which identify the proportion of academy graduates, union school graduates, and hawsepipe officers in the present active deck and engineer officer total of between 20,000 and 21,000 deep sea officers. Sufficient information does exist, however, to give a good picture of what the academy-produced officer has done. Appendixes 2 and 3 give this information for the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and for the Maine Maritime Academy respectively. We believe that job records of graduates of the other academies would show a similar pattern. The following table summarizes the information for the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy:

U.S. MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY 20-YEAR WORK STUDY, 1949-68

While the Kings Point records show that 30% of the 1949-68 graduates surveyed are at sea and 23% are in shoreside industry, the Maine report, covering a longer span-1943-68-shows slightly over 10% of the graduates surveyed to be in industry ashore while 37.4% were actively engaged in shipping. Of the Kings Pointers graduating in the period 1964-68, 82.8% are in the merchant marine, while only 6.6% of those graduating in 1949-53 are still actively employed in the merchant marine. However, 42.3% of those in the 1949-53 groups were still in the maritime industry, 27.9% of them in maritime jobs ashore. More than 250 U.S. Merchant Marine Academy graduates are at present sailing either as Master or Chief Engineer, indicating that one out of every four ships in our active fleet has a Kings Pointer heading its deck or engine department.

OBJECTIVE OF FEDERAL SUPPORT

Although the objective of merchant marine legislation providing for Federal support of officer training has been specifically to produce men for the active merchant marine, the Maritime Administration has always regarded service in the maritime industry ashore and in the government shipping services, particularly in times of limited opportunity for seafaring, as a valuable contribution of Federal support.

Moreover, we believe that well-trained officers, with active merchant marine service following graduation, can well provide a much needed infusion into the shoreside maritime industries of forward-looking, progressive men with both the academic and practical background needed to help the U.S. merchant marine to meet the challenges and opportunities which President Nixon has placed before us. It should therefore not be regarded as a discredit to the training program that many of the graduates take positions ashore following their initial sea service. There will always be some men who will make their lifelong careers at sea, and these will be the backbone of our merchant marine officer corps. But seafaring, even under the much improved conditions of today's best ships, is still a very confining occupation. It places great strains on family life, and offers less breadth of experience than many ambitious young men desire.

The extremely rapid advances in technology now taking place in shipping make it advisable to supply our ships with young officers trained in the latest techniques. Under the steadying influence of the experienced officers, these young men can make a most useful contribution to the modernization of merchant marine operations. They can then turn to shoreside maritime jobs to pursue their careers with the practical experience gained at sea to temper their academic training, and in turn can bring to shorebased maritime industry the insight they have gained into what is needed to improve ship operations. The maritime industry in this way no longer serves merely as a haven for those too old to go to sea any longer, but as an integral part of the whole merchant marine of which ships are only one aspect. To the extent that federally supported training bene

fits a private industry, however, the industry should be prepared to provide its own support to the maritime schools to a greater extent than is now the case. First and foremost, however, Federal support of merchant officer training must be directed to the manning of active merchant ships, for it is here that the training brings the most direct benefit to the government's support of the merchant fleet. However satisfactory on-the-job training may once have been for supplying new officers, the increasing complexity, size, and value of merchant ships makes this an extremely expensive and inefficient method of training officers.

It is not feasible to employ a ship in active service to provide training in use of radar to avoid collisions, for instance. Intensive practice with simulation devices permits the student to learn collision avoidance, cargo handling, fire and damage control, and proper response to many difficult and dangerous situations without fear that a mistake will result in anything worse than a bad mark. The trend to larger and larger ships, with tankers approaching 500,000 tons, bulk carriers of 50,000 and over, and the greater speed of expensive container ships already at 30 knots or more, obviously requires much more training for the officers who will manage these giants.

Use of bow thrusters, variable pitch propellers, constant tension winches, container cranes, barge handling elevators, navigation aids employing satellites, bridge control of the main engine, and many similar technological developments place constantly increasing demands on the knowledge and skill of the ship's officers. The time for training in such advanced equipment is before it comes into use, not afterwards. The equipment alone will not provide safer and more efficient operation, as has been clearly shown by the increasing number of accidents on ships equipped with radar and other advanced navigational aids. Their effectiveness depends on the skill of the man who uses them, which in turn depends on the thoroughness of his training.

The trend to automation, by cutting down the number of men required per ship, puts a greater demand on those who are left. Greater and greater amounts of information are poured into the system, which must be absorbed, interpreted. and acted upon, often almost instantaneously. Even with the advent of computers to analyze and provide solutions to the problems encountered, there will always be a need for men trained to understand the way the system works, so that they may detect and correct malfunctions.

While the traditional types of ship propulsion are expected to dominate the marine field for some time to come, there will undoubtedly be increasing marine use of gas turbines, jet propulsion, nuclear power, etc. Changes in ship maintenance functions will affect the work of the marine engineers; there will be changes in the traditional divisions between deck and engine, perhaps to more functional breakdowns, such as operating and technical departments. Greater emphasis will be put on systems analysis and preventive maintenance of expensive equipment to avoid breakdowns.

In addition to the need for officers trained to meet the requirements of new merchant ship technology, Federal support of officer training is based also on the need to provide trained manpower for emergency support of the armed forces. Many merchant marine officers, including most academy graduates, hold Naval Reserve commissions. Some of these officers apply for active Navy duty and may accept regular Navy Commissions. In turn, naval officers can and do use their Navy sea experience in obtaining merchant marine officers' licenses. Under Coast Guard regulations, sea service in the military is evaluated to determine its equivalence to sea service required on merchant vessels and to determine the appropriate grade, class, and limit of licenese for which the applicant is eligible. The naval training given the academy students and their Navy Reserve participation thereafter give the nation a valuable double capability. This Naval Reserve training enables merchant marine officers to operate merchant ships in conjunction with military operations and under Navy direction rather than providing direct transfer of merchant marine officers into Navy combatant ships. In past emergencies, while some merchant marine officers have served in the Navy, Coast Guard, and other armed services, the role of merchant ships as auxiliaries to carry military supplies has been so essential that merchant ship officers have generally been deferred from the draft while serving on board ship. They therefore constitute an active naval reserve to the extent that they are employed in the merchant marine.

By foregoing vacations and time off, by sailing short-handed with Coast Guard waivers, merchant marine officers have been able to spread the available manpower over more ships under emergency conditions.

The maritime academies have also been able to speed up graduations by increasing student loads and shortening the time required. If necessary, union training courses, which have comparatively greater flexibility than formal academy programs, can rapidly expand their output of trained men. As demonstrated in World War II, the Government can rapidly institute very large training programs if required by the demands of a full-scale war, using the nucleus of training capacity in existence in the Federal, State, and union schools.

We believe, therefore, that Federal support of the training of merchant marine officers is both necessary and desirable in support of the commercial fleet and for the military auxiliary role played by merchant ships in an emergency.

It is of interest to note that most of the leading maritime nations take a strong role in many aspects of their maritime industry and training of seamen. Many of them are taking note of the major social, economic, and technological changes taking place in the maritime industry, and are revising their training facilities to meet them. In the USSR, for example, the curriculum for seafaring personnel includes such subjects as cybernetics, automation, and remote control as well as the more conventional maritime subjects. In England the Merchant Navy Training Board was recently reorganized to conduct periodic investigations into the quality of officer education because of recent and projected innovation. England is also concerned with upgrading ships' deck officers in terms of their functions as managers. Future course development in Holland and Belgium will concentrate to a higher degree on management studies, maritime law, labor relations, marine insurance, and other management oriented topics. As in virtually all of the European nations, the Japanese provide overall coordination of training by a Government council made up of representatives of seafarers, shipowners, and maritime authorities. Japan has an extensive network of nautical universities, high schools, and seamen's schools. The Japan Ship's Officer Training Association, a private organization with ten branches, offers a variety of training for experienced ships' officers. Also, the Nautical College of Tokyo offers a two-year course for mature and experienced marine personnel to further their education and to carry out research in nautical affairs as a means of contributing to the continuing development of the maritime industry. The availablity of this development capability for experienced personnel is a unique feature of the Japanese training operation.1

TRAINING CAPACITY

The five State maritime schools and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy will produce about 625 new officers this year, and the union schools probably somewhat less than 400. Added to an estimated 200 new licenses from the hawsepipe, outside the channel of the union schools, new officers will total about 1,200. Officer training programs are dominated at the present time by the large productive capacity of the union schools, a factor which did not exist before the need to increase the supply of officers for the Vietnam support operation. The union programs, varying in length from 90 days to two years, are much more flexible in expanding or contracting output to meet demand than the academies. It is not likely, however, that they will close their schools, even in a condition of developing surplus. They are now established institutions, with permanent staffs and quarters, funded by industry contributions provided by contract agreements. It seems much more probable that the union schools will cut back on their production to levels which in their judgment will maintain their capability, and then look to the academy sources to reduce their output.

All of the State schools except New York use their training vessels to some degree as dormitory space. All cadets at the Massachusetts Academy are berthed aboard ship. To this extent, the schools are close to enrollment limits. All except California, however, are planning expansion of enrollment to varying degrees, and are planning to provide the physical plant to accommodate the increases.

Kings Point, with a plant geared to World War II officer output, has large reserves of cadet quarters, assuming wartime austerity conditions. To accommodate more than a small increase in cadets, however, would require increases in staff, faculty, and most other facilities.

TRAINING COSTS

The question has been raised as to whether the Federal Government should increase its support to the State academies. At the present time the Federal Gov

1 "Changing Shipboard Duties and Recommendations for Training of Modern Ship's Deck Officer," Link Division of Singer-General Precision, Inc., June 1969, p. 11-12.

ernment provides $600 per student to assist in defraying the cost of uniforms, books, and subsistence, and provides $75,000 to each school for general expenses. We have only general information as to the basic financial condition of the State schools. State support for the schools varies widely, as indicated in Appendix 4. These are operating costs; capital costs are not available for the State schools.

A summary of the cost per student at the State schools is shown in the following table:

STATE MARINE SCHOOLS-ANALYSIS OF COST PER STUDENT PER YEAR 1960-69

The average cost per graduate for the 405 graduates in the 1969 class of all five State academies was $19,310. Of the total cost of $7,820,468, 24.8% was supplied by Federal funds, 45.7% by State funds, and 29.5% by tuition, contributions, etc. (Appendix 5)

The various components of State academy operating costs rose 113.64% during the 10-year period. State contributions to the operating costs rose 131.63%, student contributions 169.61%, and Federal contributions 84.66%. Not included are expenditures made by the schools for capital improvements, or assistance from other Federal educational support programs.

Although Federal maritime outlays increased in dollar amounts considerably during the period, they did not maintain their relative level compared to other components making up the operating cost. The $75,000 annual grant and the $600 annual allowance rate for students remained the same throughout the period. Increases in Federal expenditures were related to increasing enrollments and increasing maintenance and repair costs for the training vessels, which are paid for by the Government. The number of graduates rose from 292 in 1960 for four academies to 405 in 1969 for the five academies now receiving Federal assistance. During this period, the consumer price index increased from 103.1 (1957-59 period 100%) to 127.4 or 22.7%. (Appendix 6) Costs of all kinds have risensalaries, wages, materials, building, operating supplies, etc. The Federal grant of $600 per student would have to be set at $764 to be equivalent to 1957-59 purchasing power.

While an increase in Federal support to match the cost of living might therefore be justifiable, the Maritime Administration's plan for the present is to hold Federal support to current relative levels, and for the future to relate such support to the anticipated demand for active merchant marine officers.

At the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, net cost for each of the 213 graduates in the class of 1969 was $22,822. Appropriations during the 1960-69 period, reflecting comparable operating costs to those of the State academies and supporting a student body producing roughly 200 officers per year, rose from $2,852,700 to $4,923,000, an increase of approximately 73%. (Appendix 7)

The training contributions by employers for deck and officer training by unions is estimated at $10,209,699 in calendar year 1970 or 97.6% of the total $10,456,431 estimated to be available for union training courses. (Appendix 8) The additional 2.4% is provided by government funds through Departments of Labor or Health, Education, and Welfare.

The proposed legislation for a new maritime program would permit payment of operating-differential subsidy for that portion of employer contributions paid by subsidized operators for training programs. At present, such contributions are not subsidized.

PROJECTED SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR SHIPS' OFFICERS

Appendixes 9 through 23 show the estimated demand and supply situation for the U.S. flag merchant fleet for the period 1969-1982. The projection is one of

surplus of men over jobs from the near future through 1982, with particularly heavy surpluses of both deck and engineer officers in the mid-70's.

The fleet used to project the demand for officers is the privately owned U.S. flag merchant fleet as it is expected to develop in the period 1969-1982. (Appendix 9) It begins with the 1969 fleet, taking into consideration the attrition as ships become overage, and providing for addition of new construction in the period sufficient to maintain the capacity of the domestic fleet and to provide a maximum of 30 ships a year called for by the Administration bill now before Congress. Under these projections, the present fleet of 967 ships is expected to decline to 627. These are the ships which the training programs will be required to man.

The demand for deck and engine officers, based on an average of 5 deck and 6 engine billets per ship, adjusted to allow for an increasing number of men per billet during the period, will be 3,135 deck and 3,762 engine billets, with a manpower demand of 6,270 deck and 7,524 men by 1982. (Appendix 10) There will be a decline in officer demand of about 40% in the years 1970-1974. Even with increased demand in the years immediately following 1974, the needs by 1982 will still be substantially below those of the present time.

The supply of merchant marine officers will come from several sources: the present work force, the hawsepipe, the Federal and State maritime schools, and the union training courses.

The 1969 work force will decline by attrition from 6,469 deck and 7,182 engine men in 1969 to an estimated 3,037 deck and 3,374 engine by 1982. (Appendix 11) The hawsepipe will provide an estimated 100 men annually each for deck and engine (Appendix 12), with a low attrition rate of 5%, providing 1,071 men by 1982.

Based on a projection of officer production linked to demand, the State academies would graduate 1,918 deck officers and 2,019 engine officers between 1970 and 1982, of whom 1.068 deck and 1,101 engine officers would be part of the work force at that time. (Appendixes 13 and 14)

The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy will supply about 1.318 deck and 1,674 engine officers in the same period. Based on attrition rates in the past, the projected retention in the 1982 work force will be 819 deck and 1,062 engine officers. (Appendixes 15 and 16)

For the union schools, the supply projected is one of capability based on present and past performance. It is not expected that these schools will maintain maximum output in a surplus situation. Appendixes 17 through 21 indicate that the union schools will graduate 1,410 deck and 5,440 engine officers, of whom 823 deck and 3,354 engine men will be in the work force in 1982.

A summary of the supply and demand situation in 1975 and 1982 is shown in the following table:

SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF MERCHANT MARINE OFFICERS, 1975 AND 1982

These projections which include the effect of a Federal support program linked to demand, indicate a closer relationship between supply and demand by 1982. The steady increase in demand over this time span indicates the need for a further intensive review toward the end of this decade. In view of the surplus indicated by these projections, the Maritime Administration clearly sees the