shadowed what is happening today in Bosnia. That is why I think this hearing is so important.

Our only hope of bringing about a resolution of the tragic human rights violations that are occurring in Bosnia is to continue to place a world spotlight on what is happening there. That is why I particularly appreciate the fact that the Helsinki Commission is holding these hearings and look forward to the testimony of our wit

nesses.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Mendiluce, thank you again for being with us, and if you will proceed with your statement, your full statement will be put in the record if you would like to summarize it for us, please.

TESTIMONY OF JOSÉ M. MENDILUCE, SPECIAL ENVOY, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

Mr. MENDILUCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like, first of all, to congratulate you for convening this hearing. I think it is most important, and I hope it will help to clarify some ideas about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thank you very much also to all of the distinguished Representatives present here and all ladies and gentlemen who came to this hearing.

A text is available for all of you about what are the main ideas I wanted to present here, but if you allow me, and given the fact that the text is presented, I would like to just mention some of the crucial points in my view that have to be retained from the modest paper I was able to prepare.

First of all, in a very telegraphic way, the war was avoidable with preventive means, including clear and strong messages by the international community to those who would start this war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everybody knew that this war was going to start, and no preventive action was taken in time, not enough attention to the early warning signs, signals were given, and this made the war unavoidable in practice, but I insist the war was avoidable with enough strength by the international community.

The second point is that the international community became involved and assumed a co-responsibility about the events in BosniaHerzegovina. The international community became involved through many resolutions of the Security Council, through the negotiation process, through a massive humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and through all types of condemnations, resolutions, decisions, advice, and whatever, but without the necessary means to transform this implication or this action of the international community to stop the logic and to stop the war.

Third, the humanitarian organizations, and in particular, UNHCR, started denouncing the situation in Bosnian before the war started, but as early as May 1992, we told the international community that this tragedy, that the coming tragedy, did not have a humanitarian solution, and that we did not want to be used as an alibi or excuse for lack of political action because in a conflict like this, the humanitarians can only alleviate the problem, cannot solve and cannot stop the logic of the war.

So we say that since May 1992, and since that moment we have been insisting all the time and asking the international community

at the political level not to use us as the main basis of the international strategy towards the conflict.

Despite this, I want to mention also that unfortunately, given the continuation of the war, all of the atrocities and human suffering, the humanitarian assistance is needed, and the fact is if it is not, the solution should not be interpreted in the way that why to do humanitarian assistance. People there need humanitarian assistance, but not only humanitarian assistance.

Five is that today we cannot see any prospect of a solution. I am similarly pessimistic, as I think all those who are involved in the activities of Bosnia-Herzegovina-and probably Fred Cuny is going to elaborate on that-we are terrified about the coming winter and about the situation that has been going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only Sarajevo, but also in other areas.

Six, the latest proposal presented by the Co-chairmen, whatever justification at the political level could be, implies in practice this partition proposal would imply, if accepted or if implemented, additional massive displacement of people, and I could elaborate on that in the part of questions, but it will imply no possibility for return for many of the current refugees being displaced, and it would imply that more people will be displaced by force if the interpretation that the local parties to the conflict will make of this partition is the one that has been taken since the beginning of the war.

I would like also to say that ethnic cleansing continues unabated, and there are no journalists in the Banja-luka region. My colleagues have reported that the last four mosques that were not yet blown up have been blown up during the month of September. So there is not a single mosque in the Serbian controlled territory of Banja-luka, and this is part of a genocide in terms of culture and traditions of the Bosnia Muslim people.

So Sarajevo, as we mentioned, is, once again after 18 months of war, under heavy shelling, and people are suffering as you could imagine not only by this current shelling, but by the lack of any prospect for the future, and they do not understand this. They do not understand why it is impossible to stop the massacres of Sarajevo after more than 18 months, and this time we see an end there because there are other conflicts we do not know exactly. In this case, we have been bombed by the media month after month, and we should know what is going on there. So the responsibility is even greater.

I would like to say also that apart from all of the atrocities, massacres, people killed, this war has destroyed also two other dreams probably. The first dream that this war has destroyed is the dream of the majority of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina that even the referendum in the month of January 1992 decided to vote for democracy and decided to vote to live together and decided to vote for multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious society.

These people, this dream has been defeated by this war and by the incapacity of the international community to stop those who pretend to create a confessional or ethnically pure state in that country, with all of the consequences that this would have not only for Bosnia, but also as a very bad example for other parts of the world.

The other dream that this war is destroying is the dream of an international community, able to act in an energetic way to stop violations of all types of principles, international principles at the political and humanitarian level, and to abuse all types of human rights in the way that this war has been doing.

The international community has been and is being tested in this war, and I think that for the time being we can become also a casualty of this war. Many dictators, criminals worldwide are learning the lesson of the international community's incapacity to address this problem and to stop this war, and I think that we have already a few examples of some small dictators and criminals that are using our weaknesses to laugh in front of the international community and to disregard any basic principle of convenience and solidarity, and they are learning very, very quickly.

The last point for me is to say that I have the impression in all of the conferences I have been attending since I left BosniaHerzegovina, in meetings, discussions, that many people think it is too late. I am not sure if it is too late to save Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, but I think it is not too late to avoid a genocide, to stop the genocide that is going on, and I would like to insist that hundreds of thousands of people could become victims and could become casualties if we do not do anything else than try with humanitarian means to save the survivors, those who are lucky enough to be still alive.

I do not think that we should say that it is too late to prevent a genocide. If we do that, I think that millions of victims of this war will never forgive us.

Thank you very much.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Mr. MENDILUCE. Could I add that this intervention idea is on a personal basis?

Chairman DECONCINI. Yes, sir.

Mr. MENDILUCE. And on the basis of my experience in former Yugoslavia, but it does not imply that my organization fully agrees with my statement.

Thank you.

Mr. CUNY. But I think they do.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you.
Mr. CUNY.

TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK C. CUNY, PRESIDENT, INTERTECT

Mr. CUNY. Senator, Congressmen, distinguished guests, Mr. Mendiluce, I am extremely pleased to be given the opportunity to speak on the question of the problems in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, and to testify to the grave humanitarian situation that is confronting the people as we approach this next winter.

What I would like to do today is to look at the reasons why the Bosnians may have rejected the most recent peace plan and to discuss some of the humanitarian problems that are facing as a result and then to suggest some options for U.S. policy in the coming months.

In the aftermath of the Bosnians' rejection of the latest peace plan, Western policymakers seem to be at a loss about where to go next. Many observers had thought that the plan was the last best

chance that the Bosnians had, especially to try and intervene before the coming winter and to reduce the extensive humanitarian problems that are likely to be caused by the outbreak of winter conditions in the next few weeks.

Observers were very surprised when the Bosnians rejected the plan, first the Muslim assembly and later the Bosnian assembly, and when it added conditions that would make the plan unacceptable to the Serbs and the Croats, it was, in fact, a de facto rejection by the people.

The subsequent revolt by the Bihac Muslims has complicated not only the peace process, but also the humanitarian assistance program which is lagging behind in contributions of food, materials, and cash, especially in the energy and winterization sectors.

The Bosnians rejected the plan for many reasons. Some were straightforward; some represented political expediency; and some can only be seen in the context of the people's view of themselves at this point in time.

As the Bosnians see the situation, time is on their side if they can hold the republic together. They believe that the Bosnian Serbs are under tremendous pressure from Belgrade to reach a settlement so that sanctions can be lifted. They point out that the Serbs continually insist that a phased relaxation of sanctions, starting from the moment that the plan is initialed, be carried out. This has led the Bosnians to believe that sanctions are truly hurting the Serbs and that the sanctions are their main equalizer in the war. They also know that the enforcement of sanctions has been strengthened during the summer in response to the Serbs' blockade of Sarajevo.

Second, the Bosnians believe that the Europeans will continue to pressure the Serbs into keeping the current level of military activity low in order to keep the United States from intervening militarily. Thus, while the Serbs still have strategic advantage in many areas, basic humanitarian assistance will probably be able to get through at some points to most of the enclaves, to Sarajevo, Tuzla, and to a lesser extent the central zone around Zenica.

If the enclaves do not get food or fuel now, the people will blame the U.N. since these are protected demilitarized areas. If the Serbs tighten the blockade on Sarajevo again, the Bosnians believe it will play into their hands politically.

Third, at the time they rejected the plan, the Bosnians believed that President Clinton has decided in favor of military action if the Serbs continued to attack Sarajevo in northern Bosnía. Apparently the Serbs also believed that bombing was a very real threat since top UNPROFOR officers had warned them continually in July and August that U.S. action was imminent if they did not relax the siege of Sarajevo.

The Bosnian military is opposed to ending the fighting now since its forces have been making gains in central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. In the summer they pushed the Croats out of the industrial regions of central Bosnia, for example, around Fojnica, and they are now in position to consolidate their gains in several areas. They have a number of objectives that they believe they can attain: opening a route to the coast, reopening the route to Tuzla through Vares, and regaining control over Mostar. As they see it,

the Croatian army, or the HV, is in a poor position to support the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) because of the situation in Krajina.

Furthermore, the HVO's blockade of humanitarian assistance has hurt the Croats in central Bosnia far more than the Muslims. Thus, the Muslim dominated forces of the Bosnian presidency are likely to continue to oppose a peace settlement as long as they believe, one, that the Serbs are effectively checked, and, two, that they can take more territory from the Croats.

One incident that may have contributed to the Bosnians' belief that time is on their side is the rebellion of Serb forces in Banjaluka. Some military commanders believe that there are growing dissensions within the Bosnian Serb Army that could weaken the Serbs.

A key factor in the vote that effectively rejected the plan was related to the document itself. When the peace plan was finally presented to the Bosnians, there was widespread skepticism that the form of government proposed would work. Most Muslims accept the fact that the country will be partitioned, and once that is done, they want nothing more to do with the Serbs and to a lesser extent the Croats.

Critics of the proposed constitutional make-up of the government joined forces with the people who still support a multi-ethnic study to condemn the agreement and effectively block its acceptance. Many Bosnians think that the Serbs and Croats are preparing for another round of war. The Bosnians believe that when war breaks out, they will be courted by both sides in the conflict. At that point the Bosnians will be in a position to make a deal for some of the territory they have lost.

There is yet another intangible factor, and a major one, affecting the Bosnians' behavior. They fervently believe that they are the victims and their position is right. Therefore, they assume if they can just hold out a bit longer, they will eventually win military support from the outside. It may not seem logical to an outsider, but the belief is very real.

What do they want? To get the Bosnians back to the conference table in a mood to negotiate, several things must happen.

First, their territorial demands must be met: specifically, a corridor to the sea; contiguous borders with the eastern enclaves; defensible borders in the west; elimination of the HVO blockade at Vares; and access to the Sava River which is navigable to the Danube.

Second, their goals include stronger guarantees of NATO deployment, especially a larger and more rapid U.S. commitment to help prevent forced population transfers. They essentially are seeking prepositioning of forces for rapid deployment.

The only other circumstance that would get the Bosnians back to the conference table, in my opinion, is a major change on the battlefield for the better or the worse. Pressuring Mr. Izetbegovic is unlikely to achieve any major results.

UNPROFOR and many others do not share the Bosnians' analysis of the situation. UNPROFOR's assessment is far more pessimistic. From their close contacts with the Serbs, UNPROFOR personnel believe that the Bosnians' ploys will not work. According to sen