The newspapers the past few days have been telling us some of the things that have happened in the past and, of course, we have hindsight now to know some of the things that have gone about this U.S. entry.

I think all of us are just as anxious to bring all of our boys home just as quickly as possible. It is interesting to note that in 1954 the French were defeated and President Eisenhower was asked to send U.S. troops to replace the French and on the advice of General Ridgeway, refused.

It is true that President Eisenhower did have 600 U.S. advisers in Vietnam when he left office. President Kennedy thought it best to escalate so he increased the U.S. forces 30 times.

President Johnson believed it necessary to send more U.S. troops so he escalated apparently 30 times, 30 times 18,000 to 540,000.

Now when President Nixon took office he was asked by General Westmoreland for 200,000 more troops. But he rejected it but started to bring boys home.

To date, 300,000 boys have been brought home and currently he is bringing home 19,000 a month.

Now they claim it will be 131,000 U.S. boys in Vietnam by December 1. But some people claim that after the October 3 elections that maybe President Nixon's request might greatly accelerate.

President Nixon has been very firm that the U.S. prisoners of war must be protected.

Now it would seem to me that if Vietnam was really smart they would release U.S. prisoners immediately which would practically enable President Nixon to bring our troops home and turn the war over to the Vietnamese.

I don't know too much about this business, the administration has had information that we haven't had, but I think all of us are just as hopeful as you are that we get out of this war just as quickly as possble even though the fatalities have been dropped from about 500 to 600 a week to about an average of 25, 35 a week now, even one is too

many.

I think we should all work together and stop criticizing, try to work together and do the best job we know how and get out of Vietnam just as quickly as we can.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Walley.

Thank you very much, Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am enormously grateful to you for holding these hearings. I think you deserve great credit. Congress and the House is in your debt for doing it.

I also would like to suggest this, that you really take a careful, slow, deliberate look at the past, and at what Congress can do.

I think that this subcommittee has the chance to make genuine history that will go down in the books for a long period of time and to do it on the side of decency and justice and fairness and equity to

every one.

I would hope that with all deliberate speed you achieve a goal of making a congressional contribution to terminate the longest war that the United States has ever been involved in.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Congressman Rosenthal, for your fine contribution here today.

Our next witness is Congressman Robert McClory, Republican of Illinois.

He was first elected to Congress in 1962 and appointed to the Committee on the Judiciary. Congressman McClory is the primary sponsor of House Concurrent Resolution 334 and we will be pleased to hear you testify on the resolution at this time.

I might say to the other members that are here, that we apologize for the delay. We will try to speed it along.

We welcome you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MCCLORY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry?

I note that the proceedings are being recorded and I assume that is with your permission. I would like to have the agency or the individual identified so I would know who was making the record.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Who is recording? That is in violation of the rules. AN INDIVIDUAL. AS I walked in I asked the man at the door and he said it wasn't.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It is a violation of the rules and I ask you to stop. Mr. McCLORY. I might say that I am in strong support of the right of privacy, and I am particularly opposed to private eavesdropping. That is why I made the inquiry.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I agree with you.

Mr. MCCLORY. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to testify on behalf of House Concurrent Resolution 334 on which 20 of our colleagues have joined with the hope of providing some impetus for our President and negotiators in Paris to bring an early and complete termination of our military involvement in South Vietnam.

These hearings are very timely, Mr. Chairman. We have just concluded debate on several attempts to cut off funds for American troops in Indochina after the end of this calendar year.

In discussing the Nedzi-Whalen and other such amendments, I stated my opinion that while Congress shares responsibility for finding ways to end this tragic war, it is preferable at this time to meet the problem directly and deliberately.

Mr. Chairman. House Concurrent Resolution 334 provides for withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam by November 30, 1971. It expresses our opinion that American involvement in Vietnam can indeed be ended before Christmas of this year, and that in order to bring this about, three preconditions must be met.

First, it goes without saying that a cease-fire is a sine qua non to the ending of any form of hostilities.

Second, by agreeing to withdraw all U.S. forces by November, we might hope to convince the Government of North Vietnam to release all American prisoners by September 1.

I am not persuaded that precedent is on the side of those who insist that all military involvement must cease before prisoners of war can be returned. As a matter of fact, history has shown that in previous

conflicts involving American forces prisoners of war have, in fact, been exchanged while the hostilities have gone on.

Furthermore, what better way for North Vietnam to insure that all American forces depart on schedule than by returning those prisoners we are morally obligated to redeem.

Third, Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that many people throughout the world would have the President of the United States name the date by which all American forces will be withdrawn, it seemed reasonable to me to suggest that all other belligerents-North Vietnam included-likewise agree to withdraw their troops by the same date. It goes without saying that the greatest burden would be on the United States from the sheer force of logistics.

Section 2 of House Concurrent Resolution 334 expresses the sense of Congress that, once all prisoners have been returned, all U.S. forces are to withdraw to the perimeters of those cities and military installations to be designated by the President. The purpose of this proviso is to establish a withdrawal cease-fire-in contrast to an in-place ceasefire. Furthermore, also, it is intended to avoid cease-fire violations. This confinement to certain specified enclaves would also demonstrate our good faith and our sincere intention to remove American forces from combat in South Vietnam.

In section 3, my cosponsors and I are suggesting that many of the substantive questions which are an inevitable outgrowth of this war should be referred to the United Nations. I would emphasize, however, that by passing this resolution Congress would only be expressing its corporate opinion that such a disposition of responsibility would be desirable.

Also, Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that section 4 of House Concurrent Resolution 334 is merely a restatement of a constitutional truth that the President's duties as Commander-in-Chief and his power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate cannot be abridged.

Mr. Chairman, to be totally withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of November would certainly be a monumental task, but I am convinced that such speedy withdrawal from that bloody conflict is within the realm of possibility.

Mr. Chairman, one of the revealing disclosures to come out of the recent printing of classified documents relating to the war in Southeast Asia was the ranking of American objectives in that part of the world. First, on the list was the assertion by an Assistant Secretary of Defense that our goal was "70 percent-to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat." Mr. Chairman, I was not aware that this was so, but now that it has been made public I am powerfully convinced that we have more than fulfilled our obligation.

Mr. Chairman and fellow colleagues, it is my opinion that a nation as great as America might better survive a humiliating defeat than a shameful victory; however, my cosponsors and I are not suggesting that we subject ourselves to a humiliating defeat. We are saying, though, that to continue this war with all the military might it would take to win it would lead to a shameful victory-and we cannot stand that.

In order for the people of South Vietnam to remain independent of the tyranny and inhumanity of a Communist dictatorship, the people of South Vietnam-themselves-will have to win the victory.

It is my hope and expectation that South Vietnam will, indeed, continue the struggle to remain free of those who would oppress and subjugate her.

Mr. Chairman, the American people are a peace-loving people, and they have become offended by this war which has cost so many human lives and shattered so many more. Therefore, I ask you to report favorably on House Concurrent Resolution 334, and thereby lend the authority of your voices to the proposition that this war has persisted long enough, and that the provisions of this measure offer a reasonable, honorable and possible method for effecting a final termination of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam war.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that at this point in the record, the statement of the Honorable Albert H. Quie, Representative from the First District of Minnesota may be inserted.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection that will be done. Thank you very much, Mr. McClory.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. ALBERT H. QUIE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to submit a statement on behalf of H. Con. Res. 334 which proposes a November 30, 1971, date for total withdrawal from South Vietnam provided that three conditions are met which are of the utmost importance to the complete resolution of the Vietnam war and the future peace of the whole of Indochina.

Many people of my home district have written to me and spoken to me of their great anxiety with regard to the unending duration of this war in South Viet nam. The people of my district and this nation want Congress to act to help bring this war to an early end.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution is designed so that it does not remove incentives for Hanoi to negotiate seriously; it does not tie the President's hands; it does not eclipse the possibilities of a favorable outcome in Vietnam; and it should not imperil the future of the South Vietnamese government or state. The importance of this resolution is not just in the fact that it provides a sense of Congress which will coalesce public sentiment divided over the issue of the Vietnam war, but in the fact that it allows the Congress to unite with the President for the one purpose of ending the Vietnam war swiftly, justly, and safely.

The President has announced his intention to end the Vietnam war at the earliest possible date, and he has been working toward this goal. From a troop level of 543,000 men when he took office, President Nixon will have reduced American troop numbers in Vietnam to 184,000 by December 1 of this year. And he has continued this withdrawal in spite of the lack of progress in Paris.

The President proposed in October of 1970: (1) an internationally-supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina; (2) the establishment of an Indochina Peace Conference; (3) negotiation for an agreed timetable for complete withdrawal of all United States forces on the basis of North Vietnamese reciprocity and international verification; (4) a fair political settlement reflecting the will of the South Vietnamese people and ali political forces in South Vietnam; and (5) the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war by both sides. The President has made withdrawal from South Vietnam contingent upon the release of American prisoners of war; yet, Hanoi has yet to release a complete list of names of these prisoners of war.

This situation is all too reminiscent of the situation in Korea in 1951-1953. We would do well to remember the tactics of the North Koreans and Chinese. They were all too ready to take back their men from the prisoner-of-war camps of the South, even if these men did not wish to return to them. And on the other hand, they took delight in a game of not releasing news of Allied prisoners of war in the North.

Hanoi has at least been honest when speaking about the prisoners of war. It has told us that even if we fir a date for total withdrawal (meaning, according to the proposals they set forth in September of 1970, that South Vietnam be left

defenseless and virtually in Hanoi's control), they will then only begin to discuss the question of prisoners of war.

Using these facts as preface, this resolution sets about not to condemn the President or to usurp his Constitutional authority, but to aid him by providing him with the consensus necessary in order to represent American objectives honestly and American public opinion in its broadest scope.

It is quite obvious that Hanoi is not at the present negotiating seriously, and one reason is because of the vituperation and invective which flow against the President from the floors of the House and Senate and from the public platforms. It is not that Congress and its Members should be yes-men to this or to any other Administration, but the issue of the Vietnam war is an American problem. It is a problem that is common to us all-one that can only be solved by working as a unit. As long as Hanoi expects that the Congress will go contrary to the President as the chief executor of foreign affairs, it will never deal seriously. This resolution is of the nature of what the President has stated as his objective-a just peace-and what the Congress has shown as its desire-an imminent peace and total withdrawal.

This resolution proposes that American troops be withdrawn on November 30 of this year, provided that (1) a total cease-fire be established between the parties involved, to commence no later than August 15, 1971, under the supervision of a United Nations military observer group; (2) all American prisoners of war held in Indochina are returned no later than September 1, 1971, under the supervision of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; and (3) the Government of North Vietnam and all other governments with military forces in South Vietnam likewise commit themselves to withdrawing their forces to the date certain of November 30, 1971, this mutual withdrawal to be supervised by a United Nations military observer group.

Hanoi stated that there had to be a date of American withdrawal. This resolution proposes November 30 of this year, but only on the condition that the provisions enumerated in the resolution are met. This proposal places on Hanoi the burden for action to bring about peace. It provides the President with the necessary tools of initiative on our part and Congressional support to facilitate and encourage negotiations and gain the release of American prisoners of war. This proposal takes the form of a resolution so that it does not on the one hand clear up the uncertainties of Congressional opinion only to propagate the uncertainties of proper Legislative-Executive balance on the other. This resolution neither snatches from the President's hands his prerogative which emanates from the Constitution as chief executor of foreign affairs nor attempts to tie his hands with regard to the negotiations in Paris. Nor does the resolution limit American initiative in the light of future developments in Southeast Asia or Paris.

This resolution will not undermine the freedom of choice for South Vietnam, and, in its full effect, this resolution could eliminate any pending considerations as to why a residual force might have to be kept in that area of the globe.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution is an expression of the desire of the American people, a record of Congressional feelings and objectives, and a message to the President of what these are. This resolution gives the President the backing he needs to deal successfully with Hanoi and provides that synthesis of Congressional and public opinion necessary to do this and to end the war in Vietnam quickly.

Mr. du Pont?

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two points, Mr. McClory.

First of all in your resolution, subsection (2), beginning at line 2 on page 2, you talk about one of the preconditions of provisos being the return of all American prisoners of war.

Nowhere in your resolution does it appear to say that we shall have an obligation or the South Vietnamese shall have an obligation to return their prisoners of war; also, and I assume that you mean that there would be an exchange because you refer to it down on line 21 as an exchange.

Mr. McCLORY. You are talking about the United States returning North Vietnamese prisoners?