Depon USA 41-10-77 Add vol. No. 1 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR APPENDIX III PART A-HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941-October 17, 1941) FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington (In 2 parts-complete). August 5, 1941 # 447. 1. The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important matter of Japanese-United States relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics. According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject, the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes toward Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general public opinion. On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the United States economic pressure on Japan is being daily increased in intensity. For example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried a dispatch from on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the President of the United States had either ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled. Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety. 2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact, it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our national characteristics. If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved United States-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the example set forth above. 3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-United States relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States. If an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool consideration. For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure all measures which may be construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance. 4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448°, to improve Japanese-United States relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough consideration. Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the graveness of this matter. 5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-United States negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of July 14 and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message # 448° without delay. The motive and character of the French Indo-China joint defense measure were carefully and fully explained by this Minister and by the Japanese Ambassador in the United States. In brief, the step was taken peacefully, for the purpose of self-defense and in such a manner as to make intervention by a third country unnecessary. Japanese public opinion had become exceedingly incensed over the trend of the attitude during recent months, of the British, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, and others. The French Indo-China measure had to be taken to restrain those who were clamoring for vigorous overseas action and to avert a storm on the peaceful waters of the Pacific. It is admitted here that the above explanation may not completely wipe away the sense of uneasiness felt by the government of the United States. However, we believe that it will be able to accept it conditionally. On this assumption we make the proposals set forth below. In view of the times and circumstances, we desire that discussions on the proposals set forth here be conducted in secrecy and entirely off-the-record. Should these discussions culminate in a successful agreement, we desire that the points agreed upon be appropriately incorporated in the plan to promote relations between the United States and Japan which has been under consideration for the past several months. We are convinced that the government of the United States is as anxious as is the government of Japan to view their respective positions clearly, coolly, and with understanding, in order to determine the fundamental causes which have led to the present critical situation between the two countries. We also firmly believe that the United States is as desirous as we are to remove at the source, or otherwise relieve, any and all military, economic, and political uneasiness which exists between the two nations. On these assumptions, we propose the following: |