If we could have a commission made up primarily of Southeast Asia nations, but participated in as well by the big powers. I would have no qualms about the participation by the Communist countries. Mr. GALLAGHER. I think it would be a fine idea if such a commission could be established. Obviously, as we look down the path, there is going to be a great need for such an international body to assume responsibilities of a referee in some of the developing states where problems exist and will continue to exist for some time. I think it is also very sad, and one of the other tragedies of Vietnam, that the United Nations has never been able to take an active role or has refused to take an active role. Many times the various administrations have called upon them and found that the phone was never answered. Mr. KEITH. If the chairman will permit, I think that is one of the reasons why the Congress is looking less favorably upon our support of the U.N. role in an international society. Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes; I fully agree with you. That is a very significant point. Mr. du Pont? Mr. DU PONT. No questions. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Wolff? Mr. WOLFF. I just want to ask whether or not the commission that you would like to set up for the elections that are to be held in October or future elections that will be held? Mr. KEITH. I think it would be unrealistic to expect such a development in time to supervise the October elections. At the time that I first conceived this it might have been. But I would say that if we have a continuing presence there after these elections-and there appears to be a great urgency domestically and worldwide in further hastening our withdrawal-we could agree to withdraw immediately upon creation of such commission with elections to follow in a proper timespan to make the necessary preparations. I would think that, perhaps, a year would be a proper timespan. Mr. WOLFF. Certainly I feel that the recommendations that have been made by the gentleman are very valid ones and deserve very serious consideration by this committee. I thank you. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Whalley. Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you, Congressman Keith. I think the international commission would be great. It has puzzled me many times why the 126 nations of the United Nations have not been able to get positive action in Vietnam. Did you have in mind stop fighting immediately on the creation of a commission? How would you do that unless you had a U.N. force step in? Is that what you had in mind? Mr. KEITHI. Yes, they would have a peacemaking, peacekeeping role. Immediately upon creation of that commission and its being constituted in the way of a military government or civil affairs unit occupying a nation at conclusion of hostilities, the commander of that occupying force would publish a proclamation and the government of that country is in accordance with that proclamation from that point on. That would be the procedure that would be followed. Immediately upon that creation, we would agree to withdraw all of our forces, including our support forces. Mr. WHALLEY. I think it is a good idea, but how would you go about getting this commission immediately? Mr. KEITH. I don't think you could get it immediately, but you could get an agreement to establish it as of a particular date. There have been similar precedents. In other drawn out conflicts not resolved with a victor in the usual sense of the word, provision has been made for an immediate form of administration and government. Mr. WHALLEY. The people of the country apparently were not satisfied with the buildup of from 600 in 1961 to 540,000 in 1969, nor are they apparently satisfied with the withdrawal of 300,000 troops in the past 2 years. They want fast action. Apparently the entire world is pretty much fed up with the war. The idea is great, but how in the world do you get it started quickly? Could we have a special session of the United Nations? Mr. KEITH. If you could get some support for this in the major powers of the United Nations. I doubt that you can. You do have this Jakarta Three from this Indonesian conference. As a continuing organization it could be encouraged to take the international commission idea under advisement, perhaps with economic assistance to the area as contrasted to a unilateral role on our part. In reading my report on our last year's Vietnam visit, you would discover that the Southeast Asian nations have not done their share in the economic assistance that must accompany the military assistance, particularly in the days that are ahead of us. Japan, which could participate in this economically, not militarily, has a great deal to gain by stabilization of this area. I am not really optimistic that this is going to become a reality as a result of my presentation of a case here. But as we and the world. become frustrated with the instability that could come to that area, it is possible that something could trigger the creation of such a commission. As I said in my report, things may get worse before they get better and, if they begin to deteriorate, there may be more willingness by stronger nations of the area to try to save the situation. Mr. WHALLEY. The situation has got so critical that we almost have to try anything. Japan, being the powerful nation it is, could be a tremendous factor if they could be persuaded. Mr. KEITH. In recent months they have been somewhat persuaded to take a much more active economic role. Of course, they cannot take a role militarily. But other nations of the area, such as Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, could play a more significant role. Mr. WHALLEY. I think those nations would be very willing to help, but the bigger nations are again trading because of the war, and watching some of their principal competitors being torn down like we are, through resources, men, and money. These are the countries we seem to have to have. Of course, Japan and Russia could stop the whole thing overnight if they really tried. Mr. KEITH. I am inclined to agree with you on that observation. Mr. WHALLEY. You deserve a lot of thanks for the time and effort you are making. I think the chairman here is hopeful that something will come of it, some thought that had not been developed up until now, that will bring about the rapid conclusion, because it certainly seems to be at a standstill. Mr. KEITH. I don't know whether or not the committee has had any witness comment about the potential role of the Geneva Convention and the possibility of its being reactivated in this area. Mr. GALLAGHER. No; but that again is another one of the areas where we look for hope. Mr. KEITH. I recall that, in talking to our colleague, Mr. MeCloskey, about what might happen if we should be more precipitous in our withdrawal, I asked him what he thought about the Rand report. He said, "What is that?" I said, "Well, the Rand report was one that forecast the possible number of casualties that might occur if the situation deteriorated and the North Vietnamese moved in en masse." He said. "Well, how many casualties were suggested in that report?" I replied, "Somewhere in the vicinity of 100,000." He had not even heard of this. But this committee must deliberate the long-range effects of perhaps, a hundred "Hues." Certainly some of this type of Red massacre operation could be expected if the North Vietnamese moved in. Should that happen, the attitude of other countries and of our own people might change. That, I think, is what prompts Mr. Nixon's more phased withdrawal, rather than the hasty withdrawal for which others have called. Mr. GALLAGHER. This is one of the points that was discussed at some length yesterday Mr. Keith, and one of the points which gives this subcommittee great concern on the fixed withdrawal date. How we can extricate the last remaining troops there without severe casualties, other than relying on the good faith and good intentions of the North Vietnamese, intentions and faith which have not always been very apparent. Mr. Wolff? Mr. WOLFF. I wonder if in talking about hasty retreat, how about Hasting's withdrawal? Mr. KEITH. Watch it, Mr. Wolff. Mr. WOLFF. Would the gentleman agree to the idea of setting up this commission, setting a date for withdrawal, asking a number of the powers to come in and oversee the transitional stage? Mr. KEITH. I hesitate to make a hasty response, but off the top of my head, I would say yes. Mr. WOLFF. I think that might make a lot of sense. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Keith, for a very fine contribution to our deliberations. The subcommittee stands adjourned to the call of the Chair. (Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.) LEGISLATION ON THE INDOCHINA WAR MONDAY, JULY 12, 1971 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:23 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order. I want to welcome you here this afternoon as the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee continues its hearings into bills and resolutions relating to the war in Indochina. The Chair wishes to apologize for the delay; we have a problem on the floor. We will begin rather than keep you waiting, Mr. Secretary and our members will be on the way over. For the past five sessions we have heard from 20 of our fellow Members of the House of Representatives who have offered a wide range of informed opinions and legislative options for our consideration. Personally, I have learned a great deal during the informative and lively discussion with my colleagues and I believe we are reaching the point where the subcommittee can begin to draft a resolution which could fairly reflect the views given us. Several points of agreement have emerged thus far. All of us are united in assuring the release of our prisoners of war. I believe there is a consensus in the Congress that the withdrawal process, begun by the administration, must be irreversible and that if there is a residual force it must not contain American ground troops involved in the fighting. I also sense that everyone, inside and outside the Congress believes that we must actively assert our constitutional responsibilities in a more direct partnership with the executive branch. The remaining questions of some dispute relate to the establishment of a fixed date for total American withdrawal of ground troops, and what role American military support should play in assisting the legally elected government of Saigon in resisting the pressures exerted by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. In addition, how deeply should we be involved in support of the Governments of Laos and Cambodia, both of which have been used by the other side as staging areas for many years and both of which are engaged in direct armed conflict with North Vietnamese forces. To speak to these and other points, we are very pleased to have as our main witness this afternoon the Honorable Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. Green is highly regarded in the Department of State, and I may say in the Congress as well, as a persuasive, experienced, and skilled public servant. I am sure that his presentation today will be enlightening to us and will be very useful to the subcommittee as we continue our deliberation on what is certainly the most important issue of our day. Please begin, Mr. Secretary. Again I apologize. STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHALL GREEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, first of all thank you for your kind remarks. I hope my obituary eventually reads that well. I have not had the advantage and privilege of reading the transcript of the hearings held so far under your chairmanship, I look forward to it. Therefore, what I say in my prepared testimony may not address itself entirely to your concerns although I would gather that some of the things I am about to say are responsive to the points you enumerated as being of special interest. I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, which I would like to read. Mr. Chairman, the subject of this hearing, how to end the war in Vietnam, terminate the U.S. role in the conflict, and bring our prisoners home, is a matter of deepest concern to all of us. U.S. diplomatic representatives, together with those of the Government of Vietnam, have made relentless efforts to achieve a peace settlement during years of difficult negotiations in Paris. The United States is quite prepared to withdraw American forces totally and rapidly from Vietnam as part of an overall peace settlement. Our efforts have been met in Paris with adamant insistence by the other side that we withdraw our forces in such a way as to cripple the ability of the non-Communist South Vietnamese to defend themselves against the Communists, and that we ourselves impose political conditions on the people of Vietnam designed to lead to their domination by the Communist side. We have refused to agree to withdraw to end the war in such a manner. In the absence of progress in Paris toward an acceptable peace settlement, we have engaged in a program for gradual and orderly unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. We are taking our men out as fast as we believe we can consistent with our objective of leaving the South Vietnamese with a reasonable chance to defend themselves. We will speed this withdrawal if we can, but our policy must continue to be guided by this objective, together with the need to obtain the release of our men held prisoner by the other side. As early as May 14, 1969, the President announced a comprehensive program for peace in Vietnam. He has since that time made numerous proposals and sought through a variety of channels to advance the quest for peace. The President's most recent peace proposal was set forth in his address of October 7, 1970. At that time he called for a cease-fire in place throughout Indochina under international supervision; he pledged the withdrawal of the American forces as part of an overall settlement; he asked the Communists to join in a search for a political settlement for South Vietnam that truly meets the aspirations of South |