed, thousands of women raped, are signals impressive enough to seriously question the "success" of a strategy based on a massive humanitarian operation and a process of negotiations without the readiness to intervene in a more decisive manner. 4. The divisions at the international level on how to address the crisis, both within the UN and the EC and the lack of sufficiently developed preventive diplomatic means contributed to the developments as they evolved. So did the lack of significant or sufficient analysis on the early warning signals from the ground together with the difficulties confronted in different key countries in terms of electoral processes. Other internal and external elements on domestic agendas, along with additional issues that could be added to this list, made in fact and in reality apparently impossible for the international community to address the problem in a preventive way. 5. One of the key elements that was absent in the process was a clear decision by the international community, to confront the crisis not only with diplomatic and humanitarian means, but also with the necessary strength and coherence to show that it was ready to negotiate and act in a more decisive way to stop the process of territorial gains and ethnic cleansing. This process had already started in Croatia and set the trend that was going to follow in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 6. Since the war in Croatia and mainly once war started in Bosnia, as early as April 1992, it became obvious to UNHCR that one of the basic characteristics of the conflict was that the civilian displacement was not a consequence but an objective of the war (a finding which we reported early on). For this reason, UNHCR insisted on assisting the victims as close to their homes as possible. We deployed staff to negotiate the prevention of expulsions of civilians in some areas. Such "preventive protection" did not succeed, as figures show, to prevent displacement, neither in Bosnia Herzegovina nor in Croatia (UNPAS). 7. But it was also evident (as the High Commissioner rightly reported as early as June 1992) that this humanitarian tragedy, with all the foreseeable consequences, did not have a humanitarian solution, but a political one. Since the beginning, when UNHCR defined the policy of the agressors as "ethnic cleansing", we knew that whatever we were going to do, was not going to avoid the tragedy. We were forced to be realistic in our objectives, and concentrate our efforts in saving as many lives as possible while waiting for a peace settlement. The fact that the International Community based its strategy, primarily, on humanitarian assistance, instead of on more decisive political action, forced UNHCR to desperately attempt to avoid the worst, well knowing (and predicting) the consequences in humanitarian terms, of this incomplete strategy to prevent or stop the war. 8. The approach referred above using humanitarian work as main strategy of the International Community's response, generated a great deal of contradictions. UNHCR has been subjected to all sorts of manipulation attempts by many of the actors involved (local and international). 9. How to solve the dilemna between the right to stay and the right to leave, with ethnic cleansing as main policy of those who were winning the war? How to protect the rights of the people without being an instrument of ethnic cleansing? How can one qualify as "success" our ability to cross front lines to feed the people in enclaves, besieged areas, etc, while at the same time the same people were killed under shelling, sniper fire, were raped, and terrified? How to accept the tendency to consider our role more or less as a trucking and airline company, reducing our objectives just to feed those persons lucky enough to survive? 10. From our humanitarian perspective, only a very pragmatic and flexible approach has helped us to address the very complex issues in the middle of all these contradictions. While trying to protect and assist people where they were, we help them to evacuate in some cases (Bosanski Novi, Srebenica, ...) and negotiate to keep the borders open for those who needed asylum or protection abroad (assisting them as "refugees"). Ethnic cleansing was a two-fold strategy: killing and expulsion. For us, the debate was finished early in June 92: We decided to help people to survive. We choose to have more displaced or refugees than more bodies; But we suffered all the time of attempts to manipulate us or to use us as an instrument by all sides to avoid or to assist in displacement. cases the victims were hostages of their own military and civilian authorities. In many 11. The "safe area" concept has been another element of debate for UNHCR for many months and the future of some of these areas is a matter of serious concern. Without a just political settlement and good-will from the Serbian side, the "safe areas" have become de facto large refugee camps, totally dependent on international assistance and their situation is rapidly deteriorating at all levels. Surrounded by enemy forces, without basic shelter, medical care, infrastructure conditions, isolated and with almost all the families with members missing, separated, killed, living under sporadic shelling or sniper fire, these areas are becoming more and more a sort of detention centers administered by the UN and |