"whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, and live, "and converse like other men; and for this con"duct he is not obliged to give any other reason, "than the absolute necessity he lies under of so 'doing."

TIM. I think it would be hard upon him, if he were obliged to give any other reason; for absolute necessity is an exceeding good one. But what, then, is it you are all about, spending your pains in constructing a system, which you are necessitated to contradict and protest against, every time you go down a ladder, or get over a stile? Surely you ought to be set in a corner, with fools' caps upon your heads, like the misses at a boarding-school. In the name of common sense, what can you mean?

TOм. It is an amusement: " If a person carries "his speculations farther than this necessity con“strains him, and philosophizes either on natural "or moral subjects, he is allured by a certain plea"sure and satisfaction, which he finds in employing "himself after that manner."

TIM. Suppose he were to play at push-pin, or span-farthing, would it not be more to the purpose? And then he would not disturb his neighbours. But that man's heart must be as wrong as his head, who can "find a certain pleasure and satisfaction" in endeavouring to persuade his fellow rationals, that they are without God in the world. However, if amusement be the word, let us believers have some too.

If philosophers will amuse themselves with talking nonsense, they must give us leave to amuse ourselves by laughing at it. On our side of the question it is possible to be merry and wise, as well as to do some little service to the world, by showing it what stuff these dreams are made of. Come, Tom, you shall represent the genius of philosophical scepticism. And now let us hear some of those strong reasons which induce you to deny the existence of a Deity.

TOм. Bless us! you shock me! I do not mean to deny the being, but only to philosophize a little concerning the nature of God".

TIM. Well, then, be it so. Philosophize away. TOм. Our reason, Tim, is very weak, very weak; indeed, we are poor, finite, frail, blind creatures. Our knowledge of the things around us is extremely limited and imperfect: we ought to humble ourselves—".

TIM. There is always mischief in the wind, when a philosopher falleth down and humbleth himself. But what is your inference from all these lowly considerations?

TOм. That it is presumption in such worms of the dust to argue about the nature and attributes of God.

TIM. But you will allow poor reason to exercise herself in her own province; and, when she is furnished with premises, to draw a conclusion.

TOм. Ay, ay, there is no harm in that.

TIM. When we see a house calculated to answer

m Dialogues, p. 42.

n Ibid.

various purposes of beauty and convenience, and having in it all the marks of wisdom and design, we know it could not build itself. The senseless materials could never have prepared and arranged themselves in such order. The timber could not dance, cut and squared, out of the forest, nor the marble meet it, hewn and polished, from the quarry. The house therefore must have had a builder. We apply the same argument, a fortiori, to the case of the world, and its Maker, God; and Tully, if I remember right, makes no scruple to assert, that he who denies his assent to it does not deserve the name of a man. This is the argument called a posteriori, and lies open to the common sense of all mankind. Now, then, let us try the sincerity of that declaration of yours, that "the question is not con"cerning the being, but the nature of God." For if you controvert this argument, you certainly mean to shake our belief in the existence of a Deity. You must of course attempt to show, that the world might have been as it is, without one; and, if that be the case, you will next defy us to prove that there is one.

TOM. Fiat justitia, ruat cælum. I must stick to truth, let what will come of it. I am not bound to answer for consequences. I must own I look upon the argument to be inconclusive.

TIM. All very well; but why could not you say so at first? What occasion to be mealy-mouthed in an age like this? Now matters are in a train, and we can proceed regularly. What is your objection to the argument? Wherein does it fail?

TOM. It will fail, d'ye see, if there be not an exact similarity in the cases. You will not say, that there is an exact similitude between the universe and a house, or between God and man.

TIM Why really, Tom, I never imagined the world had a door and a chimney, like a house; or that God had hands and feet like a man. Nor is it at all necessary that it should be so, for the strength and validity of the argument, which is plainly and simply this: If stones and trees have not thought and design to form themselves into a house, there must have been some one, who had thought and design, to do it for them; and so, as I said before, a fortiori, with respect to the universe, where the thought and design appear infinitely superior to those required in building a house. We have no occasion to suppose a resemblance of the universe to a house, or of God to man, in every particular.

TOM. "But why select so minute, so weak, so "bounded a principle, as the reason and design of "animals is found to be upon this planet? What

peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the "brain which we call thought, that we must thus "make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it upon all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion""" TM. It is not "our partiality in our own favour "that presents it to us upon all occasions," but the necessity of the case. There is no other way of Dialogues, p. 50, 51, 58.

• Ibid. p. 60.

speaking upon the subject, so as to be understood. Knowledge in God and man, however different in degree, or attained in a different manner, is the same in kind, and produces the same effects, so far as relates to our present purpose. The knowledge of God is intuitive and perfect; that of man is by deduction, and is therefore imperfect, either when his premises are false, or when passion and prejudice enter into his conclusion. But wisdom, which consists in fixing upon proper ends, and fitly proportioning means to those ends, is wisdom, in whatsoever object, mode, or degree, it may exist; and there is therefore no illusion, in saying, " every "house is builded by some man, but he that built "all things is God." You speak of thought, reason, or design, as "a little agitation of the brain;" as if you imagined, that Paradise Lost, or the Advancement of Learning, might at any time be produced by simmering a man's brains over the fire. Certainly an author cannot compose without brains, heart, liver, and lungs; but I am of opinion something more than all four must have gone to the composition even of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. "Minute, weak, and bounded, as this

principle of reason and design is found to be in "the inhabitants of this planet," it can form and frustrate mighty schemes; it can raise and subvert empires; it can invent and bring to perfection a variety of arts and sciences; and in the hands of some very worthy gentlemen of my acquaintance, it can set itself up against all that is called God, and revile