EXTENDING THE TIME FOR PAYMENT OF SUMS AUTHORIZED FOR THE RELIEF OF THE OWNERS OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES ABUTTING EASTERN AVENUE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AUGUST 22, 1949.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House and ordered to be printed Mr. HARRIS, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. J. Res. 3371 The Committee on the District of Columbia, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 337), extending the time for payment of sums authorized for the relief of the owners of certain properties abutting Eastern Avenue in the District of Columbia, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution do pass. The purpose of this bill is to extend the time of authority to pay sums authorized by Private Law 363 of the Eightieth Congress, entitled "An act for the relief of owners of certain properties abutting Eastern Avenue in the District of Columbia." The claims which remain unpaid are shown below: Section 1 provides among other things, that upon completion of the construction, by private contractors, of the retaining wall and steps for each parcel, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia shall certify to the Secretary the amount payable to the owner of each parcel under the provisions of this Act. Vouchers and related papers supporting the several claims were submitted at intervals throughout the past year. The act required that before the vouchers could be approved the work had to be com pleted in its entirety, inspected and approved as to compliance with the building code by the Highway Department. The last two vouchers, as shown above, cleared through the necessary channels toward the close of the limitation fixed by the act, but failed to reach the Treasury Department before the dead line. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have approved the legislation. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW In compliance with paragraph 2a of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as introduced, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in order to provide relief for the owners of certain properties abutting Eastern Avenue in the District of Columbia, which properties were involved in condemnation case numbered 2611 in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, wherein the owners of such properties were awarded damages as a result of the bringing to grade of the proposed Eastern Avenue, which damages have become inadequate because of increased construction costs during the war period, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the District of Columbia, upon certification by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia of the amounts payable, to the owner of each parcel of real property enumerated in section 2 of this Act, an amount equal to the actual cost of constructing a retaining wall and steps in front of such parcel, not exceeding, however, the amount set forth in section 2 after the number of such parcel. Upon completion of the construction, by private contractors, of the retaining wall and steps for each parcel, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia shall certify to the Secretary the amount payable to the owner of such parcel under the provisions of this Act. SEC. 2. The parcels of real property referred to in the first section and the maximum amount payable to the owner of each parcel are as follows: SEC. 3. All walls and steps, payment for which is authorized by this Act, shall be designed and constructed in accordance with applicable regulations in force in the District of Columbia, and all construction shall be performed under permit or permits issued by the appropriate officials of the Government of the District of Columbia. [SEC. 4. The authority to pay the sums authorized by this Act shall expire one year after the date of enactment of this Act.] SEC. 4. The authority to pay the sums authorized by this Act shall expire ninety days after the date of enactment of this amended section. EXTENDING THE TIME LIMIT WITHIN WHICH CERTAIN SUITS IN ADMIRALTY MAY BE BROUGHT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AUGUST 22, 1949.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed Mr. HOBBS, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. R. 483) The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 483) to extend the time limit within which certain suits in admiralty may be brought against the United States, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. The amendments are as follows: Page 1, line 4, after "March 9, 1920," insert "as amended," and following "is" insert "hereby". STATEMENT The purpose of the bill is to amend the Suits in Admiralty Act (41) Stat. 525; 46 U. S. C. 741-745) as amended June 30, 1932, so as to relieve certain litigants whose right to sue the United States under the Suits in Admiralty and Public Vessels Acts have become barred by expiration of the pertinent statute of limitations. A brief excursion into the legislative and judicial background is necessary to clarify the merits of the bill which prompt its favorable reporting. In Lustgarten v. U. S. Shipping Emergency Fleet Corp. et al. (280 J. S. 320 (1930)), the Supreme Court held that the Admiralty Act precluded suits against the Fleet Corporation and its agents for their maritime torts arising out of the operation of merchant vessels. The decision had the effect of depriving relief to many claimants who had theretofore brought suits against the Corporation or its agents in reliance upon the prevailing theory as to the status of the law, and whose rights to bring suits anew against the United States after the date of the decision had expired. Congress then enacted Public Law 213, Seventy-second Congress (act of June 30, 1932), which revived for such litigants their rights to institute suits against the United States within a certain time. The law, however, did not legislatively settle the question of exclusivity of remedy. The Supreme Court then, in 1942, in Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Company (317 U. S. 575), held that the Suits in Admiralty Act, by furnishing as in personam remedy against the United States, did not free the agent from liability for the torts of its own employees. This case was followed in 1946 by the Court's decision in Hust v. Moore-McCormack (328 U. S. 707). These cases together were popularly taken as an endorsement by the highest court in the land of the theory of duality of remedy in all cases. Accordingly, many litigants. relying upon these decisions, brought their suits against the agent only because of the opportunity for a jury trial which many of them preferred. Then the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Caldarola v. Eckert (332 U. S. 155 (1947)) and Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister (U. S. (1949)), which clarified. in the opinion of the committee, the rule previously announced so as to make it plain that the agent, while liable for the negligence of its own employees, was not liable for the negligence of the civil-service masters and crews with whom the United States manned the vessels. For the negligence of those, the United States was the only responsible party. The committee believes that litigants should not be made the victims of the legal confusion regarding the proper remedy in such cases, and are not responsible for the conditions brought about by the lack of clarity in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Legislative relief is requisite not only to save to litigants possessing meritorious claims their right to a day in court. but also to settle the question of remedy in future cases. Since the situation sought to be corrected is analogous in its major aspects to that brought about by the Lustgarten decision, the bill was patterned after Public Law 213, Seventy-second Congress (act of June 30, 1934), with minor adjustments to meet current requirements, and to provide for an exclusivity of remedy bringing an end to uncertainty in choice of defendant. The provision allowing a 1-year period from enactment for the bringing of suits enables the public to become acquainted with its rights. It is important to note that the bill in itself is designed to provide relief only in those cases where suits were dismissed, though timely brought, solely because brought against an improper party, and where the time for suits against the United States under existing law had expired. In concluding, figures are not available as to the number of claimants who would benefit by the bill, although the number is considered to be relatively few. While such personal injury and cargo claims on Government vessels are insured, 90 percent of the risk is in effect reinsured by the United States, and only the remaining 10 percent is at the risk of the underwriters. ANALYSIS OF THE BILL The first proviso makes it plain that the rule of the McAllister and Caldarola cases is to be followed not only in respect of suits against shipping organizations engaged as agents by the United States, but also in respect of suits against the masters of Government vessels as well. The second proviso gives litigants 1 year after the enactment of the act within which to file suit against the United States, where suits, whether in State or Federal courts, were timely brought under any applicable statute of limitations but have or shall be dismissed solely because improperly brought against any agent engaged by the United States to attend to the business of its vessels or any master of such a vessel. The final proviso carries forward the effect of section 5 of the 1920 act, as amended in 1932, allowing interest in all suits under the Suits in Admiralty Act from the date suit is commenced. (See the Wright case (2d Cir., 1940) 109 F. 2d 699, 701; National Bulk Carriers v. United States, (3d Cir., 1948) 169 F. 2d 943, 950; and Eastern SS. Lines v. United States (1st Cir., 1948) 171 F. 2d 589, 593.) This allowance of interest from the time suit is brought instead of from the date of the entry of judgment as in suits under the Tucker Act, 1887; the Public Vessels Act, 1925; and the Tort Claims Act, 1946, is preserved. Slight changes in phraseology are made in the existing language so that it will be clear that no implied repeal and reenactment of the 1932 amendment is intended. The following report has been received from the Department of Justice, but it will be observed that the Department bases its comments primarily on the language of another bill (H. R. 4051). So far as H. R. 483 is concerned it is believed that the language suggested by the Department of Justice in respect of the exclusive provision constitutes an immaterial variation in the language of the bill as drawn: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Hon. EMANUEl Celler, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of Justice relative to the bill (H. R. 483) to extend the time limit within which certain suits in admiralty may be brought against the United States. A study has also been made of the bill introduced in the nature of a substitute, H. R. 4051. The primary purpose of both bills is to enlarge the present 2-year statute of limitations contained in section 5 of the Suits in Admiralty Act (47 Stat. 420), by granting an additional 1 year after the enactment of the bill within which suit may be brought against the United States on causes of action where suit has been mistakenly brought against an agent or ship master employed by the former War Shipping Administration. In this respect both bills are identical. In addition, however, the bills contain other provisions respecting the exclusiveness of the claimant's remedy by suit against the United States and the allowance of interest in such suits. In these respects the two bills differ widely. Both bills are intended to relieve a small number of litigants, whose rights to sue the United States under the Suits in Admiralty and Public Vessels Acts have been permitted by their attorneys to become time barred in consequence of the confusion regarding the absence of liability of the ships' husbands or shore-side agents employed by the Government to operate the accounting and certain other shore-side business of its vessels under the wartime standard form general-agency agreement (GAA 4-4-42, 7 Fed. Reg. 7561, 46 Code of Fed. Regs., 1943 Com. Supp., p. 11427, sec. 306.44). Such ships' husbands or shore-side agents were held by the Supreme Court in Caldarola v. Eckert (332 U. S. 155), not to be owners pro hac vice-operating owners for the voyage of the Government's vessels as were the operating agents to whom the Government demised its vessels in peacetime. Not being operating agents in possession and control of the vessels, such general agents, were they employed by private shipowners, would, of course, not be subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of the master and crew engaged to manage and navigate the vessel as agents and em |