ADDITIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL MINORITY VIEWS

While the statement of policy with regard to the Far East which is contained in H. R. 5895 has our endorsement and approval, it does not seem to us to fill the urgent need for a plan of action in the Far East and particularly in China. For it is in China that the cold war has become a hot war. It is in China that the sincerity and effectiveness of our declared policy of containing communism is being put to an acid and tragic test. While in Europe, American national security is threatened, in China American national security is actually under ruthless and efficient attack.

We do not feel that we possess the final answer to the China crisis. This is a vast and complex subject. We know that there is no easy solution to the difficulties which the anti-Communist forces in that suffering country face. But the present policy toward China as expressed in the white paper, recently released, is by definition a donothing policy. If we do nothing we cannot possibly succeed. If we take positive action there is at least a chance.

At the end of his letter of transmittal of the white paper the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson says:

Should the Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's neighbors, we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted with a situation violative of the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatening international peace and security.

Does this mean that the China war does not constitute a threat to international peace and security? If so, we vigorously disagree.

It is our view that we should not passively accept the notion that all China is lost; that we should not wait until all China is conquered before taking action and that we should not assume that if all of China is conquered, "Soviet Russian imperialism" will be implemented outside the borders of China by the Chinese Communists. We believe that just as it is implemented in China by Chinese Communist units so it could be implemented in Indochina by Indochinese Communists, in Burma by Burmese Communists, in Indonesia by Indonesian Communists and so on. We believe that we are giving official recognition, sanction, and assistance to the subterfuge of internal force employed by the Soviet Union when we regard the China war as an internal question for the Chinese to handle without outside assistance.

It has been asserted that aid to the Chinese Government will be futile and wasteful and that experience has shown that it will simply reach the hands of the Communists. We do not propose aid to China along past patterns of action. Such aid might well fail.

Our amendment provides that

such aid shall be given and administered under the terms and conditions and in such manner as to be consistent with the general objectives and limitations provided in section I of the Act for Assistance to Greece and Turkey.

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This measure indicates our intention to proceed according to the tested methods which have proved successful in the Greek civil war. It expresses our conviction that we cannot protect American national security by hunting with the hounds in Greece and running with the hare in China.

Furthermore, the amendment to H. R. 5895, which we propose does not require that aid be given only to or through the Chinese Government. Indeed, it uses the very language used by the Secretary of State in his letter of transmittal. It states that the sum to be appropriated to the President for aid to China is to be used not only for "the military defense of those parts of China not occupied by or under the control of the Chinese Communists" but also "for use in encouraging all developments in China which work toward the end of assisting China to throw off the foreign yoke, to retain her independence, and to regain. her administrative and territorial integrity." Our effort is to help the administration to act upon the principles set forth in the white paper. Our desire is to provide the administration with the legislation necessary to carry out these declared objectives.

Another argument raised against extending military aid to China as we have to Greece has been that the Chinese anti-Communists have lost their will to fight. Certainly we who urged them to make friends with the Reds can hardly criticize if there are some who no longer wish to fight them. Surely the white paper is not calculated to encourage the will to fight. Surely no one will contend that the Greeks could have saved themselves from communism without our military assistance. Moreover, it is a matter of record that the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, stated a few days ago to the Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Atlantic Treaty nations will have little will to fight if we do not provide them with the military aid which the State Department has requested. But beyond all this, there remains the significant fact, that according to a Chinese Communist official news release, the Government forces in 3 years of war caused the Communists 1,432,900 casualties, of which 243,900 were killed, 989.700 wounded, and 188,900 missing (mostly deserters).

The theory is advanced that there are only two courses of action open in China. One is to encourage Titoism and the other is to attempt to overthrow the Communist regime. These do not represent the only possible courses of action. There is a third course which is the one which we believe should be followed. That is the course of attempting to contain the Communist forces.

For it should be borne in mind that as the Chinese Communists have taken over a large section of China they have also inherited the many problems which have plagued the Chinese Government. The paramount problem in China is to feed the people. To date the Chinese Communists have had no more success in doing that than their predecessors. China is a country in which, on a far larger scale than in Greece, guerrilla activities are highly effective. It is now possible for the anti-Communist forces in China to resort to inexpensive and harassing guerrilla operations which will augment the troubles of the Communists.

Accordingly, it is not enough to charge that the Chinese Government is corrupt and inefficient. In order to sustain a do-nothing

policy in China it must be contended that there are no dependable anti-Communist elements in China. Yet this is not so. Indeed. it has not even been asserted by the proponents of the do-nothing policy. It is well known that in the western and southern provinces of China there are sizable and reliable anti-Communist elements whom the Japanese were never able to conquer and whom the Chinese Communists will find it exceedingly difficult to defeat if we give them hope by a declaration of moral support and a certain amount of military aid, under American advice and supervision. The broad grant of powers contained in our proposed amendment would give the President authority and funds to provide directed and supervised aid where it is most needed and where it can be most effective. We believe that events, not only in China but in Europe, have shown that we too must learn to operate in the twilight zone of action in which communism makes its greatest gains.

It has been announced that a committee is being set up composed of Dr. Philip C. Jessup, our Ambassador at Large to the United Nations, Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, head of the Rockefeller Foundation, and Dr. Everett N. Case, head of Colgate University, for the purpose of studying the far eastern situation and particularly China. While we hope that this may prove useful, we do not believe that it is sufficient reason for delaying the limited and directed aid which would be made possible under the legislation which we propose. We believe that there is now at hand enough information to warrant taking the action which we envisage. We believe that it is inconsistent for those who say it is too late to do anything now, to propose that we wait even longer before we act. We believe that every day's delay multiplies the hazards of war and increases the cost of preventing it. Indeed, the future of Hong Kong now hangs in the balance. As we debate the military assistance program, the principle of which we strongly approve, there are forces on the move in China which may involve Great Britain and ourselves in a momentous decision. The British may soon have to decide whether to fight to defend Hong Kong. We shall then have to decide whether simply to refer the matter to the United Nations or to stand by the British. Surely with this imminent and fateful decision confronting us, this is no time to vacillate; this is no time to wait upon the deliberations of a committee which has not even begun its investigation.

We do not intend to wait in Europe where, fortunately, there is no armed conflict. Why should we wait in China where the war is very much in being? If we mean what we say we must not fail to take advantage of all the elements of resistance to Communist aggression which are still fighting on.

JOHN M. VORYS.
WALTER H. JUDD.
JOHN DAVIS LODGE.

AUGUST 16, 1949.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. KERR, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 6008]

The Committee on Appropriations submits the following report in explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations to supply certain supplemental and deficiency appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, and for other purposes.

The estimates upon which the bill is based are contained in House Documents Nos. 259, 261, 266, 272, 273, 274, 281, 283, 288, 289, 290, 291, 298, 299 and 301.

The estimates total $89,965, 021.82, against which the committee recommends appropriations of $75,790, 521.87.

The committee had before it a number of estimates for the fiscal year 1950 representing the estimated cost of increases in compensation of certain classes of government employees pursuant to recently enacted legislation. No appropriations for this purpose are recommended as the committee desires that as much as possible of these costs be absorbed by the respective agencies and it will handle these items in the same manner as similar items have been handled in the past. Later in the fiscal year the matter will be reviewed and only such deficiency amounts allowed as are absolutely necessary after all possible efforts have been made to absorb the costs.

H. Repts., 81-1, vol. 6- -12

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

SPECIAL FUND FOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

The budget estimate of $1,000,000 requested for use by the President during the fiscal year 1950 for the improvement of management activities in the executive branch of the Government is approved with the exception that this amount is to be derived by transfer from other appropriations from which savings are to be effected rather than by way of a direct appropriation. The purpose of the appropriation is to provide a basis for leadership and initiative in achieving efficiency and economy in Government operations recommended by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government and endorsed by the President.

The funds will be used for allocation to various agencies of the Government to conduct studies of internal operations with a view to revising procedures and improving organization to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government as well as any other organizational improvements which might tend toward efficiency and economy. The committee is informed that the bulk of management improvement activities will be financed out of regular appropriations to individual agencies, and that the special fund will be used only to finance activities considered urgent and which, because of their nature or cost, cannot be financed from regular appropriations. Furthermore, many of the problems to be resolved may involve several agencies or groups of agencies. Obviously, such studies must be financed from a central fund under the direction of a coordinating head. The fund also is to be used for certain basic studies involving other phases of activities applicable to Government as a whole.

INDEPENDENT OFFICES

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

Reconversion unemployment benefits for seamen. For these payments, the bill includes $300,000 additional appropriation and language authorizing use of the unobligated balance-estimated at about $200,000 of the 1949 appropriation for this purpose, or a total of approximately $500,000 for fiscal year 1950 as against the budget recommendation of $726,000. No provision was made for this item. in the regular bill because the program was scheduled to end last. June 30. Public Law 174, approved July 16, 1949, extended the program to June 30, 1950.

It always has been impossible to accurately forecast the requirements of this program. There is a balance of at least $200,000 left in the hands of the State agencies from last year's appropriation, even after the requests for that year had been cut. It was testified that the number of potential eligibles is about 10,000 and the estimate is that 30 percent of them will apply for benefits during the year. That percentage is, admittedly, a speculative figure at this point and is somewhat higher than the corresponding experience during 1949.