Chicago, on February 8, 1949 The AEC Chairman, David E. Lilienthal, has attempted to minimize this quantity. He has sneered at the Nation's "4-gram jitters." The truth is that for research in the field of weapon development, this is a vast quantity of this precious material. Dr. Allen May, the British scientist, drew a 10-year prison sentence for stealing one-thousandth of a gram of U-233; and we began building Hanford before we had as much as is still missing.

2. The AEC, in direct violation of its duty, did not notify the FBI of this loss until March 28, 1949. Mr. Lilienthal has declared that there was no suspicion of theft or espionage. This is completely untrue. The FBI was called in only because there was suspicion of theft and espionage, and though the trail was completely cold, the FBI made its investigation on the assumption of theft and espionage.

3. The AEC did not notify the chairman of the congressional committee until April 27, 1949, though the law requires that such notification be made immediately. 4. When this loss was reported publicly on May 17, 1949, by the New York Daily News, Mr. Lilienthal replied that the loss was trivial and that it was being partially recovered, from "waste."

There is no satisfactory evidence to support this claim. It is true that some U-235 is being recovered from waste-this is a process which goes on constantlybut there is no satisfactory evidence that what is being reclaimed is indeed from this missing parcel.

We have no conclusive evidence that a theft has been committed but neither do we have conclusive evidence that a theft has not been committed.

What makes this situation deeply disturbing to me and other colleagues is this: We have learned from the records that there are numerous persons employed on our atomic projects who have strong Communist leanings. We have urged Mr. Lilienthal to adopt a realistic attitude toward these dangerous persons but he has not been responsive to our urgings. And if two-thirds of a pound of uranium compound can disappear without either the FBI or the joint committee being notified for 6 weeks, how can a responsible Member of Congress have any confidence in Mr. Lilienthal's management?

In the matter of the fellowship program, the situation is this:

Tomorrow, Dr. Isidore S. Edelman, a 29-year-old scientist, will appear before the congressional committee to try to salvage his career. He is no doubt a brilliant young man and the publicity given him is tragic to himself, perhaps even to the Nation. But this is a tragedy which must be laid at Mr. Lilienthal's door.

Dr. Edelman had earlier applied for work in the AEC laboratories but the AEC's own Security Department ruled that he could not be cleared for access to restricted atomic information. When Mr. Lilienthal insisted, in the face of this report, on awarding Dr. Edelman a fellowship, the joint committee warned him that he was being unrealistic and unfair.

A student or his wife having been Communist does not render him ineligible for public education in America It does not render him ineligible for aid in private foundations. But because of the realities of our time, because there is a Communist conspiracy against democracy and peace in the world, it does render him ineligible for education in the atomic field at Government expense.

Because of this reality, Mr. Lilienthal was urged to approve no student for an AEC fellowship until the applicant had been given an FBI investigation. Mr. Lilienthal flatly refused to admit even the propriety of an investigation and Dr. Edelman's tragic experience is the result of this doctrinaire obstinence.

It is my hope that after Dr. Edelman's appearance, the necessity for making public spectacles of Mr. Lilienthal's mistakes will be eliminated. I hope that the AEC will now quietly cancel all fellowship students who cannot qualify as good security risks.

Public hearings should, of course, be afforded these persons involved who, themselves, insist on it.

In addition to these two highly publicized fiascos by Mr. Lilienthal and the AEC, in my opinion, there is now perhaps even more serious evidence of maladministration. Our atomic program is suffering from equivocation, misplaced emphasis, and waste. There are a number of important problems, the solution of which requires administration by the Chairman of the AEC which is competent, realistic, and courageous.

It is my considered opinion, in the light of the record of the past 2 years, that the interests of the Nation can best be served by the President requesting the resignation of Mr. Lilienthal.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which had not previously been aware of Senator Hickenlooper's views, felt that so serious a

charge as "incredible mismanagement" left it no choice but to undertake a full-scale investigation. Also, the Commission itself, in a letter addressed to the chairman of the joint committee, asked that full inquiry be made. This letter reads as follows:

MAY 25, 1949.

DEAR SENATOR MCMAHON: A full, complete, and speedy report on the charges that the United States atomic energy program is virtually a failure is a matter urgently necessary; the investigation initiated by the McMahon committee and to be carried out by it is welcomed.

The charges by Senator Hickenlooper of "incredible mismanagement," "misplaced emphasis," and "maladministration" involve nothing less than the security of this Nation and the peace of the world.

If it is true that the atomic energy program is in an almost bankrupt condition, then this Nation, far from being the custodian and trustee of a substantial stock pile of atomic weapons, and in a favorable production situation, is in a sadly weakened condition. If this were true, it is difficult to imagine any single fact more disturbing to the peace of mind of the people of the country or to the security of the world's democracies.

The facts on this crucial test of our stewardship can be readily established.

That in an enterprise requiring the services of some 60,000 human beings there have been mistakes and errors goes without saying; this has been freely admitted. Working with the atom does not make human beings perfect and beyond error. For these errors and mistakes the Commission has and will continue to accept full responsibility. The failure to follow explicit Commission regulations in the matter of the uranium oxide at the Argonne Laboratory in Chicago is such an instance. In the handling of many thousands of tons of crucial materials, in various forms, the Commission and its contractor-employees have sought and will continue to seek to improve on methods of accountability, that will keep the element of human fallibility at a minimum; no system can eliminate the human factor entirely

Among the hundreds of decisions of policy thus far made by the Commission, and those that will be made in the future, there are many the soundness of which is and will be subject to differences of judgment among equally sensible men. Such a case is that concerning scholarships for nonsecret study, awarded by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences as contractor for the Commission. The policy of the Council and the Commission has in the past 10 days been changed to meet the objections, on public-policy grounds, strongly expressed by Members of the Congress. But the difference was one of judgment on which equally patriotic and reasonable men could have and do entertain differing views. The export to scientists abroad, of isotopes, announced by the President in September 1947, is another instance. This was done upon the unanimous recommendation of distinguished advisers to the Commission. There are bound to be cases of underestimating of construction costs by contractors of the Commission in connection with urgently needed facilities of a wholly new kind. These are properly subject to criticism. But they were common experience during the war and today in industry generally.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the House and Senate was established by the McMahon Act to review and consider, among other things, differences of judgment on policy, and to receive and consider and appraise the rate of progress, or lack of progress in the substantial work of this project-one of the largest enterprises and most complex in history. Numerous reports, largely secret or top secret, and frequent hearings, conferences, and staff liaison have made your committee essentially-and rightly so-a continuous congressional investigating committee.

The test of whether there has been and is "incredible mismanagement" and a grave situation in this country's atomic energy program can be made a quite specific test, or series of tests. The country, I suggest, is entitled to and will want to know the answers to such specific questions as the following, among others, and we welcome the decision of your committee to proceed to the making of such analysis and report:

(1) Has the Commission failed in its stewardship at a time of great tension in its obligation paramount to all others; i. e., the production and improvement of these complex scientific weapons? What is the state of our atomic weapons the order of magnitude of the stock pile; the improvements made in the past 2 years in new weapon design? What has been the progress in the past 22 years of our stewardship? What is the progress today in still

further improvements, and the quality of personnel and the morale of those engaged in this work?

(2) How about production of fissionable materials-the essential ingredients of atomic weapons? Is it on a secure basis? What situation did the project face concerning disruption of production and how successful were the steps taken to overcome them? We assert, and our reports to you have made clear, that production is now at the highest level in history, with the same facilities; that new facilities are approaching the production state.

(3) How has basic and applied research progressed since the Commission took responsibility-and where was it when the Commission took over? (4) How about security? What was the state of physical protection of plants when the Commission took over? Has this improved, and in what ways?

What about security of secret documents? What was the situation when the Commission began, and what is it today?

What about accountability for source and fissionable materials? What was the situation in 1947? What is it today?

(5) What about the investigation and clearance of personnel? What was the situation and what is it today?

There are many other areas of inquiry that your committee will engage upon, in addition to those carried on by it continuously as a regular practice in the past.

But the chief question I believe is this: Is this country weak today in atomic weapons and materials, and in their production and improvements, as implied by the broad and grave charges leveled against the Commission?

It can be stated categorically that the record in this respect is a proud one. It is one to give great reassurance to the peoples of the world who, as of this hour. rely upon the strength of the United States of America.

In order that the fears and misapprehensions on this score may be settled beyond peradventure and as promptly as it is possible, it is urged that the joint committee call before it immediately, not only the Commission, its staff, its principal industrial and university contractors, but also other citizens of the highest renown and technical standing, including the distinguished members of the General Advisory Committee and other advisory groups for their testimony and appraisal. In this way the dangerous cloud of uneasiness resulting from these charges will be dispelled.

Sincerely yours.

DAVID E. LILIENTHAL,

Chairman.

With the issue thus joined, between Senator Hickenlooper's indictment and the Commission's answer, Chairman McMahon opened the June 1, 1949 mecting of the joint committee as follows:

Senator Hickenlooper, a member of the committee and formerly its chairman, has charged Mr. Lilienthal and the Atomic Energy Commission with incredible mismanagement.

Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has replied that the Nation's project is not incredibly mismanaged; that, on the contrary, the Commission's record is a proud one.

The issue is one which goes to the heart of our national defense.

The responsibility of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to Congress and to the people is now direct and immediate.

The purpose of the hearings which begin today is to get at the truth.

The American people can feel confident that a fair opportunity will be furnished here (within the limits of security) to throw a searchlight on the facts.

If the facts are such as to alarm our people, then they ought to be alarmed. If the facts are such as to reassure our people, let them be reassured. We must be thorough. We must be just. There must be no persecution and no whitewash. When the hearings are completed, the joint committee will report to the American people. This committee, as the responsible representative of Congress and the people, is obligated to render its judgment.

When the joint committee first decided upon an investigation, Senator Hickenlooper agreed to document his general charges and, for this purpose, asked leave to examine witnesses himself and to present a continuous case throughout the first hour or hour and a half of successive open hearings. In accordance with his request, therefore,

the early portion of each meeting was turned over to Senator Hickenlooper, and he directed the course of the discussion. Later in each meeting the other committee members became free to comment and to pose questions; and, in addition, representatives of the Commission were permitted to volunteer testimony. The investigation proceeded substantially along these lines, with one or two interruptions, for about 5 weeks, whereupon Senator Hickenlooper elected to discontinue his public presentation. Another week of open hearings then followed, during which the Commission brought forward such witnesses as it wished to testify affirmatively in its behalf. The final phase of the inquiry took place in executive session and mainly involved discussion of FBI reports covering personnel-security cases. Altogether, the joint committee held 45 separate meetings connected with the investigation-24 of them in public, and the remaining 21 in private. The printed record discloses no classified data, but it contains more new and pertinent information about Commission activities than has ever before been assembled in one place.

Strenuous efforts were made throughout to assure fairness, to maintain dignity, to protect secrets, and generally to follow the principles enunciated in the committee chairman's opening statement. Senator Hickenlooper, Mr. Lilienthal, and the Commission, and each individual committee member all had unfettered opportunity to suggest witnesses, to criticize and defend, and to illuminate publicly such facts as may properly be discussed at open hearings. Now, through this report, the joint committee must review the evidence and submit its verdict.

STANDARDS OF JUDGMENT

In looking back upon the investigation, the committee confronts several basic questions. Are the specific charges, as developed through the hearings, substantiated by the facts? If so, are the specific charges adequate to support such general charges as "maladministration," "misplaced emphasis, "equivocation," "waste," and "'incredible mismanagement"? In a larger sense, do the American people have cause to fear for the essential soundness and well-being of their atomic energy enterprise?

This latter question clearly raises the issue of the Commission's responsibilities. The nature of those responsibilities needs careful definition if the many hundreds of pages of testimony are to be viewed in perspective. What is the Commission legally obliged to accomp sh? Which of its missions take priority, and which are secondary? What is the kind of activity which, if incredibly mismanaged, would give the American people most reason for concern? These matters bear much the same relation to the evidence presented at the committee hearings as the law bears to evidence presented at a court trial.

Section 1 of the McMahon Act for domestic control of atomic energy, approved by Congress in 1946, contains the following fundamental statement outlining the policy framework within which the Commission operates:

it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that, subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing

the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace.

The McMahon Act also contains a section entitled "International Arrangements," which reads as follows:

SEC. 8. (a) DEFINITION.-As used in this Act, the term "international arrangement" shall mean any treaty approved by the Senate or international agreement hereafter approved by the Congress, during the time such treaty or agreement is in full force and effect.

(b) EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.-Any provision of this Act or any action of the Commission to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of any international arrangement made after the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be of no further force or effect.

(c) POLICIES CONTAINED IN INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.-In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Commission shall give maximum effect to the policies contained in any such international arrangement.

It is a tragedy-the ultimate tragedy of our time-that no international arrangements have yet been achieved. Three years ago the United States officially offered to relinquish atomic weapons, to forego atomic secrets, to admit foreign inspectors inside its borders, and even to permit international operation of its atomic plants and facilities. In return, the United States asked only that other powerful countries accept corresponding regulation for the protection of one and all against the danger of violations. Although the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed this proposal and although an overwhelming majority of the world's statesmen consider it to be just, generous, and urgently necessary, Soviet Russia blocks its adoption. Consequently, the section of the McMahon Act dealing with international control has no present application. The Atomic Energy Commission lacks responsibility for giving "maximum effect to the policies contained in any * international arrangement.'

Instead, the Commission is still governed by the basic policies set forth in section 1 of the act, which states that "the common defense and security" are the "paramount objective" and that all other objectives are subordinate thereto. Fortunately, under the circumstances, the development of atomic energy for war follows much the same paths as development for peace. Advances in the one sphere mean advances in the other. The two cannot be segregated or compartmentalized. Our accomplishments in a military sense will therefore help us to exploit the atom for the welfare and ennoblement of the human race. But the stern fact remains that, since Soviet Russia rejects international control, the Commission is duty-bound to consider first and foremost "the common defense and security."

These words expressing the Commission's supreme responsibility, however, require interpretation in light of the world situation existing at the time the charge of "incredible mismanagement" was made if they are to serve as a clean-cut standard for evaluating evidence produced at the hearings. The Commission must be praised or condemned largely according to its successes in strengthening the ability of the United States to defend against aggression. Yet, there are various kinds of defense. What approach does sound judgment dictate in the field of atomic energy?

Until recently we regarded ourselves as possessing a monopoly of atomic weapons, and we counted heavily upon it to deter potential aggressors or to defeat them if they thrust war upon us. But we also knew that our monopoly could not last forever, that it was bound to