be broken in a short time, and that we would then have little left in the atomic field to sustain us except superiority: i. e., more and better weapons than a possible opponent. This logic meant that, during the period of our monopoly, the Commission was profoundly obligated to press forward in basic and applied research, to hasten reactor development, to accelerate production of fissionable materials, and to fabricate atomic explosives with the utmost sense of urgency as insurance against the day when totalitarian countries would complete their own initial bombs. In that way alone could our superiority, the only advantage remaining to us after our monopoly had vanished, be maximized. The inevitable came to pass sooner than expected: on September 23, 1949, we learned that the Soviet Union had created an atomic explosion. But the need for rapid progress in our own project was as obvious before the event as afterward, since Russia's acquisition of the bomb through her own independent efforts had been foreseen and predicted by every authority qualified to judge.

Thus the law's "paramount objective" of "assuring the common defense and security," has always placed greatest emphasis upon an affirmative task: protecting our country by keeping it far ahead of rivals in the sciences, in nuclear reactors, and in quality and quantity of bomb output. This over-all task may appropriately be called "security by achievement," in recognition of the positive character of the activities which, from the outset, contributed most to our atomic. defenses. So strong an accusation as "incredible mismanagement" surely means that the Commission is derelict in essentials and not merely in nonessentials. Such a charge, to be proven, must consequently show that the Commission has failed to furnish us with security by achievement"-failed, in other words, to prosecute research with satisfactory vigor, failed to develop reactors adequately, and failed to make as many superlative weapons as could and should have been made under all the circumstances.

Another standard for appraising evidence given at the hearings is the Commission's record in safekeeping atomic energy secrets. The correct use of secrecy as a technique of "assuring the common defense and security" furnishes us a measure of negative protection, in the sense that we avoid helping rival nations to manufacture the bomb, and hence contrasts with the positive protection afforded us through our own continuing progress. Guard posts, barbed-wire fences, investigations of personnel, materials accountability, documents control, and all the apparatus mobilized to suppress information leaks that might benefit a foreign power may conveniently be considered under the heading "security by concealment."

It requires no argument to show that both broad types of security"by achievement" and "by concealment"-are indispensable. But much confusion has surrounded the nature of atomic secrets, notwithstanding the conscientious efforts of the Nation's scientists to clarify this aspect of public thinking. There existed, for instance, an unfortunate notion that one marvelous "formula" explains how to make bombs and that it belonged exclusively to the United States. Actually, the basic knowledge underlying the explosive release of atomic energy-and it would fill a library-never has been the property of one nation. On the contrary, nuclear physicists throughout the world (including those who live behind the iron curtain)

were thoroughly familiar with the theoretical advances which paved the way for practical development of an atomic bomb. Such towering scientific figures as Niels Bohr of Denmark and Sir James Chadwick of Great Britain, together with dozens of associates from almost all countries except Russia, came to the United States during the war, participated intimately in the Manhattan District project, rendered priceless service, and returned to their native lands when hostilities ended. Equally notable figures from abroad-Enrico Fermi of Italy and Hungarian-born Leo Szilard, for example-shared in our atomic effort and established permanent American residence following the war. The Soviet Union, for its part, possesses some of the world's most gifted scientists, as well as technical experts imported from Germany-men whose abilities and whose understanding of the fundamental physics behind the bomb only the unrealistic were prone to underestimate. Russian success in breaking our monopoly dramatically exposes the fallacy that atomic secrets relate principally to pure science.

On the other hand, the vast American enterprise which culminated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not only a scientific tour de force but also an industrial and developmental feat of the first magnitude. It is here in the field of engineering, design, and applied researchthat real atomic secrets were and are mainly concentrated. The fact that we are dealing with secrets in the plural and not with one single secret cannot be overstressed; for the blueprints of our facilites at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos, the construction drawings, the material-order sheets, the technical papers, operating manuals, weaponeering studies, statistical surveys, and similar documents of value to a foreign power cover millions of pages. However, this tremendous collection of data, plus thousands of tons of precious metals, plus the almost limitless fund of classified information which atomic workers collectively carry about in their minds, must all be kept from trickling into the wrong hands.

The philosophy of "security by concealment," as related to the situation that existed during the period of our monopoly, rested upon two chief concepts. First, if we successfully withheld key techniques from Russia, she could not borrow our know-how and exploit it to advance the date when she completed her earliest atomic weapons. follows that secrecy on our part tended somewhat to delay completion of the first Soviet bombs and to extend the duration of America's monopoly; and during this period of extension (however brief it may have been) we enjoyed extra opportunity to increase our atomic "head start." Such reasoning acknowledged that Russia would eventually acquire her own bombs, regardless of how effectively we ourselves concealed what we knew, but stressed the importance of postponing the development as long as possible. The second main concept which justified secrecy during the period of our monopoly was that of shielding from others the latest American accomplishments, especially applications of basic knowledge: the details of new weapon models, the engineering intricacies of a new industrial process, and the like.

The repressive requirements of "security by concealment," if carried far enough, come into conflict with the constructive requirements of "security by achievement." In the spring of 1948, for example, experiments involving the detonation of three atomic weapons were staged at Eniwetok atoll, and the National Military Establishment

(the Commission approving) permitted thousands of men under its control to participate in this operation without a full FBI field investigation into their loyalty. From the viewpoint of "security by concealment"-considered alone and disregarding every other factor-it would have been wisest not to conduct the tests at all, for such a decision would have eliminated any possibility of the test results reaching a foreign nation and thereby assisting that nation in its quest for atomic stature. A second best alternative, exclusively from the viewpoint of guarding secrets, would have been to defer the Eniwetok operation for several months while each and every participant received a complete FBI investigation. But the demands of "security by achievement"-getting a critical job done-decreed that the tests take place without delay. Otherwise the test results would not have been available to us until a later date; those results would not have been translated into the design of new weapons so soon; and we would not now possess as many improved bombs as have actually been incorporated into our stock pile.

Whenever the Commission constructs a laboratory, builds a reactor, erects a metal-fabrication facility, or even leases extra office space, it unavoidably broadens the opportunities open to a foreign agent and, therefore, enlarges the risk that some atomic secrets will escape to our totalitarian competitors overseas. If the only consideration were "security by concealment," the ideal solution would be to dismantle all plants at Hanford and Oak Ridge, raze Los Alamos, stop manufacturing bombs, and destroy all papers containing classified information. In such fashion the danger of leaks could be held at an absolute minimum. Conversely, whenever a technical document is stamped "top secret." "secret," or "confidential" the circulation of knowledge from one qualified expert to another becomes confined to officially sanctioned channels: the mutual stimulation of minds through exchange of ideas-the lifeblood of science-suffers proportionately; and the end result may be a diminution of our ability to outstrip rivals in the struggle for atomic preeminence. Similarly, whenever policemen must patrol an installation; whenever a group of employees needs clearance for access to restricted data; whenever, for secrecy reasons, a contract is negotiated instead of awarded through competitive bids; whenever code words, armed couriers, and special safes are necessary, an impeding element is introduced that adds expense, multiplies red tape, and encumbers our advance toward more and better weapons. If "security by achievement" were the only consideration, the ideal solution would be to abolish all secrets and to concentrate single-mindedly upon actual accomplishments.

It is apparent that the defense of the United States calls for the striking of a sane and judicious balance between the two indispensable but competing types of security: "by achievement" and "by concealment." Just where this balance should be struck in particular instances depends upon circumstances, and upon a weighing of the fact that. on the one hand, Russian success in achieving first a bomb and later a stock pile has always been a foregone conclusion and that, on the other hand, American secrecy slows the rate of foreign progress but may hamper our own progress as well.

Many problem cases present themselves. Assume, for example that a question before the Atomic Energy Commission is whether or not to downgrade the classification of a certain document from

"secret" to "unrestricted." Assume further that the document, if published, might be expected to assist Soviet technicians in some indeterminate degree, but that a decision not to publish might so hamper research throughout the United States as to delay the fundamental work foreshadowing an important new weapon by 3 or 4 years. Should the Commission help Russia and simultaneously help ourselves, or should it conceal the document from Russia and simultaneously retard our own advancement? Again, suppose that the issue is whether or not to hire a brilliant scientist whose abilities are unique and whose contribution could not be duplicated. Suppose, further, that the FBI investigation report on him discloses sufficient derogatory information to raise a doubt regarding his loyalty. Should the Commission, as a calculated risk, employ the scientist and strengthen the technical phase of our project, or should it, as an equally calculated risk, refuse to employ him and suffer the consequences of taking a less able substitute? Luminous wisdom must be brought to bear upon such dilemmas if they are to be solved in a manner that best serves "the common defense and security."

Accordingly, an appreciation of the issues in all their ramifications suggests two principal ways of proving "incredible mismanagement" so far as secrecy is concerned. It might be shown that the Commission has been so obsessed with "security by concealment" as to bungle "security by achievement," thus leaving us in a relatively feeble position when totalitarian powers accumulate a real atomic-bomb stock pile through their own unaided exertions. Alternatively, the exact opposite might be shown, to wit, that the Commission is so preoccupied with positive accomplishments that it has let slip secrets of genuine significance. If the latter alternative were chosen, a rough rule-of-thumb test might be applied by asking this question: Is there evidence that Russia has gleaned knowledge from Commission sources which speeded development of her first bomb or which might help make better bombs than she could design independently?

A further standard for judging the testimony relates to the Commission's administration of funds Once again the striking of a sensible balance between opposing objectives figures prominently. Here the conflict involves, on the one hand, incentive to build certain novel facilities quickly and, on the other hand, pressure to complete exhaustively considered design plans and cost estimates before breaking ground so as to minimize possibilities of waste. During the recent war the Manhattan Engineer District spent more than $300,000,000 in hastily constructing two major plants for the isotopic separation of U-235 from normal uranium. One plant (known as Y-12 and exploiting the electromagnetic principle) operated about 2 years, whereupon efficiency dictated that it be placed in permanent stand-by except for small-scale activities. The other (known as S-50 and exploiting the thermal diffusion principle) operated only a few months and then proved to be so uneconomical that it was placed in stand-by and finally dismantled altogether. But the large investment which both plants represent was eminently justified in terms of wartime emergency and the state of knowledge existing at the time construction began. The "cost-be-damned" philosophy then wisely and properly prevailing may not have been equally tenable between January 1947, when the Commission took over from the Manhattan District, and September 1949, when we learned of Russia's bomb test Nevertheless, enough urgency still

underlay our atomic endeavors so that the Commission would merit severe criticism if it failed to expedite crucial defense tasks without waiting for all the conventional deliberations and planning niceties which would have been desirable if economy were an overriding factor. Of course, this is hardly to imply that the Commission should have thrown financial caution to the winds. Moreover, a different order of permissible license attached to the new facilities needed in research and weapons production than to the houses, schools, stores. and recreation centers needed in Commission-owned communities.

Yet another relevant standard to be focused upon testimony developed through the hearings is whether or not the Commission has ever violated the terms of the McMahon Act. Section 1 of that act furnishes still further criteria: whether or not, "subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security," the Commission has directed its efforts "toward mproving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace. All Commission endeavors are so intertwined and intermingled with administrative policies, practices, and procedures that to evaluate the one is also to throw critical light upon the other.

Such, then, is the committee's opinion respecting the standards which should be applied and which, if the charge of "incredible mismanagement" were litigated in a court, would guide judge and jury. A verdict may be reached according to the answer given a simple question which takes precedence over all others: in terms of the record before the committee is there evidence that the Commission has failed to discharge its defense responsibilities?

With the applicable standards thus established, the testimony must now be examined. (Each statement of fact in the following discussion complies with the secrecy provisions of the McMahon Act.) The first part of this committee report deals with "security by achievement" and with the general topics most germane to that top-priority defense against aggression; namely, weapons, production, research, reactor development, and community affairs. The second part of the report discusses "security by concealment," and there follows a statement of the committee's conclusions.

SECURITY BY ACHIEVEMENT

The harnessing of atomic energy, like any other industrial and military activity requiring metal, begins with a search for ore located in the earth's crust. While uranium, the basic material, is about 1,000 times as prevalent as gold; while a ton of it inheres in each cubic mile of sea water; and while an average of one-seventh of an ounce per ton occurs in all granitic and basalt rocks (which comprise more than 90 percent of the earth's crust by weight), concentrated deposits are extremely rare and arduous to locate. To date, by far the larger share of uranium used by the United States issues from the Belgian Congo and Canada, with supplementary quantities derived from Colorado. Exploration on a scale recalling the "gold rushes" of the last century has pushed forward throughout the globe; but notwithstanding numerous "strikes" of lean ore and scattered lodes. there have been no reported new discoveries of extensive veins. Exploitation of such low-content sources as shales and phosphates awaits development of a satisfactory recovery technique. Uranium,