Mr. FRASER. Let me say first of all, I don't know what Colonel Hackworth would say if he is called, and would not want to endorse everything he would say as gospel.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Basically, he said Vietnamization can't work and we know it can't work, and the war continues to be fought the wrong way.

Mr. FRASER. Let me touch on that. The real point I am trying to make is that I think it is essential, and I think it is true of our committee generally, not just the subcommittee, to deliberately seek out those qualified by experience who are prepared to challenge the conventional wisdom or accepted policies.

I think we have to have that kind of discipline of challenging our own beliefs. But to set that aside, I regret that we did not seek to negotiate an end to this war a long time ago. My own view is that our capacity to negotiate anything except the return of prisoners and the safe withdrawal of our troops is about all that is left; that is, we are each day in less of a position to bargain, and I think that the only thing that we can hope to bargain for realistically is the safe withdrawal of our troops and the return of our prisoners of war.

I think we can do that; that is, if the President decided that he wanted to get out by the end of this year, I have not the slightest doubt that he could find ways. Either by negotiation or just through military redeployments, he could effect the safe removal of our troops. I have never believed that to be a problem.

I don't like to impugn the President's motives. His conjecture on my part, but I must say that I have a feeling or belief that this President is doing about what the other Presidents have done. They have temporized with the choices and not faced up to them. They have temporized with them in the context of the domestic public opinion as they think it exists today, and as they think it may exist after the

events.

This is one of the tragedies of the way we conduct American policy. I really think that if the President faced up to this issue and didn't worry about the 1972 elections, he would then conclude that it would be well to move out.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. WOLFF. Wouldn't it seem logical that with 260,000, or whatever the number is that we have there now, it would be much easier to protect the withdrawal than when we are down to 50,000?

Mr. GALLAGHER. If we brought them out immediately, it probably would be easier. But at some point there will be 50,000 left, or 30,000 or 20,000.

Mr. FRASER. I don't think that North Vietnam would have an interest in attacking troops that were clearly destined to leave. I can't conceive of that serving any interest of theirs. I would, in any event, think that we could negotiate that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraser.

Our next witness today is Congressman Hastings Keith, Republican, of Massachusetts.

Mr. Keith came to Congress in 1959 with many of our distinguished colleagues, and he has made a record of conscientious and dedicated service.

It is a pleasure to welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Keith. We will be pleased to hear your testimony at this point.

I might say that Mr. Keith has also gained firsthand experience in Vietnam as a member of a congressional study team that went there and came back with an excellent report.

STATEMENT OF HON. HASTINGS KEITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. KEITH. Thank you. I am particularly pleased that you made reference to the report which was written upon our return from Asia about a year ago.

I have a prepared statement which I would be happy to read. It is one that has been a long time in my mind. Or, I could submit it for the record and paraphrase.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Whichever you would like.

Mr. KEITH. I would like to start, if I may, to read it. If it is helpful, I would appreciate your interposing questions from time to time.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee and to address myself to its deliberations into how we can best extricate our Nation from our involvement in and about Vietnam. In military tactics, a withdrawal movement is generally recognized as one of the most difficult of maneuvers. Its success or failure in Southeast Asia will influence not only the fate of all Pacific nations, but of all Americans for generations to come. As a Congress, we must contribute, if we can, to the debate and help find and support a course of action that will bring peace for this generation.

Throughout my 12 years in the Congress, I have found abundant cause and precedent to support our President in Vietnam and in other matters of foreign affairs. I have done so in loyalty to our country, faith in the executive branch, and acceptance of Harry S. Truman's admonition that, in foreign affairs, politics must stop at the water's edge.

This does not mean that I have not been concerned that Congress has not involved itself more deeply in foreign affairs. Nor does this mean that I have not been concerned that the executive branch has failed to provide us with the necessary intelligence with which we might better exercise our constitutional responsibility to share in foreign policy determination and decisions.

A year ago, after participating in the factfinding mission of the Select Committee on U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia, I wrote views supplementary to that committee's final report. Among them were these:

Complete and factual information on our overall military posture and national foreign policy strategy is essential if Congress is to vote intelligently on these matters of grave national and international

concern.

The Tonkin Gulf resolution which made possible commitment of significant numbers of U.S. combat forces to the Asian mainland resulted from very brief and inadequate debate: a debate which failed to bring out what such a course of action would mean to us in the years

to come.

In recent years, congressional rules and customs have inhibited extensive foreign policy debate; but that appears to be changing, with

Congress becoming more involved in foreign policy and beginning to discuss its details in full.

Against this background, heightened by unauthorized publication of the "Pentagon Study on the Origins of the Vietnam War," I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for calling these hearings.

These Pentagon papers have pointedly revealed that, in connection with the Vietnam problem, the executive branch did not provide Congress with information essential to intelligent exercise of its foreign affairs responsibility. This revelation has provided abundant cause to speculate that, had such hearings as these been held a decade ago, we might well have avoided the national tragedy to which our Vietnam involvement has brought us.

It is, however, not my purpose to attempt to assign blame; to do so would be to compound the tragedy and render a great disservice. Our country already suffers enough division, enough distrust of leaders, and enough disrespect for our system.

Our purpose, then, must be: How best to pick up the pieces, cement the differences, reassure our people, restore unity, get out of Vietnam, and assure peace abroad and tranquility at home. In short, we need reconciliation of peoples in order that we have the reconciliation of governments from which, hopefully, will come a world at peace.

We in the Congress must summon the bipartisanship essential to the statesmanship required to achieve these worthy goals.

We, as Americans, must continue to be tolerant of other Americans so that we can expect tolerance of the other nations of the world. While maintaining the integrity of our democracy and our free enterprise system, we must seek to understand the views and ideologies of others. We must purposefully seek to find areas where we can work together effectively, not only to move money and manpower, but to increase areas of personal and national understanding.

Even while remaining in Vietnam, we are discussing joint space ventures, strategic arms limitation, and Middle Eastern peace with the Soviet Union. Even while remaining in Vietnam, we are relaxing tensions with mainland China. Consider, gentlemen, what we might be able to achieve in such critical matters once we have removed ourselves from the Vietnam conflict.

This is not to suggest that I have altered my longstanding belief that, in dealing with established adversaries, unilateral action is neither the prudent nor proper course; quite the contrary, I continue to believe that for us to withdraw from South Vietnam without providing South Vietnam with the means of self-defense would invite greater tragedy for Southeast Asia, and I continue to believe that unilateral disarmament would invite disaster for the world.

I am aware that, while we must forever negotiate from a position of established strength, we do possess that strength, and we do possess the means of monitoring sensible, workable agreements based on a proper quid pro quo.

It is our possession of such capabilities which has made possible our real progress in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. It is our possession of such capabilities which has made possible our real progress in President Nixon's program of planned and orderly withdrawal of our forces from South Vietnam.

Gentlemen, the League of Nations failed, as we knew, and the United Nations has certainly been inadequate; but I am thoroughly con

vinced that we must keep on trying to make way for attainment of world peace through world law-the ultimate of the "parliament of man."

I am convinced that the vitality of this ultimate condition of the world increases in direct proportion to increases in improved internationalization of some of the world's resources. For example, in oceanography, satellite communications, and in science and technology in general.

It is, of course, perfectly well established that the era of international living has long since arrived. What a wonder it is, for example, that, as a Member of Congress, I can move from Capitol Hill business this evening to my assignment as a congressional adviser at a Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, and be back in my district in Massachusetts in time to participate in Fourth of July observances on Monday.

As we commemorate our national birth in freedom, as we contemplate a world of peace, we can use the resolution of the Southeast Asian problem as a major building block in the long road to furthering the cause of freedom.

As I stated upon my return from my participation in the congressional factfinding mission to Indochina a year ago, I am convinced that the Nixon doctrine of shared responsibility is accepted by Asian leaders. I am equally convinced, however, that a major gap exists in the realistic applicability of the logic of the Nixon doctrine; the gap being that an effective regional defense organization is 5 to 10 years away. Yet, U.S. combat forces will and should be out of the area long before that period.

Some of you gentlemen may recall that on June 17, during the debate on the Nedzi-Whalen amendment, I proposed an amendment which would call for the international commission to do the following:

Supervise an agreed-upon cease-fire in Vietnam.

Supervise arrangements for release and exchange of all prisoners of war.

Supervise South Vietnamese elections that would assure participation by all South Vietnamese individuals, parties, and groups. These elections would include persons who had supported, or served with, the Vietcong provided they renounce violence and are willing to abide by the elections results.

If such elections should bring about a government other than the incumbent government, the commission, to the extent necessary, would have the responsibility of facilitating the transition period.

As some of you may also recall, I did not attempt to introduce that amendment because the Parliamentarian advised me that it would not be germane to the Nedzi-Whalen amendment. I do submit, most respectfully, that such a proposal is germane to your task of considering how best to end the war in Indochina.

I do so with the reminder that, in connection with the Nedzi-Whalen debate, our distinguished colleague from Illinois, Mr. John Anderson, made the point that the Foreign Affairs Committee would be the proper forum for consideration of my proposal.

My suggestion, gentlemen, is that peace can best come to Southeast Asia through an international sharing of the problem. This must be

gin with recognition, by the nations of Southeast Asia themselves, that they hold prime responsibility for that peace and its potential stability that could result.

I believe that, if such a commission is not established, our moving out of Vietnam could create a vacuum into which dissident, subversive, and other hostile elements could move. Such elements, if successful, could destroy the possibility of realizing the high purposes for which, to date, more than 45,000 American servicemen have given their lives and for which more than 300,000 other American servicemen have been injured, wounded, or maimed.

If you gentlemen should ascertain that there is a possible legislative approach to realization of my proposal, I would respectfully propose that you take it. If that be impractical, I would suggest that provisions be made to note it in your report and for further discussion on the floor of the House and in the parliaments of other interested nations.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Keith.

I am very happy to have you with us this afternoon. This subcommittee, as well as the full committee, has long been aware of the outstanding work you have done in the search for a rule of law in the international community.

In connection with your amendment calling for an international commission, who do you believe should be part of that international commission? Should it be within the United Nations, or another international commission?

Mr. KEITH. I recall on an earlier trip to Vietnam discussing this with Cabot Lodge. His frustration was that the United Nations had not taken a more positive role in this. I am afraid that nothing that we can say or do here would at this time make it possible for them to take it up.

There is in existence a group called together in, I would say, about April of last year by Mr. Malik, who is the Foreign Minister of Indonesia. They had 15 or 16 nations that met in Indonesia, in that area at any rate, for the purpose of discussing their response to this problem. I think Mr. Malik sort of hoped that they might take some part. This was their response to the enunciation of the Nixon doctrine.

In my discussions with him, and with the Prime Minister in Singapore, and with people in Thailand. I found that they were unwilling to; but they nevertheless do have an organization which is now called, I believe, "the Jakarta Three." It is Malaysia, Japan, and Indonesia. That would be the ideal, in my view. But we are not going to have that ideal because it would not be bought by the North Vietnamese. So I think in your report you might make some reference to the role that could be played, not only by the Jakarta Three and the other nations they represent, but by North Vietnam, China and Russia. The latter two who are the ones who, perhaps behind the scenes, have been sympathetic to, or at least in one way or another have supported the North Vietnamese.

The essential ingredient is that these be truly free elections, and that those who do participate agree to abide by them. We don't want to have a repetition of what took place in Warsaw in 1947 when our Ambassador there resigned in protest over the lack of free elections.