NO.350 P017 ANNEX 36 19/18/93 12:49 UNHCR 2822264199 SECURITY INCIDENTS (3 September 1992-27 August 1993) Notes: Not all incidents have been reported to UNHCR thus the above map only shows a partial picture of the security By 27 August, 56 soldiers had been killed - 29 in war related incidents - since the deployment of UNPROFOR. includes also refugees from other republics of former Yugoslavia as well as an estimated number of beneficiaries including refugees, displaced and other vulnerable does not include some other 128,000 persons estimated to be in need of humanitarian BOSNIA: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? Mr. Chairman, Senators, distinguished guests: I am extremely pleased to have been given the opportunity to testify today on the grave humanitarian and political situation in Bosnia. In the aftermath of the Bosnians' rejection of the latest peace plan, Western policy-makers seem to be at a loss for what to do next. Many observers had thought that the plan was the last, best hope to halt the war before the winter and believed that the Bosnians would agree to the plan in order to secure the deployment of NATO troops, something that has been a key element of the Bosnians' foreign policy. Observers were therefore surprised by the rejection of the plan, first by the Muslim (Bosnjnak) Assembly and later, in effect, by the Bosnian Assembly, when it added conditions that would make the plan unacceptable to the Serbs and Croats. The de facto rejection of the plan, and the subsequent revolt by the Bihać Muslims, has complicated not only the peace process but also the humanitarian assistance program, which is lagging behind in contributions of food, materials, and cash, especially in the energy and winterization sectors. Why the Bosnians rejected the peace plan: The Bosnians rejected the plan for many reasons; some were straightforward, some represented political expediency, and some can only be seen in the context of the people's view of themselves at this point in time. As the Bosnians see the situation, time is on their side, if they can hold the republic together. They believe that the Bosnian Serbs are under tremendous pressure from Belgrade to reach a settlement so that sanctions can be lifted. They point out that Serbs continually insisted that a phased relaxation of sanctions starting from the moment that the plan was initialed. This has led the Bosnians to believe that the sanctions are truly hurting the Serbs and that the sanctions are their main "equalizer" in the war. They also know that the enforcement of sanctions was strengthened during the summer as a response to the Serbs' blockade of Sarajevo. Second, the Bosnians believe that the Europeans will continue to pressure the Serbs into keeping the current level of military activity low to keep the United States from intervening militarily. Thus, while the Serbs will still have strategic advantage in many areas, basic humanitarian assistance will be able to get through to Sarajevo, most of the enclaves, Tuzla, and to a lesser extent, the central zone (Zenica). If the enclaves don't get food or fuel now, the people will blame the UN, since these are protected, demilitarized areas. If the Serbs tighten the blockade on Sarajevo again, it will play into the Bosnians' hands politically. Third, at the time they rejected the plan, the Bosnians believed President Clinton had decided in favor of military action if the Serbs continued to attack Sarajevo and northern Bosnia. (Apparently, the Serbs also believed that bombing was a real threat, since top UNPROFOR officers warned them last August that U.S. action was imminent if they did not relax the siege of |