-880, 757, 394-1, 222, 757, 394

PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE STATEMENT

Approximately two-thirds of the facilities to be built under this program are operational in type. These include airfield pavements to provide necessary runways and parking apron for operational aircraft, liquid fuel storage, and dispensing facilities, and aircraft maintenance facilities. Included in the grouping of operational facilities are those for the aircraft control and warning system. This program will provide facilities, principally in the United States and Canada, for an additional increment of the air-defense warning network, as well as for the existing permanent and mobile radar sites.

The Air Research and Development Command program provides facilities for continued development of aircraft and weapons, for advanced propulsion systems and for improvements at the Air Force Missile Test Center.

Other significant areas included in the program are:

1. $76 million for the second increment of the Air Force Academy.

2. $20 million for minor construction projects, which formerly were funded in the "Maintenance and operations" appropriation.

3. $160 million for 11,822 units of family housing, primarily for installations within the continental United States.

4. $77 million for the first increment of a phased program to replace temporary structures erected during the early part of World War II. This increment is concerned exclusively with replacement of troop housing and dining facilities and medical facilities.

5. $32 million to provide necessary construction facilities for the additional B-52 aircraft which will be received as a result of the B-52 acceleration program.

Substantially all currently available military construction funds have been apportioned and released to the Air Force construction agents. It is estimated that the carryover of unobligated funds into fiscal year 1956 and fiscal year 1957 will be approximately $658 million and $558 million, respectively. This compares favorably with the carryover into fiscal year 1955 of $1,207 million and into fiscal year 1954 of $1,770 million.

The carryover into fiscal year 1957 ($558 million) is required and will be utilized for 2 purposes:

1. Funds are required to cover commitments for costs such as Governmentfurnished equipment, supervision and inspection, and contingencies. The difference between cumulative contract awards and cumulative obligations during fiscal year 1955, representing the value of these commitments, has amounted to approximately $180 million.

2. The balance of the funds are required to provide minimum working capital for continuation of a construction program of this magnitude, after the end of the fiscal year and until new funds become available. Although there will be a relatively small carryover into fiscal year 1956 and fiscal year 1957, as compared with prior years, the status of advance planning of new projects now permits orderly apportionment and contract award immediately upon congressional approval of appropriation requests. This will permit continuation of the momentum of the Air Force construction program, based upon receipt of new funds, rather than upon funds already available. Specific construction projects totaling $1,432 million are presented on the following pages in support of this appropriation request. However, only $1,200 million are requested for financing the program in fiscal year 1956. The difference of $232 million represents unforeseeable delays which inevitably arise in a program of this size, and which may preclude the use of these funds during the budget year.

Mr. MAHON. Gentlemen, the committee will come to order. We will proceed with the detailed hearings on the military public works budget for the Air Force for fiscal year 1956.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Mahon, before we get into the details of the book we have three special presentations we should like to give. The first will be by Colonel Jones, on the DEW line.

Mr. MAHON. For the record, you mean the distant early warning ne?

Mr. TURNER. Yes; DEW is short for the distance early warning ystem.

Then Major Paul will make a presentation on SAGE, the short title or semiautomatic ground environment.

Next, General Washbourne will present some of the highlights of ur fiscal year 1956 construction estimate, prior to going into the deails of the request.

First is the DEW line. Lieutenant Colonel Jones, from the Direcprate of Operations, will make that presentation.

Mr. MAHON. You feel that much of this will have to be off the ecord?

Mr. TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Place anything in the record that may seem approriate, but give us the full details.

Mr. TURNER. We surely will.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Off the record. (Discusion off the record.)

GENERAL STATEMENT ON DISTANT EARLY WARNING LINE

Lieutenant Colonel JONES. I am Lieutenant Colonel Jones, from he Directorate of Operations, Air Force.

Mr. Chairman, we propose to present to you a review of the entire istant early warning project and to cover the status of the various ctivities involved in this project. Actually, you might say we want o give you the answers to those classic questions: Who? What? When? Where? Why? And how much?

(Discussion off the record.)

(The following statement was submited for the record :)

During the summer of 1952 considerable study was underway to determine he requirements for and the means of providing early warning of air attack or the continental United States. Agencies such as the Department of Defense, he National Security Resources Board, the Federal Civil Defense Administraon, the Lincoln laboratories, and others were involved in various aspects of the roblem. Inevitably two big questions emerged from these studies. Both inolved time: "How much time do we need" and "how much time can we get?" There is no single statement of how much time is needed. The warning time equired for effective civil defense in one city is different from that required another. The warning time required by one military force differs from the equirements of another. The time of day, the weather conditions, the seasons f the year, all have a direct bearing on the amount of warning time needed. The answer to the question of "How much time can we get" can be more pecific. One group of prominent scientists and technicians serving as the Linoln summary study group, concluded that it was technically and economically easible to install a detection system in the Arctic which would provide from to 6 hours warning of air attack. This chart illustrates what that means Pographically.

If the speed of the bon
tion system in order to
differ according to the
and the speed of the b
As a result of these
system in the north, th
on the 31st of Decem
system should be devel
Mr. Lovett, then the S
Telegraph Co. to unde
and electronic equipm
tion of an early warni
ist with the Western I
in northeast Alaska an
been completed with t
stations By Novemb
ram was underwa
In February of 1954.
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The Joint Chiefs of
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oncerned today, gener
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a communications sys
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the United States.
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Western Electric Co. in

lities. The Air For
meat fund to finance the
nent fund totaled $79.
tant early warning I
Western Electric Co.
Dental Air Defense Com
Air Force Installation I
Canadian Air Force m
Western Electric has
estruction firms. Th
Drake & Pipe, Inc., of
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ad11.600 tons to the e

Each of these lines depicts a possible route of a 450-knot bomber toward a pecific target in the United States. Take this route toward Minneapolis as an xample. If we could be satisfied with 1 hour warning of attacks against the inneapolis area, a detection system placed approximately 450 nautical miles orth of the city would suffice. On the other hand, such a system would provide innipeg about 20 minutes warning. If we need 3 hours of warning of attacks Minneapolis, our detection system would have to be about 1,350 miles north.

's considered that the magnitude of the t ing small parties of

If the speed of the bomber increases, we have to go farther north with our detection system in order to provide the same amount of time. The warning time will differ according to the target selected, the route flown by the bomber to the target, and the speed of the bomber.

As a result of these activities and interest in the development of a warning system in the north, the President authorized the release of a statement of policy on the 31st of December 1952, which stated in part "such an early warning system should be developed and made operational as a matter of high urgency." Mr. Lovett, then the Secretary of Defense, requested the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. to undertake the task of developing and testing communication and electronic equipment and techniques which would make possible the operation of an early warning system in the far north. Subsequently a contract was let with the Western Electric Co. to install and operate a test warning system in northeast Alaska and northwest Canada. In February 1953, agreements had been completed with the Canadian Government for the installation of the test stations. By November 1953 the sites were completed and the development program was underway.

In February of 1954, the National Security Council again directed that a distant early warning system be established as soon as proven feasible by the testing program that was being conducted in the north. By late summer of 1954, the equipment and techniques being tested showed sufficient promise to enable Air Force to start action to implement a complete system.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on a study prepared by the representatives of Canadian and United States Air Forces, approved the location of the entire distant early warning system. The land-based segment, with which we are concerned today, generally lies along the most northerly practicable part of the North American Continent. The line will be made up of radar stations located so as to assure detection of any aircraft crossing the line. In addition to operating detection equipment the DEW line stations are linked together with a communications system which makes possible direct contact with the air defense headquarters of the Alaskan Air Command, the Royal Canadian Air Defense Forces, the Northeast Air Command, and the Air Defense Command in the United States.

Following the decision on the location for the line, a contract was let with the Western Electric Co. in November 1954 to proceed with the installation of the facilities. The Air Force and the Department of Defense established a management fund to finance the project. The first increment of money into the management fund totaled $79.1 million of which $42 million was for construction. A distant early warning project office was formed to manage the contract with the Western Electric Co. Personnel from the Air Materiel Command, the Continental Air Defense Command, the Air Research and Development Command, the Air Force Installation Representative in the North Atlantic Area, and the Royal Canadian Air Force man the office.

Western Electric has let contracts for the actual construction to three major construction firms. The Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. and Johnson, Drake & Pipe, Inc., of Seattle, Wash., have the job for the western portion of the line. Northern Construction Co. and J. W. Stewart, Ltd., of Vancouver, British Columbia, are doing the construction in the central portion. Foundation Co. of Canada, Ltd., of Montreal, Quebec, has the job in the eastern section.

The movement of men and materials to the line has been and will continue to be a major undertaking. There are four major methods of transportation involved. We have used airlift and "cat" train operations during the winter months. This summer sea transports in the Atlantic and Pacific and barge traffic down the MacKenzie River will be used. In order to get the line in and operating at the earliest possible date, the airlift had to be started immediately. By January 1954, commercial aviation companies of the United States and Canada, augmented with military aircraft of the USAF and the RCAF were starting to move a mountain of materials to the north. Our objectives were to move 8,000 tons to the western section, 10,500 tons to the central section, and 11,600 tons to the eastern section before the ice broke up this spring. When it is considered that there were no landing strips in the arctic areas concerned the magnitude of the task becomes apparent. This problem was overcome by landing small parties of men with small tractors on the sea ice with DC-3 type

rcraft. The small tractors were used to level off an area long enough to rmit C-119 aircraft, the "flying boxcars" of the Tactical Air Command, to nd with more men and a larger tractor. The larger tractor made possible e clearing of a strip long enough for C-124's to land which brought in D-8 ats." With the heavy equipment the strips could be kept open for a flow of rcraft bringing in men, supplies, and construction materials. Aircraft weighg as much as 168,000 pounds were landed on these strips of leveled sea ice. s of May 27, the combined efforts of commercial aviation companies and military uadrons had airlifted to the stations along the line, 8,444 tons in the western ction, 10,601 tons in the central section, and 10,582 tons in the eastern section. he USAF alone flew over 1,100 "sorties" on trips to and from the line between -bruary and May.

The success of the winter airlift made possible considerable progress in the nstruction of the facilities at the various sites. As of May 27 all the sites ve been surveyed and detailed plans completed. Gravel hauls are progressing I schedule. Many foundations are in and some of the buildings are up and e being lived in. Many new techniques have made possible this exceptional ogress. Many of the foundations are being put in by using steam jets to aw holes in the permafrost for piling. In other areas we are using power gers to drill holes through the frozen tundra and gravel typical of the region. he buildings are made of prefabricated plywood panels and are set well above e ground. This permits the wind to sweep under the buildings thus preventing e accumulation of large snow drifts. Work is progressing on the preparation gravel airstrips which will make future airlift to the sites a much more simple b than that we experienced this last winter and spring.

I would like now to answer the big question of how much? How much, in anpower and in money.

The Air Force is now studying two major proposals concerning manning the e. Although no decision has been reached on this matter to date, the question whether to use a civilian contractor to operate and maintain the equipment th a small group of military officers to make military decisions, or to use ilitary personnel throughout. There are a number of good points for both -oposals.

The dollar costs of the line can be more specific. As indicated earlier, the oject was started with an initial fund of $79.1 million. Of that amount 42 illion was for construction. On May 31 an additional 23 million was added r construction. At the present time there is an additional 6.5 million for conuction awaiting approval of the Bureau of the Budget. This latest addition ll bring the total expended in fiscal year 1955 to 108.6 million of which 71.5 llion is for construction.

The fiscal year 1956 budget request contains a total of 104.78 million for the EW project. Of this amount, 7.02 million is for procurement other than airaft, 10.76 million is for maintenance and operations costs and 87 million is r construction.

The fiscal year 1955 funds of 108.6 million plus the fiscal year 1956 estimate of 4.78 million brings the total to 213.38 million. While a detailed estimate is not ailable at this time, we believe the fiscal year 1957 requirement will be about million. The 3-year total for this portion of the DEW line will be about 8 million.

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION

Mr. DEANE. I would be interested in what contribution financial-
se the Canadian Government is making in this picture.
General BRIGGS. Zero, sir.

Mr. DEANE. Zero?

General BRIGGS. Zero; yes, sir. It is a joint effort. They are buildg the mid-Canada line. The impact on the two national budgets is uch greater on their side. We feel they have made a great contrition to mutual defense in that area.

Mr. DEANE. It l
San Francisco curr
in peacetime, of this
actional defense tha
General BRIGGS.
mean politically?
Mr. DEANE. Read
(Question read by
General BRIGGS.
our liaison, friendly
relations with the
Canadian Governm
which is a new depa
for the Arctic.
Mr. MAHON. Tha
What good is
That is the question
General BRIGGS. I
Mr. DEANE. That
I was thinking a
north, landing field
me that you would l
than purely defense
Colonel JONES. TI
tremendously valual
The communications
modern northwes
tremendously.

Let us say we elim
use of the DEW c
from Alaska to Euro
ing]. This new con
alled in a lateral c
We have this link ac
(Discussion off the
Mr. DEANE. I am
defense people who
terms of peace and 1
could be synchro
chnology, landing
phases of developme
That is all, I belie
Mr. MAHON. I wo
its could spring from
e. Of course, the m
Let us proceed.
GENERAL STATEMEN

Mr. TURNER. Mr.
s to do something a