Sarajevo. However, recent events in Somalia may have tempered this view, making it more difficult to assess how likely the Serbs believe military intervention is.) The Bosnian military is opposed to ending the fighting now, since its forces have been making gains in Central Bosnia and in western Herzegovina. In the summer, they pushed the Croats out of the industrial regions of central Bosnia (e.g., Fojnica), and they are now in position to consolidate their gains in several areas. They have a number of objectives they believe they can attain: opening a route to the coast, reopening the route to Tuzla through Vareš, and regaining control over Mostar. As they see it, the Croatian Army (HV) is in a poor position to support the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) because of the situation in the Krajina. Furthermore, the HVO's blockade of humanitarian assistance has hurt the Croats in Central Bosnia more than the Muslims. Thus, the Muslim-dominated forces of the Bosnian Presidency are likely to continue to oppose a peace settlement as long as they believe (1) the Serbs are effectively "checked" and (2) they can take more territory from the Croats. One incident may have contributed to the Bosnians' belief that time is on their side: the rebellion of Serb forces in Banja Luka. Some military commanders believe there are growing dissensions within the Bosnian Serb Army that could weaken the Serbs. A key factor in the vote that effectively rejected the plan was related to the document itself. When the peace plan was finally presented to the Bosnians, there was widespread skepticism that the form of government proposed would work. Most Muslims accept that fact that the country will be partitioned, but once that is done, they want nothing more to do with the Serbs -- and, to a lesser extent, the Croats. Critics of the proposed constitutional makeup of the government joined forces with the people who still support a multi-ethnic state to condemn the agreement and effectively block its acceptance. Many Bosnians think that both the Serbs and the Croats are preparing for another round of war. The Bosnians believe that when the war breaks out, they will be courted by both sides in the conflict. At that point, the Bosnians will be in a position to make a deal for some of the territory they have lost. a major one There is yet another, intangible factor affecting the Bosnians behavior: they fervently believe that they are the victims, that their position is "right." Therefore, they assume that if they can just hold out a bit longer, that they will eventually win military support from the outside. It may not seem logical to an outsider, but the belief is very real. What they want: To get the Bosnians back to the conference table in a mood to negotiate, several things must happen. First, their territorial demands must be met, specifically: ⚫ contiguous borders with the eastern enclaves; • defensible borders in the west; elimination of the HVO blockade at Vareš; • access to the Sava River.1 Second, their goals include stronger guarantees of NATO deployment, especially a larger and more rapid U.S. commitment to help prevent forced population transfers. (Pre-positioning of forces for rapid deployment is the key.) The only other circumstance that would get the Bosnians back to the peace negotiations would be a change in the military situation on the ground -- for the better or the worse. Pressuring Alija Izetbegovic is unlikely to achieve any major results. A different view: UNPROFOR does not share the Bosnians' analysis. UNPROFOR's assessment is far more pessimistic. From their close contacts with the Serbs, UNPROFOR personnel believe that the Bosnians' ploy will not work. According to senior officers, the Bosnians' move has strengthened the Serb radicals and the Mladić faction. Rather than wait, they will now move to punish the Bosnians, grab more territory, and complete ethnic cleansing in several areas. While it is unclear whether they will initiate an all-out assault on Sarajevo, they will certainly go after more territory in the north and complete the expulsion of Muslims from Banja Luka and other areas now under their control. This reduces the likelihood that those areas will ever be reoccupied by their original inhabitants and will further hamper any efforts to forge a unified nation. What is likely to happen for the next few months: In the near term, the situation is likely to remain fairly static. The Serbs will gradually tighten the blockade of Sarajevo, but are unlikely to resume prolonged, full-scale shelling, as they did last winter and in May-June. Sniping has resumed and will gradually become more intense. Additionally, the Serbs are not likely to honor many of the agreements they have made with UNPROFOR and UNHCR regarding coal and firewood, restoration of electricity, etcetera. They will undoubtedly try to consolidate some territory in the north, perhaps near Maglaj and the 1 The Sava is navigable to the Danube for barge traffic. 'UNHCR recently reported new incidents of violence against the estimated 40,000 Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka. Additional mosques in the area have been destroyed and Muslim religious and political leaders arrested. Two sixty-five-year-old women were raped and two middle-aged women were kidnapped and severely beaten. An elderly man was shot to death in front of his young granddaughter, another old man was tortured and an 80-year-old woman was stripped naked. perimeter of Tuzla and will try to cut off the Muslims' access to Sarajevo from the south. In the last week, the Serbs have stopped all but food and medicines from coming into Sarajevo -- all winter supplies, gas and water equipment, and even blankets have been stopped. At the same time, political divisions among the Bosnians are likely to grow, making it more difficult to supply aid or to reach a political accommodation with the Serbs or Croats. In short, the people of Bosnia and especially those in Sarajevo and the various enclaves are in for a tough winter. In the meantime, the Bosnians will probably agree to return to the negotiations but only to prolong the existing situation. They are gambling that the Serbs will agree to give back more territory to get the sanctions lifted, so they will continue to maneuver, holding out for more land and a more workable form of government. A looming problem for the Bosnians is the growing factionalism among the Muslims. There are disputes among regions -- Bihać versus Sarajevo3, Sarajevo versus Tuzla -- and between the urban Muslims and the Sandjaks (rural Muslims). All threaten to further weaken the Bosnians' ability to hold out and could negate any advantages they may have in the present circumstances. What the U.S. response should be: At this point, the best approach for the United States would be to help the Bosnians make their strategy work. It would be unwise for the United States to push a new peace plan based on the old one. The old plan was not, as some have argued, the best deal the Muslims could get; signing on to a bad plan could limit U.S. options in the future. Rather, we should help the Bosnians by focusing on measures that will keep the level of conflict low and allow time to work for them. Another, better opportunity, where U.S. power and leverage can be applied, should arise sooner or later. Specifically, the United States should do the following: 1. 2. 3. Continue to threaten the Serbs with air strikes if they resume shelling Sarajevo or attacking other enclaves. (Since the plan was effectively rejected, the level of shelling has increased; frequently more than a hundred shells per day hit the city.) Support the Bosnians' negotiating position by further tightening sanctions enforcement. Pressure Croatia into curbing the HVO. This could be done by suspending economic assistance to Croatia if the HVO fails to end its attacks on the Bosnians. Croatia should also be pressured into giving Bosnian refugees better treatment. › When the peace accord was effectively rejected by the assembly in Sarajevo, Bihać declared itself an "autonomous republic." 4. 5. 6. Increase our diplomatic efforts to limit the growing political divisions among the Continue to support humanitarian assistance, especially supporting the UN on issues of access and freedom of movement and the supply of energy for winter heating. Continue to press all parties on human rights. Special emphasis should be given to (a) publicizing the human rights abuses of the Serbs and Croats (pressuring them publicly should tend to encourage the Bosnian leadership to take stronger measures to curb similar abuses by their troops and allow the Bosnians to regain the moral high ground) and (b) giving more visible U.S. support to the war crimes tribunal. Measures we can take now: The most important immediate step the United States can take is to ensure that the supply of natural gas to Sarajevo is restored. The Serbs have cut off the gas since May. Gas is now in the lines up to Sarajevo but has been stopped in Serb-held territory from reaching both Sarajevo and Zenica. Under the terms of the sanctions, gas may be shared with Serbia only if the flow of gas to Bosnia is uninterrupted. Since gas is the principal source of fuel for Belgrade, both for heating and for running the city's industries, cutting it off would send a strong message to the Serbs as well as demonstrating that the West is still behind Bosnia despite the breakdown of the peace process. - Frederick C. Cuny October 13, 1993 |