I do know this: Now that America is there, if we do what many of our very sincere critics think we should do, if we withdraw from Vietnam and allow the enemy to come into Vietnam and massacre the civilians there by the millions, as they would, let me say that... America is finished insofar as the peacekeeper in the Asian world is concerned.

Mark those words "peacekeeper in the Asian world." In them is the core of the mistaken assumptions which guide our foreign policy, I believe. They reflect a long standing national attitude that America is the receptacle, the protector, and the disseminator of liberty and freedom.

In 1821, on the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, John Quincy Adams told the Nation:

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers.

Of course, in 1821 ours was a weak Nation, and Mr. Adams continued:

But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.

Today, we have the strength to destroy monsters-and where they do not exist, we create them. We intervene in a civil conflict in Vietnam so that the South Vietnamese may have the benefit of self-determination, no matter what price they pay for what we want them to have.

Under the guise of our role as protector of freedom, much of our foreign policy is justified. The difficulty is the way in which we define that freedom and the compromises we condone in the name of stability for the sake of that some time future when the democratic process will replace the dictatorships we support today.

So whatever coloration the administration chooses to cast upon its actions, it is not peacekeeping which is afflicting the peoples of Southeast Asia. It is war, pure and simple.

In the last year, finally, significant congressional debate on the war and on foreign policy premises and implications inherent in our involvement in Southeast Asia finally began to build up. This was debate which I and a few others first opened years ago, when the deaths were still few and optimism for a quick resolution still feasible for some. At that time, when I voted against the first supplemental appropriation bill for the war, I said, on May 5, 1965:

The situation in South Vietnam is not simply a case of aggression from North Vietnam. There is no doubt that North Vietnam is aiding the guerrillas in the South. This fight, however, is also an internal struggle which has been created in part because of the social and political conditions within South Vietnam. In short, it is a political as well as a military effort. The response to the threat in Vietnam has been overwhelmingly military, as was the response of the French in Indochina and Algeria. The population in the countryside does not support the Government of South Vietnam; and it is not a stable government. We cannot bomb people into democracy, nor can we bomb people into negotiations.

At unofficial congressional hearings on Vietnam, which I held on August 12-13, 1965, in New York City, I said:

We are told that we are in the war. If it continues it is likely to be a long war, a frustrating war, and an increasingly cruel war. Gas and napalm have already been used and atrocities increased. Villages whose support is sought by both sides have become casualties.

There is no satisfaction for me that my prophecies then have come to reality since. But there is real hope in that the debate of a few of us has grown to become the debate of the majority of Americans.

So, first, this debate must be continued, and it must be conducted at every opportunity. This debate must occupy the Congress, and it must occupy the country. The voices of the public must be heard-and I would point out that the latest Gallup poll reveals that 73 percent of the American public now favors withdrawal at the latest by December 31, 1971. We have turned the rhetoric around from the early days, when the proponents of the war spoke of victory. Now even the administration disavows a military victory-at least in terms of its rhetoric. By increased public pressure, it can be made to forswear as well the actions which reveal that it continues to seek a military solution-its public statements notwithstanding.

Second, the Congress, buttressed by public pressure, must finally exercise its powers. The Constitution has placed in the Congress the authority to declare war. It has never done so. Yet, admittedly, it has approved, over the protests and votes of only a few of us, funds to fight the war in Southeast Asia. In doing so, it has abdicated its responsibilities. It has lain supine, surrendering its authority and its constitutional mandate to executive fiat.

These hearings offer an opportunity to reverse this process. This committee can report out legislation such as the Vietnam Disengagement Act, of which I am a sponsor-bringing an end to the war.

Now, I realize that the problem of prisoners of war-a very real problem-does exist. However, it just does not make sense to argue, as the administration does, that U.S. forces will remain in South Vietnam until the prisoners are released. Our continued presence only insures their continued imprisonment, as well as does it insure the addition of more men to the captured and missing in action lists.

Third, we must work to defeat every appropriation bill which provides money for the war. Sometime this fall, the fiscal year 1972 appropriations bill for the Department of Defense will be before the House. All moneys in that legislation for the war must be defeated. The affirmative support of that end by this committee can significantly help in achieving that end.

Fourth, the negotiations in Paris must be pursued vigorously. There is good reason to believe that a negotiated settlement is possible. The North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front have, in effect, made clear that in return for setting a date of withdrawal all prisoners of war will be released. Thus far, the administration has failed to encourage or pursue such avenues. I say it must.

The final answer is so starkly simple, yet so tragically remote. We must have peace. Southeast Asia must have peace. We have fought a misguided war for mistaken ends. We have exacted a price which cannot be repaid-ever. Now-finally-we must stop. We must have peace.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee stands adjourned until 2 p.m.

tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the following day, Wednesday, June 30, 1971.)

LEGISLATION ON THE INDOCHINA WAR

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 30, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:20 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee begins its fifth day of hearings into resolutions and bills relating to the war in Indochina.

I think I can speak for my colleagues on the subcommittee when I say that the hearings thus far have been very useful to us in our deliberations over ways to bring the tragic conflict in Indochina to a conclusion. There is still, I suspect, a lively disagreement among us over whether a date certain resolution passed by the Congress is the best manner to speed the end of our involvement.

But in virtually all other areas, particularly in the desire to see the war end as expeditiously as possible, we are in substantial agreement. We all want the war to end, we all want the killing of both Asians and Americans to stop, and we all want to find a way to make sure American prisoners of war return to their loved ones here in America. We were scheduled to have five Members of Congress testify today, but Congressmen Harrington and Stratton found other engagements more pressing. Therefore, we will hear from Congressmen Fraser and Keith.

First we have our distinguished colleague, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Honorable Donald Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota. Mr. Fraser is now chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, and is doing an outstanding job on that, as he does in all his work in the Congress.

Mr. Fraser has been opposed to the war in Indochina for many years, and I am sure his testimony will be helpful to this subcommittee. I am glad to welcome you here this afternoon.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. FRASER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. FRASER. Thank you.

First, I want to thank the chairman and the members for permitting me to testify.

Second, I want to thank you for holding these hearings. I think these are the first formal hearings held on the subject of Vietnam policy

held by the committee or any of its subcommittees since the war began. As you will learn shortly from my statement, I am not going to try to elaborate the reasons why I think we should get out, but simply to urge one particular proposal on you.

One of the most urgent tasks facing Congress is the reestablishment of constituent belief in a viable congressional system of oversight. Clearly, in relation to the conduct of the Indochina war, many of our constituents feel that Congress as an institution, and Congressmen as individuals, have failed to fulfill clear constitutional obligations.

At this very moment we need accurate, hard information on what is actually happening in Vietnam. We need to know whether or not Vietnamization actually has a chance of succeeding, or is simply a public relations ploy; whether or not the South Vietnamese military is capable of maintaining and using sophisticated equipment if we turn it over to them; and what the dangers are to the U.S. troops who remain while the South Vietnamese take over their own defense.

In short, we need to determine the reality of what we are asking the American people to support in the name of Vietnamization.

To this end, I am requesting that this committee bring before it as a witness Col. David H. Hackworth, a veteran with 25 years in the Army and 512 years' combat experience in Vietnam.

Colonel Hackworth has recently submitted his resignation from the Army and is in Saigon finishing his tour of duty. He is possibly one of the most decorated officers on active duty. He holds two Distinguished Service Crosses, nine Silver Stars, nine Bronze Stars for valor, four Army commendation medals for valor, eight Purple Hearts, and has commanded 11 companies and three battalions.

His last assignment was as senior adviser to the commander of the 44th Special Tactical Zone, a four-province area in the Mekong Delta, which is the richest and most heavily populated area of Vietnam. He has worked all over South Vietnam, both as an adviser to the South Vietnamese and as a U.S. troop commander, and he has stated publicly, contrary to views expressed by many senior Army officials, that the war is irredeemably lost.

Although I have no idea whether or not Colonel Hackworth's perceptions on the origins or the course of U.S. involvement in Vietnam coincide with those of us who have been critical of U.S. war policies over the past few years, I feel that we urgently need the quality of the information he can provide us. For too long, congressional analysis of the war has been based on military handouts. Congress cannot continue to make judgments on the basis of third- or fourth-hand information.

If we are asked to support the President's plan for withdrawal from Vietnam based on a policy of Vietnamization, we need to hear from those who have seen Vietnamization in operation and who feel, as Colonel Hackworth expressed it, that Vietnamization is a public relations man's dream.

He has publicly stated that the entire organization of the South Vietnamese army has been wrong, that it has not been designed to fight the guerrilla fighter, and that the United States has given the Vietnamese a lot of equipment that they are simply incapable of using and maintaining.

He has also predicted that by late 1973, "we'll see the enemy demonstrating the same power as he did in 1964-65" when government forces were losing a battalion a week.

He has also revealed that a study group from the Pentagon, of which he was a member from 1967-68, concluded that 15 to 20 percent of United States and South Vietnamese casualties were the result of friendly fire.

If we are to continue voting funds for the winding down of the war via Vietnamization, it is my opinion that we need full disclosure of what the situation really is in Vietnam. I have been told that Colonel Hackworth has been instructed by the Army not to speak out further on the declining situation within the South Vietnamese military.

As a self-governing people, we need to know whether this is a war we should have fought and must now go on fighting. If the Army feels the need to prevent Colonel Hackworth from making his views public, then in the interest of the public's right to know, this committee should serve a subpena to Colonel Hackworth so that he might appear before this congressional hearing. I appear today to request the committee to do so.

As this subcommittee knows, I have favored withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam at the earliest possible date. I hope the subcommittee will report a bill or resolution which will have that as its purpose.

To the extent that the subcommittee wishes to develop a factual record with respect to the war, it is essential that this subcommittee, along with the full committee, actively seek out those who can offer views based on first-hand experience which contrasts with the official line of the U.S. Government. Only in this way can the Foreign Affairs Committee discharge its responsibilities to the American people. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Fraser. I certainly concur with you that Colonel Hackworth is possibly, if not probably, the most decorated officer on active duty. From what we have read about him, he possesses outstanding credentials to discuss the point you have so ably made today.

I will be happy to instruct our staff to contact Colonel Hackworth. I think it is a splendid suggestion on an individual whose viewpoint this subcommittee should become familiar.

Mr. FRASER. You may have some problem getting him here, but you can cross that bridge when you come to it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Right. I know your position generally, Mr. Fraser, on the point which you have made before this subcommittee. I concur that it is valid and would be useful.

Mr. du Pont?

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fraser, I would like to associate myself, first of all, very strongly with the second paragraph of your comments about the need that we have for hard information as to what is happening. In my brief tenure in the Congress I have been working to develop such information.

As I am sure you know, it is not easy to develop, but if we are going to have to make the decisions that we were elected to make, we have to have a lot better information than we have had.

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